Supreme Court allows appeal on first-instance jurisdiction, ordering new trial for counts tried without authority.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe Supreme Court allowed the appellants' appeal regarding the District Court of Nicosia's lack of territorial jurisdiction over specific criminal counts. Although the trial court had jurisdiction for conspiracy charges, it lacked authority for harbouring and aiding offences committed in other districts. The court held that the jurisdictional issue could be raised for the first time on appeal and declared the verdict and sentence on those counts a nullity, ordering a fresh trial in a competent district.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IASection 23 of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960; Section 69(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155: A trial court's lack of territorial jurisdiction renders its verdict a nullity, and the issue of jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal, necessitating a new trial in a competent court.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IAGiurisprudenza citata
Generato dall'IADecisioni correlate
Generato dall'IATesto completo
[*75] 1974 April 29
(TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P., STAVRINIDES, L. LOIZOU, JJ.)
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Vassilios Lasarou Mouyios and Others,
Appellants,
v.
The Police,
Respondents.
(Criminal Appeals Nos. 3563-3565).
District Court - Jurisdiction - Territorial Jurisdiction in criminal matters - Offences not committed within District in which trial Court is established but within two other Districts - No jurisdiction - Section 23 of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 (Law 14 of 1960).
Criminal Procedure - Practice - Jurisdiction in a criminal matter - Issue of - Can be raised for the first time on appeal -even though it was not raised at the trial - “Before pleading to the charge or Information” in section 69(1) (a) of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155 – Regulates procedure at the trial.
Criminal Procedure - Trial in Criminal Cases - Lack of jurisdiction - Verdict of guilty and sentence a nullity - New trial ordered Section 145(l) (d) of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap 155 and section 25(3) of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 (Law 14 of 1960).
Jurisdiction - Territorial jurisdiction of District Court in criminal matters - Issue of jurisdiction - Whether it can be raised for the first time on appeal - Proper course to be followed by Court of Appeal after finding that trial Court did not have jurisdiction - See, also, under “Criminal Procedure”; “District Court1”.
E. Efstathiou with C. Adamides, for the Appellant in appeal No. 3563.
C. Adamides, for the Appellants in appeals Nos.3564 & 3565.
N. Charalambous, Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT
The judgment of the Court was delivered by:-
TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P.: The three appellants [*76] were accused 1, 2 and 3 in criminal case No. 3481/74 before the District Court of Nicosia; they were found guilty, on their own pleas, of the offences of “knowingly harbouring a person whom they knew to have entered the Republic of Cyprus through a non-approved port, contrary to sections 2 and 19(1) (h) of the Aliens and Immigration Law, Cap. 105” and of “aiding” such “person to leave the Republic of Cyprus through a non-approved port, contrary to sections 20 and 21 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154 and sections 2 and 12(l)(5) of the Aliens and Immigration Law, Cap. 105” appellants (accused) 1 and 2 were sentenced to concurrent terms of three months’ imprisonment in respect of each one of the above offences and appellant (accused) 3 to concurrent terms of one month’s imprisonment: they have all appealed against the said sentences.
In the notice of appeal counsel for the appellants raised the issue that the District Court of Nicosia, namely a Senior District judge who dealt with the criminal case in question, by way of summary criminal proceedings, did not possess jurisdiction in relation to the said offences, which were charged by means of counts 3 and 4; counts 1 and 2, charged the appellants with two offences of conspiracy to commit a misdemeanour.
It is not in dispute that in respect of the conspiracy charges the District Court did possess jurisdiction. The appellants initially pleaded not guilty to all four counts, when they first appeared before the trial Court on the 13th March, 1974; then, on the 4th April, 1974, [*77] they were allowed to withdraw their pleas of not guilty on counts 3 and 4 and to plea guilty instead; on the 5th April, 1974, no evidence was offered by the prosecution against them as regards counts 1 and 2 and they were acquitted and discharged in relation thereto; they were sentenced, as aforesaid, on counts 3 and 4.
It is proper to examine first whether the trial Court was vested with jurisdiction to deal with counts 3 and 4: The relevant provision is section 23 of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 (Law 14/60), which reads as follows;-
“23.-(1) Every District Court shall, subject to the provisions of section 19, have jurisdiction to try in accordance with the provision of section 24 –“
“(a) all offences committed within the district in which the Court is established;”
“(b) all offences committed within the Sovereign Base Areas by a Cypriot against or in relation to a Cypriot.”
“(2) Where an offence is committed on the boundary of two or more districts or within a mile of the boundary or is committed partly in one district and partly in another or other districts such offence may be tried by the District Court of either or any such district as if it had been wholly committed in the district in which it is tried.” [*78]
“For the purposes of this subsection ‘district’ includes the Sovereign Base Areas.”
“(3) ………………………………………………………………………”
The particulars of counts 3 and
4 were as follows:-
Count 3
“The accused between the 19th and 28th day of February, 1974, both days inclusive, at Larnaca, in the District of Larnaca and at Paphos, in the District of Paphos, did knowingly harbour Georghios Karoussos of Greece, whom they knew to have entered the Republic of Cyprus through a non-approved port”.
Count 4
“The accused at the time and place in count III hereof mentioned, did aid Georghios Karoussos of Greece to leave the Republic of Cyprus through a non-approved port”.
