Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
Artemis Charalambous Kyprianou as administratrix of the estate of Anna Constanti Koutsouki v. Christos Mitsi and Another (1975) JSC 1179 Generato dall'IA

Prior registration of land prevails over later registration when the later purchaser failed to verify title.

Numero d'incarto Artemis Charalambous Kyprianou as administratrix of the estate of Anna Constanti Koutsouki v. Christos Mitsi and Another (1975) JSC 1179
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Cipro (CY)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Accolto (Allowed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The court declared the plaintiff's 1913 land registration valid and voided the defendant's 1954 registration obtained through purchase. The defendant failed to satisfy the court that he conducted reasonable inquiries to verify his vendor's title before purchasing the property. Consequently, the court held that the defendant was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and could not rely on the registration certificate.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

Regn. Act; Registration of Title Act: A subsequent registration of land cannot supersede a prior valid registration if the subsequent purchaser failed to make reasonable inquiries to ascertain the vendor's title and was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
prior registration validity bona fide purchaser without notice reasonable inquiries for title double registration dispute vendor title verification status giuridico anteriore titolo esecutivo per i crediti non contestati iscrizione di un'ipoteca legale
Generato dall'IA

Ti chiedi come si applica questa sentenza alla tua fattispecie?

Analizza questa decisione insieme alla legislazione federale e cantonale, ai commentari e alla giurisprudenza successiva in Legislator AI.

Apri in Legislator →

Testo completo

[*1179] 1973 April 21

(STYLIANIDES, P.D.C.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF LIMASSOL

The Administratrix of the estate of Anna

Constanti Koutsouki i.e. Artemis Charalambous Kyprianou,

Plaintiff,

and

Christos Mitsi & Another,

Defendants.

(Action No. 2325/71).

Immovable Property - Double registration - Whether prior registration can be superseded by registration of later date - Plaintiff obtaining registration in 1913 - Possessing and cultivating property until 1968 - Defendant obtaining registration in 1954 through purchase.

- No prescriptive rights acquired by defendant’s predecessor in title entitling him to registration - Registration in predecessor’s name wrongfully obtained on strength of false village certificate - Latter registration cannot supersede prior registration.

Immovable Property - Bona fide purchaser for value without notice - Purchase of registered title which had been wrongfully obtained - Purchaser making no enquiries before purchase to ascertain rights and interests of vendor which could be ascertained by making reasonable inquiries - Purchaser not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

Double Registration - See under “Immovable Property”.

Purchaser for Value - Bona fide purchaser for value without notice - See under “Immovable Property”.

M. Houry, for the Plaintiff.

B. L. Vassiliades, for the Defendants.

JUDGMENT

The following judgment was delivered by:-

STYLIANIDES, P.D.C.: The dispute in this action [*1180] is over a garden land 2,200 sq, ft in extent, situated within the village of Pano Platres, shown on the D.L.O. map as plots 143 and 497 of Sheet Plan XLVII/II.E.I.E.

Anna Constanti Koutsouki, Orthodoxia Michael (defendant 2), Michael Constanti Vovos, alias Pillaris, Pericles Constanti Koutsouki and the mother-in-law of Christos Mitsis (defendant 1) were the children of Constanti Hj. Michael, late of Platres.

The plaintiff is the administratrix of the estate of her mother, the late Anna Constanti Koutsouki who died on 26/4/62.

Michael Constanti Vovos, alias Pillaris, (hereinafter referred to as ‘Pillaris’), died in 1957 and his sister, Orthodoxia Michael is the administratrix of his estate.

The plaintiff in her capacity as administratrix as aforesaid, raised this action against defendant 1, ChristosMitsis, and the administratrix of the estate of Pillaris.

The plaintiff claims the afore-described garden land by virtue of Regn. No. 1046 of 1913 in the name of her mother and by possession by the said deceased until her death. It is alleged in the Statement of Claim that Regn. No. 3242, which was issued in 1954 in the name of Pillaris and which was transferred in the name of defendant 1, is void as Pillaris had never acquired any right to be registered as owner thereof and the Lands Office neither took into account that the property was already registered in the [*1181] name of Anna Constanti Koutsouki, nor did they notify her of the intended registration in the name of Pillaris. By this action she claims:-

“(i) A declaration that the land at Pano Platres denoted by Registration No. 1046 of 27/10/1913 in the name of the deceased, Anna Constanti Koutsouki, is the exclusive property of her during her lifetime and of her estate after her death”.

“(ii) A declaration that any registration for the above - mentioned land in the name of the defendants or either of them or in the name of the deceased, Michael Constanti Vovos (alias Michael Constanti Koutsouki or ‘Pillari’) is null and void”.

“(iii) An order cancelling any registration for the said land in the name of the defendants or either of them”.

“(iv) An injunction restraining the defendants, their servants and agents from in any my interfering with the above-mentioned land”.

“(v) Damages”.

Defendant 2 on 17/7/71 appeared before a judge of this Court and submitted to judgment. I consider it pertinent to quote verbatim the material part of the record of 17/7/71:- [*1182]

“Defendant 2 states:-

“I submit to declarations and orders in favour of the plaintiff as follows”:-

“(a) That the immovable property under Regn. No. 1046 dated 1913 at Pano Platres standing registered in the name of Anna Constanti Koutsouki, deceased, is her property”.

“(b) That any registration in respect of the aforesaid immovable property in the name of my deceased brother, Michael Constanti Vovou, alias Michael Constanti Koutsouki (Pillari), late of Pano Platres, is null and void”.

“(c) That any registration in the name of my deceased brother in respect of the aforementioned property, he set aside”.

“(d) That I will not interfere in any way in the aforementioned property”.

Mr. McBride: -

“I claim no costs against defendant 2.

C Court:-

“Declaration and order granted against defendant 2 as above. No order as to costs.”

