IEHC 54 — IEHC 54 — High Court

APPROVED [2026] IEHC 54

THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW

2024 1221 JR

BETWEEN

STUDENT A

APPLICANT

AND

PROVOST, FELLOWS AND SCHOLARS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN, TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN

PHARMACEUTICAL SOCIETY OF IRELAND

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Garrett Simons delivered on 6 February 2026

INTRODUCTION

1. This judgment addresses the question of whether these judicial review

proceedings should be subject to reporting restrictions. More specifically, the

question is whether a university student is entitled to anonymity in pursuing

judicial review proceedings which seek to set aside a decision withdrawing him

from a postgraduate course. The resolution of this question requires

consideration of the common law power of the court to regulate its own 2

proceedings (as described in Gilchrist v. Sunday Newspapers Ltd

[2017] IESC 18, [2017] 2 IR 284).

2. It should be emphasised that this judgment is concerned solely with the question

of reporting restrictions. It entails no findings whatsoever in respect of the

underlying merits of the proceedings. In particular, this judgment does not

address the university’s objection that judicial review is not an appropriate

remedy in the circumstances of this case. The objection will, instead, be

addressed as part of the judgment to be delivered in due course on the underlying

merits of the proceedings. In ease of the student, the present procedural

judgment has been prepared on the working assumption that judicial review

proceedings are appropriate.

THE UNIVERSITY PROCEEDINGS

3. Student A had been enrolled on a pharmacy course at Trinity College Dublin.

The course is an integrated NFQ Level 9 course. The course comprises a four-

year undergraduate degree which, if successfully completed, results in the award

of a B.Sc. (Pharm) Honours. Thereafter, there is an option to undertake a

postgraduate year which, if successfully completed, results in the award of an

M.Pharm. This, in turn, entitles the successful postgraduate to apply to register

as a pharmacist with the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland.

4. Having regard to the issues which arise in the judicial review proceedings, it may

be of assistance to pause here, and to explain the role of a pharmacy school in

certifying a master’s degree under the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland

(Education and Training) (Integrated Course) Rules 2014 (S.I. No. 377 of 2014). 3

5. Rule 20 stipulates that no master’s degree in pharmacy shall be awarded for the

purpose of being recognised as a qualification appropriate for practice unless the

head of the school of pharmacy has confirmed, inter alia, his or her overall

satisfaction that the person concerned is fit to be a registered pharmacist. One

of the findings made against the student in this case is that he is not fit to practise.

6. Student A completed the undergraduate degree. Thereafter, he enrolled on the

postgraduate course. The University Council subsequently approved a

recommendation by the College Fitness to Practise Committee to “withdraw”

the student from the postgraduate course. The approval is dated 14 February

2024.

7. The request for reporting restrictions is premised, primarily, on the fact that one

of the findings made against Student A is that he committed an act of plagiarism

in the sitting of the penultimate exam of his postgraduate year. It is useful,

therefore, to rehearse the procedural history in this regard. Before turning to that

task, however, it should be explained that this is not the only factor relied upon

by the university’s decision-making tribunals in reaching the decision to

withdraw Student A from the postgraduate course. Rather, Student A has been

found to have committed what are described as an “agglomeration” of breaches

of the code of conduct. These include, for example, arranging for another student

to sign him into a mandatory workshop which he did not actually attend.

8. Once the (since admitted) plagiarism was detected, the Director of Teaching and

Learning (Postgraduate) consulted the Dean of Graduate Studies, who advised

that the incident be referred directly to the Junior Dean. Following a meeting

between the Junior Dean, the student, and the Director in September 2023, the

Junior Dean determined that: (i) the work was inadmissible; (ii) the mark should 4

be set to zero; (iii) any reassessment (if permitted by course rules) should be

capped at the pass mark; and (iv) the incident be recorded as Level 4 plagiarism,

i.e. the most serious level.

9. Separately, the plagiarism incident and a number of other alleged breaches of the

code of conduct were referred to the School of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical

Sciences Fitness to Practise Committee. The first-instance decision comprised

a finding that Student A was not fit to practise as a pharmacist. Student A

brought an appeal against the first-instance decision to the College Fitness to

Practise Committee. The appeal takes the form of a de novo hearing. The

outcome of the appeal was to affirm the first-instance decision. Thereafter,

Student A brought an appeal to the University’s Visitors. The Visitors made a

decision on 24 July 2024 to dismiss the appeal. A detailed statement of reasons

was subsequently furnished in December 2024.

10. The 2010 Consolidated Statutes of Trinity College Dublin and of the University

of Dublin provide that hearings of the Visitors “shall be open to members of the

Community, except in such special and limited circumstances as decided by the

Visitors on the application of a party to a hearing before them”. No such

application was made on behalf of Student A.

