Supreme Court dismisses committal order application for non-payment of judgment debts without sufficient evidence.

[*1787] 1972 Οκτωβρίου 21

ΔΙΚΑΣΤΗΣ: (ΜΙΧΑΗΛΙΔΗΣ, Ε.Δ.)

ΕΝ ΤΩ ΕΠΑΡΧΙΑΚΩ ΔΙΚΑΣΤΗΡΙΩ ΛΕΜΕΣΟΥ

Μεταξύ: Κικίτσας Πλάτωνος Σολομωνίδη,

Εναγούσης

(Αιτούσης),

και

Φοίβου Παπαπεύκου και Άλλων

Εναγομένων

(Καθ'ων η αίτησις).

Πολιτική Δικονομία - Οφείλεται δυνάμει

δικαστικής αποφάσεως - Εκτέλεσις - Διάταγμα περιοδικών πληρωμών εκδοθέν δυνάμει

του άρθρου 91 του Περί Πολιτικής Δικονομίας Νόμου Κεφ. 6 - Δεν απαιτείται

επίδοσις οπισθογραφημένου αντιγράφου τούτου εις τον εξ αποφάσεως

οφειλέτην - Η διάταξις 42Α των Περί Πολιτικής Δικονομίας Διαδικαστικών

Κανονισμών δεν αναφέρεται εις απόφασιν ή διάταγμα δια την καταβολήν χρηματικής

οφειλής.

Πολιτική Δικονομία - Οφείλεται δυνάμει

δικαστικής αποφάσεως - Εκτέλεσις - Αίτησις δι' έκδοσιν διατάγματος φυλακίσεως

δυνάμει του άρθρου 82 του Περί Πολιτικής Δικονομίας Νόμου Κεφ. 6 - Δεν υπάρχει

μαρτυρία πληρούσα τας προϋποθέσεις του εν λόγω άρθρου 82 - Αίτησις

απορρίπτεται.

Συνταγματικόν Δίκαιον - Έκδοσις

διατάγματος φυλακίσεως

δυνάμει του άρθρου 82 του περί Πολιτικής

Δικονομίας Νόμου Κεφ. 6 - Δεν αντίκειται προς το άρθρον 11 του Συντάγματος.

Κ. Τσιρίδης δια την αιτούσαν Α. Αναστασιάδης δια τους καθ' ων η αίτησις.

ΑΠΟΦΑΣΙΣ Χ

ΜΙΧΑΗΛΙΔΗΣ, Ε.Δ: Δια της υπό κρίσιν αιτήσεως, [*1788] ερειδομένης επί της διατάξεως του άρθρου 82 του Περί

Πολιτικής Δικονομίας Νόμου Κεφ. 6, η αιτούσα εξαιτείται την υπό του δικαστηρίου

έκδοσιν διατάγματος φυλακίσεως των καθ' ων η αίτησις 1 και 2 - δυνάμει

δικαστικής αποφάσεως οφειλετών - επί τω ότι παρέλειψαν να προβούν εις τας

μηνιαίας αυτών πληρωμάς βάσει του σχετικού δικαστικού διατάγματος.

Η εν λόγω αίτησις προσβάλλεται δια δυο κυρίως λόγους. Πρώτον, ότι δεν υπήρξε

συμμόρφωσις προς τον θεσμόν 8 της Διατάξεως 40 του Περί Πολιτικής Δικονομίας Διαδικαστικού Κανονισμού, και δεύτερον

"η ένορκος δήλωσις εφ' ης στηρίζεται η αίτησις δεν είναι επαρκής καί/ή δεν

παρέχει τα απαραίτητα στοιχεία." Περαιτέρω δια της ενστάσεως αυτών οι καθ' ων η αίτησις ισχυρίζονται ότι

ουδέν οφείλουν προς την αιτούσαν.

Η διάταξις του άρθρου 82 του Περί

Πολιτικής Δικονομίας Νόμου Κεφ. 6, ήτις παρέχει εις δικαστήριον αστικής

δικαιοδοσίας εξουσίαν εκδόσεως διατάγματος φυλακίσεως εξ, αποφάσεως οφειλέτου,

έχει ως ακολούθως:

"When the debtor may be

imprisoned.

