Court adjourns appeal when counsel fails to locate specific municipal regulations required for liability determination.

[*1232] 1968 November 12

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Loizos Panayides as a natural guardian

of Andreas Panayides Petrou,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Andreas Kyriacou,

Respondent-Defendant.

(Civil Appeal No. 4692).

Practice - Appeal - Hearing of – Direction - Direction adjourning hearing of appeal to enable counsel to prepare themselves.

Court of Appeal - Parties - Counsel - Research – Court of Appeal or any Court cannot he expected to do research for the parties - Up to counsel to go on trying until they ensure that they are ready in every respect.

L. Papaphilippou, for the Appellant.

N. Pelides, for the Respondent.

The following Direction was made in the course of the hearing of an appeal.

DIRECTION

TRIANTAFYLLIDES. J.: Having heard counsel for the appellant on the issue of damages - with which he chose to deal first, in view of its being the shorter one - we started hearing him on the issue of liability; and, at this stage, it has become clear that the hearing of this appeal cannot proceed any further, to-day, because both counsel appearing before the Court are not ready, as they themselves have very frankly [*1233] admitted, to direct the Court’s attention to the relevant, if any, municipal regulation, or regulations, governing the right of way at a roundabout in Nicosia town; such right of way at a roundabout being directly and vitally related to the issue of liability for the collision which has given rise to these proceedings.

The Court which determined this case in the first instance has relied, in doing so, on "the municipal regulations regarding roundabouts whereby precedence is given to traffic coming from the right”; yet, through, apparently, an oversight, it has not referred to the specific regulations in its Judgment.

Counsel for the appellant is relying, by his ground 2(b) in the notice of appeal, "on municipal regulations", but he is not in a position to tell this Court which exactly are such regulations; and counsel for the respondent, who had to be prepared to argue this appeal, was not able to be of much help to us, either, when asked to assist the Court on the point.

We need hardly stress how unfortunate this whole situation is. We do accept that - as stated by them - both counsel have made efforts to trace the relevant regulations and that they have been unsuccessful, for the reasons which they explained to us, in their search for them; but this Court, or any Court, cannot be expected to do research for the parties: it is up to counsel to go on trying until they ensure that they are ready in every respect; we have no doubt that both counsel involved in this case, conscientious as they are, appreciate this fully, and that they regret as much [*1234] as we do that their efforts to prepare themselves for today’s hearing have not succeeded in their being in a position to assist the Court to-day as much as we expected them, and no doubt they themselves would have like, to do.

Our order, in the circumstances, is that this appeal shall stand adjourned sine die, to be fixed again before us in the ordinary course, on an application to that effect by counsel for appellant, when he is fully prepared to present his case to us.

There shall be no order as to costs for to-day; and, also we trust that, in all fairness, both counsel will not charge any costs as between advocate and client for this adjournment.

Hearing of Appeal adjourned

sine die; order for costs

as above.