Court voids mortgage contract due to lack of consideration and sets aside transfer of property.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe court declared the mortgage contract and property transfer void, setting aside the transaction between the elderly plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff alleged the £6,000 loan was made under undue influence and without lawful consideration, while the defendant claimed the debt was genuine. The court found the creditor's story incredible and ruled that the absence of valid consideration rendered the contract and mortgage declaration void.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IASection 78 of the Contract Law, Cap. 149; Section 21(2) of Law 9/65: A contract and mortgage declaration are void and must be set aside if the creditor's story regarding the consideration is incredible and no lawful consideration exists.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IADecisioni correlate
Generato dall'IATesto completo
[*244] 1973 October 3
(STYLIANIDES, P.D.C., CHRYSOSTOMIS, D.J.)
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF LIMASSOL
Hatidje Shaban Durmush alias Hatice Hasan Selim,
Plaintiff,
and
Ahmed Hasan Cevdet,
Defendant.
(Action No. 3206/69).
Contract - Consideration - Bond - Not stating the consideration for which it was made - Not a bond in customary form - Open to a party to prove that there was no consideration - Section 78 of the Contract Law, Cap. 149.
Contract - Consideration - Amount of £6,000 alleged to have been lent to a 70 year old illiterate lady - On mortgage of immovable property as security - Creditor’s story as to consideration incredible - Contract and declaration of mortgage void due to absence of consideration - Set aside.
Civil Procedure - Indorsement of the writ - Statement of claim - Plaintiff may therein alter, modify or extend his claim without any amendment of the writ - Provided that he does not completely change the cause of action indorsed therein - Civil Procedure Rules 0.20 r. 1A.
Consideration - Absence of consideration - See, also, under “Contract”.
A. Dana, for the Plaintiff.
O. Mehmed, for the Defendant.
JUDGMENT
The judgment of the Court was delivered by:
STYLIANIDES. P.D.C.: The Plaintiff is [*245] a 70 year old villager of Yerovasa. She had the misfortune about 10 years ago of witnessing the shooting of her husband in her house. The couple had no children. She left Yerovasa for Malia village and thereafter she was moved to Episkopi village where for some time she was living in a tent.
The Defendant is aged 31 and he is the son of the Plaintiff’s nephew. He is a sub building engineer. He has spent his whole adult life at Famagusta with the exception of a six months’ stay in London in 1960.
The Plaintiff was and is the owner of rural properties at Yerovasa including an old vineyard, 12 donums 2 evleks in extent, covered by Regn. 2350 dated 1/4/48, a house at Limassol, Ayios Ioannis quarter, covered by Regn. 40620 dated 29/5/58 and a ruined house at Nicosia.
On 5/3/69 the parties in this action appeared before the D.L.O. of Famagusta and declared Mortgage Famagusta Y.271/69. The Plaintiff thereby mortgaged her immovables covered by Registrations 2350 Yerovasa and 40620 Limassol town, in favour of the Defendant as security for the payment of £6,000, plus interest at 9%. The contract and the declaration of mortgage is in Form B prescribed by Section 21(2) of Law 9/65. This declaration was forwarded to Limassol and on 10/3/69 it was recorded at the District Lands Office of Limassol under No. Y.644/69.
On 2/12/69 the Plaintiff instituted this action whereby she prayed for:- [*246]
“(a) Declaration that the transfer and/or declaration of transfer of the Plaintiff’s house situate in Limassol and of her vineyard at “Makrina” locality, Malia village, consisting about 7 donums, in the name of the Defendant and a bond or promissory note for £6,000, or for any amount made by the Plaintiff in favour of the Defendant were made as a result of undue influence and/or fraud and/or misrepresentation and/or without any lawful consideration.
(b) Declaration that the aforesaid transfers and/or declarations and the bond or promissory note are void and/or voidable and/or of no legal effect.
(c) Order setting aside the aforesaid declarations and/or transfers and the bond or promissory note."
(d) Order directing the L.R.O. to cancel the declarations and/or transfers and/or registrations in the name of the Defendant in respect of the aforesaid properties,”
and damages.
