Supreme Court dismisses appeal against refusal of sanction to use 'Co-operative' due to potential confusion with registered societies.

[*474] 1970 May 30

(TRIANTAFYLLIDES , J.)

REVISIONAL JURISDICTION

In the matter of Article 146 of the Constitution

Anastasia Savvidou, personally and/or

as Secretary of the Association of

Folk Art’s Friends,

Applicant,

and

The Republic of Cyprus, through

(1) The Council of Ministers,

(2) The Ministry of Commerce and Industry,

Respondents.

(Case No. 31/69).

Co-Operative Societies Law Cap. 114

- Word "Co-Operative" Sanction for the use of - Discretion under s.

58 of the Law - A very wide one - Not beyond the proper limits of such discretion to refuse sanction on the ground of exclusive use of the word, during the past fifty-five years, by registered Co-Operative Societies only - Because its use in other circumstances might cause confusion.

Administrative Law - Policy view - Taken in the exercise of statutory discretion - Court cannot enter into the question as to whether or not it is a proper one once it is satisfied that respondent acted within the limits of its statutory discretion and not in abuse or excess of powers.

L. Papaphilippou, for the Applicant.

L. Loucaides, Senior Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondents.

JUDGMENT

The following judgment was delivered by:

TRIANTAFYLLIDES, J. By

this recourse the applicant complains, in effect, against a decision of the Council of Ministers [*475] taken on the 10th October, 1968 (see exhibit 8), by virtue of which she was not allowed to

use the word "Co-operative” in relation to the description of an intercommunal workshop of folk art, for the creation of which she had been taking steps for some time in the past.

The Ministry of Commerce and Industry, under which come the Co-operatives, had recommended to the Council of Ministers to reject the application of the applicant, for reasons which the Council of Ministers adopted, and which are referred to later on in this judgment.

It is quite clear that the applicant never sought to register the said workshop as a Co-operative Society, under the relevant legislation.

All that she was aiming at was to obtain, under section 58 of the Co-operative Societies Law (Cap. 114), the sanction of the Council of Ministers for the use of the word "Co-operative" in relation to such workshop.

The Council of Ministers refused the requested sanction on the ground, mainly, that during the last fiftyfive years the word "Co-operative" had come to be exclusively connected with registered Co-operative Societies, and its use in other circumstances might cause confusion.

It has been submitted by learned counsel for the applicant that the Council of Ministers, by basing its decision on such a ground, has, in reality, failed to exercise its powers, under section 58, on the merits of [*476] the matter and has adopted an erroneous approach in relation thereto; counsel has submitted, further, that the Council of Ministers could have granted its sanction subject to such conditions as would avoid any confusion with registered Co-operative Societies.

In my opinion, the discretion under section 58 is a very wide one and it was not beyond the proper limits of such discretion to take the view which the Council of Ministers took in this particular case; especially, as the material placed before it, by means of the relevant submission of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, disclosed, in addition to the already mentioned exclusive use of the word "Co-operative", during the past fifty-five years, by registered Co-operative Societies only, that such Societies were 988 in number and were having dealings not only locally but also with persons from abroad. Thus the scope for, and danger of, confusion was great, indeed, if the request of the applicant were to be granted.

What the Council of Ministers did, in effect, was to deal with the said request on the basis of a policy regarding the exercise of its powers under section 58; and I cannot accept the view that the Council of Ministers disregarded the merits of the case; it had before it all relevant material; apparently, it did not find such merits in the case in question as would justify a course contrary to that adopted by it, which was quite reasonably open to it. [*477]

Once I am satisfied that the Council of Ministers acted in this matter within the limits of its statutory discretion and not in abuse or excess of powers I cannot enter into the question as to whether or not the policy view taken by the Council of Ministers was a proper one; to do this would be beyond the limits of a jurisdiction such as the one under Article 146 of the Constitution (see Kyriacopoullos

on Greek Administrative Law, 4th ed., vol. I, p. 209 and the decisions of the Greek Council of State in Cases 733(33)

and 11(35).

Counsel for the applicant has referred to Articles 89(2) and 21 of the Constitution as being relevant to the matter involved in these proceedings; but he has not, and quite rightly so, seriously pressed any argument that the sub judice

decision is unconstitutional. So I need not deal with this aspect.

In the light of the foregoing the recourse fails and it is dismissed accordingly.

In view, however, of its nature, I am not prepared to make any order as to costs.

Application dismissed;

no order as to costs.