Hereinafter ‘defendant’ means and denotes defendant 1 except as may be otherwise expressly stated. [*1183]

The defendant by his defence denied the registration in the name of the plaintiff’s mother and contended that Pillaris was entitled to be registered as owner; the defendant was in possession of the property in question from 1934-1954, as the tenant of Pillaris, and thereafter as owner to the exclusion of all others, Furthermore, he alleged that he is a bona fide purchaser for value and that he acquired a good title. He averred that the plaintiff is estopped from denying the validity of the titles of Pillaris and the Defendant, and that her claim should fail as it is statute barred and/or because the plaintiff is guilty of laches. By counterclaim he seeks the cancellation of Registration 1046 of 1913 in the name of the plaintiff’s mother, if it is in respect of the same property as Registration 3243 (obviously 3242) dated 31/7/54, standing registered in his name and covering plots 143 and of Sheet Plan XLVIl/lI.E.I.E. of Pano Platres.

In her reply and defence to the counterclaim the plaintiff repeated that Pillaris was not entitled to be registered as owner either by prescription, or purchase, or otherwise and that the defendant was not a bona fide purchaser. The alleged tenancy and possession of the Defendant is denied.

P.W.1. Charalambos Spyrou, a D.L.O. clerk, P.W.2 the plaintiff, P.W.3 her husband, Charalambos Kyprianou, and P.W.4 Michael Charalambous, testified for the Plaintiff. Six witnesses, including the defendant, gave evidence for the defence. [*1184]

The subject property was recorded in the name of the late Constanti Hj. Michael by undated Registration 158 of Pano Platres village. Undated registrations are old records of immovable property and are not considered valid registrations. On 28/11/1913 by A. 1912/1913, after a local inquiry, Registration No.1046 was issued in the name of Anna Constanti Koutsouki by virtue of ‘‘possession as dowry from her father since 1912”. At the general survey and valuation, which was carried out in 1922 under the provisions of the Immovable Property and Valuation Laws, 1907-1913, plot 497 was assessed in the name of Anna Constanti Koutsouki and plot 143 in the name of Smaragtha Constanti Koutsouki, the mother-in-law of the defendant. On 26/3/54 by A.832/53 Title Deed 3242 was issued in the name of Pillaris by virtue of “private purchase for £3 from Pericles Constanti Koutsouki 26 years prior to 1953, who owned it by possession for over 40 years”. A local inquiry was carried out for the issue of this Title Deed, but, as the previous owner in the Certificate of the Village Authority was Pericles Constanti Koutsouki, no previous registration in his name for this property was traced by the Land Clerk. If a registration in the name of a living person had been found recorded, the applicant would have had to be called upon to produce the written consent of the person registered. If he withheld his consent the Lands Office would have asked for a judgment 2 of a competent Court before effecting the registration applied for. This is the practice of the Lands Office. (See evidence of P.W.1 at page 3 of the record). [*1185]

Pillaris, by formal declaration of sale Pano Platres S. 8/54, on 3/6/54 transferred the said title in the name of the defendant. The declared price was £150.

The land referred to in Registrations 1046 and 3242 is one and the same. Thus, there appears to exist a double registration of the property in question: One in the name of the deceased, Anna Constanti Koutsouki, and the other in the name of the defendant.

It is clear that the Law contemplates that only one registration can subsist in respect of the sole right of ownership of one piece of land and, therefore, there cannot be two valid registrations existing in respect of one piece of land. In the present case though these two entries in the Land Registry refer to the same piece of land, it is clear that both cannot be regarded as valid registrations.

In Giorghi Michail Francoudi v. The Heirs of Heracli Michaelides, Ill C.L.R, p. 221, the Plaintiff left Cyprus in 1834 and resided in Egypt, Turkey and Russia till the year 1893, when he returned to this Island and made his claim to a share in what he alleged was his father’s property, in possession of the defendants. The plaintiff was in 1279 (1863) registered at Yoklama for a share of arazi-mirie lands by virtue of possession. In 1886 the defendants were registered for the whole of those properties by inheritance from their father, who, according to a village certificate, had been in possession of same [*1186] for 40 years. It was clear that it was impossible for the plaintiff to have acquired a right of possession in the way alleged in the registration as he was entirely absent from Cyprus from 1834-1893, and there was no evidence that anyone was cultivating the lands in question for or on his behalf during the period in question. At p. 227 of the Report it is stated:-

“We have, therefore, to decide whether the registration of 1279 (1863), which is clearly based on a false ground, is to prevail over the registration of 1886, which, prima facie, is good and well founded”.

“There can be no doubt from the evidence of the plaintiff himself that he was never entitled to be registered in 1279, on the grounds alleged in his registration, and there is nothing to shew that the father of the defendants, Michail and Evterpe, was not in possession of the lands in question for the period of forty years as alleged in the certificate of the village”.

“If, therefore, he was in such possession for the period alleged, there can be no doubt, in default of evidence to the contrary, that his heirs would be entitled to be registered as they are. We must, therefore, hold that this subsequent registration overrides the old and [*1187] faulty one, and that the plaintiff is no longer entitled to he registered for the lands he claims partition of”.

ln Mihtat v. Loiza, VI C.L.R, p. 13 it was decided that a prior registration is not necessarily superseded by a registration of later date. Where two persons are registered as owners of the same land, if the prior registration is properly made, and the later registration is made on a ground which is proved to have untrue, the prior registration is not superseded by the later registration. The defendant in that case was registered at Yoklama in 1877 as owner of the disputed phrakte which he purchased in the same year. The vendor, shortly afterwards, purported to dedicate verbally the same phrakte to the Kilani Mosque - the plaintiff. In

May, 1891, the plaintiff’s registration was effected on the ground (as stated in the kochan) of length of possession. In

the judgment of the Court it was said:-

“There is nothing to show that the defendant’s registration in 1877 was wrongfully made, and we must assume, unless the contrary is shown, that the registration was properly made. It was not therefore superseded by the registration of the plaintiff in 1891, which purports to be made on the ground of length of possession by the plaintiff: whereas it is plain that the plaintiff could not then have had 15 years uninterrupted possession”. [*1188]

“In our judgment, therefore, the defendant’s registration is still in force and the plaintiff has not shown that he is entitled to have it set aside”.

