Cyprus Supreme Court dismisses constitutional challenge to architect licensing time limit as valid for public safety.

[*582] 1966 April 30

(TRIANTAFYILIDES, J.)

REVISIONAL JURISDICTION

In the matter of Article 146 of the Constitution

Andreas Tsouri,

Applicant,

and

The Council of Registration for

Architects and Civil Engineers,

Respondent.

(Case No.13/65).

Architects and Civil Engineers - Architect by profession - Applicant's recourse against decision of Respondent Council refusing him a licence as an architect by profession under section 9(1) (A) of the Architects and Civil Engineers Law, 1962 (Law 41 of 1962) - Application not submitted within the time-limit laid down by section 9(2) of the Law - Therefore, not possible or proper for Respondent Council to deal with Applicant's application.

Constitutional Law - Constitution of Cyprus, Article 25 Architects and Civil Engineers Law, 1962 (Law 41 of 1952) - Provision in section 9(2) of the Law prescribing a time-limit for the submission of an application for the issue of a licence as an architect by profession under section 9(1) (A) of the Law not unconstitutional - Necessary in the interests of public safety and in the public interest generally in the sense of Article 23.2 of the Constitution.

A. Pemtelides, for the Applicant.

Lellos Demetriades, for the Respondent.

DECISION and JUDGMENT

(A) . DECISION The following Decision was delivered by:-

(B) TRIANTAFYLLIDES,J. : By this recourse Applicant complains against the decision of the Respondent Council, communicated to him by letter dated the 11th November, 1964 [*583] (exhibit 1) and refusing him a licence as an architect by profession tinder section 9(1)(a) of the Architects and Civil Engineers Law, 1962 (Law 41/62).

Applicant's application for licensing, as above, was rejected by the Respondent on the ground that it was made on the 25th September, 1964, i.e. it was made after the expiration of the period prescribed for the purpose by means of subsection (2) of section 9 of Law 41/62, Such period is the period of twelve months from the date of the coming into force of Law 41/62; and it came into force on the 30th May,1962.

It has been Applicant's contention that the provisions of subsection (2) of section 9, which read as follows:-

"(2) Applications under subsection (l)(A) or subsection (l)(B)(a) of this section shall be submitted within a period of twelve months from the date of the coming into force of this Law".

are unconstitutional as being contrary to Article 25 of the Constitution.

The validity of any other of the provisions of section 9 is not in issue in this recourse.

The said subsection (2) is a provision laying down a formality or condition regarding the right to practise the professions of architecture or civil engineering, as such right is regulated by the provisions of subsection (1) of section 9.

Bearing in mind, inter alia,:- (I) that for the purpose of determining

with sufficient certainty the factual aspects of the possession of [*584] the qualifications prescribed under subsection

(l)(A)(ii) and subsection (1 )(B)(a)(ii) of section 9 it is obviously necessary that those claiming to be licensed under subsection (1) of section 9 should come forward as reasonably early as possible, so that the Respondent Council may be able to examine such aspects while the relevant events are still resent and material evidence has not yet perished through the efflux of time, and

(II) the need to inform, the appropriate authorities for building control and the public at large, reasonably soon after the coming into operation of Law 41/62, as to who are the persons entitled, under one style or another, to practise under Law 41/62 the professions of architecture or civil engineering (see also in this respect section 8 of Law 41/62),

I am of the opinion that it was properly open to the Legislature to adopt a provision such as subsection (2) of section 9, as being necessary in the interests of public safety and in the public interest generally, in the sense of Article 25(2) of the Constitution.

Furthermore, I cannot find that any discrimination is made, by means of the said subsection (2), against those coming within the ambit of section 9(l), as compared to those coming within the ambit of section 7 of the same Law - where no provision such as subsection (2) exists - because, in my opinion, the existence of subsection (2) in section 9 and the absence of a similar provision from section 7 amount, in effect, to the making of a reasonable differentiation arising out of the inherent nature of things, [*585] in view of the fact that those affected, by section 9 are a dying class, whereas those to whom section 7 applies are those to become entitled to be registered as architects or civil engineers, at any time in the future, by obtaining the necessary academic qualifications.

For all the above reasons the contention that subsection (2) of section

9 is unconstitutional fails.

Order in terms.

Court: I would like to hear counsel on the fate of this recourse in the light of the Decision just given.

Mr. Pantelides: After this Decision I do not see how the recourse can proceed further.

Mr. Demetriades: I agree. Once Applicant had to apply within the time-limit laid down by section 9(2) and he failed to do so, the Respondent Council had no alternative but to reject his application.

(B). JUDGMENT

Court: As already pointed out by counsel, once Applicant failed to conform with the provisions of section 9(2) of the relevant legislation - and I have found such provisions to be valid for the reasons given in my Decision which I have just read and which reasons I adopt as part of the short judgment I am now giving - it was not possible or proper for the Respondent Council to deal with his application for a licence under section 9(1)(A) of such legislation.

I would observe, also, that the Respondent Council has done its best, through repeated notices in the press before [*586] the expiration of the time-limit set down by section 9(2), to draw the attention of all concerned to the fact that such time-limit was about to expire; this has teen stated to the Court by counsel for the Council and it has not been disputed by counsel for the Applicant.

In the circumstances, this recourse fails and has to be dismissed but I have decided to make no order as to costs.

Application dismissed.

No order as to costs.