82. Where upon any investigation by the Court

respecting the ability of a judgment debtor to pay the amount due under a

judgment or order it appears to the Court that the creditor has been unable to

obtain satisfaction of his judgment by the sale of the debtor's property or by

attachment of property in the hands of

_______________________

Χ An English translation of this judgement appears at pp.

1795 – 1802 post.

some third party; and [*1789]

(a) that the debtor then has or since the making

of the judgment or order has had sufficient means to pay the money directed to

he paid by him or some part thereof which still remains unpaid, and that he

refuses or neglects to pay it according to the judgment or order; or

(b) that he has made or suffered to be made any

gift, delivery, or transfer of any property, or charged, removed or concealed

any property and has thereby prevented the creditor from obtaining payment of

the judgment debt or any part thereof,

the Court may on the application of the creditor

commit the debtor to prison for any term not exceeding twelve months, or -until

the payment of the sum due, subject to the provisions hereinafter contained;

but may at any subsequent time order his release on the request of the

creditor."

Επειδή κατά την ακροαματικήν διαδικασίαν

συνεζητήθη η φύσις του υπό του δικαστηρίου εκδιδομένου διατάγματος φυλακίσεως

θεωρώ σκόπιμον όπως προβώ εις εξέτασιν του θέματος επί τη βάσει της άχρι τούδε

νομολογίας.

Η ως άνω αναφερομένη διάταξις του άρθρου

82 του Περί Πολιτικής Δικονομίας Νόμου Κεφ. 6 μετά των συνεπακολούθων τοιούτων

83, 84 και 85 προσεβλήθησαν ως αντισυνταγματικαί και δη ως αντιβαίνουσαι προς την διάταξιν του άρθρου 11 του

Συντάγματος δι' ου κατοχυρούται το δικαίωμα ελευθερίας [*1790] και προσωπικής ασφαλείας του ατόμου. Το θέμα αντισυνταγματικότητος ηγέρθη

ενώπιον του Επαρχιακού Δικαστηρίου Αμμοχώστου κατά την ακροαματικήν διαδικασίαν

αιτήσεως εις την υπ' αριθμόν 1248/59 αγωγήν, το δε ζήτημα παρεπέμφθη προς

εξέτασιν ενώπιον του Ανωτάτου Συνταγματικού Δικαστηρίου συμφώνως της παρ. 1 του

άρθρου 144 του Συντάγματος (ως ήτο η διαδικασία προ της εκδόσεως της αποφάσεως

εις την υπόθεσιν Attorney-General v. Ibrahim and others 1964 C.L.R. 195 - Ίδε ωσαύτως The Improvement Board of Eylendjia v. Constantinou (1967) 6 J.S.C. 803 όσον αφορά την ακολουθητέαν διαδικασίαν προσβολής

αντισυνταγματικότητος νόμου).

Δυνάμει της υπ' αριθμόν 85/62 αποφάσεως

αυτού (Panayiotis Kayttani of Varoshia and Emilios Makris of Limassol, 3 R.S.C.C. 143) το Ανώτατον Συνταγματικόν Δικαστήριον απεφάνθη ότι αι

διατάξεις των άρθρων 82, 83, 84 και 85 του Περί Πολιτικής Δικονομίας Νόμου Κεφ.

6 δεν είναι αντισυνταγματικαί και μη αντικείμεναι προς το άρθρον 11 του

Συντάγματος, η δε εκούσια παράλειψις (wilful evasion) εξ αποφάσεως χρεώστου να καταβάλη την οφειλήν αυτού

ισοδυναμεί προς "μη

συμμόρφωσιν προς νόμιμον διαταγήν δικαστηρίου" εν τη εννοία της παρ. 2 του

άρθρου 11 του Συντάγματος.