In Nicolaides v. Kotiri, VII C.L.R. p. 7 it was held that the owner of land duly registered is entitled to that land, although there may be a second registration for that land, unless: by reason of the way in which he has acted, or otherwise, he is estopped from asserting his rights.

In Tsikkinou Hj.Sava v. Kyriakou Yeorghi Mariolou, VII C.L.R. p. 89, at p. 90 it is reported:-

“In dealing with all property, but more especially with immovable property, the law prima facie protects possession - unless that possession can be shown to have been acquired by force, by stealth or by permission, as against the person impeaching it. This is a fundamental principle of the English law of real property, under which any person in possession of land may bring an action to vindicate that possession, and in any such case it lies upon the person disputing the right of the possessor to establish that he holds a superior title”.

And, at p. 91 it is said:-

“In this country the Courts will assert this same principle in protection of persons in [*1189] possession under a title which the Court recognises - that is to say - persons holding under a registered title”.

“Applying that principle to the class of cases now under consideration we are of opinion that where a dispute as to boundaries arises between two adjoining proprietors, both claiming under kochans, each of which is consistent with the claim of the person holding under it, and where one of the parties is in possession of the land in dispute, the onus lies upon the party seeking to disturb that possession to establish his claim to the satisfaction of the Court”.

The certificate of registration, as it has been stated by the Supreme Court over and over again, is prima facie evidence of ownership. A person who claims to defeat the title, or part thereof, of a holder, has either to establish that the registration was effected in the name of the holder by mistake or error, or that, where there is room for acquisition of a prescriptive right, the holder of such certificate has lost his right over the land as it has been adversely possessed by such person. (Thomas Antoni Theodorou v Christos Theori Hj. Antoni. (1961) C.L.R. p. 203, per Zekia, J., at p. 208).

In Molla Mustafa Hj. Ahmed v. Abdul Kadir Hassan, VII C.L.R. p. 42, Tyser, C.J., had this to say at page 47:-

“Any person who wishes to take advantage of the [*1190] law must not only be registered but have a right to be registered. When a person claims to have a right superior to that acquired by occupation for the prescribed time he must at all events prove that right - that is to say - he must prove not only that he is registered but that he has a right to be registered. Registration alone is not sufficient”.

I shall now proceed to examine the evidence adduced.

It has been proved without dispute that the deceased, Anna Constanti Koutsouki, married in 1912, she received the disputed land as dowry from her father and was lawfully registered as owner thereof. (See evidence of P.W.1, the D.L.O. clerk and the evidence of P.W.4 Michael Charalambous).

The plaintiff was born in 1919 and is the only child and heir of the deceased, Anna Constanti Koutsouki. She stated that her mother was planting summer greens in this garden land continuously until 2-3 years prior to her death that occurred in 1962. The plaintiff, since the age of 10, was helping her mother in the irrigation of those plantations. The deceased in 1938-39 planted a walnut tree which grew; the mother collected the walnuts and since her death the plaintiff has been collecting same. The deceased also planted rose bushes and a vine. They picked the roses and produced rose water. The defendant, who was a building contractor, in 1962 placed in this [*1191] disputed land some materials but he sold them and same were removed as soon as the plaintiff passed remarks to him. Some three years ago the defendant interfered and planted three apple trees. The plaintiff passed remarks to him and an altercation ensued. The defendant did not disclose to her that he was registered. The plaintiff applied to the Lands Office and, on finding out that the defendant was also registered for this same property, she resorted to the Court. The defendant never in the past, except in 1962-63, stored any materials on this land. He used to place his materials, etc., on the land of his mother-in-law which is next to the disputed property.

The plaintiff’s husband, Charalambos Kyprianou (P.W.3), a member of the Police Force, stated that he was posted to Platres in May, 1941. In the following year he married the Plaintiff. The walnut tree was then about three years old. It was a small tree less than his own height. His mother-in-law was cultivating summer greens and was collecting the walnuts and grapes, and was picking the roses. After her death, his wife cultivated the land and collected the walnuts. The defendant at no time, except in 1962, placed any building materials or anything else on this land.

P.W.4 Michael Charalambous is an 82 year old person. He is the husband of defendant 2 and, by marriage, he is the uncle of the plaintiff and the defendant’s wife, He married in 1910. He testified that in 1912 the disputed property was given as dowry to his sister-in-law, Anna, [*1192] who ever since had it in her possession until her death. She was planting greens until i960. A walnut tree was planted either by her or her husband between 1938-40. The nuts were collected from this tree as from 1948 by the deceased until her death and afterwards by her daughter, the plaintiff, except for two years when the defendant collected them. Neither Pericles C. Koutsouki nor Pillaris ever cultivated this land, The defendant, before 1962, was storing moulds, barrels, etc., in the field, the ownership of his mother-in-law, and he also let the stores of Marianna Theodotou and loannis

Theodotou. The defendant placed timber or moulds on the disputed land only in 1962. The house of this witness is next to

the defendant on the other side of the road, opposite the disputed property. This witness, however, from 1923-1935 was residing in Limassol and from 1937-1940 at Mavrovouni, but he used to visit his village, Pano Platres, occasionally during those years. The defendant during the period of the demolition and re-construction of his house moved to the house of his mother-in-law.

