Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
Christos Louka v. Cyprus Mines Corporation (1970) JSC 1215 Generato dall'IA

Court allows partial appeal increasing damages for injured worker while upholding 20% contributory negligence apportionment.

Numero d'incarto Christos Louka v. Cyprus Mines Corporation (1970) JSC 1215
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Cipro (CY)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Parzialmente accolto (Partially Allowed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The Supreme Court allowed the appellant's partial appeal, increasing general damages from £450 to £800 due to the severe loss of his right thumb and associated pain. While the court affirmed the trial court's finding that the worker was 20% responsible for his own negligence in improvising a risky work method, it rejected the respondents' cross-appeal to reduce their liability. The final judgment varied the lower court's order to award £610 in damages based on the 80% liability attributed to the factory owner.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

Sections 25 and 26(1) of the Factories Law Cap. 134; A workman's breach of statutory duty to fence dangerous machinery constitutes contributory negligence, but appellate courts will not interfere with liability apportionment unless it is wrong in principle or based on a misapprehension of facts.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
contributory negligence apportionment of liability factories law dangerous machinery general damages safe system of work master and servant incapacità di lavoro

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA
Sections 25 and 26(1) of the Factories Law Cap. 134
Factory - Master and Servant - Safe system of work - Dangerous machinery - Duty to fence - Accident to workman through contact with unfenced dangerous machinery - Factory owner in breach of statutory/ duty - Sections 25 and 26(1) of the Factories Law Cap. 134.

Giurisprudenza citata

Generato dall'IA
25 Kyriacou v. Aristotelous (1970) 6 J.S.C. 551
Kerry v. Carter (1969) 3 All E.R. 723
Andronikou v. Kitsion (1970) 5 J.S.C. 494
Generato dall'IA

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Testo completo

[*1215] 1970 June 12

(TRIANTAFYLLIDES, STAVRINIDES, HADJIANASTASSIOU, JJ.)

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Christos Louka,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Cyprus Mines Corporation,

Respondents-Defendants.

(Civil Appeal No. 4815).

Factory - Master and Servant - Safe system of work - Dangerous machinery - Duty to fence - Accident to workman through contact with unfenced dangerous machinery - Factory owner in breach of statutory/ duty - Sections 25 and 26(1) of the Factories Law Cap. 134.

Negligence - Master and servant - Safe system of work

- Accident to workman through master’s breach of strict statutory duty to fence

- Whether workman can be guilty of contributory negligence.

Negligence - Contributory negligence - Apportionment of liability - Principles on which Court of Appeal will intervene - Apportionment in the instant case neither wrong in principle nor based on a misapprehension of facts or otherwise clearly wrong.

Damages - General damages - Right-handed workman of forty-five losing use of his right thumb - Pain and suffering; due to two operations - His worth as a workman considerably reduced -- Amount awarded increased.

Safe system of work - See – under “Factory”; “Negligence”.

Dangerous Machinery – See under “Factory”.

G. Ladas, for the Appellant.

Chr. Artemides, for the Respondents.

JUDGMENT

The judgment of the Court was delivered by:

TRIANTAFYILIDES. J.: In this case the appellant plaintiff appeals against that part of the decision [*1216] of a Pull District Court in Nicosia, in Civil Action No. 1477/66, by means of which he was found responsible, through negligence, to an extent of 20% for the occurrence of an accident in the course of his employment by the respondentsdefendants; as a result of such accident the was injured in a manner incapacitating practically in full his right thumb. He appeals, also, in relation to the amount of general damages assessed in respect of his injury, contending that it is inadequate.

There is a cross-appeal by the respondents by which they claim that either the decision of the Court below should be set aside, so that they should be absolved of all liability for the accident, or, at least, that such decision should be varied so that the appellant shall be held to blame much more for the accident than as found by the said Court.

The relevant facts are set out fully in the painstakingly prepared judgment of the learned trial judges and we need not repeat them at length. It suffices to say that the appellant had been assigned the duty of obtaining samples of ore, in the works of the respondents, while the ore was carried along a conveyor belt; he was given certain instructions as to how to do it, but such instructions were considered by him to be an unsafe system of work and, as a result, he improvised his own method of taking the samples; in the course of following such method he got himself injured, through his thumb being caught by an unfenced part of machinery.

Regarding the liability for the accident, we have not been convinced, by their counsel, that no part of it at [*1217] all should have been found to rest with the respondents. We are, in this respect, in agreement with the Court below that the respondents were negligent in that they laid down a system of work which was unsafe, especially when there are taken into account the tool with which the appellant had been 5 ordered to obtain samples of the ore from the conveyor belt, the confined space within which he had to carry out such task, the obstruction carried by pipes around which he had to place his hands in doing so, and the protruding and unguarded part of the pulley to be found under that part of the conveyor belt wherefrom the samples of the ore were to be obtained by him.

