Court affirms six-month driving disqualification for dangerous speeding and prior convictions despite business inconvenience.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe Supreme Court dismissed the appellant's appeal against a six-month driving disqualification order following his conviction for dangerous speeding and driving without due care. Although the appellant, a grocer requiring a license for business, argued the order caused significant inconvenience, the court noted his history of six recent motoring convictions. The court affirmed the trial judge's decision, stating the disqualification was fully justified given the appellant's repeated offenses and that the six-month period represented maximum leniency.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IASections 6, 13 and 4(1) of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Law; A driver with numerous recent convictions for careless or dangerous driving and speeding is properly disqualified for a license, even if the disqualification causes business inconvenience, as the court must prioritize public safety over the individual's commercial needs.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IADecisioni correlate
Generato dall'IATesto completo
[*1263] 1970 December 18
(VASSILIADES, P., JOSEPHIDES, HADJIAEASTASSIOU, JJ.)
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Matheos Chr. Armeftis,
Appellant,
v.
The Police,
Respondents,
(Criminal Appeal No. 3215).
Road Traffic -- Sentence - Disqualification Disqualification order for six months for driving without due cure and attention and for dangerous speeding - Sections 6, 13 and 4(1) of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Law, Cap. 332 -Numerous similar previous convictions
- Inconvenience caused to appellant for needing driving licence in connection with his business – Disqualification order affirmed.
Disqualification - See under “Road Traffic”.
Appellant in person.
M. Kyprianou, Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT
The judgment of the Court was delivered by:
VASSILIADES. P.: This appeal was taken upon, a notice signed by the appellant - a Limassol grocer [*1264] of about 54 years of age - and apparently prepared by him. The notice states that the appeal is taken against the conviction; but from the only ground on which the appeal was based, it is apparent that the appeal is directed against sentence; and particularly against the part of the sentence which consists of a disqualification for holding a driver's licence for some six months from the date of conviction. With the consent of all concerned, the appeal was treated as an appeal against sentence only.
The appellant was charged before the District Court of Limassol on two counts: (1) For driving without due care and attention contrary to sections 6 and 13 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Law, Cap. 332; and
(2) for driving a motor-vehicle on a public road at a speed which was likely to endanger human life, contrary to section 4(1) of the same statute.
Appearing in person, on August 20th, 1970, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both counts. But at a subsequent stage in the proceedings, some two months later (owing to adjournments due to the appellant) the appellant appearing together with his advocate, applied for leave to change his plea; and when re-charged in the presence of his advocate, he pleaded guilty to both counts.
The facts of the case, as far as material to sentence, are simple. The appellant drives his own ear, a specially constructed vehicle for a driver with an amputated right hand from above the wrist. He has been driving for over 30 years. On the evening of April 17, 1970, (at [*1265] about 7:20 p.m.) the appellant was driving at considerable speed his rather powerful car, in an inhabited area of the town of Limassol. At a street crossing he came into collision with a cyclist, a schoolboy of about 12 years of age, who came into the crossing from a side street, riding his bicycle without a light. Prom the tyre marks found on the road by the police who investigated the case on the same evening, it appears that the appellant used his brakes before the collision in an attempt to avoid the bicycle; and then in order to stop his car. The plan prepared by the police, and produced at the hearing as an exhibit shows tyre marks caused by, appellant’s car on the asphalted surface of the road, running for some 108 ft. The boy was seriously injured; and was taken to hospital directly after the accident, by the appellant.
The count for driving without due care and attention was based on the evidence of eye witnesses. The count for dangerous speeding was based on the same evidence, supported also by expert evidence from tests carried out by the police with appellants own vehicle. These indicated that appellant's car was travelling, at the material time, at a speed of over .60 miles per hour. The appellant, pleading through his advocate, blamed the cyclist fa1 the collision; and as that matter is the subject of a civil claim, we do not wish to enter into it at all. We deal in this appeal only with the sentence imposed on the appellant after his plea of guilty to the counts in the charge.
In Imposing sentence, the trial Judge took into
consideration a list of previous convictions for motor [*1266] offences, commencing from December 1938. They were put to
the appellant who admitted them. The list is before us as part of the record. During the last five years the list contains six convictions for motoring offences; one of them for driving without due care and attention in 1966 (for which the appellant was bound over in £30for one year to keep the peace); one for using a car without the required insurance in September 1968, (for* which he was bound in £30 for six months to come up for judgment); and a conviction, again in 1968, for exceeding the speed, for which the appellant was fined £5.
In this case, the learned trial Judge imposed a sentence of £10 fine on each of the two counts and disqualified the appellant for holding a driving licence for a period of six months, ending on May 1, 1971. The Judge give as reason for the disqualification order, the numerous convictions of the appellant, particularly those connected with careless or dangerous driving and speeding.
The appellant, appearing before us in person urgently pleaded for his driving licence which he badly needs, he said, in connection with his business. We appreciate the inconvenience in which the appellant is put by the disqualification order, but we find no merit in his plea. We take the view that in the circumstances of his case, the trial Judge was fully justified in making the disqualification order; and we think that he extended every possible leniency in limiting the period of six months only. We hope that the inconvenience and perhaps also the expense, which [*1267] he will suffer, shall impress upon the appellant that if he wishes to hoi1 a driving licence, he must change the manner in which he makes use of it.
This appeal is dismissed; and the sentence imposed by the trial Judge, including the disqualification order, is affirmed.
Appeal dismissed