Cyprus Supreme Court allows libel damages against UK publishers and Cyprus distributor for foreign newspaper libel.

[*455] 1972 January 31

(STAVRINAKIS, AG. P.D. C., EVANGELIDES, AG. D.J.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF NICOSIA

I. C.P. (Cyprus) Limited,

Plaintiff,

and

1. Times Newspapers Limited,

2. Thomson Newspapers Limited,

3. Minerva. Bookshop S. Chr. &. A. Papadopoullos,

Defendants.

(Action No. 1590/69).

Libel - Libel published in a foreign newspaper caused to be circulated in Cyprus - Jurisdiction.

Damages - Special damages - Libel - Corporate body - Special damages need not be proved by a defamed Corporate body.

Damages - Exemplary damages - Libel

- Rookes v. Barnard (1964.) 1 All E.R.

367 not applicable in Cyprus - Failure to enter an appearance a factor to be taken into consideration in aggravation of damages.

Libel - Injunction - Injunction against defendants resident out of the jurisdiction - Cannot be effectively enforced - Refused.

Libel - Defence of innocent dissemination - A common Law defence - Not an express defence under the Civil Wrongs Law Cap. 148 but is applicable in Cyprus - Section 29 (1) of the Courts of Justice Law, 1 960 (Law 14/60).

Chr. Demetriades, for the Plaintiff.

No appearance for Defendants

1 and 2.

A. Emilianides, for Defendants3.

JUDGMENTS

The judgment of the Court was delivered by:-

STAVRINAKIS. AG. P. D. C.: By this action the plaintiff claims against the defendants – [*456]

A. Damages for libels published in the Sunday Times on the 12th, 19th and 27th January, 1969.

B. An injunction restraining the defendants and/or either of them from in any way printing, publishing or distributing same or similar libels concerning the plaintiff.

The plaintiff is a Company limited by shares, registered in Cyprus on or about 19.10.1968. According to the statement of claim the main objects of Plaintiff Company are the carrying on of business as manufacturers, importers, exporters, buyers, sellers, merchants and agents of pharmaceutical and other similar products, as well as the carrying of business as chemists.

Defendants 1 were at all material times a Company limited by shares, registered in the United Kingdom and were proprietors and publishers of the newspaper "The Sunday Times" published in London.

Defendants 2 were at all material times a Company, also limited by shares, registered in the United Kingdom and they were the publishers of the same newspaper.

Defendants 3 is a partnership registered in Cyprus, distributing in Cyprus the said newspaper.

The action was filed on the 28th of March, 1969 after an order of the Court for leave to seal and serve the writ of summons on defendants 1 and 2 abroad and an order to that effect was given on the same day. According to the [*457] terms of the order, defendants 1 and 2 were entitled to enter an appearance within 40 days from the service and in case of failure to do so, the plaintiffs were given the right to give notice of any application by posting a copy thereof on the Court's notice board.

Service on the defendants 1 and 2 was effected through a London solicitor by posting notice of the writ of summons on the 28th of August, 1969 in a prepaid envelope addressed to the first defendants at 200 Gray’s Inn, London, W.C.1 and to the second defendants at Printing House Square, London, E.C.4.

An affidavit by Donald Edward Munro, the solicitor who effected the service in the above manner, is in the file of the case.

Defendants 3 were also served with a copy of the writ of summons an appearance and eventually a statement of defence were filed through their legal representatives.

Defendants 1 and 2 failed to enter an appearance within the prescribed period, and the plaintiff filed on the 17th December, 1970 an application for judgment in default of appearance under Order

17 rules 3-11 of the Cyprus Civil Procedure Rules. So far, no appearance has been entered and eventually the case was set down for hearing both as regards defendants

1 and 2 and defendants 3.

Defendants 3 filed a defence on the 5th of December, 1970, the substance of which is that being merely the distributors [*458] and having no sufficient knowledge of the English language, without being aware of the libels contained in the said newspaper and without intending to defame in any way the plaintiff, distributed the papers in the ordinary course of their business.

On the day of the trial learned counsel of plaintiff admitted the averments contained in the statement of defence and left the matter to the Court for the legal inference to be drawn therefrom.

