Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
Annika Christodoulou v. The Republic of Cyprus, through The Public Service Commission (1967) JSC 1367 Generato dall'IA

Supreme Court allows public officer retirement on marriage grounds, annulling Commission's refusal based on time elapsed.

Numero d'incarto Annika Christodoulou v. The Republic of Cyprus, through The Public Service Commission (1967) JSC 1367
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Cipro (CY)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Accolto (Allowed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The Supreme Court annulled the Public Service Commission's decision denying Annika Christodoulou's retirement request based on her marriage. The Commission had refused the application because three years had passed between her marriage in 1963 and her 1966 request, arguing the statutory provision only applied to recent marriages. The Court held that the Commission was competent to review the case and must apply the Pensions Law provision modified to align with the Constitution, requiring an examination of individual circumstances rather than a rigid time limit.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

Pensions Law Cap. 311, s. 8(1); Article 125(1) of the Constitution: The Public Service Commission has competence to review retirement applications on marriage grounds and must consider individual circumstances, not merely the time elapsed since marriage.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
public officer retirement marriage ground eligibility Pensions Law Cap 311 Constitutional competence time elapsed limitation revisional jurisdiction administrative prudence rappresentanza dell'unione coniugale

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA
Pensions Law, Cap. 311, section 8(1)
Public Officers - Retirement - Retirement on the ground of marriage - The Pensions Law, Cap. 311, section 8(1) - Competence
Article 125(1) of the Constitution
Article 188(3)(b) of the Constitution
Article 188(4) of the Constitution
Article 38(3) of the Constitution

Giurisprudenza citata

Generato dall'IA
Rouhi and The Republic (2 R.S.C.C. p. 84 at p. 87)
The more so, as it is clearly to be derived from the case of Rouhi and The Republic (2 R.S.C.C. p. 84 at p. 87) that any matters of retirement of public officers requiring specific decisions are natters within the competence of the Commission - (and that case was followed in Ieromonahou and The Republic,
Ieromonahou and The Republic, 4 E.S.C.C., p. 82
Generato dall'IA

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Testo completo

[*1367] 1967 December 13

(TRIANTAFYLLIDES, J.)

REVISIONAL JURISDICTION

In the matter of Article 146 of the Constitution

Annika Christodoulou,

Applicant,

and

The Republic of Cyprus, through

The Public Service Commission,

Respondent.

(Case No. 22/67).

Public Officers - Retirement - Retirement on the ground of marriage - The Pensions Law, Cap. 311, section 8(1) - Competence

- Articles 22, 188(3)(b)(4) of the Constitution.

Words and Phrases - "She has married or is about to marry" in section 8(1) of the Pensions Law, Cap. 311.

L. Clerides, for the Applicant.

M. Spanos, Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondent.

JUDGMENT

The following Judgment was delivered by:-

TRIANTAFYLLIDES, J.: By this recourse the Applicant Annika (or Ioanna) Christodoulou complains against the decision of the Respondent Public Service Commission not to permit her to retire from the public service on the ground of her marriage, under the provisions of section 8(1) of the Pensions Law, Cap. 311, as such provisions were in force at the material time; the: have now been amended by section 7 of the pensions (Amendment) Law, 1967 (Law 9/67). [*1368]

The history of relevant events is shortly as follows:

The Applicant entered the public service in 1957 and on the 1st November, 1961 , she was appointed to the pensionable post of Superintendent of Homes, in the Welfare Services under the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance.

In the autumn of 1963, she got married and, three years later, on the 1Oth October, 1966, she applied to the Respondent to be allowed to retire as from the 6th November, 1966, for family reasons; she, further, requested to be granted whatever gratuity or pension she might be entitled to (see exhibit 1).

Her letter was forwarded to the Respondent through the Director of the Department of Welfare Services on the 11th October’, 1966, (see exhibit 1A).

By letter of the 18th October, 1966, the Respondent informed the Applicant that her resignation had been accepted as from the 6th November, 1966, and that she ought to be granted by such date whatever leave of absence she might be entitled to (see exhibit 2).

On the 5th November, 1966, the Applicant wrote back saying that she had not intended to resign, but she had applied for permission to retire on the ground of her marriage, in accordance with the provisions of section 8(1) of Cap. 311 ; she requested that her case be re-examined by the Commission accordingly (see exhibit 3).

On the 25th November, 1966, the Commission met and considered the matter; it decided in view of the time that had elapsed since the Applicant’s marriage that the [*1369] case be referred to the Legal Department for advice as to whether her application could be granted under section 8(1) of Cap. 311, (see exhibit 4).

On the 14th December, 1966 a counsel of the Republic, in the office of the Attorney-General, advised the Commission that the said provision was applicable only in cases of marriage which had taken place shortly before a request for permission to retire on such a ground and, therefore, it could not be applied to the case of the Applicant (see exhibit 5).