Ο τ. Δικαστής του Ανωτάτου Συνταγματικού

Δικαστηρίου Μουνίρ αναφέρει εις την σελίδα 145 της ως άνω αναφερθείσης

αποφάσεως:-

"In the opinion of the Court the aforesaid

wilful evasion of a judgment debtor to pay his debt amounts to his

'non-compliance with the lawful order of a court', in the sense of paragraph 2

of Article 11 and, therefore, the provisions of section 82 of CAP.6, and of the

ensuing sections 83,84 and 85 of CAP. [*1791] 6, which

are incidental to the provisions of section 82, are not, in the- Opinion of the

Court, contrary to, or inconsistent with, Article 11 of the Constitution.

The concluding words of section 82 might appear, at

first sight, to give one citizen, namely, the creditor, discretion in the

matter of the continued imprisonment of another citizen, namely, the judgment

debtor. In the opinion of the Court there is nothing improper in providing that

the release of the imprisoned debtor may be ordered by the-court on the request

of the creditor because in such a case if the creditor wishes to discontinue

execution by way of imprisonment then it is only right and reasonable that the

court should be empowered to release the judgment debtor from prison."

Εν όψει και της ως άνω αποφάσεως του

Ανωτάτου Συνταγματικού Δικαστηρίου επί του θέματος φρονώ ότι η συμφώνως της

διατάξεως του αρ. 82 του περί Πολιτικής Δικονομίας Νόμου Κεφ. 6 έκδοσις

διατάγματος φυλακίσεως του εξ αποφάσεως οφειλέτου ανταποκρίνεται προς "μη συμμόρφωσιν προς νόμιμον διαταγήν του

Δικαστηρίου", και ως εκ τούτου ουδόλως Αντιφάσκει προς το δικαίωμα

ελευθερίας και προσωπικής ασφαλείας του ατόμου ως τούτο κατοχυρούται δια της

διατάξεως του άρθρου 11 του συντάγματος.

Εις την υπόθεσιν Anestos Adamou v. Xenophon Ioannides (1963) 2 C.L.R. 468, ο τ. Δικαστής του Ανωτάτου Δικαστηρίου Ιωσηφίδης,

προβαίνων εις λεπτομερή ανάλυσιν των διατάξεων των αναφερομένων εις το μέρος

VIII του Περί Πολιτικής Δικονομίας Νόμου Κεφ. 6 (Άρθρα 82-85) εν αντιπαραβολή

μετά της Διατάξεως 42Α, Θεσμοί 1 και 2 των Περί Πολιτικής Δικονομίας

Διαδικαστικών Κανονισμών ως και του άρθρου 42 του Περί Δικαστηρίων Νόμου

(14/60) αναφέρει εις την σελίδα 474: [*1792]

"It will be seen that, so far as

the argument in this case goes, the operative words both in rule 1 of Order 42A

and section 42 of the Courts

of Justice Law, 1960 are 'any order dirëcting any act to be done’ . In

this connection, the Supreme Court of Cyprus in Maroullou Antoni Nicola v.

Zannetos Yiorghi Djaboura (1929), 14 C.L.R. 10, held that a judgment or

order for the payment of money is not an order ’directing an act to be done'

within the meaning of Clause 40(i) of the Cyprus Courts of Justice Order,1927

which was the precursor of section 42 of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960, and

Order 42A of the Civil Procedure Rules, Adopting the reasoning in the above

case, we are of the view that order 42A does not apply to a judgment or order

for the payment of money and that, consequently, it was not necessary to have

an endorsed copy of the consent instalment order (made under section 91 of the

Civil Procedure Law, Cap.6) served on the debtor in this case.

Finally, in the course of the

argument the question was raised whether a committal order could be made under

the provisions of section 82 of the Civil Procedure Law, Cap.6, in the

circumstances of this case, i,e. after the making of an instalment order (under

the provisions of section 91) and after the failure of the debtor to pay the

instalments as ordered by the Court. We take the view that the wording of

section 82 is clear. A committal order could be made in this case provided

there was evidence before the trial Judge satisfying the requirements of

section 82 .............." [*1793]

Είναι σαφές εκ της ως άνω αποφάσεως ότι

η διάταξις 42Α των Περί Πολιτικής Δικονομίας Διαδικαστικών Κανονισμών δεν

εφαρμόζεται εις απόφασιν η διάταγμα δια την καταβολήν χρηματικής οφειλής και

κατά συνέπειαν δεν απαιτείται επίδοσις οπισθογραφημένου αντιγράφου του

διατάγματος περιοδικών πληρωμών εις τον εξ αποφάσεως οφειλέτην.