Order 17, rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Rules which is similar to the English Rules (13.5), as they stood before the amendments effected in 1964, reads:-

"Where the writ is for pecuniary damages only, or for detention of goods with or without a claim for pecuniary damages, and the defendant fails, or all the defendants, if more than one, fail to appear, the plaintiff may apply ex parte to the Court or a judge for judgment, and the Court or judge may ascertain the value of the goods or the amount of the damages in any way in which the Court or judge may think fit and give judgment accordingly".

The plaintiff adduced evidence to prove the allegations contained in the statement of claim. In all, he called three witnesses, namely, Joseph Yamakis, Sygmunt Sieczko and Ninos Yamakis. [*459]

During the hearing no less than 13 exhibits were produced, including the three editions of the newspapers containing the libellous articles, Exhibits 1-3.

At this stage, we consider it appropriate to examine the question of jurisdiction.

According to section 3 of the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap. 148 -

"....any person who shall suffer any injury or damage by reason of any civil wrong - committed in the Colony or within three miles of the coast thereof measured from low water mark shall be entitled to recover from the person committing or liable for such civil wrong the remedies which the Court has power to grant".

In the case of Loizos D. Georghiades v. Kaminaras(1) section 3 of the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap. 148 was considered as inoperative for the following reasons:-

(a) Sections 56-58 of the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap.9 (Now Cap.l48)dealing

with the remedies enacted in section 3 were repealed by section 18 of the Civil Wrongs (Amendment) Law, 1963 (Law 38/53). Section 3 of Cap. 9 was

bound up. with the aforesaid

sections 56-58 which have been so repealed without being substituted. The object of section 3 was to refer to circumstances under which the persons

affected would have the right to the remedies given by sections 56-58 which are hot now in existence. The effect of their repeal is to render section 3 inoperative. [*460]

(b) It was further held that actions on torts regardless of the

place where the cause of action arises, being actions in personam are triable by the Cyprus Courts so long as the defendant is resident

within the jurisdiction. That is so both under the Common Law, as well as under the Cyprus Courts of Justice Law, 1953 (section 25(1)(b))(1)

Defamation is a civil wrong within the provisions of the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap. 1.48. Section 18 of the same law deals with the publication of defamatory matter.(2)

Having had the opportunity of going through the articles complained of, we have no doubt whatsoever as to their defamatory nature.

In the light of all the above, we find that the Cyprus Courts have jurisdiction -

(a) to try actions on torts regardless of the place where the cause of action arises so long as the defendant is resident within the jurisdiction; and

(b) to try a civil wrong committed in Cyprus, irrespective of whether the person who committed it is in Cyprus or abroad. [*461]

The libels are contained in a newspaper printed and published in England and the action is brought in Cyprus by a person residing in the Republic to whom the libellous articles

refer. We find that as the newspaper is caused to be distributed in Cyprus through defendants 3, and can be bought and read freely by anybody, the

publication was effected in Cyprus and, therefore, the Cyprus Courts have jurisdiction to try the case.1

According to section 17(1) of the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap. 148 -

"Defamation consists of the publication by any person by means of print, writing, painting, effigy, gestures, spoken words or other sounds, or by any other means whatsoever, including broadcasting by wireless telegraphy, or any matter which –

(a) imputes to any other person a crime; or

(b) imputes to any other person misconduct in any public office; or

(c) naturally tends to injure or prejudice the reputation of any other person in the way of his profession, trade, business, calling or office; or [*462]

(d) is likely to expose any other person to general hatred, contempt or ridicule; or

(e) is likely to cause any other person to be shunned or avoided by other persons".

Special damage need not be proved in a case of written libel

(section 17(2) ibid), nor is it necessary for defamation that the defamatory meaning should be directly or completely expressed; it suffices if

such meaning and its

application to the person alleged to be defamed, can be collected either from the alleged defamatory statement itself or from any extrinsic

circumstances or partly by the one and partly by the other means.(1)

Section 19 of the same law sets out the defences open to a defendant in an action for defamation.(2) [*463]

It has been established by the evidence before us that on three successive Sundays, to wit. the 12th, 19th and 26th of January, 1969 articles were published in the Sunday Times defamatory of the plaintiff.