11. The “College Community” is defined under the Consolidated Statutes as

consisting of persons associated with the College, comprising (a) students and

staff of the College, (b) members of the Board, Council and Senate, (c) the

Chaplains, Visitors, Fellows Emeriti and Honorary Fellows, and (d) such other

persons as the Board may from time to time include.

12. Student A asserts that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in these judicial

review proceedings arising from the fact that there was no reportage of the earlier 5

university proceedings. This argument is flawed for two reasons. First, the

hearing before the Visitors was open to the “College Community” as defined. It

cannot sensibly be characterised as a private hearing. Any member of the twenty

thousand-strong college community would have been entitled to attend the

hearing. Any attendee would have been made aware of the identity of the

appellant, i.e. Student A. An attendee would have been at liberty to publish

details of the hearing, for example in a college magazine or on social media, or

to share those details with a journalist from a mainstream media organisation.

The fact, if fact it be, that no member of the college community (other than those

directly involved as participants) actually attended the hearing in July 2024

cannot change the character of the hearing from a legal perspective. Student A

elected to invoke an appeal procedure to the University’s Visitors which

involved, by default, a hearing open to the college community. Student A did

not, as he might have done, request that the Visitors conduct the hearing in

private.

13. Second, and more fundamentally, the form of procedure before a public body

cannot dictate the procedure to be adopted by the High Court in a subsequent

legal challenge. The constitutional imperative is that justice be administered in

public save in such special and limited cases as may be prescribed by law. This

imperative cannot be cut down by the fact that events prior to the commencement

of court proceedings may have been confidential.

THE JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS

14. The within judicial review proceedings were commenced on 30 September

2024. The High Court granted leave to apply for judicial review on 9 December 6

2024. As part of the ex parte order, reporting restrictions were imposed. The

court prohibited the publication of, or broadcast of, any matter relating to the

proceedings which would or could identify the student or the university.

15. The university filed a motion on 29 April 2025 seeking to set aside the reporting

restrictions. Prior to the hearing of the motion, the reporting restrictions were

modified, by consent of the parties, to allow for the identification of the

university. This was done on 30 June 2025.

16. The motion was part-heard on 30 June 2025. The hearing was adjourned to

allow the parties time to prepare written legal submissions. The hearing resumed

on 20 October 2025 and judgment was reserved to today’s date. In the interim,

the substantive application for judicial review was heard over three days in late

January 2026, and judgment was reserved.

17. It should be explained that one of the grounds advanced in the judicial review

proceedings is that, having regard to the earlier decision of the Junior Dean in

September 2023, the plagiarism incident should not have been dealt with as a

fitness to practise matter at all. It is said that the matter should, instead, have

been dealt with by way of disciplinary proceedings. An argument in similar

terms was rejected by the University’s Visitors, but this is now under challenge

in these judicial review proceedings.

18. For completeness, it should also be explained that whereas Student A has

acknowledged that he committed plagiarism in his final year of studies, he

contends that the surrounding context significantly mitigates the seriousness of

same. Indeed, Student A contends that the existence of mitigating circumstances

was accepted by the Junior Dean. Student A also disputes both the fairness and

lawfulness of the referral to the Fitness to Practise Committees. Moreover, 7

Student A contends that the Visitors’ decision was disproportionate and made

without taking account of relevant material, in particular written character

references furnished on his behalf by professional pharmacists.

DISCUSSION

ONUS LIES WITH REQUESTING PARTY

19. Before turning to the detail of the request for reporting restrictions, it is

necessary, first, to address the question of which party bears the onus. The matter

formally comes before the court in the form of a motion by the university to set

aside the ex parte anonymisation order.

20. It is well established that the High Court has an inherent power to set aside any

order which has been obtained on an ex parte basis. This principle has recently

been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in M.D. v. Board of Management of a

Secondary School [2024] IESC 11. Collins J. summarised the position as

follows: where an order is made ex parte that immediately and materially affects

another party, the affected party is entitled to apply to have the order set aside.

Whether the party seeking to set aside bears the onus will depend on the nature

and effect of the ex parte order.

21. The case law in relation to reporting restrictions (discussed below) confirms that

the onus resides with the party requesting anonymity to demonstrate the

existence of a legitimate interest which might justify a departure from the

constitutional imperative that justice be administered in public. It follows,

therefore, that the onus resides with Student A to justify the reporting

restrictions. The earlier ex parte order does not give the student a “head start”,

as it were. The university does not bear a burden of having to displace the 8

existing order. Rather, this court is required to consider afresh the question of

whether reporting restrictions are justified.

22. Student A has sought to attach some weight to the fact that no member of the

media has brought an application to set aside the ex parte order. It is also said

that the media have, without difficulty, reported each stage of these proceedings.

