Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
1 . Niovi Michael Glyki, 2. Soterios Georghiou Emfiedjis v. The Municipal Corporation of Famagusta (1967) JSC 1353 Generato dall'IA

Court annuls compulsory acquisition order as municipality failed to prove necessity and acted as last resort.

Numero d'incarto 1 . Niovi Michael Glyki, 2. Soterios Georghiou Emfiedjis v. The Municipal Corporation of Famagusta (1967) JSC 1353
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Cipro (CY)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Respinto (Dismissed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The Supreme Court declared the Municipal Corporation's compulsory acquisition order null and void. The applicants argued the municipality lacked sufficient planning data and failed to explore voluntary alternatives before seizing their land for a Cultural Palace. The court ruled that public authorities must demonstrate a project is unavoidable and that compulsory acquisition is a true last resort before acting.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law 1962, s. 2; Municipalities Law 1964, s. 8(2): A public authority may only compulsorily acquire property when planning is sufficiently developed to prove necessity and no other course is open.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
compulsory acquisition municipal authority last resort principle administrative law premature acquisition Cultural Palace property rights revoca dell'atto amministrativo

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA
Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law 1962 (No. 15 of 1962), sections 2, 3(2)(q) and 4
Matters of compulsory acquisition are regulated by the Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law, 1962, (Law 15/62) and, by virtue of section 2 thereof, a municipal corporation is specifically stated to be an acquiring authority.
Municipalities Law 1964 (No. 68 of 1964), section 8(2)
6h of 1 964), section 8(2) - Compulsory acquisition annulled as having been made in contravention of the principles of Administrative Law applicable to compulsory acquisitions.
Generato dall'IA

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Testo completo

[*1353] 1967 December 12

(TRIANTAFYLLIDES, J.)

REVISIONAL JURISDICTION

In the matter of Article 146 of the Constitution

1. Niovi Michael Glyki,

2. Soterios Georghiou Emfiedjis,

Applicants,

v.

The Municipal Corporation of Famagusta,

Respondent.

(Case No.312/66).

Immovable Property - Compulsory acquisition of land - Compulsory acquisition for Puilding of a Cultural Palace - Competence - Matter within the ambit of the competence of a municipality - The Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law, 1962 (No. 15 of -1962), sections 2, 3(2)(q) and 4, and the Municipalities Law, 1964 (No. 6h of 1 964), section 8(2) - Compulsory acquisition annulled as having been made in contravention of the principles of Administrative Law applicable to compulsory acquisitions.

Administrative Law - Principles applicable to compulsory acquisitions - Apply with equal force to compulsory acquisitions by municipal authorities.

Sir P. Cacoyiannis, for the Applicants.

F. Saveriades and M. Papas, for the Respondent.

JUDGMENT

The following Judgment was delivered by:-

TRIANTAFYLLTDES, J.: In this Case the Applicants challenge, in effect, the validity of an Order for compulsory acquisition made by the Municipal Committee of Famagusta on the 22nd September, 1966 end published in the official Gazette on the 20th October, 1966 (see Notification 754 in the Third Supplement).[*1354]

By virtue of such Order the property of the Applicants - as described in the relevant Notice of acquisition, published in the official Gazette on the 4th August, 1966 (see Notification 510 in the Third Supplement) - was acquired for the purpose of building a Cultural Palace (Μέγαρον Πολιτισμού).

The Applicants, by letter dated the 1 6th August, 1966 (see exhibit 3), did object against the proposed compulsory acquisition of their property, but they were informed, by letter of the Respondent dated the 17th September, 1966 (see exhibit 4), that their objection had been rejected.

The property in question of the Applicants appears marked as plot 345, and is delineated in blue, on the relevant survey map (see exhibit 1 ).

The decision to acquire the Applicants' property (and another adjoining private property, plot 118 on exhibit 1) was taken at a meeting of the Municipal Committee on the 9th February, 1966 (see the minutes exhibit 2). It is stated therein that the Cultural Palace would comprise, inter alia, a library, picture gallery, an art museum, the municipal theatre and an auditorium for concerts.