In the edition of the 12th of January an article under the title "Cheap drugs boss leaves debt trail" was published, exposing a certain Sieczko in an accusatorial way reminiscent of a prosecutor's opening or final address in a criminal case. It leaves no room for doubt that the contents are highly defamatory of the said Sieczko, accusing him of all sorts of trickery, dishonesty and criminal activities. The Plaintiff Company is specifically mentioned in the first article as being formed by Sieczko and a Cypriot M.P., Joseph Yamakis, plaintiff in another action (No.854/69)

The plaintiff avers in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the statement of claim, the following:-

"8. By the said, words the Defendants meant and/or were understood to mean:-

(a) that Plaintiff Company was intentionally and deliberately established in order to continue in and from Cyprus dishonest and/or unlawful and/or criminal acts already practised elsewhere, as described in the publication complained of, Schedule 'A’;

(b) that Plaintiff Company deliberately was established and was intending to operate in a [*464] manner which, inter alia, would result, in:-

(i) defrauding people dealing with it, including the Government of Cyprus;

(ii) defrauding its shareholders;

(iii) infringing patents;

(iv) selling drugs of a cheap and/or inferior quality;

(v) selling drugs with a misdescription as to their contents and quality, thereby defrauding its customers and/or endangering their life and/or actually causing their death;

(vi) all types of illicit, dishonest, unethical and/or unlawful practices.

(c) That Plaintiff Company was an accomplice in conspiracy to defraud the creditors and/or share holders of other companies and/or of its own;

(d) that Plaintiff Company was part of a meticulously established and run international racket;

(e) that Plaintiff Company was unworthy of any confidence, as being involved in shady and/or dishonest transactions;

(f) that the products to be manufactured and/or sold by Plaintiff Company would be worthless, false and/or dangerous to health. [*465]

9. In page two of the said newspaper, dated 19th January, 1969, under the title 'Cyprus cheap drug plan goes ahead', the Defendants falsely, and maliciously printed and/or published and/or caused to be printed and/or published of and concerning the Plaintiff Company and of it in its said business and/or trade the words appearing in Schedule 'B' attached to the present statement of claim and forming part of same.

10. The said words were meant and/or were understood to mean the Plaintiff Company.

11. By the said words the Defendants meant and/or were understood to mean:-

(a) all that is alleged in paragraph 8 hereinabove, with regard to the publication of 12.1.1969 and which publication is specifically mentioned and reconfirmed in the present publication complained of;

(b) that Plaintiff Company was intending to operate a 'pirate' drug market and/or produce 'pirate’ drugs, namely drugs of a worthless and/or inferior and/or false and/or dangerous nature and/or drugs whose manufacture and sale would be an infringement of patents;

(c) that Plaintiff Company was knowingly proceeding to be a part of an international racket.

12. In page six of the said newspaper, dated 26th January, 1969, under the title "Sieczko drugs probe demand", [*466] the Defendants falsely and maliciously printed and/or published and/or caused to be printed and/or published of and concerning the Plaintiff Company and of it in its said business and/or trade the words appearing in Schedule 'C' attached to the present statement of claim and forming part of same.

13. By the said words the Defendants meant and/or were understood to mean:-

(a) that Plaintiff Company was part of a racket and/or that it is part of a dishonest set-up;

(b) that the products to be manufactured and/or sold by Plaintiff Company were to be suspicious;

(c) that Plaintiff Company is a company fit to be blacklisted".

The above averments were verified on oath by the witnesses called.

Having considered the evidence before us, including the exhibits produced, we are satisfied as to the correctness of the allegations and even more, we have evidence to the effect that some of the accusations contained in the articles are untrue, such as the selling of machinery to the Plaintiff Company at prices much higher than their actual value. It is not for the plaintiff to prove the untruthfulness of the allegations, but for the defendants to prove the truthfulness thereof. The plaintiff, however, in order to show that the libel was malicious, unjustified and published with ulterior [*467] bad motives, adduced evidence to the effect which having regard to the totality of the evidence before us, we accent.

We must, however, point out that we decided not to rely on the cyclostyled article, circulated in Cyprus to a number of persons, including the advocate of the plaintiff (Exhibit 9), as its admissibility is doubtful.