23. With respect, no weight can be attached to the absence of an application by the

media. The enforcement of the constitutional imperative that justice shall be

administered in public, save in such special and limited cases as may be

prescribed by law, is one which the courts themselves are required to enforce. It

is not contingent on an application by a party or non-party. Whereas a bona fide

member of the media would certainly have standing to challenge reporting

restrictions, it is unrealistic to expect that the media would have the resources

and the appetite to pursue an application each and every time reporting

restrictions are imposed on court proceedings. The enforcement of the

constitutional imperative cannot turn on the happenstance of whether the media

has knowledge of a case and the impetus to make an application.

24. Here, one of the parties to the proceedings has expressly raised the issue and has

brought a motion in that regard. The motion falls to be determined on its own

merits and does not require the imprimatur of the media. Indeed, even in the

absence of such a motion, the court would be entitled to raise the issue of its own

volition.

25. It is inaccurate to suggest that the media have not been inhibited in their reporting

of these proceedings. The initial reports could not include the name of the

university, nor even the course of study involved. Even the modified form of 9

reporting restrictions fixed on 30 June 2025 preclude the media from reporting

on what is an integral element of open justice, namely, the identity of the parties.

OVERVIEW: GROUNDS FOR REQUESTING ANONYMITY

26. The application for an anonymisation order is advanced, principally, by

reference to three related propositions as follows. The first proposition is that

the identification of Student A as the applicant will adversely affect his

constitutional rights to a good name and to earn a livelihood. It is said that

academic plagiarism attracts a “visceral” reaction among members of the public

generally, and potential employers specifically. This is said to support the

making of an anonymisation order pursuant to the court’s common law power,

i.e. as opposed to pursuant to a specific legislative provision. It is also said that

there is the risk of online abuse.

27. The second proposition is that a student of pharmacy is entitled to be treated, as

regards fitness to practise and disciplinary matters, in a manner analogous to a

qualified pharmacist under the Pharmacy Act 2007. It is suggested, mistakenly,

that the courts “routinely” anonymise the names of professionals. As appears in

the discussion of the Pharmacy Act 2007 at paragraphs 68 to 86 below, the

default position is that the hearings of the professional conduct committee are in

public.

28. The third proposition is that an anonymisation order will be appropriate where

the identification of an individual as a party to legal proceedings might adversely

affect their mental health.

29. These arguments are addressed, in turn, in the discussion which follows. 10

COMMON LAW POWER / GILCHRIST PRINCIPLES

30. Article 34.1 of the Constitution of Ireland provides that justice shall be

administered in public save in such special and limited cases as may be

prescribed by law. The qualifying words “prescribed by law” have been

interpreted as encompassing not only statute law but also the courts’ common

law power to regulate their own proceedings.

31. The Supreme Court in Gilchrist v. Sunday Newspapers Ltd (cited above)

confirmed that the common law power includes a continuing power to depart

from the standard of a full hearing in public. The judgment further held that such

a course could be particularly justified when constitutional values are engaged.

32. The principles governing the exercise of the court’s common law power were

summarised as follows (at paragraph 46 of the reported judgment):

“(i) The Article 34.1 requirement of administration of justice in public is a fundamental constitutional value of great importance.

(ii) Article 34.1 itself recognises however that there may be exceptions to that fundamental rule.

(iii) Any such exception to the general rule must be strictly construed, both as to the subject matter, and the manner in which the procedures depart from the standard of a full hearing in public.

(iv) Any such exception may be provided for by statute but also falls under the common law power of the court to regulate its own proceedings.

(v) Where an exception from the principle of hearing in public is sought to be justified by reference only to the common law power and in the absence of legislation, then the interests involved must be very clear, and the circumstances pressing. […]

(vi) If it can be shown that justice cannot be done unless a hearing is conducted other than in public, that will plainly justify the exception from the rule established by Article 34.1, but that is not the only criterion. Where constitutional interests and 11

values of considerable weight may be damaged or destroyed by a hearing in public, it may be appropriate for the legislature to provide for the possibility of the hearing other than in public, (as it has done) and for the court to exercise that power in a particular case if satisfied that it is a case which presents those features which justify a hearing other than in public.

(vii) The requirement of strict construction of any exception to the principle of trial in public means that a court must be satisfied that each departure from that general rule is no more than is required to protect the countervailing interest. It also means that the court must be resolutely sceptical of any claim to depart from any aspect of a full hearing in public. Litigation is a robust business. The presence of the public is not just unavoidable, but is necessary and welcome. In particular this will mean that even after concluding that the case warrants a departure from that constitutional standard, the court must consider if any lesser steps are possible such as providing for witnesses not to be identified by name, or otherwise identified or for the provision of a redacted transcript for any portion of the hearing conducted in camera.”