In the Statement of Claim it is
alleged that in 1969 the Defendant, by undue influence and/or fraud and/or misrepresentation, induced the Plaintiff to put her
mark on some documents which the Plaintiff subsequently found out to be a bond or promissory note in favour of the Defendant for £6,000, or for a substantial sum, and a mortgage No. D.M.Y. 271/69 and/or D.M.Y. 644 by the [*247] Plaintiff of her properties, which are properly described, in favour of the Defendant as security for the aforesaid sum. Particulars of undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation are set out. The Plaintiff at the material time was not in a position to appreciate the legal effect of putting her mark on the said documents and did so thinking that it would be in her best interest. It is further contended that the Defendant never paid the sum of £6,000 or any sum whatsoever to the Plaintiff at any time.
In paragraph 5 of the Statement of Claim the Plaintiff claims:-
“(a) Declaration that the mortgage and/or declaration of the mortgage in respect of the Plaintiff’s house under title deed No. 40620 situate at Ayios Ioannis quarter, Limassol town, and land and/or vineyard under title deed No. 2350 situate at Yerovasa, Limassol and/or a bond or promissory note for £6,000 or any amount made by the Plaintiff in favour of the Defendant were made as a result of undue influence and/or fraud and/or misrepresentation and/or without any lawful consideration.
(b) Declaration that the aforesaid transactions and/or declarations and/or the bond or promissory note are void and/or voidable and of no legal effect.
(c) Order setting aside the aforesaid transactions [*248] and/or declarations and/or the bond or promissory note.”
The Defendant contested and denied the claim. In his Statement of Defence he contended that the Plaintiff, with her free will and consent and without any inducement or the exercise of any fraud, or undue influence, or misrepresentation by the Defendant as alleged in the Statement of Claim, or at all, executed the bond in customary form and/or promissory note and declared the mortgage in favour of the Defendant as security for the sum stated in the bond in customary form and/or promissory note.
The aforesaid declaration of mortgage, which is in Turkish, and a Greek copy thereof were produced by consent as Exhs. 1 and 1A.
The Plaintiff was the sole witness for the claim. The Defendant (D.W.2), Mustafa Mehmet (D.W.1), the advocate’s clerk who filled in the form of the contract and the declaration of the mortgage, and Vedat Mehmet Zia (D.W.3), a villager who attested the declaration, testified for the Defence.
The Plaintiff testified that due to her age, the misfortune of losing her husband in the circumstances we have already explained, her mental faculties failed her and she was not able to understand. She visited the Defendant at Famagusta who asked her to take him her title deeds in order to fix them up. She denied that she signed any document, either bond or mortgage, she denied that she [*249] appeared before the D.L.O. of Famagusta and she categorically denied that she ever received as a loan or otherwise from the Defendant £6,000 or any other amount whatsoever.
Having regard to her evidence we feel that it is not necessary to embark on undue influence, misrepresentation, or fraud, as the Plaintiff failed to substantiate the allegations set out in the Statement of Claim.
We shall consider the issue of consideration.
We are satisfied from the oral
evidence of the. Defence and the contents of Exh. 1 that this document was duly declared and signed by the parties at
the D.L.O. of Famagusta on 5/3/69. This declaration bears the mark of the Plaintiff, the number of her identity card and the signature of the Land clerk before whom the parties declared the mortgage. Exh. 1 is a printed form prescribed by Section 21 (2) of the Immovable Property (Transfer and Mortgage) Law, 1965. It was duly filled in by D.W.1 at his office.
Mortgage is defined in Section 2 f Law 9/65 as follows:-
“ ‘Mortgage’, with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means a charge on immovable property voluntarily created by the owner thereof for securing a monetary debt or liability, whether liquidated or future or contingent.” [*250]
The first part of Exh. 1 is a contract whereby the mortgagor covenanted to pay to the mortgagee on 4/3/70 £6,000 plus compound interest at 9% as from 5/3/69 and, in the event of legal proceedings, for the recovery of the said sum and interest, the costs and expenses thereof. The second part is a declaration of mortgage. The existence of a monetary debt or liability, either liquidated or future or contingent is a pre-requisite for the creation of the charge of mortgage.
Mortgage is governed by the provisions of Law 9/65. The covenant referring to the debt or liability is governed by the Contract Law.
An agreement enforceable by law is a contract, (Section 2(2) (h) of the Contract Law, Cap. 149.)