On the 20th December, 1966, the Commission met and on the basis of the legal advice given to it, as aforesaid, it decided to turn down the request of the Applicant (see exhibit 6)

This was communicated to the Applicant on the 27th December, 1966, (see exhibit 7); she was informed, further, that her resignation continued to be effective.

The Applicant has filed the present recourse on the 28th January, 1967.

What is in issue is the correct interpretation of section 5(1) of Cap. 311, which provided that a female officer might be required or permitted to retire for the reason that “she has married or is about to marry".

The first thing to be borne in mind in this respect is that section 8(1) was a provision which existed since before the establishment of the Republic and which continued in force on the strength of Article 188 of the Constitution; therefore, it would, by virtue of paragraph 4 of such Article, [*1370] have to he applied with such modification as might be necessary to bring into accord with the Constitution.

Particularly, it had to he brought into accord with Article 22 of the Constitution, which safeguards the right to marry. As a result, it would no longer he constitutionally possible to apply section 8(1) for the purpose of retiring compulsorily a female officer merely because of the very fact that she was about to marry or she had married; it would, however, be still open to the appropriate organ to retire a female officer if consequences arising because of her marriage did, in the particular circumstances of her work, interfere with the exigencies of the service; such a course would not involve an infringement of the right to marry, as such.

Correspondingly, the right of a female officer to apply for permission to retire, because she was about to marry or she had married, must be Hooked upon as no longer directs linked to the event of her marriage, as such, but as related to the consequences of her marriage; for example, a female officer might feel that, once she got married, she had to cease working in order to devote herself to her household duties and, thus, she might apply for permission to retire either when she was about to marry or shortly after she had done so; on the other hand, a female officer might find that she had to retire from the service sometime after she had got married, in view of the fact that she had to stay and look after her children; in such a case her application to be permitted to retire would not be made shortly after her marriage but at some later date.[*1371]

I am, therefore, of the view that if section 8(1) were construed in such a manner as to be brought into accord with the Constitution the notion of "has married” in section 8(1) could be taken as being wide enough to apply to the case of the Applicant.

The Commission has, thus, acted on a wrong legal basis in rejecting the request of the Applicant, because ; it thought, in accordance with the legal advice given to it, that such request was not within section 8(1) of Cap. 311, as it had not been made shortly after her marriage. Its decision has, therefore, to be, and is hereby, declared as null and void and of no effect whatsoever and the matter has to be re-examined in the light of this Judgment.

Of course the granting or refusing of permission to retire is a matter of discretion, to be exercised in the light of the particular circumstances of each case, and, thus, the length of the time which elapsed between the marriage and its relevant consequences and the request for permission to retire is one of the material considerations to be taken into account when re-examining the case of this Applicant.

Before concluding this Judgment I have to consider, too, the question of whether the Commission was competent to deal at all with the relevant request of the Applicant; this point has not been contested in the proceedings before me but it is one of those matters with which the Court has to deal ex officio in view of the nature of its revisional jurisdiction.

It is correct that under section 8(1) of Cap.311 the relevant competence. was vested, before the coming into[*1372] operation of the Constitution in 1960, in the Governor of the then British Colony of Cyprus.

Under Article ,38(3) of the Constitution it is provided that any reference to the Governor, in a law continuing in force after the coming into operation of the Constitution, shall be construed as a reference "to the Council of Ministers in matters relating to exercise of executive power" ; hut this is to be done "unless the context otherwise requires"

In view of the express provision in Article 125(1) of the Constitution conferring on the Commission competence in relation to retirement of public officers, I am of the opinion that this was a case where the context required otherwise and in which Article 188(3)(b) was consequently inapplicable; furthermore, in view of the provisions of Article 188(4), section 8(1) had to be applied modified so as to be broughtinto accord with the Constitution, and particularly with the said Article 125(1).

Thus, I have no doubt that the Commission was competent to deal with the request in question of the Applicant. The more so, as it is clearly to be derived from the case of Rouhi and The Republic (2 R.S.C.C. p. 84 at p. 87) that any matters of retirement of public officers requiring specific decisions are natters within the competence of the Commission - (and that case was followed in Ieromonahou and The Republic,

4 E.S.C.C., p. 82).

It may be that if the Commission were to decide, after an examination of the individual circumstances of Applicant's case, that her request for permission to retire [*1373] because of her marriage should be granted,, then the relevant administrative action would still have to be completed through the Council of Ministers considering the matter from the wider aspect of policy involved therein (in view of Article

54 of the Constitution), There might well be cases where, in respect of a matter affecting a public officer, the Commission has first to reach a decision, to the extent to which the particular circumstances of such matter are involved, but its decision constitutes only the initial stage of a composite administrative action to be completed by an act a" decision of another organ also competent in the matter from another aspect; I leave, however, this question entirely open in this Judgment.

In the result this recourse succeeds, as already indicated; there shall be no order as to costs, in view of the fact that the Commission acted in this case with all due prudence and good faith.

Sub judice decision annulled.

No order as to costs.