Moreover, we are of the opinion that the trial Court judges were correct in holding that the respondents, through not securely fencing the whole width of the pulley in question, committed a breach of statutory duty, contrary to section 25 of the Factories law, Cap. i3k} which required the machinery concerned to be fenced in any case, in view of its being transmission machinery, as well as a breach of section 26(1) of the same Law, in that it was clearly fore- 20 seeable that the said pulley was a dangerous part of machinery and it had to be securely fenced in order to avoid the likelihood of injury to a workman in the position of the appellant (see, inter alia, in this connection, the case Millard v, Serck Tubes, Ltd.

(1969) 1 All E.R. 598, decided in relation to section 14 of the Factories Act 1961, in England, which corresponds to section 26 of our own Cap. 134). [*1218]

In relation to the breach of statutory duty imposed by virtue of section 26(1), counsel for the respondents submitted that no such breach had occurred because the duty to fence under the said provision was a duty to fence against contact of the operator with dangerous parts of machinery and that this duty did not include a duty to fence against a tool, which the operator was using, coming into contact with such dangerous parts; he relied in this respect on the case of Sparrow v. Fairey Aviation Co. Ltd. (1964) A.C. 1-19. In our view the situation in this case is clearly distinguishable from that in the Sparrow case, because in the present instance the appellant was injured due to the fact that his own hand came into contact with an unfenced dangerous part of machinery, without the tool which he was using having contributed to this happening, by getting 15 caught in the dangerous part and flinging the appellant's hand against the said part, as in the Sparrow case (supra), in which, the position, as described by Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in his judgment (at p. 1050) was as follows:

“On the facts as found the appellant did not therefore receive injury because he came into contact with a dangerous part. He received injury only as a consequence of the fact that his implement came into contact with a dangerous part”.

Regarding, next, the issue of contributory negligence we shall deal, first, with the contention of counsellor appellant that once the respondents were found to have contravened their strict and absolute duty to fence securely the transmission machinery, which injured the hand of the appellant, no question of contributory negligence on the part of the appellant could, in law, arise. We cannot uphold such [*1219] contention as being a valid one in this respect the case of Caswell v. Powell. Duffryn Associated Collieries, Ltd. (1940) A. C. 152 (see, in particular, the judgment of Lord Atkin at p. 164) as well as the cases of Lewis v, Denye (1940) A.C. 921 (see the judgment of Viscount Simon L.C at p. 929) p Sparks v, Edward Ash. Ltd. (1943)1 K. B. 223 and London Passenger Transport Board v. Upson and another (1949) 1 All E.R. 60 (see the judgment of Lord Wright at p. 67) establish that the defence of contributory negligence was available in law to the respondents in the present case. This being so, we do agree that, on the facts as found by the trial Court, the appellant was rightly held guilty of contributory negligence. It is true that he had to improvise his own system of work because of the unsafe system of work laid down by his employers - the respondents - but the system which he adopted was, as correctly pointed out in the judgment appealed from, a risky one, too.

Both parties to this appeal have challenged as erroneous the apportionment of liability for the accident, as made by the Court below, vis. the appellant being at fault to an extent of 20% and the respondents to an extent of 80%.

The principles governing the exercise of the powers of an appellate tribunal in relation to such a matter have often been stated and need not be gone into in detail; it suffices, we think, to mention the very recent case of 25 Kyriacou v. Aristotelous, (1970) 6 J.S.C. 551, in which relevant case-law has been referred to. In the present case, and applying the said principles, we have decided not to interfere with the apportionment of liability as made by the trial [*1220] Court because we have not been convinced that such apportionment is either wrong in principle or based on a misapprehension of facts or otherwise clearly wrong (see, also, the judgment of Lord Denning M.R. in Kerry v. Carter (1.969) 3 All E.R. 723 at n. 726).

On the question of the amount of £450 assessed as general damages in respect of the injury suffered by the appellant, we have reached the conclusion, bearing in mind the principles of law applicable, as they have often been reiterated in decisions of this Court (see, inter alia, Andronikou v. Kitsion 1970) 5 J.S.C 494), that such amount is so low that we should intervene and increase it to £800. In taking this view we have been particularly influenced by the factors that the appellant, who is a workman about fortyfive years old, has lost the use of his right thumb and he is a right-handed person, he has had to suffer considerable pain and suffering die to two surgical operations on his thumb, and, even though he has not, for the time being, lost his job, his incapacity in question has reduced considerably his worth as a workman.

In the result this appeal is allowed in part and the order made by the Court below is varied so that there will be judgment in favour of the appellant for £61+0 damages, on the basis of 80% liability on the part of the respondents.

The part of the order of the trial Court regarding the refund of of the total of social insurance benefits received by the appellant remains undisturbed, as being correctly based on the relevant legislative provisions.

The cross-appeal is dismissed. [*1221]

Before concluding we wish to place on record our appreciation for the assistance which learned counsel appearing for the parties have so diligently rendered to us in the course of the proceedings before us.

We award two-thirds of the costs of the appeal in favour of the appellant; and we have decided not to disturb the order made in respect of the costs of the trial.

Appeal allowed in part.

Cross-appeal dismissed.

Order for costs as above.