Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
Michael Hji Haritou Michaelides v. The Police (1965) JSC 265 Generato dall'IA

Supreme Court allows appeal, holding firearm forfeiture is discretionary punishment under Constitution.

Numero d'incarto Michael Hji Haritou Michaelides v. The Police (1965) JSC 265
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Cipro (CY)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Accolto (Allowed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The Supreme Court allowed the appellant's appeal and set aside the forfeiture order for his firearm. The appellant, who had legally owned the gun since 1939, was convicted of possessing it after a new prohibition was imposed without prior notice. The court ruled that forfeiture constitutes punishment under Article 12(3) of the Constitution and must be exercised judicially in the accused's favor.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

Firearms Law Cap.57 s.3(1)(d); Constitution Art.12(3): Forfeiture of a firearm for possession contrary to statutory provisions is classified as punishment and is therefore discretionary rather than mandatory.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
firearms law forfeiture order constitutional punishment judicial discretion property rights prohibition order appellant's favor infrazioni contro i beni culturali

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA
Firearms Law, Cap.57 s.3(1)(d)
57 (as amended) - Possessing a firearm contrary to the provisions of section 3(1)(d) and an Order made by the Council of Ministers thereunder - Conviction and forfeiture of firearm under section 3(2).
Firearms Law, Cap.57 s.3(2)
57 (as amended) - Possessing a firearm contrary to the provisions of section 3(1)(d) and an Order made by the Council of Ministers thereunder - Conviction and forfeiture of firearm under section 3(2).
Constitution of Cyprus Art.12(3)
Firearms Law (supra) and the Constitution of Cyprus - Forfeiture of a gun under section 3(2) for offences under section 3(1)(d) of the Law is punishment within Article 12.3 of the Constitution and therefore discretionary and not mandatory.
Interpretation Law, Cap.1 s.38
Generato dall'IA

Ti chiedi come si applica questa sentenza alla tua fattispecie?

Analizza questa decisione insieme alla legislazione federale e cantonale, ai commentari e alla giurisprudenza successiva in Legislator AI.

Apri in Legislator →

Testo completo

[*265] 1965 March 18

(ZEKIA, P., VASSILIADES & JOSEPHIDES, JJ.)

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Michael Hji Haritou Michaelides, of Kyperounda,

Appellant,

v.

The Police,

Respondents.

(Criminal Appeal No.2752)

Firearms Law, Cap. 57 (as amended) - Possessing a firearm contrary to the provisions of section 3(1)(d) and an Order made by the Council of Ministers thereunder - Conviction and forfeiture of firearm under section 3(2).

Firearms Law (supra) and the Constitution of Cyprus - Forfeiture of a gun under section 3(2) for offences under section 3(1)(d) of the Law is punishment within Article 12.3 of the Constitution and therefore discretionary and not mandatory.

Forfeiture of gun - Discretion - Exercise of judicial discretion in accused's favour.

Firearms Law (supra) — Effect of forfeiture order having regard to the provisions of section 12 of the Law and section 38 of the Interpretation Law, Cap.1 - Gun forfeited becomes the absolute property of the Republic and the accused ceases to have rights of ownership - He cannot vindicate such rights as long as the forfeiture order stands.

St. Pavlides, for the Appellant.

L. G. Loucaides, Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondents.

JUDGMENT

1965 February 19

ZEKIA P.: The appeal is allowed and the forfeiture order is set aside as it is regarded as punishment.

The reasons for judgment will be given later. [*266]

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1965 March 18

ZEKIA, P.: Mr, Justice Josephides will deliver the reasons for the judgment of the Court in this case.

JOSEPHIDES, J.: This appeal was allowed and the forfeiture order set aside and we intimated that we would give our reasons later. We now proceed to do so.

The appellant in this case pleaded guilty to a charge of possessing a type of firearm , to wit, a repeating and semi-automatic S.B. shotgun, the importation or possession of which is prohibited, contrary to section 3(1) (d) of the Firearms Law, Cap.57, as amended by Law 11 of 1959. He was sentenced to pay a fine of £1. and £6.720 mils costs and it was further ordered that his gun. be "confiscated". Presumably what the Judge meant was "forfeited".

He was convicted and sentenced on the 29th November, 1963 and on the 14th January, 1965 he was granted an extension of time to lodge his appeal which he eventually did on the 20th January, 1965. His grounds of appeal are that "the sentence of confiscation is illegal and/or excessive and/or unjust and/or unconstitutional".

We think that it is necessary to go into some detail into the history and facts of this case.