In cross-examination this witness was asked whether he knew that Anna had sold this property to Pericles Constanti Koutsouki. His reply was in the negative.

D.W.1 Costas Kyriakides is the brother-in-law of the defendant, He was born in 1911. He stated that Anna never cultivated this property. If she ever cultivated it she must have done so before the time his memory could go back to. [*1193]

Before 1933 the whole area, meaning the properties of the children of Michael Constanti, but, obviously excluding the houses, as it emerges from the evidence that the house of the children and grandchildren of Michael Constanti are around there on both sides of the road, was the family property. Each one, he said, had his house and land. In 1933 the main road was constructed and thereby the properties were separated. Before 1933 Pericles was cultivating the disputed land. This witness, however, did not know and could not say for how long Pericles was cultivating it. He stated first that Pillaris was cultivating this land after 1933 Then he said that Pillaris did not cultivate this land at all, but, he gave a third version that Pillaris started planting after 1934-35. The walnut tree has been bearing fruit ever since his childhood. Pillaris, he stated, was collecting the walnuts. He did not refer to Pericles at all with regard to the walnut tree. Pillaris, according to the evidence of this witness, placed a ladder, climbed up the tree for the collection of the walnuts though he had a wooden leg. The description of Pillaris given by all the witnesses on both sides is that of a poor, lame, invalid, miserable man who could not go up a ladder. Prom 1940-45 the defendant started collecting the walnuts. D.W.1 further said that when his brother-in law, the defendant, demolished his matrimonial home in September, 1936 to rebuild it, he placed the old windows and rafters on this property and kept them there until I960 or until he sold them to a certain Panaghi. D.W.2 [*1194] Efstathios Aristidou, contradicted him on this point. The defendant, D.W.1 continued, piled on top of these old windows and rafters the timber he brought from his work until he left for England. He admitted that the house and land of his mother - the mother-in-law of the defendant - is the northern boundary of the disputed property but he denied that the defendant placed anything thereon.

D.W.2 Efstathios Aristidou said that after the construction of the new road, no-one cultivated this property. Before 1940 he did not see anyone cultivating or irrigating this land as the witness had no interest in looking there. He was positive that the walnut tree was hearing fruit even prior to his marriage that was celebrated in 1929. Pillaris, according to him, was collecting the walnuts, but as he was lame, others, who were employed by Pillaris, collected then for him. The defendant, did not place either the old windows or any materials from the old house he demolished on the disputed property. Later, after he built his house the defendant placed timber on the disputed land. It is noteworthy that prior to 1933: the road was not in existence and the witness stated: “At the time it was the property of the whole family”,

D.W.3 Loizos Kapsalis of Pera. Pethi, D.W.4 Loukis Ioannou Achilleos of Phini and D. W. 5 Nicolas Vassili of Sylikou were in the employment of the defendant from 1940 - 1953. They stated that they placed the timber, the moulds, the barrels, wheel barrows, etc., on a piece of land opposite the defendant’s house, near the house of Pillaris. [*1195] They did not know the owner of that land. That area could not be cultivated due to the heap of the materials, etc. they placed thereon. They identified the property from the following: -

(a) It was boundered by a path.

(b) On the lower part thereof there was a walnut tree.

(c) It was near Pillaris’s house.

These persons admitted that they had not been in that area for the last 20 years.

The disputed property is small in extent. The land of the defendant’s mother-in-law is adjacent to the subject property. With regard to the walnut tree, D.W.3 stated that it was a small walnut tree. D.W.5 gave its age as 15 years at the time he worked there but he evaded to say at which time of those 13 years he was referring to. D.W.3 said that Pillaris employed persons to collect the nuts but when pressed to say if he saw anyone collecting the nuts, his reply was that he did not have time to sit there and he saw no-one. D.W.3 who was asked to indicate the property, to which he referred, on the D.L.O. map (exhibit 1), said that plot 497 was at the time a garden land.

The defendant’s evidence is to the following effect:-

He married in 1935. No one has cultivated this land ever since. The walnut tree was a big one, bearing [*1196] up to 1,000 nuts. Pillaris was collecting them until his death in 1957. In 1929 the defendant happened to be at Platres and he knew that Pillaris sold walnuts which were the best for “ghlyko”. In September, 1936 he demolished his wife’s house for the purpose of rebuilding it. He entered into an agreement with Pillaris to store the old windows and frames taken from the house under demolition on this property. He agreed to and paid Pillaris £1 per month. He used same from September, 1936 until 1969 as an open store for the old wood, iron poles, etc. The tenancy agreement for the land was a written one. Shortly after - wards, however, he said that it was an oral one. He testified that he let the upper storey of Pillaris’s house for two months for the habitation of his family, consisting at the time of himself, his wife and newly born child, at £5 per month, and this was in the autumn of 1936. In 1954 he purchased this property from Pillaris for £150. He knew that Pillaris possessed this property for many years. He had it by inheritance from his family. He did not know at the time of the purchase that Pillaris had no title deed. He asked the vendor about the title deed and the transfer, and the reply of Pillaris was: “Georghios to go down”, meaning Panaghides, “and he will do it”. When they went to Panaghides in Limassol the seller told him that he had no title deed. The defendant explained to Panaghides that Pillaris wanted to sell his property to him and inquired how to do the contract. Panaghides asked Pillaris if he had a title deed and then Pillaris disclosed that he had no title deed. Panaghides prepared [*1197] a document. The defendant did not read that document. Pillaris explained, in the presence of the defendant, to Panaghides that he had purchased it from his brother, Pericles, for £3. Pillaris himself arranged everything for the issue of the title deed. When the title deed was issued Panaghides called upon the defendant to attend for the declaration of sale. Though Pillaris was illiterate, Panaghides advised that it would be better if he signed. Panaghides wrote the name of Pillaris and Pillaris copied it, obviously by drawing.