By the said articles the Plaintiff Company is accused of associating: with a person who allegedly has been involved in the manufacture of cheap pirate pharmaceutical products and other nefarious activities. The grave consequence of such an imputation on a newly formed Company cannot be denied, especially at a time when they were getting organized for production and export of their products. As it was said in the case of Kemsley Newspapers v. K.E.O- (supra) -

",... the fact that serious aspersions were cast upon its employees, does not prevent the respondent company from making a case that it was defamed in its trading character. The aspersions amount to an imputation to be reasonably inferred against the trading character of the Company, in that it continued its business insufficiently with gross neglect and lack of supervision …"

And following the British Empire Machine v. Linotype(1) we [*468] consider the facts of the present case more serious and the defamation far more injurious to the plaintiff company. In Kemsley's case the aspersions were cast on ordinary employees of the company, whereas in the present case they were cast on the founders of the company and its technical consultants. Moreover, the defamation is not merely calculated to injure the reputation of the company’s products, but also is calculated to shake the company's foundations, undermine their operations and jeopardize their future prospects.

Bowen, L.J. in the case of Ratcliffe v. Evans (189 2) 2 Q.B. 525, said:-

"The law presumes that some damage will flow in the ordinary course of things from the mere invasion of his absolute right of reputation".

And per Blackburn, J. in the case of Watkin v. Hall (1866) L.R. 3 Q.B. 399 -

"Where disparaging words are spoken of a person, and either actual injury has flowed from them, or they were spoken of him in the way of his trade or profession, in contemplation of law damage has accrued to the person defamed".

Special damages need not be proved in a case of libel. Section 7 of the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap. 1.48, provides that "a corporate body shall not recover compensation in respect of any civil wrong, unless it shall suffer damage thereby".

In Kemsley’s case, it was held that section 7 in no way nullifies or contradicts section 24(1) of the same [*469] law (injurious falsehood) and that "damage" means according to section 2(2) of the same law "loss of or other similar loss or detriment".

Section 25(2) of the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap. 148, expressly provides that special damage need not be proved in a case of injurious falsehood if certain prerequisites are established.(1)By analogy, we arrive at the

conclusion that section 7 does not nullify the relevant provision(2) of the Civil Wrongs Law, relating to special damages in a case of libel and that no special damage need be proved by a defamed corporate body. The damages in a case of libel are said to be at large, because the "real" damage cannot be ascertained. [*470]

Lord Atkin in Ley v. Hamilton

(1935) (153 L.T.) 153 p. 386 said:-

”It is impossible to track the scandals to know what quarters the poison may reach: It is impossible to weigh at all closely the compensation which will recompense a man or a woman for the insult offered or the pain of a false accusation”.

According to Gatley on Libel & Slander, 6th Edition, evidence of the following may be adduced in aggravation of damages:-

(a) Mode and extent of publication.

(b) Republication of libel.

(c) Conduct of defendant.

(d) Other defamatory words.

(e) The conduct of the defendant's case.

(f) Defendant’s plea of justification.

(g) Joint tortfeasors.

(h) Special damage.

Regarding (a), there is evidence that the Sunday : Times is a newspaper with wide circulation both in England and abroad, including Cyprus, Also, the mode of the publication is not such as to be ignored in the assessment of damages.

Regarding (b), there is evidence that the articles concerning the same libel appear on three consecutive editions of the Sunday Times. [*471]

Regarding (c) and (d), there is evidence that despite the pendency of other Libel actions in England by Sieczko, the defendants continued their articles about him. This is something that we can take into consideration in aggravation of damages in view of the fact that Sieczko is involved in the formation of the Plaintiff Company. The attack is not merely confined to the person of Sieczko, but also to his business activities and his companies.

Regarding (e), learned counsel of plaintiff urged the Court to condemn the course pursued by defendants 1 and 2 in not entering an appearance and in not appearing to defend themselves. We are not aware of the reasons behind the defendant’s decision to pursue this course, especially in a case of libel published in a foreign newspaper with world-wide circulation. If the intention of the publishers was to protect the public from the activities of an allegedly unscrupulous person, then why not expose him in the Courts of the country where he is intending to continue his activities? A newspaper printed and published abroad with worldwide circulation should not defame persons or companies in another country with impunity shielding themselves behind legal and procedural technicalities. In a case of libel where malice plays an important role, such a conduct cannot be ignored and may be taken into consideration in assessing the damages.

