Court holds a vehicle cannot hold both a specified route and on contract road service licence simultaneously.

[*843] 1973 December 1

(ARTEMIDES, D.J.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP LARNACA

Police

against

Andreas Georghiou,

Accused,

(Case No. 7101/73)

Motor transoort - Road Service Licence- Public Service Vehicle - Having road service licence for a "specified route" - Its owner not entitled and has not the right to he issued with a road service licence "on contract" as well, even if prerequisites laid down by s. 8B(l) of the Motor Transport (Regulation) (Amendment) Law, 1572 (Law 33 of 1972) are satisfied.

Motor transport - Road Service licence - For a "specified route" and "on contract" - Distinction - A person cannot have a road service licence for a "specified route" and "on contract” at the same time - Section 4 of the Motor Transport (Regulation) (Amendment) Law, 1971 (Law 45 of 1971).

Road Service Licence - For "specified route" and "on contract" - See, also, under "Motor Transport".

Inspector A. Epiphaniou; for the Prosecution.

A. Panayiotou, for the Accused.

JUDGMENT

The following judgment was delivered by:-

ARTEMIDES. D. J. : The accused is charged that on the 21/9/73, he was driving his public service vehicle, a rural bus, registration No.EI446, and failed to comply with the conditions of the road service licence being in [*844] issue for the said bus, in that he drove same and carried passengers along Larnaca-Dhekelia road instead of drivingsame on the route of Troulli-Larnaca as prescribed in his road service licence.

The charge is preferred on section 7(1) (3) (4) of the Motor Transport (Regulation) Law (l6/64), as amended by Law

45 of 1971, and regulation 15(a) of the regulations made under the Law, (see· Cyprus Gazette of 19th November, 1964).

The facts of the case are not in dispute. These may be summarised as follows:-

Accused on the 21/9/73, was driving the

said bus along the main Larnaca-Dhekelia road transporting personnel working at the British Base Area in Dhekelia. The

aforesaid transportation was being effected pursuant to a contract existing between the Brit: sh Sovereign Base Area Authorities on the one hand, and a number of Cyprus companies on the other. Apparently the Cyprus companies have sub-contracted a number of owners of public service vehicles in order to be enabled to fulfil their obligations as per the conditions on the said contract. Accused was one of these owners. The carriage therefore, was a carriage on contract “επί συμβάσει”.

The bus in question was registered with the Registrar of Motor Vehicles as a ,J'public service omnibus1' on the 1/11/69. It was so registered to substitute another bus owned by accused i.e. that of registration No. AY322. A road service licence was first issued for EL446 on the[*845]

15th November, 1969, on the specified form with the usual conditions applying to a rural bus. The said road service licence is exhibit 1, before the Court. This road service licence was issued in substitution of a road service licence which existed for bus AY322. There is also as exhibit before me the last road service licence for EL446, which is valid until 25/1/74. This road service licence is a renewal of exhibit 1 and the conditions specified in it are those provided for by the relevant regulations.

On the 28/7/72 accused filed an application to the Permits Authority applying for a road service licence on "contract” to serve the route, Lamaca-Dhekelia. His application was rejected on the 9th November, 1972. On the 5/5/73, accused filed another application by which he was requesting the addition of the route of Larnaca- Dhekelia on contract to the routes specified on his licence. On the 25/1O/73 he filed another application for the same purpose. In these two applications accused in fact applies that his existing road service licence which is a licence for a specified route, be extended so as to cover the route of Larnaca-Dhekelia "on contract" as well. His last application is under consideration.

Accused in his evidence added that he has filed an appeal to the Minister of Communications and Works from the dismissal of his application of the 9/ll/72. The Minister on the 20/10/72 ordered the Permits Authority to reconsider the said application.[*846]

Counsel for accused raised the same legal points which were raised in Case No, 5536/72. The main submission of counsel may be put as follows: There is nothing in the Law which prohibits a vehicle, for which there is in issue a road service licence for a specified route, to be used at the same time for transportation "on contract", if of course, the other provisions of the law are satisfied.

The argument of counsel is mostly based on the provisions of Law 33 of 1972, which amends the basic Lav/. Section 8B(l) of this law provides as follows:

"8Β. (1) Ανεξαρτήτως παντός

διαλαμβανομένου εν τω παρόντι Νόμω η αρχή αδειών παρέχει άδειαν οδικής

χρήσεως, συμφώνως προς τα διατάξεις του παρόντος Νόμου, εις παν όχημα προς

εκτέλεσιν μεταφοράς επιβατών επί συμβάσει οσάκις οι εν τω εδαφίω (2)

αναφερόμενοι όροι υφίστανται και τηρουμένων των διατάξεων του εδαφίου (3)

".