The defendant was not mindful, however, that the declaration of sale was effected at Pano Platres and. not in Limassol as it is S. Platres 8/54 The declaration is signed in the presence of the Lands Clerk. (See Land Transfer Amendment Law, Cap. 228, section 5 This Law was repealed by the Immovable Property (Transfer and Mortgage) Law, No. 9/65). Did Panaghides travel to Platres on 3/6/54 for this declaration? This is not clear before me.

The defendant gave a second version that he did not know what Pillaris said to Panaghides about how Pillaris had acquired the property. He simply read in the title deed that he purchased it from Pericles for £3. The title deed is exhibit 2 before me but the name of Pericles does not appear in the title deed. In exhibit 2 we read: “By private purchase for £3”. The defendant made no inquiries about the ownership of this property. He confined himself to his own knowledge as a fore said. If the defendant [*1198] had looked in the survey hook he would have found out that neither Pericles nor Pillaris were recorded as owners. If he had applied to the D.L.O. he might have been informed that Anna was registered for this property. If he had asked the old neighbours and relatives he might have learned about the ownership of Anna.

I shall now give a full picture of Pillaris. The witnesses who testified in this case described Pillaris as an unfortunate creature; a very poor, lame, blind in one eye, deaf and dumb person who was almost completely invalid. He was illiterate and communication with him was almost impossible. He understood only by sign language. He was living on charity and his two sisters, the plaintiff’s mother and the defendant’s mother-in-law, were the only people who could communicate with him.

I have heard and observed the witnesses. The plaintiff and her husband impressed me favourably, though they were over anxious, not unnaturally, for the determination of the case in their own favour.

P.W.4 is an old common relative. He impressed the Court. The performance of D.W.1 In Court was poor. He pretended to be disinterested. The veil of this pretence was shortly torn into pieces. His disguise in no time was revealed. Not only did he have reason to testify against the plaintiff but he had a motive to give evidence for the defendant. The plaintiff had sued him twice recently; he paid £140 for a nuisance case instituted against him by the plaintiff. He considers his conviction in that [*1199] civil action unjust. He expects some favour from the defendant in the form of a written consent of the defendant’s children, who are abroad, for the issue of title deeds in his name. His hostile attitude towards the plaintiff led him into placing a half blinded man with his leg amputated from above the knee (Pillaris) on a wooden ladder collecting walnuts. His evidence is contradicted by other Defence witnesses. I place no reliance on his evidence and I reject it.

I carefully watched the demeanour of D.W.2 Efstathios Aristidou. He left much to be desired.

D.W.3, D.W.4 and D.W. 5 are ex-employees of the defendant who were marshalled by the defendant. They were either mistaken or their memory failed them. Probably they were labouring under confusion. The defendant was placingbarrels, poles, wheel barrows, etc., on the land of his mother-in-law which abuts the disputed property. I do not exclude that on occasions such materials were placed on part of the front portion of the disputed property. It is significant that though the evidence of D.W.3 is almost identical to the evidence of the others, he stated that plot 497 - one of the plots forming the disputed land - was in his time at Platres a garden land. I do not attach weight on their evidence.

The defendant was more clever than truthful. I reject his evidence.

My findings are, in brief, as follows:- [*1200]

(a) The disputed property was the ownership of Constanti Hj. Michael Koutsouki.

(b) The said Constanti gave it in 1912 as dowry to his daughter Anna.

(c) Anna in 1913 by A. 1912/13 after a local inquiry was held, was registered as owner thereof under Registration No. 1046 dated 28/11/1913.

(d) Anna was possessing same during her lifetime. She planted the walnut tree some time in 1938-39. She was collecting the walnuts.

(e) The defendant, who is a building contractor, stored his cement and timber in built stores which he let from two persons, namely Marianna and loannis Theodotou. He placed barrels, wheel-barrows, poles, etc., on the land of his mother-in-law adjacent to the disputed property after 1940. On occasions these materials covered part of the front portion of the disputed land.

(f) The defendant in 1953, without making proper or any inquiries, took all necessary steps for the issue of title deed in the name of Pillaris, whose description by the witnesses I need not repeat.

The defendant went to Panaghides. Pillaris was the tool this defendant used to have the property ultimately registered in his own name. [*1201]

Registration in the name of Pillaris was issued on the strength of a village certificate. From the evidence of the D.L.O. clerk and the other evidence before me, it is abundantly clear that the contents of that certificate were false. It was put to P.W. 4 that Pericles purchased this property from Anna. Thus the original validity of the title of this deceased, Anna, is not disputed. There is no evidence and I do not accept that Pericles purchased this garden land from Anna. Pericles never possessed this property. None of the defence witnesses, not even D.W.1 Kyriakides, stated that Pillaris ever cultivated the land.

The array of witnesses for the defence testified about: -

(i) The walnut tree.

(ii) The placing of the timber, etc., by defendant 1 on this property. The defendant’s evidence covers the period after September, 1936. The evidence of the other witnesses, D.W.2 D.W.3, D.W.4 and D.W.5, relates to the period after 1940. I had occasion to comment and state my findings with regard to possession and the acts about which these witnesses testified.

(g) Soon after the issue of the title deed in the [*1202] name of Pillaris, Pillaris and the defendant appeared before the proper official of the D.L.O. at Pano Platres (a sub-office of that Government Department), and Pillaris drew his name on the declaration of sale, of the property to the defendant.

(h) About three years prior to the institution of this action the defendant cultivated the land for the first time and planted some trees. The plaintiff naturally protested. The plaintiff applied to the D.L.O.; a local inquiry was carried out; the registration in the name of the defendant was revealed to the plaintiff and hence this action ensued.