In Dutt on Contract, 4th. Edn., p. 55 we read:-
“The definition of a contract appears to be built upon a succession of definitions of the elements which go to make a contract, such as proposal, acceptance, promise, consideration, agreement. Consideration and promise are the two incidents necessary to constitute a contract. Taken together they form the whole of it. A contract means consensus ad idem.”
Section 10 of the Contract Law sets out the various elements which may affect the validity of a contract and thus prevent it from being legally binding or enforceable. [*251]
Consideration is, except as otherwise provided by Section 25 of the Contract Law, a necessary element for the validity of a contract. The concept of consideration is peculiar to the common law. The classic statement on consideration is that in Currie v. Misa
(1875) L.R. 10 Ex. 153, 162:-
“A valuable consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forebearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other.”
In our Contract Law, which is a reproduction of the Indian Contract Act, “consideration is defined in Section 2(2) (d).
A bond in customary form is a
peculiar bond of our Law. It originated from the provisions of Art. 1610 of the Mejelle and its requisite elements are found in Section 78 of the Contract
Law, Cap. 149 which reads:-
“A ‘bond in customary form’ is a promise in writing made by one person to another signed by the maker in the presence of at least two witnesses themselves competent to contract, engaging to pay, on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum of money to a person specified therein, together with interest at a rate fixed therein not exceeding [*252] nine per centum per annum and, in the event of any legal proceedings thereon, the costs thereof, and stating therein the consideration for which it is given.”
Triantafyllides, J., as he then was, had this to say in Papastratis v. Economou (1970) 4 J.S.C., 402, 404:-
“In our view the provisions of section 78 have to be strictly complied with if a bond is to be a bond in customary form; and this view is strengthened by the kind of provisions set out in sections 79 and 80 of Cap. 149.
“Moreover, it has to be borne in mind, that a bond in customary form is granted by the Limitation of Actions Law (Cap. 15) a much longer lease of life, for purposes of proceedings based on it, than ordinary bonds, and for this reason, too, we think that it is quite important that formalities regarding a bend in customary form should be fully complied with.”
If the covenant, part of Exh. 1, is a bond in customary form the contents of such bond are conclusive evidence of the facts therein stated. (Section 80 of Cap. 149.)
Mr. Dana argued that tile covenant, Exh. 1, is not a bond in customary form as, (a) it was not signed by [*253] the maker (the Plaintiff) in the presence of at least two witnesses, and (b) it does not state therein the consideration for which it was given.
With regard to the first ground the evidence comes from the witnesses of the Defence, mainly from D.W.1 Mustafa Mehmet. and D.W.3 Vedat Mehmet Zia. D.W.1 Mustafa Mehmet stated that the D.L.O clerk read over and/or explained in Greek the contents and/or nature of the declaration, the parties signed in the presence of the D.L.O. clerk and in his own presence; he attested their signatures and then the D.L.O. clerk asked for a second witness. The parties and the witness (D.W.1 ) were facing the counter having their backs turned to the wall. D.W.1 turned and called D.W.3, who was about 10 ft. away, to attest the signatures; they explained to him the transaction and he inquired himself, and thereupon he signed as an attesting witness. D.W.3 stated that he was about one foot behind the parties, he followed them, he saw the Plaintiff affixing her mark and, though the parties and D.W.1 Mustafa Mehmet were within his sight for the whole time, he did not see either the Defendant or D.W.1 putting their signature on Exh. 1. It is in evidence that the Plaintiff affixed her mark first, the Defendant signed and then D.W.1 Mustafa Mehmet attested their signatures.
We reject the evidence of D.W.3 on this issue. We are not satisfied that the Plaintiff signed in the presence of D.W.3. [*254]
Nevertheless, as she signed in the presence of D.W.1 Mustafa Mehmet and the D.L.O. clerk we are of the view that this requirement of the formalities of the bond has been complied with. The provision of the law is that the maker signs in the presence of at least two witnesses. In our view this is satisfied notwithstanding that the Land clerk did not sign on the first page under the Turkish word “Sahit” (which means ‘witness’ and not ‘witnesses’) but above the words “Land Clerk” on the second page. A comparison of the provisions of Section 78 of the Contract Law with Section 23 of the Wills and Succession Law lends support to our view.
In the body of this covenant the consideration for which it was made is not stated. On the top of the form we read:-
“Capital £6,000
Amount secured £6,540.”
This falls short of the requirement of the law which has to be strictly complied with. We therefore hold that this covenant is not a bond in customary form.