Μετά ως άνω εκτεθέντα όσον αφορά την

νομικήν θέσιν του θέματος χωρώ εις εξέτασιν των εγερθέντων ζητημάτων.

Υπεστηρίχθη υπό του ευπαιδεύτου

δικηγόρου των καθ' ων η αίτησις ότι δεν υπήρξε συμμόρφωσις της αιτούσης προς

τον θεσμόν 8 της Διατάξεως 40 του Περί Πολιτικής Δικονομίας Διαδικαστικού

Κανονισμού. Η σχετική διάταξις έχει ούτω:-

"8. Where six years have elapsed since the

judgment or date of the order, or where any change has taken place by death or

otherwise in the parties entitled or liable to execution, the party alleging

himself to be entitled to execution may apply to the Court or a Judge for leave

to issue execution accordingly. And such Court or Judge may, if satisfied that

the party so applying is entitled to issue execution, make an order to that

effect or may order that any issue or question necessary to determine the

rights of the parties shall be tried in any of the ways in which any question

in an action may be tried. And in either case the Court or Judge may impose

such terms as to costs or otherwise as shall be just."

Εκ της δικογραφίας προκύπτει ότι η

Αιτούσα υπέβαλε την 1.6.72 αίτησιν (ex parte ) μετ' ενόρκου δηλώσεως, [*1794] δι' ης εζήτει άδειαν εκτελέσεως κατά των καθ' ων η αίτησις, ήτις και παρεχωρήθη υπό του Δικαστηρίου ως τούτο εμφαίνεται

εκ του πρακτικού ημερ. 2.6.1972. Εν συνεχεία της δοθείσης προς τούτο άδειας

εκτελέσεως κατεχωρήθη την 3.6.1972 η υπό κρίσιν αίτησις μετά της υπό ιδίαν

ημερομηνίαν ενόρκου δηλώσεως.

Εις την εν λόγω ένορκον δήλωσιν ουδόλως

αναφέρονται τα στοιχεία τα αναφερόμενα εις την διάταξιν 82 του Περί Πολιτικής

Δικονομίας Νόμου Κεφ. 6. Ως και εις την προαναφερθείσαν απόφασιν του Ανωτάτου

Δικαστηρίου Anestos Adamou v. Xenophon Ioannides (1963) 2 C.L.R. σελίς 475 αναφέρεται, "το

λεκτικόν της διατάξεως 82 είναι σαφές. Διάταγμα φυλακίσεως δύναται να εκδοθή

νοουμένου ότι υπάρχει μαρτυρία ενώπιον του Δικαστηρίου πληρούσα τας προϋποθέσεις

της διατάξεως 82." Ουδεμία μαρτυρία προσήχθη ενώπιον του Δικαστηρίου προς τούτο, πλην της

καταχωρισθείσης ενόρκου δηλώσεως, αορίστου περιεχομένου.

Εν συμπεράσματι, η παρούσα αίτησις δεν

δύναται να επιτύχη και ως εκ τούτου αύτη απορρίπτεται. Όσον αφορά, τα έξοδα, εν

όψει της φύσεως της αιτήσεως και των εγερθέντων σημείων ουδεμίαν διαταγήν

εκδίδω.

Αίτησις

απορρίπτεται.

Ουδεμία

διαταγή ως προς τα έξοδα. [*1795]

This is an English translation of the

judgment in Greek appearing at pp. 1787-94 ante.

Constitutional law - Making of

committal order under s.82 of the Civil Procedure Law, Cap. 6, not contrary to

Article 11 of the Constitution.

Civil Procedure - Judgment debtor -

Execution - Instalment order under s. 91 of the Civil Procedure Law, Cap. 6 -

Mot necessary to have an endorsed copy thereof served on the judgment debtor -

Order 42A. of the Civil Procedure Rules not applicable to a judgment or order

for the payment of money.

Civil Procedure - Judgment debtor -

Execution - Application for committal order under s. 82 of the Civil Procedure

Law, Cap. 6 - No evidence satisfying the requirements of the said s. 82 -

Application dismissed.