The first proviso of section 10 of the Immovable Property (Tenure, Registration and Valuation) Law, Cap. 224 has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. The period of prescription, if not completed by 1/9/46, cannot be completed thereafter againt a registered owner. To defeat the title of land of a registered owner, the prescriptive period must have been completed before the enactment of this Law

even though the period of prescription has started to run before 1/9/46. (Thomas Antoni Theodorou v. Christos Theori H.j.

Antoni (supra); Rodothea Papa Georghiou v. Antonis Savva Charalanibous Komodromou, (1963) 2 C.L.R. p. 221).

The Law governing possessory rights of immovable [*1203] property and acquisition by prescription prior to the enactment of the Law, Cap. 224, was Article 20 of the Ottoman Land Code in the case of lands of Arazi Mirie category and Article 1660 of the Mejelle and the Immovable Property Limitation Law, 1886, Law 4/1886 in the case of Mulk property. The categories of lands recognised by the Ottoman Empire are those enumerated .in Articles 1, 2, 3 4, 5 and

6 of the Ottoman Land Code which contained the Law in force in the Island up to the coming into operation of the Immovable Property (Tenure, Registration and Valuation) Law, Cap.

224 although certain parts of the Ottoman Land Code were amended prior to the passing of the said Law. Article 2 describes the categories of Mulk land. I quote Article 2:-

“Article 2 - Mulk land is of four kinds.

“(1) Sites (for houses) within towns or villages, and pieces of land of an extent not exceeding half a donum situated on the confines of towns and villages which can be considered as appurtenant to dwelling houses”.

“(2) Land separated from State land and made mulk in a valid way to be possessed in the different ways of absolute ownership according to the Sacred Law”.

“(3) Tithe-paying land, which was distributed at the time of conquest among the victors, and given to them in full ownership”. [*1204]

“(4) Tribute-paying land which (at the same period) was left and confirmed in the possession of the non-Moslem inhabitants. The tribute imposed on these lands is of two kinds”;-

“(a) ‘Kharaj-i-moukassemfé’ which is proportional and is levied to the amount of from one-tenth to one-half of the crop, according to the yield of the soil”.

“(b) ‘Kharaj-mouvazzef’ which is fixed and appropriated to the land”.

“The owner of Mulk land the legal ownership”.

“It devolves by inheritance like movable property, and all the provisions of the law, such as those with regard to dedication pledge or mortgage, gift, pre-emption, are applicable to it”.

“Both tithe-paying land and tribute-paying land become State land when the owner dies without issue, and the land becomes vested In the Treasury (Beit-ul-Mal)”.

“The provisions and enactments which are applicable to the four kinds off mulk land are stated in the books of the Sacred Law, and will not therefore be dealt with in this Code”.

Zekia, J., in Minas Sylvestrou & Others v. The [*1205]

High Council of Evcaf, 24 C.L.R. p. 153 at p. 168 said: -

“There is no doubt that in modern times the great part of cultivable lands belong to Arazi Mirifé category but it is clear from Article 2 of the Land Code as well as from its historical background that considerable extent of arable lands were of mulk category. When a country was conquered by Ottoman Sultans the recognised practice was to divide the arable land into three and to distribute the first part among the conquerors and/or leave it in the hands non .Moslems inhabitants of the country; to allow the second part to remain in the hands of the non-Moslems and to turn the third part into State land (Arazi Mirié)”.

“The first category was known as ‘Oshriyé’, that is, tithe-paying land. The second category was known as ‘Harajiyé’, that is, “tribute-paying land”.

“Apart from cultivable land there was the built-up area, towns and villages, and such built-up area comprised the house, etc., together with small pieces of land forming “yard or curtilage of such houses and building sites These were also considered as mulk property”.

“Now the ownership in the case of bits of land [*1206] attached to buildings and of the arable lands coming under the first and second category just mentioned vested absolutely in the owner of such property and were collectively known as mulk lands”.

Having regard, inter alia, to the following: -

(a) The land in dispute is situated in the village (see Title Deed, exhibit 2).

(b) The area is built-up.

(c) It is surrounded by houses.

(d) The scale of the plan on which this Title Deed is based.

(e) The definition of mulk property.

I presume that the land in dispute is of the mulk category

In Yeronymos Michail Hemenji Haralambo Andoniou and Azize Nalbant Mehmet, II C.L.R. p. 140. at p. 143 it is stated:-

“We are unable to concur in the argument that no title to mulk property can be obtained by prescription. The law as Mr. Pascal has pointed out, has provided that after the 28 Regeb 1291, immovable mulk properties must be registered, and that henceforward the possession of such properties without registration is prohibited. This in our opinion was [*1207] not intended in any way to interfere with the law, which enables a person to obtain a legal right to possess such properties by undisputed possession for 15 years, as provided by the Mejellé”.

At page 144-145 it was said:-

“The law clearly recognises that the right to possession of State land, which is registered in the name of another person, and, therefore, the right to be registered as its possessor, may be acquired by an undisturbed enjoyment of the property for 10, years. Supposing that a man’s right to be registered as the possessor of a certain property having accrued, and the very day after it has so accrued, a memorandum affecting such property is deposited by a creditor of the person in whose name it is registered at the Land Registry Office; the person who has so acquired a title by prescription would have had no opportunity of obtaining a rectification of the existing registration, causing the property to be registered in his name; but he could not be ejected from the property, and the debtor’s interest in it, though owing to circumstances it still remains registered in his name, has practically ceased, The same principles appear to us to apply to the case of mulk, and if the plaintiff has [*1208] acquired a right by prescription to he registered as the owner of this room, we should hold that he had the right to have it excluded from the sale”.

In Molla Mustafa.Hj.Ahmed v. Abdul -Kadir Hassan Another, (supra) section 20 of the Land Code, 1660 of the Mejellé and the Immovable Property Limitation Law, 1886, No. 4 of 1886, were considered. Tyser, C.J., at. p. 44 said:-

“The limitation of action law as regards mulk is Article 1660 of the Mejellé”.