As this contract is not a bond in customary form it is open to a party to prove that there was no consideration. In Dutt on The Indian Contract Act we read at page 292:-
“It has become the established practice of the courts in India, in cases of contracts, to require satisfactory proof that consideration [*255] has been actually received according to the terms of the contract; …. It is open to a party, even where a document states what was the consideration, to prove that there was no consideration or that it failed, or that it was paid in full, or that it was other than that stated.”
The Plaintiff is an old lady who receives £10 per month rent from her house in Limassol, about £10 per month from some authority in the Turkish quarter as “Refugee Pension” and a negligible income from her Yerovasa properties. Her ordinary needs can be met by these amounts. She lives at Episkopi in a hut which was made for her by the Defendant on payment by the Plaintiff to him of £100. She admitted visiting her relative, the Defendant, at Famagusta but she denied categorically that the Defendant gave to her any amount.
The Defendant’s version is that the Plaintiff visited him at .Famagusta in August or September, 1968 where she stayed in his house for 2-3 days. She paid another visit to him towards the end of the same year. During this visit she told him that she was in need of money and that she was about to sell the house in Limassol, but due to the prevailing conditions she could not realize a good price. Early in 1969 the Plaintiff visited him again in Famagusta where she repeated that she was in need of £6,000. He inquired why she required this amount but she confined herself to saying: “I need this amount. [*256] Either I get it or I have to sell the; house to realise this amount.” She asked the Defendant to lend her the amount and, as security, to mortgage in his favour her house in Limassol and her vineyard at locality “Makrina”. Without any hesitation the Defendant agreed and advised her to bring her title deeds to Famagusta and declare the mortgage. In cross-examination it was put to the Plaintiff that she wanted to sell her house to raise money to build a new house. The Defendant till today does not know and has not inquired why his aunt (the Plaintiff) wanted to borrow such a huge amount in the circumstances. The Plaintiff left Famagusta to return a month later on the day prior to the date of the declaration of the mortgage, bringing her title deeds with her. On the morning of the declaration the Defendant handed to the Plaintiff £6,000 in five pound notes at the Defendant’s flat.
This young sub building engineer did not receive any property whatsoever from his parents. He and his family live in a rather small rented flat. Before 1963 he was in the employment of the Government drawing £45 per month. In 1964 he was receiving £30 per month from some Turkish authority. It is further his allegation that he earned some money from two small building contracts and that later he had a further income by drawing plans for villagers of Famagusta district. He said that in 1964 he possessed £1,500, but later on in his evidence he increased his 1964 savings to £2,500. [*257]
Over the years he saved £6,150 which, curiously enough, he kept in a small safe made of tin and fireproof bricks, which he had hidden in a suitcase in the “sende” of his flat. He kept his money hidden in the “sende” because he always wanted to have his money near him. Before 1960 he had an account with a Bank. He gave away all the money he managed to save through the years. He lent this money to an aunt with whom he had no close contact and whom he had not seen from 1962 to 1968. His security was a house which he had seen for the last time only when he was 15 years old. We presume that this sub building engineer knew that 14-15 years is sufficient time for a house to become dilapidated or even almost ruined. Nevertheless, he made no inquiries at all about the condition of the house which was offered as security for his money which he always kept near him. He saw the vineyard for the last time in 1962. It was an old vineyard situated in a small village; its inhabitants were removed elsewhere by the Turkish leadership at the end of 1963. To a question put to him by the Court he replied that at the time of the mortgage he estimated the value of both the house and the vineyard at £7,000. In re-examination he changed the figure in an endeavour to show that the security was sound. How he could estimate, even roughly, the value of properties he had not seen for so long we are at a loss to understand. He knew very well that the mortgagor could not repay the loan. He did not even bother to inquire as to how this old lady would pay this debt to him. It is his allegation that [*258] he descended a ladder leading to the “sende” holding the money in his hands, he counted it out and the old lady placed it in a piece of cloth which she placed in a suitcase. Later on he stated that he did not see the old lady actually receiving the money; he did not know what happened to the money but, at any rate, this old lady must have conveyed these six thousand treasured pounds to Limassol by bus in her suitcase.
We watched very carefully the demeanour of this witness. He did not impress us at all. His story is incredible and it was put before us in an unconvincing way. We reject it.