C. Tsirides, for the

Applicant.

A. Anastassiades, for the

Respondent.

JUDGMENT

The following judgment was delivered

by:-

MICHAELIDES, D.J. : By this application, based on section 82 of the Civil Procedure Law, Cap. 6, the applicant

applies for a committal order against the respondents 1 and 2 - the judgment

debtors - for their failure to pay the monthly instalments in accordance with

the relevant order of the Court.

The application is opposed on two main

grounds: Firstly, that there was no compliance with order 40 rule 8 of the

Civil Procedure Rules and secondly that "the affidavit [*1796] filed in

support of the application is not sufficient and/or does not contain the

necessary facts". Furthermore, the respondents allege that they are not

indebted to the applicant for any amount.

Section 82 of the Civil Procedure

Law, Cap. 6, which empowers a Civil Court to commit a judgment debtor to prison

reads as follows:

"When the debtor may be imprisoned.

82. Where upon any investigation by the Court

respecting the ability of a judgment debtor to pay the amount due under a

judgment or order it appears to the Court that the creditor has been unable to

obtain satisfaction of his judgment by the sale of the debtor's property or by

attachment of property in the hands of some third party; and

(a) that the debtor then has or since the making

of the judgment or order has had sufficient means to pay the money directed to

be paid by him or some part thereof which still remains unpaid, and that, he

refuses or neglects to pay it according to the judgment or order; or

(b) that he has made or suffered to be made any

gift, delivery, or transfer of any property, or charged, removed or [*1797] concealed any property and has thereby prevented

the creditor from obtaining payment of the judgment debt or any part thereof,

the Court may on the application of the creditor

commit the debtor to prison for any term not exceeding twelve months, or until

the payment of the sum due, subject to the provisions herein- after contained;

but it may at any subsequent time order his release on the request of the

creditor".

As, during the hearing of the

application, the legal nature of a committal order was discussed, I consider it

proper to examine the matter in the light of the relevant case law.

The above mentioned section 82 of the

Civil Procedure Law, Cap. 6, and the ensuing sections 83, 84 and 85 were

attacked as unconstitutional, as being contrary to or inconsistent with Article

11 of the Constitution by which the right to liberty and security of person is

guaranteed. The question of unconstitutionality of the above mentioned sections

had been raised in the District Court of Famagusta, during the hearing of an

application in civil case No. 1248/59, and the matter was referred to the

Supreme Constitutional Court under the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 144

of the Constitution, (In accordance with the procedure followed before the

decision of the Supreme Court in the case Attorney- General v. Ibrahim

and Others 1964 C.L.R. 195 - See also [*1798] The Improvement Board of Eylendjia v. Constantinou

(1967) 6 J.S.C. 803 as to the procedure to he followed for alleged

unconstitutionality of any Law).

In Panayiotis Kayttani of Varoshia

and Emilios Makris of Limassol, 3 R.S.C.C. 143,

the Supreme Constitutional Court held that the provisions of sections 82, 83, 84

and 85 of the Civil Procedure Law, Cap. 6 are not unconstitutional as being

contrary to, or inconsistent with Article 11 of the Constitution, and that the

wilful evasion of a judgment debtor to pay his debt amounts to his "non I compliance

with the lawful order of a Court" in the sense of paragraph 2 of Article

11. Munir, J. said at p. 145 of the report

"In the opinion of the Court the aforesaid

wilful evasion of a judgment debtor to pay his debt amounts to his

’non-compliance with the lawful order of a Court' , In the sense of paragraph 2

of Article 11 and, therefore, the provisions of section 82 of Cap. 6, and of

the ensuing sections 83, 84 and 85 of Cap. 6, which are incidental to the

provisions of section 82, are not, in the opinion of the Court, contrary to, or

inconsistent with, Article 11 of the Constitution.

The concluding words of section 82 might appear, at

first sight, to give one citizen, namely, the creditor, discretion in the

matter of the continued [*1799] imprisonment of another

citizen, namely, the judgment debtor. In the opinion of the Court there is

nothing improper in providing that the release of the imprisoned debtor may be

ordered by the Court on the request of the creditor because in such a case if

the creditor wishes to discontinue execution by way of imprisonment then it is

only right and reasonable that the Court should be empowered to release the

judgment debtor from prison".