Regarding (f), we have to note that since no defence has been filed, it does not come into play. The sane applies to (g) and (h). [*472]

Exemplary damages were awarded in the past in all proper cases including cases of libel and the Common Law was well established on this until the House of Lords in the case of Rookes v. Barnard

(l964) All E.R. 367, restricted the categories of the cases in which exemplary damages could serve a useful purpose, to wit, (a) the case of oppressive arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants of the Government and (b) the case where the defendant’s conduct had been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which might well exceed the compensation payable to plaintiff.

Exemplary damages are sometimes called aggravated damages.(1)

Lord Devlin in Barnard’s case distinguished exemplary from aggravated damages. He said (p.412):- [*473]

"It would not be right to take the language that judges have used on such occasions to justify their non-intervention and treat their words as a positive formulation of a type of case in which exemplary damages can be awarded. They have used numerous epithets - wilful, wanton, high handed, oppressive, malicious, outrageous - but these sort of adjectives are used in the judgments by way of comment on the facts of a particular case. It would on my view be a mistake to suppose that any of them can be selected as definitive and a jury directed, for example, that it can award exemplary damages whenever it finds conduct that is wilful or wanton. When this has been said, there remains one class of case for which the authority is much more precise. It is the class of case in which the injury to the plaintiff has been aggravated by malice or by the manner of doing the injury, that is, the insolence or arrogance by which it is accompanied. There is clear authority that this can justify exemplary damages, though (except in London v. Ryder (167)) it is not clear whether they are to be regarded as in addition to, or in substitution for, the aggravated damages that could certainly be awarded ... This conclusion will, I hope, remove from the law a source

of confusion between aggravated and exemplary damages which has troubled [*474] the learned commentators on the subject. Otherwise, it

will not, I think, make much difference to the substance of the law or rob the law of the strength which it ought to have. Aggravated damages in this type of case can do most, if not, all, of the work that could be done by exemplary damages."

Whatever the distinction between exemplary and aggravated damages, what has been criticised in Barnard's case, is the restriction of the cases in which exemplary damages can be awarded. In the recent Court of Appeal case of Broome v. Cassell & Co. ltd.& another

(1971) 2 All E.R. 187 (a libel case) Lord Denning, M.R. in his judgment had this to say about the speech of Lord Devlin(1) in Barnard's case:-

"It is important to notice that both sides in Rookes v. Barnard accepted that the jury could award exemplary damages in libel actions......Yet, when the House came to deliver their speeches, Lord Devlin threw over all that we ever knew about exemplary damages. He knocked down the Common Law as it had existed for centuries. He said that they could only be awarded in two very limited categories but in no other category; and all the other Lords agreed with him. This new doctrine has up till now been [*475] assumed in this Court as a doctrine to be applied; see McCarey v. Associated Newspapers Itd.;(1) Broadway Approvals Ltd. v. OdhamsPress Ltd.;(2) Fielding v. Variety Incorporated(3) and Mafo v. Adams(4) It was applied by Widgery.

I. in Manson v. Associated Newspapers Ltd.(5) But it has not been accepted in the countries of the Commonwealth. The High Court of Australia has subjected this new doctrine to devastating criticism and has refused to follow it: see Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd.(6)

The Privy Council has supported the High Court of Australia in a judgment which marshals with convincing force the arguments against the new doctrine: See Australian Consolidated Press Ltd. v. Uren.(7) The Supreme Court of Canada, together with the Courts of Alberta, Ontario, British Columbia and Manitoba, have repudiated the new doctrine: See McElray v. Cowper – Smith and Woodman (8) ; McKinnon v. F. W. Woolworth Co. Ltd. [*476] and Johnston(1) ; Bahner v. Marwest Hotel Co. Ltd.(2) and Fraser v. Wilson(3) . The Courts of New Zealand also declined to follow it: See Fogg v. McKnight(4) The Courts of the United States of America know nothing of this new doctrine. They go by the settled doctrine of the common law as to punitive damages and would not dream of changing it. It is well stated in the Re-statement of the Law of Torts(5) This wholesale condemnation justifies us, I think, in examining this new doctrine for ourselves; and I make so bald as to say that it should not be followed any longer in this country".

