Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
Elisavet Varnava v. The Police (1975) JSC 1279 Generato dall'IA

Court dismisses appeal against six-month prison sentence for brothel permitting and procuration charges.

Numero d'incarto Elisavet Varnava v. The Police (1975) JSC 1279
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Cipro (CY)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Respinto (Dismissed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The Supreme Court dismissed the appellant's appeal against concurrent six-month imprisonment sentences for permitting a brothel and procuring women. Although the appellant argued the sentence was excessive due to her difficult childhood, divorce, and status as a first-time offender who assisted police, the court found no error in principle. The court held that a deterrent sentence was appropriate given the social conditions and risks to young women, concluding the punishment was not manifestly excessive despite being potentially severe.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

Sections 156(1)(b) and 157(b) of the Criminal Code; The Court of Appeal cannot substitute its own assessment of the right sentence but may intervene only for error in principle or manifestly excessive sentences, where a deterrent term remains appropriate for serious offenses involving social risk.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
Criminal Code provisions Brothel permitting offense Procuration of prostitutes Manifestly excessive sentence Deterrent sentence principle Appeal against sentence First offender circumstances punibilità

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA
Section 156(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154
TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P.; This is an appeal [*1280] against concurrent sentences of six months’ imprisonment which were passed upon the appellant after she had pleaded guilty, on the 17th July,, 1975, to a charge of permitting her premises to be used as a brothel, contrary to section 156(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, Cap.
Section 157(b) of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154
Procuration of women to become common prostitutes - Section 157 (b) of the Criminal Code, Cap.
Generato dall'IA

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Testo completo

[*1279] 1975 September 12

(TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P., A, LOIZOU, MALACHTOS, JJ.)

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Elisavet Varnava,

Appellant,

v.

The Police,

Respondents.

(Criminal Appeal No. 3644).

Criminal Law - Sentence - Six months imprisonment for permitting premises to be used as a brothel and for procuration of women to become common prostitutes - Sections 156 (1) (b) and 157(b) of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154 - Appellant’s personal circumstances - Need for deterrent sentence of imprisonment - Sentence neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive though perhaps severe.

Court of Appeal - Appeal against sentence - Principles on which Court of Appeal intervenes with a sentence imposed by Court below.

Appeal against sentence - See under Court of Appeal11”.

Permitting premises to be used as a brothel - Section

156 (I)(b) of the Criminal Code Cap.

154 - Sentence - See, also, under “Criminal Law”.

Procuration of women to become common prostitutes - Section 157 (b) of the Criminal Code, Cap.

154 Sentence - See, also, under “Criminal Law’.

L. Clerides with A. Xenophontos, for the Appellant.

A. Angelides, for the Respondents.

JUDGMENT

The judgment of the Court was delivered by:-

TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P.; This is an appeal [*1280] against concurrent sentences of six months’ imprisonment which were passed upon the appellant after she had pleaded guilty, on the 17th July,, 1975, to a charge of permitting her premises to be used as a brothel, contrary to section 156(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154, and to two charges of procuration of women to become common prostitutes, contrary to section 157(b) of Cap. 154; she was sentenced on the 14th August, 1975.

Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the above sentences are manifestly excessive and wrong in principle and he has, in support of his contention, emphasized particularly the personal circumstances of the appellant.

It is true that she did have a very unfortunate childhood and family, life and that she is now divorced, having to support her daughter, who is six years old.

The appellant, who is in her early twenties, is a first offender; it is not in dispute that she did not receive any money in relation to the commission of the offences of which she was convicted; furthermore, as was stressed by her counsel, she made a clean breast of everything to the police and assisted them in their investigations

As laid down in many previously decided cases we cannot on appeal substitute our own assessment of the right sentence in the place of that of the trial Court; we can intervene only if there exists good ground for doing so, such as an error in principle or a manifestly excessive sentence. [*1281]

There is nothing before us showing that the sentences imposed on the appellant are wrong in principle: We must say, in this respect, that we agree with the trial judge that in a case of this nature a deterrent sentence of imprisonment was indicated, especially when bearing in mind the difficult social conditions prevailing at present in our country and the consequentially greater risk of being led astray to which young women, such as those who were procured by the appellant, are exposed.

The trial judge appears, from his carefully worded judgment, to have taken duly into account all relevant considerations, including the nature of the offences, the facts of the case and the personal circumstances of the appellant, which were placed before him by, inter alia, a social investigation report. Having carefully considered all that has been said on behalf of the appellant we have come to be of the view that the sentences passed upon her may, perhaps, be severe, but they are definitely not manifestly excessive.

Counsel for the respondents has said that because, in particular, of the personal circumstances of the appellant, we might deem it fit to set her free as from today; this is, obviously, a very humane gesture which we do appreciate fully, but we are of the view that there is no room for such a compassionate approach within the limits of the exercise of our judicial powers in the present case; it is a matter which may, if necessary, be dealt with under the much wider powers of the Executive Branch of the Government, as provided by the Constitution.

For these reasons this appeal is dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.