Recourse dismissed as out of time; reply letter not a new decision under Article 146.3 of the Constitution.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's recourse against a school dismissal, ruling it was filed out of time. Although the applicant argued a later reply letter constituted a new decision, the court found it merely informative regarding an existing refusal. Consequently, the original dismissal decision remained the operative act, making the recourse procedurally invalid.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IAArticle 146.3 of the Constitution; A subsequent letter informing a party of an existing refusal to re-employ does not constitute a new administrative decision and cannot restart the constitutional recourse time limit.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IADecisioni correlate
Generato dall'IATesto completo
[*951] 1967 August 17
(LOIZOU, J.)
REVISIONAL
JURISDICTION
In the matter of
Article 146 of the Constitution
Chrysanthos P.
Koudounaris,
Applicant,
and
The Republic of Cyprus, through
The Ministry of
Education,
Respondent.
(Case No. 325/66).
Elementary Education - School-teachers - Dismissals - Applicant's
dismissal under the. provisions of section 9 of the Teachers of Communal
Elementary Schools Law. 1963 (Greek Communal Law No. 7 of 1963) Respondent’s
reply rejecting Applicant’s application, made over a year later, for
re-employment - Not amounting to a new decision in the matter reached after a
fresh examination thereof - Applicant’s recourse dismissed as being out of
time, in view of Article 146.3 of the Constitution.
P. Laoutas, for the Applicant.
G. Tornaritis, for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT
The following Judgment was delivered by:-
LOIZOU, J.: The Applicant was an elementary
school-teacher on probation having been appointed in September, 1959. [*952]
On the 13th August, 1965, the committee of Educational Services of the
Ministry of Education acting under the provisions of section 9 of Law No.7/63
of the Greek Communal Chamber dismissed the Applicant from the service on the
ground that his work was not considered satisfactory. The Applicant did not challenge
the decision to dismiss him by recourse but instead he applied to the President
of the Republic requesting him to intervene in the matter.
Over a year later i.e. on the 5th September, 1966, the Applicant wrote
a letter to the committee requesting them to re-employ him to his former post.
This letter was forwarded to the committee by Applicant's counsel under cover
of a letter signed by him and bearing the same date. Both these letters have
been produced and are exhibit 2 in this case.
On the 29th September, 1966, the committee replied to the Applicant
rejecting his application and informing him that they could not re-employ him
to a post for which his services had already been considered unsatisfactory (exhibit
5).
On the 11th October, 1966 Applicant’s counsel, apparently unaware of
exhibit 5. wrote to the Respondents a letter (exhibit 3) which reads as
follows:
"Αντιλαμβάνομαι ότι υπάρχουν τώρα
αρκεταί κεναί θέσεις δημοδιδασκάλων ούτως ώστε να δύνασθε ευκόλως πλέον να
αναθεωρήσετε την προγενεστέραν σας απόφασιν περί τερματισμού των υπηρεσιών του
πελάτου μου κ. Χρυσάνθου Π. Κουδουνάρη τέως διδασκάλου.
2. Την 5/9/1966 απετάθην προς υμάς δια
τον επαναδιορισμόν του και δεν έτυχον απαντήσεως μέχρι σήμερον.
3. Όθεν καλείσθε όπως, εν όψει του
γεγονότος εις την παρα. 1 ανωτέρω επισπεύσετε την απάντησιν τακτοποιούντες το
ζήτημα".
To this letter the Respondents replied
on the 18th October, 1966. This letter is exhibit 4 and reads as follows:
"Εις απάντησιν της υπό
ημερομηνίαν 11 Οκτωβρίου 1966 επιστολής σας πληροφορείσθε ότι εις την αίτησιν
του κ. Χρ. Π. Κουδουνάρη δια διορισμόν εις την Στοιχειώδη Εκπαίδευσιν εδόθη
απάντησις την 29ην Σεπτεμβρίου, αντίγραφον της οποίας σας παραθέτω:
Εις απάντησιν της υπό ημερομηνίαν
5/9/66 επιστολής σας πληροφορείσθε ότι η Επιτροπή Εκπαιδευτικής Υπηρεσίας δεν
δύναται να σας προσφέρη διορισμόν εις θέσιν δια την οποίαν η υπηρεσία σας
εκρίθη ήδη ανεπαρκής". [*953]
As a result, on the 31st December, 1966, the Applicant filed the
present recourse praying "for a declaration of the court that the decision
of the Respondent communicated to Applicant's counsel on the 19th October,
1966, by letter dated 18th October, 1966, by which Applicant's counsel was
informed that the committee of Educational Services was not prepared to
re-employ Applicant as a school-teacher, is null and void and of no effect
whatsoever". [*954]
Counsel for the Respondents submitted that the recourse is out of time
and both counsel agreed that this preliminary point be determined first.
By virtue of Article 146.3 of the Constitution a recourse "shall
be made within 75 days of the date when the decision or act was published or if
not published and in the case of an omission, when it came to the knowledge of
the person making the recourse".
There is no question, indeed it is admitted, that the reply of the
Respondents to the Applicant dated 29th September, 1966, exhibit 5. was
communicated to the Applicant personally more than 75 days prior to the filing
of the recourse. Counsel for the Applicant has explained that the Applicant did
not show this letter to his counsel and submitted that the letter dated 18th
October, 1966, exhibit 4, which was received by counsel on the 19th
October, 1966 amounts to a new administrative act and that, therefore, the
recourse is within the time limit prescribed by the Constitution.
Having considered this matter carefully, in the light of the material
before me, I have come to the conclusion that the letter dated 18th October, 1966, exhibit
4, can in no way be treated as amounting to a new
decision in the matter reached after a fresh examination thereof. In my view the decision of the Respondent is contained exhibit 5
which was communicated to the Applicant more than 75 days prior to the filing
of the recourse and exhibit 4 is merely informatory. [*955]
Having reached this conclusion I must uphold the submission of counsel
for the Respondent that the recourse is out of time in view of Article 146.3 of
the Constitution.
The recourse is, therefore, dismissed with costs which I assess at £12.
Application dismissed
with £12.- costs.