In Cyprus - where the Common Law is applicable - we have the case of Gregoriades v. Kyrialcides(6) decided much later than Barnard's case and in which exemplary damages were awarded for an assault. The circumstances under which the assault was committed, fall under neither the first nor the second category of cases in which according to Barnard's case such damages can be awarded.

We feel that we cannot depart either from the Common Law or the decisions of our own Supreme Court. [*477] Exemplary damages can be awarded in every proper case and a proper case need not be confined to the categories set out in Barnard's case. We consider the present case a proper one for the award of exemplary damages.

Bearing in mind all we have already stated and having regard to the evidence as a whole, we assess the damages to which the plaintiff is entitled at £10,000.-.

The plaintiff prayed for an injunction restraining the defendants from printing and publishing same or similar defamatory of the plaintiff articles. Injunction Is a discretionary power of the Court and it should not be granted in cases where the plaintiff did not act in good faith. We have no doubt that the plaintiff acted in good faith in the present case, but if the claim was only for an injunction against a person outside the jurisdiction, then he would not have been entitled to leave of the Court to

seal and serve the writ of summons abroad. In the case of De Bernades v. N. W. Herald (1893) 2 Q.B. 97 N. where the defendant was permanently abroad, it

was held that leave to issue and serve the writ out of the. jurisdiction will be refused where an injunction, If granted, could not be made effectual against the defendant who is out of the jurisdiction.

Defendants 1 and 2 are companies registered and permanently resident out of the jurisdiction and if an injunction is issued, it will be ineffectual, Under the circumstances, we do not consider an injunction as an appropriate remedy. [*478]

Defendants 3 are, inter alia, distributors of periodicals and newspapers including the Sunday Times. They raised the defence of innocent dissemination(1) and their allegations are admitted by plaintiff, thereby making the proof of these allegations unnecessary. There is no express provision in the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap. 148 about this defence. But according to section 29(1) of the Courts of Justice Law, (1960) every Court in the exercise of its civil or criminal jurisdiction shall apply -

"(a)

(b) The laws saved under Article 188 of the Constitution subject to the conditions provided therein save in so far as other provision has been or shall be made by a law made or becoming applicable under the Constitution;

(c) the common law and the doctrines of equity save in so far as other provision has been or shall be made by any law made or becoming applicable under the Constitution or any law saved under paragraph (b) of this section in so far as they are not inconsistent with, or contrary to, the Constitution;" [*479]

In a. number of cases(1) it was held that the Civil Wrongs Law is not exhaustive and in the absence of any provision in the Civil Wrongs Law, the Common Law applies.

We find that the Common Law defence of innocent dissemination applies in Cyprus and in view of the facts admitted by plaintiff, we find that defendants 3 are not liable and the action against them is dismissed.

Judgment is issued in favour of the Plaintiff Company against defendants 1 & 2 jointly and severally for £10,000.-. Legal interest thereon, plus costs, to be assessed by the Registrar.

Action against defendants 3 dismissed. Plaintiff to pay 50 per cent of the costs of defendants 3. Such costs to be assessed by the Registrar.

Judgment and order as to

costs as aforesaid.

(1) 23 C.L.R. p.

(1) Repealed and substituted by the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 (No. 14/60). Section 21 of the new law is the same as section 25 of the repealed law with special provisions regarding the Sovereign Ease Area.

(2) "A person publishes defamatory matter if he causes the print writing, painting, effigy, gestures, spoken words, or other sounds or other means by which the defamatory matter is conveyed to be dealt with. either by exhibition, reading, recitation, description, delivery, communication, distribution, demonstration, expression or utterance, or otherwise, so that the defamatory meaning thereof becomes known or is likely t0 become known to any person other than -

(a) the person defamed thereby; or

(b) the husband or wife of the person publishing the defamatory statement, so long as the marriage is subsisting"

1 In the case of Kemsley Newspapers Ltd. v. The Cyprus Wines & Spirits Co. Ltd., K.E.O. 23 C.L.R. p. 1, a libel was published in a newspaper published in England and distributed in Cyprus, attacking a Company’s reputation carrying on business in Cyprus. The Cyprus Courts were held to have had jurisdiction to try the case.

