Supreme Court allows appeal and sets aside order requiring advocate to pay costs personally due to lack of hearing.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe Supreme Court allowed an appeal against a District Court order requiring an advocate to pay costs personally. The advocate had been ordered to pay after failing to appear for a hearing on the matter, despite the court's power to do so only after giving an opportunity to show cause. The court set aside the order because the appellant was denied a chance to be heard before the penalty was imposed.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IAOrder 59 rule 1; Order 65 rule 11: An order requiring an advocate to pay costs personally is invalid if made without first affording the advocate an opportunity to show cause.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IAGiurisprudenza citata
Generato dall'IADecisioni correlate
Generato dall'IATesto completo
[*1335] 1967 November 10
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CYPRUS
ON APPEAL AND ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
(VASSILIADES, P.,TRIANTAFYLLIDES, JOSEPHIDES,JJ.)
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
A. E. Pantelides,
Appellant,
v.
Emine Rustem Moustafa Pafiti,
Respondent-Plalntiff,
and
Panayiota Philippon alias Panayiota Andrea
Nicola through the guardian ad litem Andreas
Nicola Hji Symeou and Another,
Respondents-Defendants.
(Civil Appeal No. 4422).
Advocate - Costs - Liability to pay costs personally - Advocate ordered to pay costs - No opportunity given to show cause - Order set aside.
Costs - Liability of advocate to pay costs personally - See under "Advocate".
G. Ladas, for the Appellant.
Hakki Suleyman, for the Rsspondent-Plaintiff.
L. Clerides, for the Bar Council, as amicus curiae.
Andreas Nicola, in person for himself and on behalf of his wife, Panayiota Philippou, as her guardian ad litem in this case.
JUDGMENT
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:-
VASSILIADES, P.: This is an appeal from an Order made in the District Court of Nicosis on the 26th of January. 1963, for the payment of costs by the appellant, one of the [*1336] advocates in the case. The amount involved exceeds £60.- (Vide ruling of the 13th May, 1 963, herein) as costs thrown away. The relevant circumstances which lédto the order are:-
In May, 1960, the respondent-plaintff, Emine Rustem Mourtafa Fafiti of Morphou, filed an action (No. 395/60, D.C. Nicosia) against the respondent-defendants Panayiota Philippou and her husband Andreas Nicola Hji Symeou, of Morphou, for the specific performance, inter alia, of a settlement in a previous action - (No.442/56, D.C. Nicosia), which was given the form of a Judgment by consent. The dispute in that action was over adjacent property.
The defendant-husband instructed the appellant advocate to defend the action, for both defendants, and signed for himself and his wife, the usual retainer form. Acting for both defendants, the appellant-advocate entered an appearance for them, filed their joint defence, and after taking other incidental steps in the proceedings, appeared for them before the District Court in May 1961. The court made a consent—Order on May 13,1961 , for a local inquiry by a Land Registry Officer for the purposes of the action.
About ten months later, in March, 1962, the parties were again before the court through their respective advocates, when the evidence of the Land Registry Officer was taken, and the case was adjourned for further hearing on a future date. After three adjournments (which naturally affect the question of costs) the case was again before the court on the 8th December. 1962. On this last occasion the wife, a party directly connected with the property in dispute, [*1337] was personally present for the first time, and the advocate who was acting for both defendants on the husband's instructions, stated that after a recent direct contact with the first defendant (the wife), he formed the impression (the "suspicion" as he described it) that she was not of sound mind; and that he mentioned this informally to his colleague, the advocate acting for the plaintiff.
We do not wish to enter for the purposes of this Judgment, into the details of the discussion which followed in chambers and in open court, between the judges and advocates of the parties, in this connection, which is recorded at pages 12 and 13 of the notes. The outcome of that discussion was that the court took" a bad view” of appellant’s way of handling this matter concerning a litigant of unsound mind, the court thought; and of certain remarks made by the appellant in the course of the discussion; and, eventually, asked him whether he wished to have his client, the wife in question, subjected to a medical examination regarding the state of her mind. The appellant consulted the husband on the point, and informed the court that he could not agree to the examination suggested. The court, thereupon, adjourned the case for a ruling at their next sitting, January 12, 1963.