The appellant, who comes from Kyperounda village, was originally registered as the owner of the firearm in question on the 8th January, 1939. He was duly licensed annually paying the licence fee regularly until the 31st July, 1963. In fact, the period of his licence covers the period [*267] for which he is charged for possessing this firearm illegally viz, between the 21 st December, 1960 and the 20th January, 1963. Until the 24th December, 1960 there was no prohibition against the possession of the type of firearm owned by the appellant. On the 24th December, 1960 an Order made by the Council of Ministers on the 22nd December, 1960, under the provisions of section 3(1)(d) of the Firearms Law, Cap. 37, declaring the aforesaid type of firearm as prohibited firearm, was published in the official Gazette of the Republic, Supplement No.3, No. 105, page 99. As from the 24th December, 1960, possession of such firearm is contrary to the provisions of section 3(1) of the Law and the punishment provided by that section, as amended by Law 11 of 1959, is a maximum of 7 years' imprisonment and a fine of £500, "and in any case, any firearm in respect of which the offence has been committed shall be forfeited" (section 3(2) of the Law).

It is the appellant's version that he was not aware of the prohibition order and, presumably, even the responsible Government authorities did not realise that the firearm in the appellant's possession was a prohibited one as he continued paying for his annual licence while the District Officer continued receiving the annual licence fee until the summer of 1962 when he last issued to him a firearms licence under the provisions of the Law, for the period 1st August, 1962 to 31st July, 1963. The first time that the authorities realised that the appellant was in possession a prohibited firearm was early in January, 1963 when the Chief of Gendarmerie addressed a letter to him, dated the 8th January, 1963, which runs as follows: [*268]

"You are hereby informed that the certificate of registration for the firearm under LL1462 is cancelled by virtue of an order by the Council of Ministers dated the 22.12.1960, published in the official Gazette of 24.12.60 under No.105".

"2. The value of this firearm will be fixed by the Chief Collector of Customs in accordance with section 13 of the Firearms Law, Cap.57, and another letter will be sent to you on the subject".

Twelve days later the appellant, on being asked by the police, delivered to them his gun on the same day, viz. on the 20th January, 1963, and ever since the gun has been in the custody of the police.

While the appellant was awaiting the letter promised to him by the Gendarmerie Chief in paragraph 2 of his letter of the 8th January, 1963 (quoted above), the charge in the present case was filed against him in the District Court of Limassol on the 10th July, 1963, although he had delivered the gun to the police, as already stated, some six months earlier. He was charged with possessing the gun illegally between the 21st December, 1960, and the 20th January, 1963.

The appellant was duly served with a summons, and he appeared before the court in person on the 27th September, 1963; he pleaded not guilty to the charge and his case was adjourned to the 8th November, 1963 for hearing. On the 8th November, 1963, the accused appeared before the Court in person and the prosecuting officer applied for an adjournment "due to the fact that the gun in question has not yet been examined by the expert and so he is not ready to give evidence before the Court and to produce exhibits", and the case was accordingly adjourned to the 29th November, [*269] 1963, for hearing. On that day the appellant changed his plea of not guilty to one of guilty and he was fined and the forfeiture of his gun ordered. On this occasion too the appellant was not represented by counsel.

Following the forfeiture of his gun on the 29th of November, 1963, the appellant, after having waited in vain for nearly

11 months for the letter promised by the Gendarmerie Chief in his letter of the 8th January, 1963, and the valuation of his firearm for the purposes of compensation, decided to consult an advocate and, eventually, a letter was sent on his behalf by his legal adviser on the 3rd December, 1963 to the Gendarmerie Chief complaining, inter alia, that he had not received the letter promised by the Gendarmerie Chief. On the 7th December, 1963, receipt was acknowledged of the advocate's letter by the Gendarmerie and a reply was promised in due course. On the 19th February, 1964, that is to say, more than 13 months after the first letter of the Chief of Gendarmerie, the latter addressed the following letter to the appellant's advocate:

"In continuation of my letter dated 7th December, 1963, I desire to inform you that the reasons which led to the cancellation of the certificate of registration of Mr, Michaelides firearm is because this firearm is of a type possession of which had been prohibited by order of the Council of Ministers dated 24/12/60 i.e. it is semi-automatic. When the letter of the 8th January, 1963 was delivered to Mr. Michaelides he delivered the firearm to the Gendarmerie but he failed to return the certificate of registration saying that he had lost it. He was told that he would be compensated for his firearm.

2. After advice however this procedure i.e. the cancellation of the certificate and the payment of [*270] 'reasonable compensation' was not followed and it was decided to charge Mr. Michaelides for possession of the firearm, possession of which had been prohibited by order of the Council of Ministers in contravention of section 3(1)(d)(2)(b) of the Firearms Law CAP 57 and the Notification 105/1960 and the Attorney-General gave his consent for Summary trial under section 24(2) of the Courts of Justice Law 14/1960.

