Supreme Court affirms burglary sentence as lenient, noting trial court properly weighed aggravating and mitigating factors.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe Supreme Court dismissed the appellant's appeal against a fifteen-month prison sentence for burglary. The appellant argued the sentence was excessive due to the victim's vulnerability and the presence of accomplices, but the court found the trial judge correctly considered the premeditation and the appellant's confession. Ultimately, the court held the sentence was not manifestly excessive and affirmed it, though it allowed the sentence to run from the date of conviction due to the appellant's mental condition.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IASection 292 of the Criminal Code; Section 292 of the Criminal Code: The trial court is bound to weigh all relevant considerations when estimating the seriousness of an offence, and a sentence is not manifestly excessive if it reflects a proper balance of aggravating and mitigating factors.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IADecisioni correlate
Generato dall'IATesto completo
[*200] 1972 March 9
(TRIANTAFYLLIDE S, P., STAVRINIDES, L. LOIZOL, JJ.)
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Andreas Michael Pittas,
Appellant,
v.
The Republic,
Respondent.
(Criminal Appeal No. 3316).
Criminal Law - Sentence - Fifteen months imprisonment for burglary - Section 292 of the Criminal Code, Cap.154 - Seriousness of the offence - In estimating seriousness of the offence trial Court bound, and entitled, to weigh duly all relevant considerations - Mitigating factors - Confession of the crime by appellant ~ And his mental condition - Sentence not manifestly excessive but a rather lenient one - Affirmed.
Burglary - Sentence - See, also, under “Criminal Law”.
L. Clerides, for the Appellant.
Cl. Antoniades, Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT
The judgment of the Court was delivered by:
TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P.: The appellant complains [*201] against the sentence of fifteen months imprisonment which was imposed on him, by an Assize Court in Larnaca, in respect of the offence of burglary, under section 292 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154.
The appellant pleaded guilty to this offence, which he committed on the 30th July, 1971, at night, by breaking and entering, with intent to steal, the dwelling-house of a widow, the complainant, who lived there with her children, and by stealing there from the sum of £35., the property of the complainant; the house is opposite that of the appellants sister, who works for the complainant.
It has been submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the Assize Court took unduly into account the fact that the appellant stole money from a widow who has four minor children: Prom its judgment it seems to us that what the trial Court, quite legitimately, took mainly into account was the fact that the appellant planned his crime in advance, as appears from a statement of his to the police; and we can see nothing wrong in taking also into account that the appellant planned his crime with full knowledge that his victim would be a widow with four young children, a fact which, because appellants sister was living opposite the house of the complainant and was employed by her, must have been known to him. In estimating the seriousness of the particular offence the trial Court was bound, and entitled, to weigh duly all relevant considerations.
We cannot hold that the sentence imposed on the appellant is manifestly excessive; on the contrary, it is [*202] a rather lenient one, because the trial Court took, very properly, into account the confession of his crime by the appellant-; and, also, his mental condition, which was regarded as diminishing somewhat his responsibility for his actions.
Counsel for the appellant has, also, submitted, that the crime was committed in actual fact by three persons, two of them being accomplices who went all the way up to the house but who did not break into it together with the appellant; that these two other persons remain unpunished and that the trial Court lost sight of this factor.
It was stated by the appellant himself to the police that, though the said two other persons went with him up to the complainants house on the night in question, they attempted at the last moment to persuade him not to commit the crime in question, but that he insisted, ongoing on with his plan on his own; we, therefore, cannot see how the existence of these two other persons could be in any way taken into consideration in mitigation.
In the light of all the foregoing this appeal fails and is dismissed. In view, however, of the appellant’s not entirely normal mental state we felt that we could order that the sentence should run from the date of conviction.
Appeal dismissed.