On this adjourned hearing, in the presence of all the parties and their advocates, the court read their ruling as recorded at pages 14. and 15 of the record. After stating the circumstances which led them to their conclusion, but without calling upon the advocate to show cause, and without hearing any evidence in the matter, the court say [*1338] that they were satisfied that defendant No.1 (the wife) wan not a person of sound mind and could not follow the proceedings which were "of a complicated nature and involved the determination of property rights" (page 14 G).
"Deploring”, as they put it in their note, the attitude of the appellant, the court referred to the English case of Yonge v. Toynbee, 1910, 1 K B. 21 5. C.A. and ordered that "all costs thrown away be paid personally by Mr. Pantelides" , the appellant herein.
The court then asked the husband whether he consented to be guardian ad litem for his wife in this case; and on his reply in the affirmative, the court appointed him accordingly, and directed the filing of an appearance within two weeks, and the continuation of the case in its "usual course”.
Against this order for the payment of costs (which as we have already said, amount to a considerable sum) the advocate took the present appeal.
When the matter was first before the court of appeals the view was expressed that the Bar Council might wish to have the opportunity to be heard in this very exceptional case in our courts, as far as one can say from memory. Indeed, today, Mr. L. Clerides of the Bar Council, appeared by leave of the Court, as amicus curiae, on behalf of the Council, fully prepared to help the Court in this matter.
Mr. Ladas for the appellant, went into the history of the case; and after criticising several points about the [*1339] procedure and the reasoning on record which led the trial Court to the order in question, he took first, ground six on the notice of appeal, that is, the failure to give an opportunity to the appellant to be heard in the matter before the making of the order, as in his submission, this should be sufficient to dispose of the whole appeal.
Learned counsel, while conceding that the court had power to order an advocate to pay costs personally after giving him an opportunity to show cause, pointed out that Yonge v. Toynbee on which the trial Court relied in making their order, was decided on completely different facts to those in the present case, and in quite different circumstances; and he then referred to Myers v. Elman (1940) A. C. p. 282 (also reported in 1939, 4 All England Reports, p.484.) and to Abraham v. J at sun (1963), 2 All England Reports, p. 484. Counsel, moreover, referred to Order 59? rule /, of our Rules, and to the English Order 65, rule 11 from which our rule originates.
We find it unnecessary to discuss, for the purposes of this Judgment, either the provisions in our rule (which apparently, the District Court did not have in mind) or the effect of the cases referred to by counsel1 for the appellant, as Mr Suleyman for the respondent, very rightly, in our jopinion, stated that he finds himself unable to support the order made against the appellant, in the circumstances; and left the question of costs to the Court.
This made it unnecessary for us to hear Mr. Clerides as amicus curiae. We only wish to thank him and the Bar Council for their interest in the matter; and for his [*1340] appearance today. And, while on this point, we wish to add the appreciation of the Court for the assistance received from all counsel before us today, in this exceptional proceeding.
As the matter is still sub judice, we prefer to say no more. The order of the District Court for the appoint ment of the husband as guardian ad Litem for his wife, has not been questioned; and it, therefore, stands, as far as we can say here. We allow the appeal, and set aside the order made for the payment of costs against the appellant on January 26, 1963. All incidental costs, i.e. costs in the action for the hearing of the 6th December, 1962 and thereafter, as well as the costs of this appeal (excepting the costs decided on December 20, 1963) to be costs in the cause between the parties to be decided in due course by the trial Court; but in no event to be made costs against the respondent (plaintiff).
Appeal allowed.
Order for the payment of
costs against Appellant
set aside.
Order for costs as aforesaid.