3. On 29th November, 1963, a fine of £1 was imposed on Mr. Michaelides and his firearm was confiscated by the Court".

It will be seen that the Gendarmerie Chief admits that the appellant had been told by the Gendarmerie that he would be compensated for his firearm but that, after advice, the procedure for the cancellation of the appellant's certificate and payment of "reasonable compensation" was not followed, presumably as a result of the decision in Sizinos and The Republic, 4. R.S.C.C.79 (dated 10th January, 1963). Following that reply from the Gendarmerie Chief the appellant filed a recourse (N0.31/64) in the Supreme Constitutional Court on the 3rd April, 1964, praying, inter alia, for a declaration that the decision of the respondents (the Republic of Cyprus through the Minister of Interior and the Ministry of Finance) to "confiscate" the appellant's firearm and/or rescind its permit coupled with their failure to pay or tender just compensation is null and void and of no effect whatsoever The recourse was, inter alia, based on Article 23 of the Constitution, and the appellant claimed that the value of his gun is £300.

On the 22nd September, 1964, the respondent Republic of Cyprus filed an opposition stating that the order of "confiscation" of the appellant's firearm was made by a Court [*271] of competent jurisdiction; that it was not made by an executive or administrative organ of the Republic and that it could not, therefore, he made the subject of a recourse under Article 1 46 of the Constitution. At the "directions" stage of the recourse: after the matter was argued before a Judge, the appellant's legal advisers decided to apply to this Court for an extension of time to file an appeal against the sentence and forfeiture order made by the District Court of Limassol on the 29th November, 1963. The extension for appeal was granted by this Court on the 14th January, 1965, and the appellant withdrew his recourse Linder Article 146 (No.31/64) two days later.

From this very long statement of the facts of this case it is apparent that the appellant was originally promised payment of compensation by the Gendarmerie of the Republic and that eventually instead of being compensated he was prosecuted and a forfeiture order was made against him.

Mr. Pavlides for the appellant submitted that the provision for forfeiture in section 3, sub-section (2), of the Firearms Law, Cap.57, is discretionary and not mandatory, in view of the constitutional provisions (Article 12(3)), and he relied on the cases of Zavos v. The Police, Criminal Appeal 2636, dated the 6th June, 1963 (not yet reported), and Antoniades v. The Police, 2 J.S.C.p.63 (October 1964). The trial Judge in making the forfeiture order did not give any reasons for his

decision.

Counsel for the respondent submitted that the above cases, as well as the cases quoted in the Zavos case (supra). should be distinguished because in the present case the very possession of this type of firearm is illegal. The trial [*272] Judge, therefore, he said, had no choice in the matter and the forfeiture was mandatory and not discretionary in the circumstances. He further submitted that, even if forfeiture is considered to be punishment, in this case it cannot be considered to be disproportionate punishment having regard to the gravity of the offence (of. Article 12, paragraph 3, of the Constitution). All previous cases, he said, in which forfeiture was held to be discretionary and not mandatory, were cases of illegally pursuing game, etc., while in this case the very possession of the gun is illegal.

The question whether the provision for forfeiture in a statute is mandatory or discretionary, as a result of the constitutional provisions, has been exhaustively considered in many cases in the past and it is not necesssary for us to elaborate on it in the present case. Suffice it to say that, having given the matter our best consideration in the light of the previous cases, we have reached the conclusion that the forfeiture provided under section 3(2) of the Firearms Law, for offences under section 3(1)(d) of the Law (as in the present case), is punishment within the provisions of Article 12(3) of the Constitution and it is, therefore, discretionary and not mandatory. We have reached that conclusion having regard to the fact that possession of the type of the sporting gun in question was not originally prohibited under section 3 but prohibition was imposed for the first time on the owners of such guns, without any prior notice, by the Order of the Council of Ministers published on the 24th December, 1960, after such owners had possessed them lawfully for many years. In the case of the appellant he had possessed his gun lawfully ever since its registration [*273] in 1939, that is, for 22 years, before the prohibition was imposed at the end of 1960.

Mr. Pavlides, in asking this Court to set aside the forfeiture order, submitted that this was the correct course to follow for the appellant to have his hands free to prosecute his constitutional and legal rights as the owner of the gun for the recovery of compensation and, generally, to safeguard his rights. We think that there is substance in counsel's submission. Having regard to the provisions of section 12 of the Firearms Law, Cap.57, and section 38 of the Interpretation Law, Cap.1, the effect of the forfeiture order is that the gun forfeited becomes the absolute property of the Crown, now the Republic of Cyprus, and the appellant ceases to be the owner or to have any rights of ownership, and he cannot vindicate such rights so long as the forfeiture order stands.

What is prohibited under section 3 of the Firearms Law and the Order of the Council of Ministers aforesaid is the importation, control and possession of the type of gun owned by the appellant, but the constitutional and legal rights of the citizen regarding his ownership of the gun remain unaffected. It should be stressed that the exportation or ownership of such guns is not made illegal under the provisions of the Order of the Council of Ministers made under section 3 of the Law. Once it is held (as already held) that forfeiture is discretionary and not mandatory, the very recital of the facts of this case shows clearly that this is a typical case in which the Judge's discretion must be exercised, without any hesitation whatsoever, in the appellant's favour.

For these reasons we allowed the appeal and set aside the forfeiture order.

Appeal allowed.

Forfeiture order

set aside.