“Now Article 1660 of the Mejellé and section 20 of the Land Code differ in their wordings, but in effect they appear to be the same. It is necessary in either case that there should be an absence of possession by the person who has the right to the property and an actual possession by another to create the bar to the action imposed by those sections”.

“The cases on the one section are and have been treated as cases governing the construction of the other section”.

“Under both sections it has been held that where the action is barred by length of possession a legal right to possess the property is conferred on the person who is in possession”. [*1209]

After referring to earlier decisions he said this at p. 45:-

“The effect of the different decisions on these laws may he summed up as follows”:-

“1. Section 20 of the Land Code and Article 1660 of the Mejellé which fix a limit of time within which the owner of real property of the kinds therein mentioned must sue for its recovery, confer upon a person who has been in possession for that time a statutory title to the land, and a right to be registered for it”.

“2. By virtue of Article 1 of the Regulations for Tapu lands and Article 1 of the Law of 28 Rejeb, 1291, the statutory title so acquired, until perfected by registration, does not confer any right which can be enforced in a Court of Law, except the right to claim a declaration of right to registration as against another and to have any existing registration set aside and an injunction to take effect upon registration”.

Fisher, Acting J., in his short judgment said:-

“In my opinion (1) the qochans produced include the property claimed by the respondent and (2) the respondent has proved uninterrupted possession, for over 15 years prior to the action [*1210] brought by him, of the property claimed in the action That being so I think that the respondent is entitled as against the Appellants to be registered as owner of the property and I do not think that anything in Law IV of 1886 as amended by V of 1887 precludes me from coming to that conclusion even if the Appellants who are plaintiffs in the cross action do in fact, as on the evidence given here and in the District Court I think they must be taken to do, come within the provisions of section 3 of Law IV of 1886 as persons who prior to the expiration of the period of prescription have been lawfully entitled to be and have been actually registered as the owners of’”.

“Possession” implies, so far as acquisition by prescription is concerned, acts of ownership in some form or another on the part of the person who asserts adverse possession. There must be positive evidence as to the acts of ownership which amount to possession which the nature of the land admits. (Anna Soteriou v. The Heirs of Despina K. Hj. Paschali, (1962) C.L.R. p. 280; see also Charalambous v. loannides (1969) 2 J.S.C.

230 and Aradipioti v Kyriacou & Others (1972) 6 J.S.C. 622).

Unregistered prescriptive rights on immovable property could not and cannot be transferred without registration. In Constanti Hj. Antoni v. Kyriaco Hj. Antoni & Others, IV C.L.R. p. 66 at p. 68 it was said:- [*1211]

“We purposely use the word immovable property, for, in our opinion, no professed sale under a document which purports to convey either Arazi-mirié or mulk property can be deemed to be valid, unless the same is completed by registration. It is as much necessary for the purposes of conveying mulk that the sale should be completed by registration and evidenced by a title-deed as it is for conveying Arazi-mirié, and we fail to see that any distinction can be drawn between these two kinds of property in this respect”.

In Sherife Moustafa Moulla Ibrahim v. Mehmed Salih Souleyman, 19 C.L.R. p. 237, at p. 238-239 Hallinan, C.J., said:-

“Under the law relating to lands prior to 1946 it is very doubtful if a person who has obtained by prescription alone a right, to be registered, can transfer his right verbally to another unless he perfects his title by registration so as to give the transferee a right of action”.

The mode of transfer of immovable property prior to the coming into operation of Law No. 9/65 is set out in the Land Transfer Amendment Law, 1890 Cap. 228 of the 1959 edition of our Laws. Section 2 thereof provides that no sale or mortgage of any immovable property, in pursuance of any contract, shall be registered at the District Lands [*1212] Office until the proceedings and formalities specified in sections 3, 4 and 5 have been complied with.

In Rodothea Papa Georghiou v. Antonis Savva Charalambous Konodromou (supra) the Court found that the disputed portion of land was cultivated by the defendant’s mother at least as far back as 1915 till 1938 or 1939, when the defendant’s mother gave the field to the defendant as dowry, and from that date the disputed .portion of land was cultivated by the defendant herself until the day of the action (in 1961). Zekia, J., as he then was, in delivering the majority judgment of the Court, had this to say at p. 236: -

“It is clear from the old and new law relating to the transfer of immovable property that registration in one way or the other was necessary for the validity of the transfer”.

“In this case the mother, the predecessor-in-title of the appellant was not, as far as the evidence goes, the registered owner in respect of the disputed portion of land and when she made a gift of the land possessed by her Including the disputed portion as dowry to her daughter, the appellant, in 1938 or 1939, that, gift not having been made in accordance with the Law, could not be considered to be a transfer in the legal sense of the word”.

And, at p. 237 he said:- [*1213]

“I am of the opinion, therefore, that whatever possessory rights were vested in the mother of the appellant in respect of disputed land those rights did not pass to the daughter either by virtue of the agreement of dowry in 1938 or 1939 or on the strength of the transfer in 1955 which transfer did not include the disputed land”.

Pericles Constanti Koutsouki did not acquire title by prescription of the property, subject-matter of the action. Even if he had any possessory rights, which he did not, he did not and could not in law transfer same to Pillaris.

