Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
In re Y.Z. an Advocate. (1973) JSC 206 Generato dall'IA

Supreme Court allows late review application for disciplinary board decision due to lack of specific time limit and absence of undue delay.

Numero d'incarto In re Y.Z. an Advocate. (1973) JSC 206
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Cipro (CY)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Accolto (Allowed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The Supreme Court allowed an advocate's application to review a disciplinary board decision found guilty of unprofessional conduct, which was filed over a month after the decision. The Board argued the ten-day limit for summary jurisdiction appeals applied, but the Court rejected this as no specific rule existed for this review process. Consequently, the Court proceeded to examine the merits of the case rather than dismissing it on procedural grounds.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

Section 17(5) of the Advocates Law, Cap. 2; Section 17(7) and (8) of the Advocates Law, Cap. 2: The time-limit for appeals against summary jurisdiction orders does not automatically apply to applications for review under section 17(5) of the Advocates Law, and the Court may proceed to merits if no undue delay or abuse of process is shown.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
Advocates Law disciplinary review time limit summary jurisdiction abuse of process unprofessional conduct procedural delay ritardo del ministero pubblico

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA
Section 17(5) of the Advocates Law, Cap. 2
In the matter of an application under section 17(5) of the Advocates Law, Cap. 2.
Section 17(7) of the Advocates Law, Cap. 2
In the matter of an application under section 17(5) of the Advocates Law, Cap.
Section 17(8) of the Advocates Law, Cap. 2
In the matter of an application under section 17(5) of the Advocates Law, Cap.
Section 32 of Cap. 2
Under section 32 of Cap. 2 Rules may be made for the better carrying into effect of the purposes of, inter alia, Part IV of Cap.
Section 133 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155
17 as going so far as to incorporate by reference the aforesaid ten days’ time-limit prescribed under section 133 of Cap.
Generato dall'IA

Ti chiedi come si applica questa sentenza alla tua fattispecie?

Analizza questa decisione insieme alla legislazione federale e cantonale, ai commentari e alla giurisprudenza successiva in Legislator AI.

Apri in Legislator →

Testo completo

[*206] 1973 February 20

(TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P., STAVRINIDES. HADJIANASTASSIOU, A. LOIZOU MALACHTOS, JJ.)

In the matter of an application under section 17(5) of the Advocates Law, Cap. 2.

and

In the matter of Y.Z., an advocate.

(Case No. 2/72).

Advocates - Conduct and Etiquette - Disciplinary Board

- Decision - Application for review by advocate found guilty of unprofessional conduct - Section 17(5) of the Advocates Law, Cap. 2 - Proper time-limit within which to file application.

Time - Proper time-limit within which to file application for review of decision of Advocates Disciplinary Board - Section 17(5) of the Advocates Law, Cap. 2 - See, also, under “Advocates”.

G. Cacoyannis, fa1 the Applicant Advocate.

L. Clerides, for the Advocates Disciplinary Board.

RULING

The ruling of the Court was delivered by: -

TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P.: This is an application [*207] under section 17(5) of the Advocates Law, Cap. 2, which reads as follows: -

“(5) The Supreme Court may, of its own motion or on the application of the complainant or of 11 the advocate whose conduct is the subject of the enquiry, review the whole case and either confirm the

decision of the Discriplinary Board or set it aside or make such other order as it may deem fit”.

The application has been made by an advocate who has been found guilty of unprofessional conduct, by the Advocate’s Disciplinary Board, and was suspended from practising for a period of two months.

Counsel for the respondent Board has submitted that, in view of subsections (7) and (8) of section 17, which provide that –

“(7) The Disciplinary Board in carrying out an enquiry under this section shall have the same powers and shall conduct the enquiry as nearly as may be as a Court of summary jurisdiction”,

And

“(8) Any decision of the Disciplinary Board shall be deemed to be an order of a Court of summary jurisdiction and shall be enforced, in the same manner as an order of such Court is enforced”, we should hold that the time-limit prescribed for bringing an appeal against a judgment of a Court of summary jurisdiction, under section 133 of the Criminal Procedure Law, [*208] Cap. 155 namely ten days, applies to an application by an advocate under subsection (5), above, and, therefore, as the complained of decision of the Board was given on the 3rd February, 1972, and this application was filed on the 6th March, 1972, the application is out of time; he has, however, added, very fairly, that he would not object to an extension of time.

Counsel for the applicant advocate has argued in reply that the said time-limit of ten days is not applicable to a case of this nature.

Under section 32 of Cap. 2 Rules may be made for the better carrying into effect of the purposes of, inter alia, Part IV of Cap. 2, in which section 17 is contained, but no such Rules have been made; thus, there exists no rule prescribing any time-limit in relation to a proceeding under subsection (5) of section 17.

Nor can we construe subsections (7) and (8) of section

17 as going so far as to incorporate by reference the aforesaid ten days’ time-limit prescribed under section 133 of Cap. 155.

Of course, we do appreciate that it would be unfair in certain circumstances to allow cases to come before us for review on an application under subsection (5) after a considerable time has elapsed from the date when the decision of the Board was taken; and we think that when it is clear that through unjustifiable delay such an application has been filed so belatedly that it amounts to abuse of the relevant process then this Court may refuse to exercise, its power of review. [*209]

In the present case, taking into account that the application was filed within a month after the decision of the Board and that the applicant advocate was and has been abroad at all material times, we are of the view that there does not exist any undue delay and, so, we shall proceed to deal with the merits of the matter.

Order in terms.