At the said meeting of the 9th February, 1966, the Chairman of the Municipal Committee put forward proposals for development projects in 1966, one of them being the Cultural Palace. The Chairman explained that an alternative site for such Palace - the site of the Municipal Garage - was not a suitable one, whereas an area belonging to the [*1355] Municipality - (and adjoining the property of the Applicants) - was the most suitable from the point of view of location of the Palace and parking facilities; this was accepted by the Municipal Committee and it was decided to acquire compulsorily all the adjoining properties so as to have space for such

a big project (“δια να υπάρχη πλήρης δι’ ένα τόσον μεγάλον έργον επάρκεια χώρου”).

It has been submitted, first, by counsel for the Applicants that, in proceeding to acquire the property in question compulsorily, the Respondent has acted unconstitutionally and ultra vires, because under the existing relevant constitutional and legislative provisions the creation of a Cultural Palace was not within the ambit of the competence of a municipality.

In my opinion this submission of counsel is not a correct one:

Matters of compulsory acquisition are regulated by the Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law, 1962, (Law 15/62) and, by virtue of section 2 thereof, a municipal corporation is specifically stated to be an acquiring authority.

Section 3(2)(q) of the same Law provides that, among the purposes which are to the public benefit and in respect of which a compulsory acquisition nay take place, are the "attainment or promotion of the objects of a municipal corporation ......specifically provided by a Law".

The Law in force, at the material time, in relation to municipal corporations, was the Municipalities Law, 1964 (Law 64/64) and by virtue of section 8( 2) there of the [*1356] provisions of, inter alia, sections 123-126 of the Municipal Corporations Law, Cap. 240 - which ceased to be in force on the 31st December, 1962 - have been made part of Law 64/64.

In my opinion, the objects of a municipality, for the purposes of section 3(2)(q) of Law 15/62, should be taken to include not only the duties laid down by means of section . 123 of Cap. 240 but also the powers provided for by section 124 of Cap. 240. It follow's, thus, that one of such objects is - on the strength of section 124(2)(i) - "to build public buildings and to do other public works......."; and in this connection I see no reason to hold that the public buildings mentioned in section 124(2)

(i) are only the public buildings , required for the purposes of the duties laid down by section 123.

Nor can I, either, accept the contention that the Respondent has acted unconstitutionally because, allegedly, compulsory acquisitions for matters of cultural nature have, since the coming into operation of the Constitution in 1960, become matters within the exclusive competence of the Communal Chambers (and, at present, in relation to the particular matter in issue, within the competence of the Ministry of Education which was set up after the dissolution of the Greek Communal Chamber). Under Article 87(1 )(g) of the Constitution it is clear that the municipalities are to function within the framework of the Laws of the Republic, and so once, by virtue of section 124 (2)(i) of Cap. 240, it was included among the objects of a municipality the building of public buildings - (a Cultural Palace being a public building) - and by virtue of section 2 of Law 15/62 a municipal corporation was designated as an. acquiring [*1357] authority, alongside a Communal Chamber - (exactly as is envisaged by Article 25(4) of the Constitution) - I can see nothing unconstitutional in the Respondent proceeding to acquire compulsorily land for the attainment of one of its objects. Furthermore, a perusal of Articles 87 and 89 of the Constitution will show amply that cultural matters, in respect of which a Communal Chamber might exercise legislative and administrative powers, are other than those relevant to municipalities (compare Articles 87(l)(b) and 89(l)(a)(ii) to Articles 87(1)

(g) and 89(1 (c) the Constitution).

For the foregoing reasons I find that the first leg of the argument of counsel for the Applicants cannot succeed.

The second leg of the argument of counsel for Applicants has been that the compulsory acquisition in question has been made in contravention of the principles of Administrative Law applicable to compulsory acquisitions, as referred to in Chrysokhou Bros, and The Cyprus Inland Telecommunications Authority (CYTA). 1966, 5 J.S.C, , p. 671 at p. 682.

It has been submit tea by counsel for Respondent that such principles, while they do apply to a public utility body such as CYTA, they do not apply to a municipal authority such as Respondent, reference has been made in this respect to section 4 of Law 15/62 and to Kouppas and The Municipality of. Nicosia. 1966, 9 J. S.C., p. 1037.

I can find nothing in section 4 to support the submission of counsel for Respondent; if anything, section 4 is more restrictive of the powers of a municipal corporation [*1358] to acquire property compulsorily than of the powers of a public utility body. Nor is there anything in the Decision in the Kouppas case which could be of any value in sustaining the submission in question of counsel for the Respondent.

