Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
I.W.S. Nominee Co. Ltd. v. The Republic of Cyprus, through The Registrar of Trade Marks (1967) JSC 1213 Generato dall'IA

Supreme Court holds trade mark registration refusal is public law under Article 146 Constitution.

Numero d'incarto I.W.S. Nominee Co. Ltd. v. The Republic of Cyprus, through The Registrar of Trade Marks (1967) JSC 1213
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Cipro (CY)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Accolto (Allowed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The Supreme Court granted jurisdiction to hear a constitutional recourse against the Registrar of Trade Marks. The Respondent argued the matter was private law, but the Court found the primary purpose of registration is public protection against consumer deception. Consequently, the Court declared Section 19 of the Trade Marks Law inconsistent with Article 146 void to the extent it barred such recourse.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

Article 146 of the Constitution; Article 188 of the Constitution; Trade Marks Law, Cap. 268, Section 19; The subject-matter of a recourse under Article 146 includes decisions on trade mark registration where the primary purpose is the public protection of consumers against deception, rendering relevant statutory provisions inconsistent with the Constitution void.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
constitutional recourse jurisdiction trade mark registration public law consumer protection deception statutory inconsistency void administrative authority domain regolamentazione commerciale presentazione di un prodotto marchio depositato

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA
Article 146 of the Constitution
In the matter of Article 146 of the Constitution
Article 188 of the Constitution
In the light of all the foregoing I find that the sub judice matter falls within the ambit of Article 146 and this Court has competence to deal with it; furthermore, in view of Article 188 of the Constitution and past relevant jurisprudence (such as Mikrommatis and The Republic, 2 R.S.C.C.
Section 19 of the Trade Marks Law, Cap. 268
Constitutional Law - Constitution, Articles 146 and 188 - Constitutionality of statutes - Section 19 of the Trade Marks Law, Cap. 268 to the extent to which it is inconsistent with a recourse under Article 146 must be deemed to be no longer in force.
Art. 146 must
In the matter of Article 146 of the Constitution

Giurisprudenza citata

Generato dall'IA
The Cyprus Industrial and Mining Co. Ltd. and The Republic (1966, 5 J.S.C., p. 652)
the case of The Cyprus Industrial and Mining Co. Ltd. and The Republic (1966, 5 J.S.C., p. 652) and it need not be gone into once again in extenso in the present Decision.
The Greek Council of State case 517/1958
The Greek Council of State case 660/1931
Mikrommatis and The Republic, 2 R.S.C.C. p. 125
In the light of all the foregoing I find that the sub judice matter falls within the ambit of Article 146 and this Court has competence to deal with it; furthermore, in view of Article 188 of the Constitution and past relevant jurisprudence (such as Mikrommatis and The Republic, 2 R.S.C.C. p. 125), section 19 of Cap.
Generato dall'IA

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Testo completo

[*1213] 1967 October 21

(TRIANTAFYLLIDES, J.)

REVISIONAL JURISDICTION

In the matter of Article 146 of the Constitution

I.W.S. Nominee Co. Ltd.,

Applicant,

and

The Republic of Cyprus, through

The Registrar of Trade Marks,

Respondent.

(Case No. 62/66).

Trade Marks - Registration - Jurisdiction - Public and private law - Constitution, Article 146 - Trade Marks law, Cap. 268 - Registration of a trade mark – A matter of public law, within the ambit of Article 146.

Constitutional Law - Constitution, Articles 146 and 188 - Constitutionality of statutes - Section 19 of the Trade Marks Law, Cap. 268 to the extent to which it is inconsistent with a recourse under Article 146 must be deemed to be no longer in force.

Statutes - Constitutionality - See under "Constitutional Law" above.

D. Themistocleous and A. Triantafyllides, for the Applicant.

M. Spanos, Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondent.

DECISION ON PRELIMINARY ISSUE OF JURISDICTION

The following Decision was delivered by:-

TRIANTAFYLLIDES, J.: When this Case came up for hearing, counsel for Respondent raised the preliminary issue that this Court had no competence to deal with the sub judice matter on a recourse raider Article 146 of the Constitution; he argued that the said matter falls within the domain of private law and is, therefore, outside the [*1214] ambit of Article 146; he has submitted that the proper remedy open to the Applicant was by way of an appeal under section 19 of the Trade Marks Law (Cap. 268).

