Court dismissed appeal holding administrative officer cannot act judicially to override statutory time limits.

[*1052] 1971 April 6

(TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P., STAVRINIDES, L. L0IZ0U, JJ. )

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

1. Ibrahim Aziz Hasan Ashik,

2. Emine Ibrahim,

3. Sherif Djemal Rustem Yiallourou,

Appellants,

v.

Emine Rustem,

Respondent.

(Civil Appeal No. 14886).

Immovable Property (Tenure, Registration and Valuation) Law, Cap. 224 - Acceptance of lodgment by Director, under section 25(2) of the Law, after expiry of the period provided therein - Appeal under section 80 of the Law - Irrespective of whether an interim order providing for postponement of the running of the period could effectively, in law, affect the running of the period it was correctly, held by trial Court, in the instant case, that it was not open to an administrative organ, the Director, to act in a judicial capacity, as a court of appeal in the matter of the interim order - And that he correctly acted as being bound to accept the lodgment of the amount, treating the relevant-period as having just commenced to run.

A. Christofides, for the Appellants.

A. Dana, for the Respondent,

JUDGMENT

The judgment of the Court was delivered by:-

TRIANTAFYILIDES, P.: In this case the appellants [*1053] appeals against the judgment given by the District Court of Kyrenia, on appeal, under section 80 of the Immovable Property (Tenure, Registration and Valuation) Law(Cap.224), from a

decision of the Kyrenia District Lands Officer exercising powers, under Cap. 224, of the Director of Lands and Surveys.

By such decision the respondent, in her capacity as a co-owner of certain properties, was allowed to lodge in the Kyrenia District Lands Office the amount of the price at which appellants 1 and 2, co-owners of the said properties, had agreed to sell their shares to appellant 3; the respondent lodged the a mount in exercise of her right, under section 25(2) of Cap. 224, to have the shares of appellants 1 and 2 registered in her name, instead of in the name of appellant 3; but the lodgment was made and accepted by the Kyrenia District Lands Officer well after the expiry of the period laid down in this connection by section 25(2), viz. thirty days as from the date of the advertisement in the press of the sale.

The circumstances in which the lodgment was accepted after the expiry of the relevant period are, in short, that on the 17th April, 1967, in proceedings initiated by the respondent under the Fraudulent Transfers Avoidance Law (Cap.62) in respect of the properties concerned an interim order was made and was allowed to remain in force without objection on the part of the appellants, who were parties to the proceedings, which, inter alia, provided that the afore-mentioned period of thirty days should run as [*1054] from the date when the proceedings under Cap. 62 would be concluded.

The interim order was, eventually, discharged, on the 12th December, 1967, by consent of the parties, after an application to that effect by the appellants. On the same day, and after the discharge of the order, the respondent made the lodgment about the acceptance of which the appellants complain.

The learned trial Judge who decided the appeal from the decision of the District Lands Officer (a decision which could only have been reached on the basis of the view that the interim order had already had its effect of postponing the commencement of the running of the period specified in section 25(2) of Cap 224) held that it was not open to the Lands Officer to act contrary to the interim order, because, then he would have acted as a court giving his own interpretation to section 25(2) and the effect in relation thereto of the interim order.

Leaving open the issue as to whether or not the interim order could effectively, in law, affect the running of the period under section 25(2) - as it is not necessary to resolve such issue for the purposes of the present appeal - we are of the view that it was correctly held by the District Court, within the narrow ambit of an appeal from the

decision of the District Lands officer, that it was not open to such administrative organ to act in a judicial capacity, as a court of appeal, in the matter of the interim order; and that the [*1055] said organ correctly acted as being bound to accept the lodgment of the amount of the sale price, treating the relevant period as having just commenced to run, irrespective of whether or not this could have been validly brought about by the interim order.

As a result this appeal, against the judgment of the District Court, on appeal from the decision of the District Lands Officer, is dismissed, with costs in favour of respondent here and in the court below.

Appeal dismissed with costs.