(1) Section 12(4) of the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap. 148.

(2) "In an action for defamation it shall be a defence -

(a) That the matter of which complaint was made was true:

Provided that where the defamatory matter contains two or more distinct charges against the plaintiff, a defence under this paragraph shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every charge is not proved, if the 20 defamatory matter not proved to be true does not materially injure the plaintiff's reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining charges;

(b) that the matter of which complaint was made was a fair comment on some matter of public interest:

Provided that where the defamatory matter consists partly of allegations of fact and partly or expression of opinion, a defence of fair comment shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every allegation of fact is not proved, if the expression of opinion is a fair comment having regard to such of the facts alleged or referred to in the defamatory matter complained of as are proved:

Provided

further that a defence under this paragraph shall not succeed if the plaintiff proves that the publication was not made in good faith within the meaning of

subsection (2) of section 21 of this law;

(c) that the publication of the defamatory matter was privileged under sections 20 and 21 of this Law;

(d) that the defamation was unintentional under section 22 of this law"

(1) (1899) 81 L.T. 331 it was further held that "an imputation on the goods sold or manufactured by a trading company may involve a reflection on the company itself in the way of its business."

(1) 25(2) (a) "If the words upon which the action is founded are calculated to cause pecuniary loss to the plaintiff and are published in writing or other permanent form; or (b) if the said words calculated to cause pecuniary loss to the plaintiff in respect of any office, profession, calling, trade or business held or carried on by him at the time of the publication".

(2) Section 17(3) of the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap. 148. "An action for defamation by gestures, spoken words or other sounds, other

than broadcasting by wireless telegraphy, shall not lie without proof of special damage except where the gestures, spoken words or other sounds

-

(a) impute a crime for which the plaintiff may be made to suffer corporal punishment or imprisonment in the first instance;

(b) are calculated to injure or prejudice the reputation of the plaintiff in the way of his profession, trade, business, calling or office;

(c) impute to the plaintiff a contagious or infectious disease;

(d) impute adultery or unchastity to a woman or girl".

(1) Halbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 11, para. 391

"Exemplary damages. Where the wounded feeling and injured pride of a plaintiff, or the misconduct of a defendant, may be taken into consideration, the principle of restitution in Integrum no longer applies. Damages are then awarded not merely to recompense the plaintiff for the loss he has sustained by reason of the defendant’s wrongful act, but to punish the defendant in an exemplary manner, and vindicate the distinction between a wilful and an innocent wrongdoer. Such damages are said to be ’at large’ and, further, have been called exemplary, vindictive, penal,punitive, aggravated, or retributory".

(1) ibid at page 198-199

(1) (1964) 3 All E.R. 947.

(2) (1965) 2 All E.R. 523.

(3) (1967) 2 All E.R. 497.

(4) (1969) 3 All E.R. 1404.

(5) (1965) 2 All E.R. 954.

(6) (1967) A.L.R. 25.

(7) (1967) 3 All E.R. 523, (1969) 1 A.C. 590.

(8) (1967) 62 D.L.R. (2nd) 65.

(1) (1968) 70 D.L.R. (2nd) 280.

(2) (1969) 6 D.L.R. (3rd) 322.

(3) (1969) 6 D.L.R. (3rd) 531.

(4) (1968) N.Z.L.R. 330.

(5) Section 21. of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 (No. 14/60).

(6) (1970) 4 J.S.C., p. 345.

(1) A person who takes a subordinate part in the dissemination of a newspaper or book containing a libel is not liable if he shows;-

(a) that he did not know that the book or paper contained the libel complained of; and

(b) that he did not know that the book or paper was of a character likely to contain libel; and

(c) that such want of knowledge was not due to any negligence on his part. (Gatley on Libel & Slander, 6tn Edition, page 342).

(1) Vassiliou v. Vassiliou. 16 C.L.R. , 69.

Universal Advertising & Publishing Agency v. Panayiotis Vouros, 19

C. L.R. 87.

H.j.Theodossiou v. Petros Koulia & another

(1970) 10 J.S.C. 1063.