It is, therefore, quite clear, on the basis of the foregoing, that the District Court of Nicosia did not possess at any material time jurisdiction to deal with the offences charged by counts 3 and 4, as they had both been, allegedly, committed in the districts of Larnaca and Paphos and not at all in the district of Nicosia.
It has been contended by learned counsel for the respondents that it was too late for the appellants to raise on appeal, before this Court, the issue of jurisdiction, as [*79] they had not raised it before the trial Court; counsel relied in this respect on section 69(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155, which reads as follows;-
“69. (1) The accused may, before pleading to the charge or information, plead –“
“(a) that the Court before which he is called upon to plead has not and that some other Court has jurisdiction over him of over the offence with which he is charged, and, if the plea is sustained, the Court shall send the case to be tried before the Court in the Colony which has jurisdiction over the offender or over the offence”;
He stressed, in particular, the expression “before pleading to the charge or information”.
An earlier provision in Cyprus similar to section 69(1) (a) was clause 153 of the Cyprus Courts of Justice Order, 1882, which reads as follows-
“153 It shall be lawful for any person against whom an information is filed to plead that the Court has not, and that some other Court has, jurisdiction over the offence with which he is charged, or over him, and if judgment is given in favour of the accused upon such a plea, the Court shall send the information to be tried before the Court which has jurisdiction over the offence or over the offender”. [*80]
Two cases were cited to us as regards the time at which the issue of jurisdiction has to he raised but they are not very helpful for the purpose of dealing with the objection raised, as above, by counsel for the respondents in this case.
In R. v. Kouloumbrides,
8 C.L.R. 65, the issue of the jurisdiction of the trial Court was raised for the first time on appeal; it was decided against the
appellant (accused) and so the Supreme Court did not deal with the point raised by the respondent that the appellant could not “take exception to the jurisdiction of the District
Court for the first time on the hearing of the appeal”.
In R. v. Reis and ethers. 12 C.L.R. 8, it was observed that the issue as to jurisdiction which had been raised at the trial after a plea of not guilty should not have been treated as triable concurrently with the question of guilt but that such issue should have been raised before plea and should have been tried before the trial.
In England - where the criminal procedure is very similar to ours - the matter of the jurisdiction of the trial Court was raised ex proprio motu by the Court of Criminal Appeal, in The King v. Dennis,
(1924) 1 K.B. 867, where Avory J. said the following (at p. 868):-
“We cannot accede to the suggestion made by Mr. Clements, that because this is a test case we should overlook a manifest want of jurisdiction in the Court of trial. It is always the duty of [*81] this Court, even although objection is not put forward by counsel, or in the notice of appeal, to take note of a point which goes to the jurisdiction of the Court of trial”.
In view of the above view of Avory J. we are of the opinion that we cannot prevent counsel for the appellants from raising the issue as to the jurisdiction of the trial Court, even, though such issue was not raised at the trial in our view the expression “before pleading to the charge or information” in section 69(1) (a) regulates the,., procedure at the trial - apparently in the manner prescribed in the. Reis case, supra - and does not necessarily exclude the raising of such an issue for the first time on appeal; and, as already stated in this judgment, such issue having been raised before us in this case, we are of the opinion that the District Court of Nicosia had no jurisdiction to deal with counts 3 and 4.
It has not even been suggested in argument - and it could not be the correct position - that because the District Court of Nicosia possessed jurisdiction in respect of counts 1 and 2 it, consequently, possessed also jurisdiction in respect of .counts 3 and 4.; there exists no provision in Cyprus, in respect of summary criminal proceedings, which could be relied on in support of this proposition, such as, for example, section 11(2) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1925, in England; and it is well established that each count is to treated as a separate charge or information. (See, inter alia, Latham & Others v. The Queen,
9 Cox C.C. 516). [*82]
The question that arises next is what order is to he made by us, after we have found that the trial Court did not have jurisdiction to deal with counts 3 and 4; In our view the proceedings as regards such counts are a nullity; as was stated by the Earl of Reading C.J. in
R. v. Crane,(1920)3 K.B. 236, at p. 239,-“…the Court in this case treats the verdict of guilty and sentence which have been recorded against the appellant as a nullity and as if they had been expunged from the record”. In the Crane case, supra, a new trial was ordered and this course was approved when that case was considered on appeal (see Crane v. D.P.P., (1921)
2 A.C. 299).
In the exercise of our powers under section l45(l)(d) of Cap. 155, as well as those under section 25(3) of Law 14/60 - to which we can resort notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Law or in any other Law or in any Rules of Court and in addition to any powers conferred thereby” and which are wider, as pointed out in Loiziss v The Republic, (1969)
2 C.L.R. 217, at p. 219, than our powers under section 145(1) (d) of Cap.155 we hereby order that the three appellants should be tried afresh on counts 3 and 4 before either the District Court of Larnaca or the District Court of Paphos. As they have been on bail pending their trial they should be let out on bail up to the date of their new trial, on the .same terms as before.
It is, of course, entirely up to the District Court, which will deal with this case afresh, to decide as [*83] to what are the proper sentences to be imposed on the appellants, but we have no doubt that it will be duly taken into account that the appellants have already served in part their sentences and that appellant 3, who was sent to prison for only a month, has served by now more than half of such sentence.
Appeal allowed.
New trial ordered.