In view also of the above decision of

the Supreme Constitutional Court on this question I am of opinion that the

making of a committal order against the judgment debtor pursuant to section 82

of the Civil Procedure Law, Cap. 6 corresponds to "non-compliance with a

lawful order of the Court", and therefore is in no way inconsistent with

the right to liberty and security of person as same is safeguarded by Article

11 of the Constitution.

In Anestos Adamou v. Xenophon

Ioannides (1963) 2 C.L.R. , 468, Josophides, J. after examining in detail

the provisions referred to in part VIII of the Civil Procedure Law, Cap. 6

(sections 82-85) as well as rules 1 and 2 of Order 42A of the Civil Procedure

Rules and section 42 of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960, said at p. 474:

"It will be seen that, so far as the argument

in this case goes, the operative words both in rule 1 of Order 42k and section

42 of the Courts [*1800] of Justice Law, 1960, are 'any order..... directing

any act to be done'. In this connection, the Supreme Court of Cyprus in Maroullou

Antoni Nicola v. Zannetos Yiorghi Djaboura (1929), 14 C.L.R. 10,

held that a judgment or order for the payment of money is not an order

'directing an act to be done' within the meaning of Clause 40(i) of the Cyprus

Courts of Justice Order, 1927 which was the precursor of section 42 of the

Courts of Justice Law, 1960, and Order 42A of the Civil Procedure Rules.

Adopting the reasoning in the above case, we are of the view that Order 42A

does not apply to a judgment or order for the payment of money and that, consequently,

it was not necessary to have an endorsed copy of the consent instalment order

(made under section 91 of the Civil Procedure Law, Cap. 6) served on the debtor

in this case.

Finally, in the course of the argument the

question was raised whether a committal order could be made under the

provisions of section 82 of the Civil Procedure Law, Cap. 6, in the

circumstances of this case, i.e. after the making of an instalment order (under

the provisions of section 91) and after the failure of the debtor to pay the

instalments as ordered by the Court. We take the view that the wording of

section 82 is clear. [*1801] A committal order could be made in this case

provided there was evidence before the trial judge satisfying the requirements

of section 82 - …….".

It is clear from the above case that

order 42A of the Civil Procedure Rules does not apply to a judgment or order

for the payment of money and that, consequently, it is not necessary to have an

endorsed copy of the instalment order served on the judgment debtor.

With the aforesaid legal principles

in mind I proceed to deal with the points raised.

It has been argued by the learned

counsel for the respondents that the applicant did not comply with rule 8 of

Order 40 of the Civil Procedure Rules which reads as follows:-

"8. Where six years have elapsed since the

judgment or date of the order, or where any change has taken place by death or

otherwise in the parties entitled or liable to execution, the party alleging

himself to be entitled to execution may apply to the Court or a judge for leave

to issue execution accordingly. And such Court of judge may if satisfied that

the party so applying is entitled to issue execution, make an order to that

effect or may order that any issue or question necessary to determine the

rights of the parties shall be tried in any of [*1802] the ways in which any

question in an action may be tried. And in either case the Court or judge may

impose such terms as to costs or otherwise as shall be just".

From the record before me it appears

that the Applicant applied on 1/6/72 by an ex parte application supported by

affidavit for leave to issue execution against the respondents after the lapse

of six years. On 2/6/72 leave was granted and on 3/6/72 the present application

was filed supported by affidavit sworn on the same day.

In the said affidavit the requirement

of section 82 of the Civil Procedure Law, Cap. 6 are not disclosed. As stated in Adamou v. Ioannides

(supra) "the wording of section 82 is clear, A committal order can be made

provided there is evidence before the trial judge satisfying the requirements

of section 82", No evidence whatsoever has been adduced in this respect,

apart from the affidavit filed, the contents of which are indefinite and

insufficient.

In the result this application cannot

succeed and is hereby dismissed. Regarding costs, having in mind the nature of

the application and the points raised I make no order as to costs.

Application dismissed.

No order as to costs.