Court dismisses appeal on dowry agreement interpretation, upholding full property transfer to daughter with life tenancy for parents.

[*794] 1972 May 12

(TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P., STAVRINIDES, A. LOIZOU, JJ.)

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Christoforos Aristidou,

Anastassia Aristidou,

Appellants,

v.

Christina Yiannaki Kantonidou,

Yiannakis E. Kantonides,

Respondents.

(Civil Appeal No.4717).

Contract - Interpretation - Principles applicable - Dowry agreement - Construction - Where the nature of the deed and relation of the parties as father and child give a clue to the "natural intention" a Court will struggle with the language to give effect to such intention.

Dowry agreement - Construction - See under "Contract".

M. Houry, for the Appellants.

Y. Potamitis, for the Respondents.

JUDGMENT

The judgment of the Court was delivered by: -

TRIANTAFYLLIDES. P.: The two appellants – who are the father and mother, respectively, of respondent 1, who is the wife of respondent 2 - appeal against an order of specific performance, made in favour of respondent 1, by virtue of which a property in Ayia Phylaxis, under registration No. 21288 of the 15th August, 1967s was registered in the name of respondent 1.

This order was made on the strength of a dowry [*795] agreement between the parties, dated the 27th April, 1938; by clause 5 of such agreement the appellants gave respondent 1, as dowry, inter alia, a house and two outbuildings, on condition that the appellants would be entitled so long as they lived to reside in the outbuildings.

All we are concerned with in this appeal is the interpretation of the said clause 5 of the dowry agreement, it being common ground that the property described in such clause is the property to which registration No. 21288 relates.

It has been the contention of the appellants that on a proper construction of clause 5 the outbuildings, in which they are entitled to reside for life, as well as part of the yard of the property concerned, should have remained registered in their names, and only the remaining part of the property, namely the house, should have been registered in the name of respondent 1.

In interpreting an agreement in writing the function of a Court is to ascertain what the parties meant by the words which they have used, by deciding about the meaning of what is written in the instrument, and not of what was intended to have been written, to give effect to the intention as expressed, the expressed meaning being, for the purpose of interpretation, equivalent to the intention (see Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd ed., vol. 11, p. 382, paragraph 629; and Shore v. Wilson, 8 E.R. 450, at p. 518).

In construing the aforementioned clause of the dowry agreement we have not lost sight of the principle that [*796] where the nature of the deed and the relation of the parties - as father and child - give a clue to the "natural intention" a Court will struggle with the language to give effect to such intention (see Halshury1s, supra, note (i) to paragraph 629)o We are of the opinion that what the said clause clearly establishes is that it has been agreed that the whole property, including the house, outbuildings and all the land covered by registration No. 21288, should be registered in the name of respondent 1, subject to the right of the appellants to reside, so long as they live, in the outbuildings; and, of course, should that right be infringed they can claim damages or any other legal remedy open to them under the law.

We therefore have to dismiss this appeal; and we are grateful to learned counsel for both sides for appearing before us to assist us in this case which, though simple, has become difficult in view of the refusal of the appellants to understand that they had to honour their obligation under the dowry agreement, not as they wished it to be read, but as it should be read. In view of the relationship between the parties we have decided to make no order as to the costs of this appeal.

Appeal dismissed.