("8Β. (1) Notwithstanding anything in. this Law provided the licensing authority grants a road service licence, in accordance with the provisions of this Law, to any vehicle for carriage of passengers on contract whenever the conditions stated in subsection 2 exist and subject to the provisions of sub-section 3")·

Mr. Panayiotou argued that Law 33 of 1972 has created a new class of public service vehicles i.e. for the transportation of passengers "on contract", and this[*847]

Law should be read and construed without taking into consideration the provisions of the basic law, in view of the wording of section 8B(l) of Law 33 of 1972 (the underlined part). The only pre-requisites for the application of this law are specified in the above section. If, these pre-requisites are satisfied, then the Permits Authority have no discretion but to issue the applicant with the relevant road service licence. It is, therefore,the sibmission of learned counsel for accused that, although a vehicle may have a road service licence for any other purpose, if it also satisfies the pre-requisites of Law 33 of 1972, its owner is entitled and has the right to be issued with a road service licence, "on contract" as well.

I have given to the forceful submission of counsel my utmost consideration. I have also reflected on my judgment which I delivered in Case No. 5536/72 but I have not changed my view of the law in the matter for the following reasons:

Section 7(l) of Law 16/64 reads as follows:-

“Ουδέν όχημα δημόσιας χρήσεως θα

χρησιμοποιείται δι’ οιανδήποτε οδικήν χρήσιν εκτός εάν είναι εφωδιασμένον δι’

αδείας δυνάμει των διατάξεων του παρόντος Νόμου, και μόνον υπό τους εν τη

τοιαύτη αδεία διαλαμβανομένους όρους”.

(“No public service vehicle shall be used for any service on any road unless it is licensed under the provisions of this Law, and subject to the conditions of such licence”). [*848]

Section 8(1) empowers the Permits Authority to issue road service licences and impose any conditions they may think fit under the circumstances. The road service licence issued to accused i.e. exhibit 2, has been issued with the conditions attached to it as provided by the regulations made by the Council, of · Ministers under section 15 of the Law. Section 15 4th schedule of these regalat ions read as follows:-

“αν αδειούχον λεωφορείον οφείλει:-

(α) να κυκλοφορή μόνον επί της καθοριζομένης τροχαίας διαδρομής”.

(’’Every licensed bus has to

“(a) Serve only the specified route”).

Exhibit 1, has been issued on the relevant specified form and at the the back of it condition

(a) provides specifically that the said vehicle should only serve the specific route prescribed in the licence. It is therefore apparent that accused failed to comply with the conditions of his road service licence when he was transporting passengers on ’’contract’5 from Larnaca -- Bhekelia.

With regard to the submission of counsel that a person may have, for a vehicle, a road service licence “on contract” and on a specified route at the same time, I am of the view that this cannot be so. Section 4 of Law 45/71, which amends the basic. Law, provides that a vehicle executing carriage "on contract" must have a road [*849] service licence. The said provision thus created a specific class of vehicles executing a particular kind of carriage. The licences "on contract"· are issued on the specified form and section 4( 4) (α)(β)(γ)(δ)(ε) enumerates the conditions which should "he imposed on such licence. These conditions are completely different, and in fact conflicting to the conditions imposed on a road service licence for a special route. How could it be possible for the two kinds of road service licences to exist, when the conditions imposed on them are contradictory. For example, the road service licence on a specified route provides that the vehicle should only serve that route, whilst a road service licence "on contract" provides that the vehicle should only be used for the purpose of the "contract” and the driver is not allowed to collect any other passenger.

Counsel for the defence submitted that accused did not commit the offence in view of the fact that his vehicle satisfies the pre-requisites of Law 33 of 1972 and he is therefore entitled to a road service licence. From the evidence adduced, I do not agree with learned counsel for accused, particularly in view of the fact that the vehicle was licensed to serve a prescribed route, but I must also add that my duty, as a judge trying a criminal case, is to decide whether the offence as described in the charge/sheet has been committed. It is not upon me to decide whether accused is entitled to any kind of a road service licence. This is a matter for the Permits [*850] Authority to examine and exercise their discretion according to the provisions of the relevant law. If the Permits Authority have failed to reach a decision until now, or in any other way to exercise their discretion properly, it is not upon me to adjudicate. Accused or any other interested party may resort to a recourse in the appropriate Court.

For the reasons I have endeavoured to put forward hereinabove in this judgment I find that the prosecution proved their case beyond any reasonable doubt whatsoever and accused is found guilty as charged.

Accused found guilty as charged.