I have no difficulty whatsoever in holding that the principles which have been adopted in the aforementioned case of Chrysokhou Bros. - and earlier in Venglis' and The Electricity Authority of Cyprus. 1965, 5 J.S.C., p. 500 - apply with equal force to compulsory acquisitions by municipal authorities.

It is quite clear on the basis of the said principles that a compulsory acquisition cannot be decided upon except as a last resort, and an inevitable corollary of this is that it cannot be said that a compulsory acquisition has been decided upon as a last resort until a sufficient study of the matter from all relevant angles has been made.

At the commencement of the hearing of this Case, in his opening address, counsel for the Respondent told the Court that the Respondent, before deciding to acquire the property of the Applicants, carried out an examination of the matter and decided that the area in question was the most suitable; and that evidence would be adduced to explain the steps taken by the Respondent. At the resumption, however, of the hearing counsel for the Respondent told the Court that he was not calling any evidence and that he was instructed that no architectural study had yet been made in relation to the proposed Cultural Palace and that a competition would be held for the purpose

in the future. Actually, such a competition was decided upon at the meeting [*1359] of the Municipal Committee, of the 9th February, 1966,

at which the sub judice compulsory acquisition was also decided upon (see the minutes, exhibit 2), Counsel has stated, further that, apart from exhibit

2. no report or other materia existed, or any evidence was available, regarding the considerations which led to, or the steps which were taken, in deciding on the compulsory acquisition of the property of the Applicants. He submitted, nevertheless, that the said minutes spoke for themselves and they were sufficient to establish the rightfulness of the compulsory acquisition in question.

It is quite clear from the statement of counsel for the Respondent and the material before the Court that the compulsory acquisition of the property of the Applicants was decided upon without any comprehensive study, even a provisional one, of the proposed Cultural Palace having been made; and unless such a study had been made the Municipal Committee could not have reached any conclusion regarding the probable costs of the Cultural Palace, either.

In the absence of such a study, and of any knowledge regarding the cost of the project, it cannot be said that the Municipal. Committee had sufficient material before it to enable it to decide finally and safely on the selection for the purpose of its property adjoining the property in question of the Applicants, or on the need to acquire - for purposes of sufficient space - the property of the Applicants, or oil the feasibility at all of the ambitious project of a Cultural Palace as envisaged in the minutes of the Municipal Committee, exhibit 2. [*1360]

Nor does there appear to have been made any effort to ascertain whether the property of the Applicants could he acquired by means of a voluntary sale before it was decided to acquire it compulsorily. On the contrary, though the Applicants by their letter of the 16th August, 1966 (exhibit 3) offered to exchange their property concerned with other municipal property, nothing has been placed before1 the Court, on behalf of the Respondent, to show why such a voluntary alternative was rejected and a compulsory requisition was resorted to.

On the other hand the Applicants have adduced evidence that there are other suitable areas - either owned by the municipality or which could be acquired by voluntary sale - which could be used for the purpose of erecting the Cultural Palace. In particular one of such areas is area A, on the map exhibit 1, which is the property of the Respondent and which appears to be as well located as, and larger than, area D - which is the area owned by the Respondent and selected for the building thereon, and on the adjoining private properties, of the Cultural Palace.

No evidence at all has been adduced to contradict the evidence for the Applicants.

In all the circumstances, I think that the Respondent has acted prematurely, without a sufficient study of the matter, and, therefore, contrary to the relevant principles it did not decide upon the compulsory acquisition of the property of the Applicants as a last resort: it has, thus, acted contrary to law - i.e. the said principles - and in excess and abuse of powers.[*1361]

A public authority can only properly decide upon the compulsory acquisition of property for the purposes of a particular project when the planning for such project has reached such a degree of development as to render it undoubtedly clear that the acquisition is called for and, moreover, that in the circumstances no other course is open to such authority; it cannot proceed to acquire compulsorily a property first, and leave it there waiting until the relevant planning has taken place, thus making a profit at the expense of a private owner, whose property is paid for on the values prevailing at the time when the Notice of the premature compulsory acquisition has been published, and not on the values prevailing when the compulsory acquisition is resorted to after sufficient planning and as a last resort.

For all the above reasons, I declare the sub judice Order of acquisition as null and void and of no effect whatsoever, and I adjudge the Respondent to pay to Applicants £25.- towards costs,

Sub judice Order annulled.

Order for costs as aforesaid.