Court dismisses claimants' attempt to introduce expert reports as hearsay and violates tribunal rules.

[*231] 1973 July 2

(PIKIS, AG. P.D.C., ANASTASSIOU, D.J.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF KYRENIA

1. Evanthia I. Papassava,

2. Ioannis K. Papassavas,

Claimants,

and

The Republic of Cyprus,

Acquiring Authority.

(Consolidated References Nos.34/72, 35/72 and 36/72).

Evidence - Hearsay evidence - Principles authorising admission of - Compulsory acquisition - Assessment of compensation - Documents containing studies prepared by claimants’ experts - Already in the Court file - Sought to be produced by claimants, through Court Registrar, in order to substantiate their case - Introduction of said documents inadmissible as infringing rule against hearsay - Moreover said documents inadmissible as infringing rule 19 of the Compensation Assessment Tribunal Rules, 1956.

Compensation Assessment Tribunal Rules, 1956 - Expert evidence - Notice of, to be given in advance to the other side - Rule 19 of the aforesaid Rules - See, also, under “Evidence”.

Hearsay evidence - See, under “Evidence”.

A. Dikigoropoulos, for the Claimants in References Nos.34 and 35/71.

G. Kaizer, for the Claimant in Reference No. 36/72.

K. Michaelides with A. Christofides, for the Acquiring Authority.

RULING

The ruling of the Court was delivered by:

PIKIS, AG. P.D.C.: The Registrar of the [*232] Kyrenia District Court has been called as a witness and asked to produce certain documents filed in Court and made available for inspection, by the claimants, pursuant to an order of the Court dated 15/5/73. Objection has been taken to the admissibility of these documents on the grounds (a) that they infringe the rule against hearsay; and (b) that they infringe the relevant rule of the Compensation Assessment Tribunal Rules 1956, whereby it is provided that advance notice must be given of any expert testimony to be given in Court, accompanied by the particulars specified in Rule 19, after an order of the Court is first obtained, authorising the calling of more than one expert witness.

Mr. Dikigoropoulos sought to counter the objections of the Acquiring Authority, mostly citing from Phipson, 10th Edition, paragraph 768, wherein an exposition is made of the principle authorising the admission of hearsay evidence, where .such evidence is tendered for the purpose of establishing that a certain document or a certain statement has been made, independently of the truth of the contents of such document; where hearsay evidence is received for this purpose, it is referred to as ‘‘original evidence”.

In Phipson On Evidence. 11th Edition, at paragraphs 638, 639 and 640, the learned authors discourse at length the implications of the rule against hearsay and specifically state that if the object of introducing a document containing hearsay information, is to rely on the truth or correctness of the contents of it, then the rule [*233] excluding hearsay evidence applies with equal force to documentary evidence, as with oral evidence, unless the document comes under any of the exceptions recognized by the law, which exceptions are mostly to be found in Rule 4, of the Evidence Act, Cap. 9. The decision of the House of Lords in Myers v. D.P.P. (1965) A.C. 1001 emphasizes in very certain terms that the rule against hearsay is not to be bypassed by a side wind and unless the conditions of admissibility are satisfied, it is the duty of the Court to reject hearsay documentary evidence.

The position is best summarised in Subramaniam v. The Public Prosecutor (1956) 1 W.L.R., 965, where it was said:-

“Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself called as a witness, may, or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hear-say and it is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made”.

Reverting to the facts of the case, what the claimants propose to introduce are documents containing studies apparently made by experts regarding the tourist potential of the Pahyammos area, the value of the land and the likely cost for the development of the land. The purpose [*234] for which such evidence is sought to be adduced is, evidently, not to establish the fact that the Acquiring Authority had knowledge of the contents of such documents, which is admitted, but so as to rely on the contents of these reports by way of persuasion in their effort to substantiate their case. We are clearly of the view that the introduction of such evidence would infringe the rule against hearsay and we sustain the objection.

We are further of the view that these documents are inadmissible for another reason, namely that their production would infringe Rule 19 of the Compensation Assessment Tribunal Rules of 1956. In accordance with Rule 19, every valuation relating to the value of land must be particularised in the manner specified in Rule 19(3) and copy of such valuation should be furnished, in advance, to the other side. In fact in a Ruling given on 16th June, 1973, giving leave to the claimants to call more than one expert witness, it is specifically stated by the Court “The evidence of every expert touching the value of land, must be summarised in a report to be furnished to the other side, seven days before the hearing of the Reference”.

We can well understand the intention of the legislator in enacting a rule such as Regulation 19 of the 1956 Rules, considering that in cases of acquisition expert reports take the form of pleadings and define the triable issues. In the Ruling of the Court, dated 15th May, 1973, it is specifically stated: “The order I am about to make, does not, and I must remind applicants of this, entitle them without leave [*235] to call more than one expert to testify in support of their claim. Perhaps they may decide to amend their valuation report by relying on extracts from these reports, subject of course to the leave of the Court being first obtained.

For the reasons above given, we rule that the evidence is inadmissible.

Order accordingly.