The other evidence with regard to the consideration consists of repeated declarations of the Plaintiff at the office of D.W.1, the advocate’s clerk, and to D.W.3 Vedat Mehmet Zia, that she had received the money. Having rejected the story of the Defendant we attach no weight at all to these alleged declarations.
We find as a fact that the Plaintiff did not borrow any money from the Defendant. The whole transaction arouses suspicion but we are not going to surmise why and under what circumstances this lonely, old and illiterate villager declared this mortgage before the District Lands Office of Famagusta. As there was no consideration the contract is void.
Remedy
In the general indorsement the relief prayed for is in respect of transfer or declaration of transfer of [*259] the properties and the bond or promissory note. The complaint is undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation and lack of consideration. The Statement of Claim contains the material facts for the Plaintiff’s case. The relief sought is in respect of the bond or promissory note and the mortgage or declaration of the mortgage.
In a general indorsement it is ‘not essential to set forth the precise ground of complaint, or the precise remedy or relief to which the plaintiff considers himself entitled’. (Order 2, r. 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules). Whenever a statement of claim is delivered the plaintiff may therein alter, modify or extend his claim without any amendment of: the indorsement of the writ. (Order 20, r. 1A). This rule corresponds to the old. English Order 20, r. 4 Hence the plaintiff is permitted in his subsequent statement of claim, to alter, modify or extend his original claim to any extent, and to claim further or other relief, without amending his writ (Large v. Large
(1877) W.N. 198; Johnson v. Palmer (1879) 4 C.P.D. 258); provided he does not completely change the cause of action indorsed on the writ without amending the latter.
In Graff Brothers Estates Ltd. v. Rimrose Brook Joint Sewerage Board & Another (1953) 2 All E.R., 631 the plaintiffs’ claim was for damages for
wrongfully taking away the support of the plaintiffs’ land and houses. In their statement of claim they alleged:
“(3) …. the defendants entered into the said land of the plaintiffs by driving [*260] tunnels through the same and pumped water from the said land and thereby withdrew support from the said land and buildings of the plaintiffs. (4) The said entry and pumping constituted a trespass. (5) Alternatively the defendants were negligent in failing to take any or any sufficient precautions to prevent support being withdrawn from the said land and buildings of the plaintiffs by the said tunnels and the said pumping of water from the said land”.
In an application to strike out para.
(5) of the statement of claim on the ground that it constituted a new cause of action which was not covered by the indorsement of the writ, Morris, L.J., had this to say (635):-
“Here, in my judgment, para.
(5) of the statement of claim does not embark on a different set of ideas or on a different allegation of fact. In a sense, para. (5) of the statement of claim might be regarded as a new explanation or a new allegation as to how the wrongful taking away of support may have come about, but it is the same complaint as is denoted by the indorsement on the writ. By ‘complaint’, of course, I am not referring to damage, but to cause of action. In my judgment, there was in para. (5) no allegation of a new cause of action”. [*261]
Singleton, L.J., after referring to Order 2, r. 1 and Order 3, r. 2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, which form part of our Order 2, r. 3, said:-
“I think that the plaintiffs were entitled so to plead in their statement of claim and that it does not amount to completely changing the cause of action indorsed on the writ …. Indeed, they ought not to be allowed to set up a new cause of action without amending the writ, speaking generally. But this is not a new cause .of action”.
The function of pleadings is to give fair notice of the case which has to he met and to define the issues on which the Court will have to adjudicate in order to determine the matters in dispute between the parties.
In the instant case the complaint in the indorsement and in the Statement of Claim is the same. The only difference between the indorsement and the Statement of Claim is that the relief sought is, in the indorsement, cancellation of the declaration of transfer and, in the Statement of Claim, cancellation of a declaration of mortgage. The Defendant answered his opponent’s case as set out in the Statement of Claim, and the trial proceeded on the basis of the Statement of Claim and the Statement of Defence. The Plaintiff is entitled to the relief claimed in the Statement of Claim on the ground of absence [*262] of consideration, as we have already found.
In the result, we give Judgment for the Plaintiff in the following terms:-
(a) Declaration that the contract and declaration of Mortgage Famagusta D.M.Y. 271/69 – Limassol Y.644/69 - are void.
(b) Order setting aside the aforesaid contract and mortgage.
With regard to costs, in all the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.
Judgment as above.
No order as to costs.