Court dismissed appeal for careless driving, upholding conviction despite unsatisfactory trial findings as no miscarriage of justice occurred.

[*1430] 1972 December 8

(TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P., STAVRINIDES, MALACHTOS, JJ.)

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Mehmet Tashan,

Appellant,

v.

The Police,

Respondents.

(Criminal Appeal No.3378).

Road Traffic - Careless driving - Section 6 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Law, Cap. 332 - Collision whilst appellant driving from side road on to the avenue and after he had practically crossed avenue and reached its opposite side - Certain parts of the trial Court’s judgment unsatisfactory - Conviction left undisturbed - Proviso to s. 145(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155 applied.

Criminal Procedure - Miscarriage of justice - Proviso to section 145(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155

- See, also, under "Road Traffic".

Miscarriage of justice - Substantive miscarriage of justice - See, also, under "Criminal Procedure"; "Road Traffic".

M. Aziz, for the Appellant.

A. Frangos, Senior Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondents.

JUDGMENT

The judgment of the Court was delivered by:-

TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P.: The appellant complains [*1431] against his conviction, by the District Court of Nicosia, of the

offence of driving a motor vehicle without due care and attention, contrary to section 6 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Law, Cap. 332.

The salient facts of the case are that on the 13th May, 1972, the appellant drove from a side-road on to the avenue leading from the airport to Nicosia, and after he had practically crossed the avenue and reached its opposite side, in order to drive towards Nicosia, he collided with a car which was also proceeding along the avenue from the airport to Nicosia.

The learned trial judge, on the basis of the evidence adduced, found that the appellant was "to blame” for the collision; and he proceeded to hold that independently of any degree of negligence on the part" of the other driver, the appellant was guilty of the offence in question.

Some of the findings made by the trial Court, and especially certain inferences drawn from the real evidence (such as the damage to the car of the appellant), are not, in our view, entirely satisfactory; it was, however, stated in evidence, by the appellant himself, that as he was coming out of the side-road he had a visibility to his left, that is in the direction from which the other vehicle was coming, of about 500 to 600 yards; in view of this, and bearing, also, in mind that, as indicated by the nature of the damage to, and the resultant positions of, the two vehicles, the collision was not a violent one, as well as that the other driver testified that she was driving at the time at a speed of about [*1432] 35 m.p.h., we are of the opinion that one of two things must have happened; Either the appellant did not keep a proper look-out when entering the avenue and, thus, did not see the other car which must have been visible, or he saw it and yet he tried to get across the avenue at a time when such car was approaching the side-road from which the appellant was emerging, and so the collision occurred.

In the light of the foregoing the appellant should have, without any doubt, been found guilty as charged; so, even though, as already stated, certain parts of the judgment of the Court below may be unsatisfactory, we think that this is a case in which the conviction should be upheld under the proviso to section 145(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155, because no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred.

This appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.