Court awards global damages for personal injury, rejecting separate heads and noting interest reform desirability.

[*1528] 1972 November 14

(PIKIS, AG, P.D.C.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF FAMAGUSTA

Maritsa Chrysostomou Sofroniou,

Plaintiff,

v.

Soteris Anastassi & Another,

Defendants.

(Action No. 151/72).

Damages - General damages - Personal injuries - Running down case - Principles governing award of general damages.

Observations regarding the desirability of reforming the Law relating to the award of interest to enable the Court to award interest on the amount of compensation awarded in running down cases.

Chr. Dermosoniades, for the Plaintiff.

Chr. Solomis on behalf of N. Pelides, for the Defendants.

JUDGMENT

PIKIS. AG. P.D.C., after reviewing the facts of the case proceeded as follows;-

The principles upon which damages are recoverable have been the subject of judicial deliberation on very many

occasions in the recent past. In the case of Constantinou v. Salehoiris (1969) 7 J.S.C. p, 910 and Andoniades v. Makrides (1969) J.S.C. p. 572 the Supreme Court expressly adopted

the principles laid down by the English Court of Appeal in the case of Fletcher v. Autocar & Transporters Ltd., (1968) 1 All [*1529] E.R.

726 which case may be said to stun up the contemporary approach of common law Courts to the assessment of damages in running down

cases. Compensation, it was said, must be a fair award in all the circumstances of the case meant to ameliorate the discomfort of the

plaintiff without at the same time ruining the defendant. They deprecated the practice of assessing damage under separate heads, such heads being at best only instrumental in arriving at a global sum sufficient to do justice to the plaintiff, help him as much as money can do to repair the holes caused by the accident, but socially just and not ruinous to the defendant. The reform of the law in England making mandatory the award of interest, depending on the item of damage, has been held not to have changed the principle Of global awards. (See Smith v. Central Asbestos Co. Ltd. (1971) 3 All H.R. p. 204 (C.A.)). In the case of Andronicou v. Kitsiou (1970) 4 J.S.C. p. 135 the Supreme Court increased an award of £400 to £600 to compensate a young boy, who had suffered on account of the accident some mental abnormality and which suffering lasted

for two years. The fact that there is no definite prognosis regarding the future is no ground for refusing to make an

award, the task of the Court being to make such an award which in the circumstances is a probable estimate of plaintiff's loss. (See the case of Andreou v. Karkalis & Another,(1971)1 J.S.C. p. 135). Iη the case of Piliou v. Markoulis(1969)8 J.S.C. 1013, it was emphasised that the uncertainty of prognosis does not extinguish a claim, but merely goes to reduce it. It is in general desirable to secure as much uniformity of awards as it is humanly [*1530] possible in this way making more certain the path of the law. (See Joannou v. Howard(1967/2 J.S.C. p. 124)· On the other

hand, one must not overlook that each case must he tried on its own facts and judges probably know hest how difficult it is to find two cases

with identical facts. (See Parry v. English Electrical Co. Ltd. (1971) 2 All E.R. p. 1095). It is a fact and this has been judicially noticed that money does over the years lose its value and to this extent, the devaluation of the currency is a relevant factor that tends to play a part in up-grading

traditional awards made by the Courts (See the cases of Karavallis v. Economides (1970) 8 J.S.C. p. 802, Du Puch v. Georghiou & Others, 1968 6 J.S.C.

p. 620, and Mitchell

v. Mulhalland(1971) 2 All E.R. p. 1205). Neither counsel brought to the notice of the Court any authorities that bear on the

issues under consideration nor did they cite any case indicating the quantum of damages that should be awarded in cases of concussion. I made reference earlier to the case of Andronicou v. Kitsiou in an effort to gain some insight regarding injuries with a marked element of mental anguish and the way the victim should be compensated. In Kemp & Kemp volume 1, 3rd edition, at pages 256, 257 and 258 there are unauthenticated awards made by judges at first instance and unsafe though it may be to gain any substantial guidance from the brevity of the reports of the relevant cases, it is not, on the other hand, altogether unhelpful to refer to one or two such cases insofar as they may indicate a trend of awards in cases of concussion. Of particular relevance is the case of Ashley v. [*1531] Herbert John Capon, the

decision of Lawton J. given on 8th April, 1964 in which case the sum of £250.- was awarded for concussion and fracture of the nose of an 18 year

old apprentice engineer. It appears that the sum of £250.- was separately and exclusively awarded for concussion and fracture of the nose. One other case that may be usefully cited is that of Lawrence v. W. E. Palmer( Excavations) a decision of Phillimore J. as he then was, given on 8th April, 1965 awarding £800.- general damages to an unmarried female of 77, who has suffered a concussion with post concussional amnesia and shock and a depressed comminuted fracture of the right parietal region of the skull and contusional injury to the right shoulder necessitating five weeks hospitalization.

In the light of my findings and the principles underlining the award of general damages in running down cases having seen and heard the plaintiff I award her £300.- for general damages.

Special Damages: -

(a) Loss of Wages:

As the plaintiff admitted in evidence contrary to the allegations made in her Statement of Claim during sick leave she was paid three-quarters of her wages. Therefore, her weekly loss during the period of her incapacity amounted to one-quarter of the wages she would have earned i.e. £2.175 mils per week. She is entitled, if my arithmetic is right, to £33.175 mils. [*1532]

(b) Medical Expenses:-

(i) £50 medical fees to Dr. Adamou. I find this sum to be fair and reasonable; I cannot allow the fees of Dr. Fanos because it has not been

established to my satisfaction that the sum of £20 was incurred because of the medical condition of the plaintiff on

account of the accident. The fact that this doctor did not appear to give evidence is no reason as such for not allowing a reasonable amount/for

his fees, provided it is established that the cost was reasonably incurred on account of her accident injuries. (See Jemal v. Zim Israel Navigation

- Shoham (1968)9 J.S.C. p. 1000.

I would allow a sum of £20 as reasonable expenses for the fees of Dr. Nikias making up medical expenses to £70.- in all.

(c) In the light of the evidence I allow £25 for expenses incurred to buy medicine and £5 for transport expenses, rejecting plaintiff's allegation that her condition prevented her from making full or partial use of public transport.

In the light of the above, judgment is given for the plaintiff for £433.175 mils costs to be assessed by the Registrar on the scale of claims £200-£500.

Suggestion for the Reform of the law regarding the award of interest.

It is well known to those concerned with the administration of justice that an appreciable interval of [*1533] time ordinarily elapses between the time damage or some item of damage is suffered and the date when compensation is paid, yet there is no provision in the law entitling the Court to award interest on the amount awarded. The injustice was remedied in England by the provisions of 1969, Administration of Justice Act, that makes the award of interest compulsory. The case of Jefford v. Gee (1970) 1 All E.R. p. 1202 illustrates the way the provisions of the law work, in practice. There is an equally good case for reforming the law in Cyprus, along similar lines, in that way making the award a more realistic assessment of the damage of the plaintiff at the same time removing the injustice of the injured party suffering all the consequences occasioned by any delay in litigation. I respectfully believe that reform of the law in this field is long overdue.

Judgment and order for

costs as above.