Criminal appeal dismissed; conviction for forgery upheld based on trial judge's credibility assessment of witnesses.

[*1471] 1968 December 23

(VASSILIADES, P., STAVRINIDES, HADJIANASTASSIOU, JJ.)

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Georghios Nicola Christodoulides,

Appellant,

v.

The Police,

Respondents.

(Criminal Appeal No. 3050).

Criminal Law - Forgery contrary to ss. 335 and 336 of the Criminal Code Cap. 154 - Findings of fact - Credibility of witnesses - Approach on appeal.

Chr. HadjiNicolaou, for the Appellant.

M. Kyprianou, Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondents.

JUDGMENT

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by;

VASSILLIADES. P.: In September 1967 the appellant filed in the District Court of Nicosia a civil action against his paternal uncle with a claim of £2,000 on two promissory notes alleged to have been signed and issued to him by his uncle. On being served with the summons in the action, the uncle, who had never signed either document, consulted his lawyer and reported the matter to the Police. [*1472]

The Police investigation resulted in the prosecution of the appellant for/forgery of the two bonds, both of which are admittedly in the handwriting of the appellant and purport to have been signed by his uncle who, on his part, entirely denies having signed the bonds or, for that matter, of knowing anything about them.

In view of the nature of the charges the appellant was committed for trial by an Assize Court; but, eventually, the case was remitted for summary trial, under directions made by the Attorney-General under section 155(b) of the Criminal Procedure Law, (Cap. 155).

The bonds are before the Court having been admitted as part of the prosecution case, which also includes the evidence of the uncle and that of a handwriting expert. The appellant elected, in due course, to give evidence at the trial; and called a witness for the defence, regarding the disputed signatures.

Dealing with the issues arising for decision, the trial Judge put the matter clearly and precisely as follows:

"From what I have already stated, it becomes clear, as rightly and fairly put by learned counsel for the accused, that there is almost only one issue in this case and this turns on the question of credibility. Put in a simple form the issue is whether, in the light of all the evidence adduced, the Court may safely accept the evidence of the complainant or is prepared to accept that of the accused; or thirdly, whether the evidence as a [*1473] whole is such that the Court should entertain doubts as to the truth and. correctness of the main allegations for the prosecution.”

Later in the course of his Judgment the trial Judge says: -

"Having thus analysed the version of the accused and gone through the whole evidence, I have no hesitation in rejecting accused’s evidence. The accused did not satisfy me at all as a person of truth and T have no doubt that his version regarding the making of the two documents in question is nothing but a fabricated story; and his intentions all through are obvious."

And towards the end of the Judgment, the trial Judge concludes:

"The fact remains that the two signatures are forged and that the two documents are forgeries. And my conclusion is that there can be no other inference than that the accused is the perpetrator of this crime."

The conviction based on the above findings, is challenged by this appeal mainly on the ground that the findings are unsatisfactory having regard to the evidence.

After hearing learned counsel for the appellant, who had a formidable case to meet, we found it unnecessary to call on counsel for the Republic. To succeed in this appeal, the appellant has to satisfy this Court that the findings of the trial Judge and his assessment of the credibility of the main witnesses are erroneous or in any way unsatisfactory. [*1474] (Lambides v. The Police (1967) 4 J.S.C. p.440 at p. 446; Charalambous v. The Police (1968), 8, J.S.C. p. 880 at p.883).

Par from achieving that, the appellant finds this Court unanimous in the view that the evidence before the trial Judge fully justifies the conviction. The appeal must, therefore, fail. The appellant should, we think, consider himself very fortunate for having been tried by a Court which could not impose on him a sentence of more than three years imprisonment; and should feel very thankful to his advocate for avoiding so carefully to touch the question of sentence. The trial Judge was, in our opinion, fully justified in imposing the maximum period of imprisonment within his powers.

Appeal dismissed;

conviction affirmed.