Court dismissed appeals holding re-enacted municipal law provisions validly in force despite lack of separate promulgation.

[*154] 1970 February 3

(VASSILIADES, P., TRIANTAFYLLIDES, JOSEPHIDES,STAVRINIDES, HADJIANASTASSIOU, JJ.)

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Andreas Koullapides Ltd. and others.

Appellants,

v.

The Municipality of Nicosia,

Respondent.

(Criminal Appeals Nos.2934-2937).

Municipal Corporations Law Cap.240 - Section 172 - Ceased to be in force - Re-enacted, by reference, by means of section 8(2) of the Municipalities Law, 1964 (Law 64/64) - Held to be validly in force - Convictions for offences thereon sustained.

Constitutional Law — Promulgation of Laws - Articles 3 and 52 of the Constitution - Re-enactment of Legislation that ceased to be in force, by reference, by means of new legislation - Only the actual text of a legislative act itself as voted by the House of Representatives has to be promulgated - Article 189 of the Constitution inapplicable - The case of Mayor etc. of Famagusta and Petrides and others (4 R.S.C.C 71) followed.

Fr. Markides, for the Appellants.

K. Michaelides, for the Respondent.

K. Talarides, Senior Counsel of the Republic, for the Attorney-General as amicus curiae.

JUDGMENT

VASSILLADES, P.: Mr. Justice Triantafyllides will deliver the judgment of the Court.

TRIANTAFYLLIDES, J. : The appellants in these four consolidated appeals attack their convictions on [*155] charges - (several in the case of each appellant) - that, on various dates in January 1966, within the municipal limits of Nicosia, they did sell flour without informing a municipal weigher that such flour was ready and required to he weighed, and without such flour having been weighed by a municipal weigher.

Such convictions were based on. section 172, of the Municipal Corporations Law (Cap. 240), which, together with a great number of other provisions of Cap. 240 - (which ceased to be in force as from after the 31st .December, 1962) - was re-enacted, by reference, by means of section 8(2) of the Municipalities Law, 1964 (Law 64/64).

The basic submission of learned counsel for the appellants has been that the convictions ought to be set aside

because, at the material time, the said section 172 - (like all the other provisions concerned of Cap. 240) - was not

validly in force in view of the fact that its text had not been duly promulgated in accordance with the Constitution.

It has been argued by counsel for the appellants that Articles 3 and 52 of the Constitution rendered necessary the promulgation of the texts of the said provisions of Cap. 240; moreover, counsel submitted that there did not exist circumstances rendering, permissible the adoption on this occasion of the course of legislation by reference in such a manner and to such an extent. [*156]

It is not in dispute that the texts of the provisions in question of Cap. 240, including section 172 thereof, which were re-enacted by means of section 8(2) of Law 64/64, are still in English only and they were not. promulgated together with Law 64/64.

In our opinion the case of the Mayor etc. of Famagusta and Petrides and others (4 R.S.C.C. 71) is a precedent on this point with which we see no reason to disagree; it was laid down thereby that what has to be promulgated in the official Gazette, according to the aforesaid constitutional provisions, is, only "the actual text of a legislative act itself as voted by the House of Representatives" and not also any provisions of another Law re-enacted by means of reference to them in a new Law.

We do not share the view of counsel for the appellants that the present cases are distinguishable from the Petrides case (supra) in that when Law 64/64 was enacted Cap. 240 was no longer in force, unlike the position in the Petrides case, which again involved re-enactment by reference, of provisions of Cap. 240. We are of the opinion that the ratio decidendi of the Petrides case applies, with equal force, to the re-enactment by reference of a provision which is in force and of one which has previously ceased to be in force.

Nor do we agree with counsel for the appellants that in the present instance there was excluded, by Article 189 of the Constitution, the re-enactment by reference of [*157] provisions the text of which was still in English. This Article is a transitional provision which could never have been intended to apply to such a contingency; it merely provides for certain exceptions from the operation of Article 3 which - exceptions - cannot affect our already expressed view regarding the relevant effect of Article 3.

It was not contended that Law 64/64 (including its section 8(2)) was not duly promulgated and, therefore, in the light of the foregoing, we fine no merit in the contention that section 172 of Cap. 240 was not duly in force at the material time.

Finally, we would like to observe that, bearing in mind the nature of Law 64/64, and the particular circumstances in which it was enacted, we are of the view that resort to the method of legislation by reference was properly made, especially as the provisions concerned of Cap.240, which were incorporated by reference into Law 64/64, must have been well known to all concerned, because such provisions have been on the statute-book for quite some decades and are to be found, too, in the latest - (the 1959) - codification of the Laws of Cyprus.

For these reasons these appeals fail and are dismissed.

Appeals dismissed.