In view of there being in issue a question of jurisdiction, the

decision thereon has been reserved for some time so as to enable the Court to consider it as fully as possible.

The subject-matter of the recourse is a decision of the Respondent Registrar of Trade Harks communicated to the Applicant by means of a letter of the 18th January, 1966, (see exhibit 1); by virtue of such decision the Registrar, in the exercise of its relevant powers under Cap. 268, refused to accept for registration the trade marks specified in the motion for relief of the Application in these proceedings.

It has not been disputed that the Respondent Registrar is an organ of Government. What has been contested by counsel for the Respondent, on the basis of past jurisprudence, is that the sub judice decision of the Respondent was not an exercise of executive or administrative authority in the sense of Article 146, because it was not a decision in the field of public law, but a

decision in the field of private law in relation to the protection of private rights.

The said past jurisprudence has been reviewed in a Decision given in

the case of The Cyprus Industrial and Mining Co. Ltd. and The Republic (1966, 5 J.S.C., p. 652) and it need not be gone into once again in extenso in the present Decision. It is to be

derived from such jurisprudence that the test to be applied, in deciding whether the [*1215] subject-matter of this recourse falls within the ambit of Article 146, is to examine whether the relevant powers of the Respondent Registrar were exercised in order to serve, primarily, a public purpose, or whether they were in fact exercised in order to regulate, primarily, civil law rights; only in the former case the sub judice decision would fall within the ambit of Article

146 and a recourse, such as the present one, would lie against it.

It is quite correct that the registration of trade marks is intended, inter alia, to protect civil law rights therein. But it has also a public purpose to serve, namely, to protect the public against deception in relation to goods being offered for sale.

In Kerly on Trade Marks and Trade Names (9th ed., p. 1), we read that:— "The foundation upon which the law relating to trade marks and trade names developed is that the deception of the public by the offer for sale of goods as possessing some connection with a particular trader, which they do not in fact possess, is a wrong in respect of which the trader has a cause of action..."; one sees therein a clear indication of the two concurrent purposes of the registration of trade marks, the public one and the private one.

After weighing the relative importance of the two said purposes, in the light of present day realities - to the extent to which they could be judicially noticed - including the fact that, for certain purposes, notices in relation to trade marks are published in the official Gazette of the Republic, for general information. I have reached the conclusion that the primary and predominant [*1216] purpose of the registration of a trade mark is its public one and that a decision such as the sub judice one is, therefore, one in the domain of public law, and not of private law.

The Greek Council of State had occasion to express such a view in its

Decision in case 517/1958 (vol. 1958 A, p. 655 at p. 656), wherein it is stated “... αι διατάξεις της νομοθεσίας περί

σημάτων είναι δημοσίας τάξεως, αποβλέπουσαι εις την προστασίαν ου μόνον του προκαταθέσαντος,

αλλά και του καταναλωτικού κοινού από ενδεχομένων εξαπατήσεων.” (... the legislative provisions concerning trade

marks are matters of public order, aiming at the protection not only of the person who has deposited a trade mark first, but also at the protection of the consumers against possible deceptions).

Actually in Greece decisions relating to registration of trade marks have always been treated as being matters within the ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in the Council of State, which is of the same nature as the one possessed by this Court under Article 146; see, inter alia, the decision of the Greek Council of State in case 660/1931 (vol. 1931 B p. 281).

At first, recourses in relation to matters pertaining to the registration of trade marks were made directly to the Greek Council of State; later on, however, special administrative courts were set up in Greece, by legislation, in order to deal, in the first instance, with such matters, and from their decisions an appeal lies to the Greek Council of State, as an appellate administrative court. [*1217]

In the light of all the foregoing I find that the sub judice matter falls within the ambit of Article 146 and this Court has competence to deal with it; furthermore, in view of Article 188 of the Constitution and past relevant jurisprudence (such as Mikrommatis and The Republic, 2 R.S.C.C. p. 125), section 19 of Cap. 268 to the extent to which it is inconsistent with a recourse under Article 146 must be deemed to be no longer in force.

Order in terms.