Supreme Court sets aside disqualification for excessive combined sentence of imprisonment and license ban.

[*26].1972 September 5

(TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P., L. LOIZOU, MALA.CHTOS, JJ.)

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Charalambos Costa Katiris,

Appellant,

V.

The Police,

Respondents.

(Criminal Appeal No. 3363).

Road Traffic - Sentence - Imprisonment and disqualification for permitting omnibus to be driven by a person (appellant’s thirteen year old son) no-t being the holder of a driving licence and not being covered by insurance policy against third party risks - Regulation 27(1) of the Motor Vehicles Regulations 1959 to 1972, section 12 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Law, Cap. 332 and section 3(1) of the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Law, Cap.333 respectively - A manifestly excessive punishment – Disqualification set aside.

Sentence - Road Traffic - Imprisonment and disqualification -See under “Road Traffic”.

L. Papaphilippou, for the Appellant.

N. Charalambous, Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondents.

JUDGMENT

The judgment of the Court was delivered by:-

TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P.: The appellant was convicted, [*27] by the District Court of kyrenia, of the offence of permitting his motor omnibus to be driven by a person not being the holder of a driving licence, contrary to regulation 27(1) of the motor Vehicles Regulations, 1959 to 1972, and section 12 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Law, Cap. 332, and of the offence of permitting the use of his omnibus by a person not being covered by an insurance policy against third party risks, contrary to section 3(1) of the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Law, Cap. 333, and section 12 of Cap. 332.

He was sentenced to concurrent terms of two months’ imprisonment, as from the 9th August, 1972, and was disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence for six months as from such date.

In the notice of appeal, which the appellant filed while being in prison, it is stated simply that the appellant is “innocent”.

With the consent of counsel for the respondents, we have allowed this appeal to be treated as an appeal against sentence, as the notice of appeal was prepared by the appellant without legal assistance; and counsel who is appearing today for the appellant has stated that he is not challenging the conviction of the appellant.

The salient facts of the case are that, on the 12th April, 1972, in the evening, at Vassilia village, the appellant allowed his son, who is only thirteen years old, and not a holder of a driving licence, to drive an omnibus for a short distance, in the village, in the course of an errand. As a [*28] result the appellant found himself in Court charged with the aforementioned offences.

Counsel for the appellant submitted that the sentence of imprisonment was not by itself manifestly excessive, but that the punishment imposed on the appellant was manifestly excessive as in addition to such sentence there was made the disqualification order.

Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the more appropriate punishment for the offences in question would have been a disqualification order, perhaps for a shorter than six months period of time. We might be inclined to agree with the above view of counsel for respondents but, as the appellant has already served a considerable part of the sentence of imprisonment, and as we are of the opinion that in the circumstances of this case the sentence of imprisonment coupled with the disqualification order amount to manifestly excessive punishment, we have decided to treat the two months' imprisonment as sufficient punishment for the offences concerned and to set aside the order of disqualification.

The appeal is allowed; the disqualification order is set aside and the appellant’s imprisonment is to run from the date when sentence was passed on him.

Appeal allowed.