On the evidence as I have admitted it and on my findings of fact, Pillaris did not acquire any prescriptive rights which entitled him to be registered as owner of the property. Fifteen years continuous adverse possession was necessary for Pillaris to acquire such possessory rights. Even if I had admitted in toto the evidence adduced by the defendant, it would not have been sufficient for Pillaris to acquire by prescription a right to be registered. The evidence of the defendant relates to the period from September, 1936, that is, less than 10 years prior to the 1st September, 1946; D.W. 2, D.W.3, D.W. 4 and D.W. 5 testified for the period after 1940. Even if I were to presume that the land in question was of the Arazi Mirie category, Pillaris did not complete the 10 years period of prescription required under the Law obtaining in this country before the enactment of the Immovable Property (Tenure, Registration and Valuation) Law, Cap. 224. [*1214]

The title deed in the name of Pillaris was obtained on the strength of a certificate, which was shown to be false; that registration was wrongfully obtained as he was not entitled to be registered as owner. This registration cannot supersede the title in the name of Anna Constanti Koutsouki.

The last question which falls for determination is whether the defendant is a bona fide purchaser for value. The matter was judicially considered in .Akil.Hussein Arnaout v Emine Hussein Zinouri, 19 C.L.R. p. 249. Hallinan, C.J., 10 reviewed the Ottoman and the English authorities on the matter and I need not repeat them. At p. 255 he had this to say:-

“This also indicates in my view that a registered sale does not confer on the purchaser an indefeasible right of ownership. Land Registries before issuing title deeds to the heirs of a registered deceased land owner insist to be supplied with a village certificate from the village authorities where the land is situate testifying that the lands inherited were under the undisputed possession of the registered deceased owner up to the time of his death. There is no reason why a prospective purchaser should not he considered bound to make reasonable enquiries in order to find out whether his vendor in addition to being the holder of title deed is also the undisputed owner in possession of the land to be sold. At any rate mere negligence or inaction was never [*1215] considered sufficient to deprive of his rights a person who acquired statutory title against a registered owner by long undisturbed possession over a particular land”.

The onus of proving that a particular purchaser for value is a bona fide purchaser and has no notice of the prescriptive claim of the respondent lies on such purchaser.

In Hanbury’s Modern Equity, 5th edition, p. 34 it is stated:-

“The defence of a bona fide purchaser for value is an affirmative defence. In order to establish it a purchaser must show, in the words of Fry J. in re Morgan, ‘that he took all reasonable care and made enquiry and that having taken that care and made enquiry he received no notice of the trust which affected the property’. The word ‘notice’ must now be examined. It is of the three varieties, actual, constructive and imputed. (1) It is actual where a purchaser actually knows of the existence of the equitable interest. (2) It is constructive where the interest would have come to his knowledge if he had made such enquiries as he ought to have made. (3) Imputed notice covers actual or constructive notice to his agent as such in the transaction in question”. [*1216]

In Cheshire Modern Law of Real Property, 10th edition, p. 63 it is stated:-

“Constructive Notice. It has always been regarded as impossible to frame a satisfactory definition of constructive notice, but it is generally taken to include two different things”:-

“1. The notice which is implied when a purchaser omits to investigate the vendor’s title properly or to make reasonable inquiries as to deeds or facts which come to his knowledge”.

“2 The notice which is imputed to a purchaser by reason of the fact that his solicitor or other legal agent has actual or implied notice of some fact. This is generally called ‘imputed notice’”.

“Now the question is: What ought a prudent, careful man to do when he is purchasing an estate? The answer will afford us an insight into the equitable doctrine of notice, and at the same time will show us in what circumstances a purchaser takes an estate free from any trust or other equitable interests to which it may be subject”.

And, further down:-

(i) Notice from not investigating title. [*1217]

“For centuries it has been regarded as essential that a man who is purchasing land should investigate the title of his vendor, that is to say, should require the vendor to ‘prove his title’ by producing evidence to show that the interest which he has contracted to sell is vested in him, and that it is unencumbered by rights and interests enforceable against the land by third parties. Except in those parts of the country where the system of registration of title is in force, proof of the title takes the form of requiring the vendor to set out the history of the land in what is called an abstract of title with a view to showing how the interest he has contracted to sell became vested in him, so as to prove that for a given number of years he and his predecessors have rightfully exercised dominion over the land consistent with that interest”.

And at p. 65: -

(ii) Notice from not inquiring for deeds.

“As we have just seen, the conveyancing practice of this country demands that a person who is buying land should examine the vendor’s deeds, in order both to ascertain whether a good title can be made and to ensure that no third person possesses rights enforceable [*1218] against the land. It follows from this that, if a purchaser makes no inquiries for the title-deeds, and allows them to remain in the possession of a third person, he will be deemed to have notice of any equitable claims which the possessor of the deeds may have against the land. If he makes inquiry hut fails to secure their production, his liability for any equity that they would have disclosed depends upon whether or not his failure was due to his own gross negligence. If he is satisfied with an unreasonable excuse for their non-production, he is liable; but if the excuse is reasonable, he may successfully shelter behind the plea of purchaser for valuable consideration without notice”.

In the present case the defendant failed to satisfy the Court that he took reasonable steps to ascertain the rights and interest of his vendor on the property which he purported to purchase. Had he made reasonable enquiries it would have come to his knowledge that the disputed piece of land was in the possession of the deceased, Anna Koutsouki, since her marriage, that she was registered as owner thereof and that Pillaris had no right or interest in the said land. If he did not bother, as he stated, to verify for himself how the interest Pillaris contracted to sell became vested in him, he is to blame and he could not be considered a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. Pillaris in the circumstances could not convey a better [*1219] title than he had. The defendant purchaser could not fully rely for good title on the Certificate of Registration, irrespective of the circumstances under which it was issued in this case, because such registration is only prima facie evidence of ownership and nothing more.

In view of the foregoing, judgment is entered for the plaintiff against the defendant in terms of prayers 7(i), (ii),

(iii) and (iv) of the Statement of Claim. The counterclaim is dismissed.

With regard to costs I see no reason why they should not follow the event.

Judgment and order in terms. Defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs to be assessed by the Registrar.

Judgment and order for costs as above.

Counterclaim dismissed.