33. The judgment in Gilchrist explained, at paragraph 41, that a court should be

cautious in departing from a full hearing in public where the Oireachtas has not

legislated for the particular contingency:

“The absence of a statutory provision is not however irrelevant. Where the Oireachtas has considered it appropriate to permit the possibility of a trial in private in respect of certain subject matters, that is an important legislative judgement on the importance of the subject matter. Where the Oireachtas has not seen fit to legislate for the possibility of a hearing in camera, then the court should only exercise an inherent jurisdiction to depart from a full hearing in public where it is shown that the interests involved are particularly important, and the necessity is truly compelling. […].”

34. Finally, it is instructive to refer to the following passage from the judgment of

O’Donnell J. (as he then was) in Zalewski v. Workplace Relations Commission

[2021] IESC 24, [2022] 1 IR 421 (at paragraph 143 of the report):

“[…] Article 34.1 makes clear that public hearings are of the essence of the administration of justice. In some cases, this 12

may be practically important because the publicity may bring forward further relevant evidence and witnesses, or because it will allow a party (whether an employee or employer) to achieve public vindication. It may, furthermore, have the general public benefit that it allows the public to see justice administered, which might, for example, make it easier for a judgement to be made on the fairness, competence, and efficiency of the decision-maker. However, the requirement for a public hearing does not require any functional justification: from time immemorial, it has been regarded as fundamental to the administration of justice, and as establishing a principle from which any exception must be justified. […]”

35. This passage is relevant to an argument made on behalf of Student A to the effect

that there is no “necessity” to identify him as the applicant in these proceedings.

It is said that such identification is not required to protect members of the public,

as he cannot practise as a pharmacist. It is also said that he is not a public figure,

even in the extended sense that the term is used in the context of freedom of

expression.

36. The difficulty with these arguments is that they invert the proper sequence of the

analysis. The correct starting position is that court proceedings will generally be

heard in public. This will include identification of the parties. There is no

requirement to establish a “need” to identify the parties. As explained in the

passage from Zalewski v. Workplace Relations Commission, a public hearing

does not require any functional justification.

A “MINOR ADJUSTMENT” ONLY?

37. It has been submitted on behalf of Student A that the reporting restrictions that

he seeks entail no more than a “minor adjustment” to a full hearing in public. If

and insofar as this submission is intended to reflect the point that the court must

always consider if any lesser steps, short of an in camera hearing, would meet 13

the contingency, then it is broadly correct. The making of an anonymisation

order simpliciter entails a less dramatic departure from the constitutional

imperative than does an in camera hearing from which even bona fide members

of the media are excluded. However, if the submission is intended to suggest

that a different legal test applies to an anonymisation order, this would be

incorrect. The legal test remains the same: where an exception from the principle

of a hearing in public is sought to be justified by reference to the common law

power alone, i.e. in the absence of legislation, then the interests involved must

be very clear and the circumstances pressing. The judgment in Gilchrist

expressly states that a court must be resolutely sceptical of any claim to depart

from any aspect of a full hearing in public. It follows, therefore, that the party

seeking any exception—such as an anonymisation order—must satisfy the

threshold of very clear interests and pressing circumstances. Put otherwise, it is

always necessary, first, to establish the existence of interests and circumstances

which are potentially capable of justifying a departure from the constitutional

standard of a full hearing in public. It is only where such interests and

circumstances have been established that the court moves on to a consideration

of the degree, if any, to which any departure from a full hearing in public might

be justified. (See, in particular, paragraph 46(vii) of the reported judgment in

Gilchrist).

38. Student A’s reliance on D.F. v. Commissioner of An Garda Síochána

[2015] IESC 44, [2015] 2 IR 487 is misplaced. That judgment concerned

section 27 of the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008. A policy

decision to allow an exception to the open justice principle, in the limited

circumstances defined under the Act, has been made by the Oireachtas. The 14

judgment emphasises that the role of the court is very different in cases where it

is exercising its exceptional common law power in the absence of legislation.

The position is stated as follows at paragraph 28 of the reported judgment:

“[…] All of these decisions, in the absence of the express legislative exception prescribed in Article 34.1 of the Constitution, and in the particular circumstances of those cases in that context, held that anonymity could not be ordered for the litigants in those cases. Here it is different. There is legislation providing for a limited departure from a full open hearing as contemplated by Article 34.1, provided particular terms are judicially adjudicated to have been met. The Oireachtas has fulfilled its function of determining whether it is appropriate that, and in what circumstances, a party to proceedings, plaintiff or defendant, applicant or respondent, or a witness or prospective witness, is entitled to be seen by the public in court, observed by and reported on by the press but, exceptionally, is to be kept unidentified in any written judgment of the court or in media reports. This minor and exceptional departure from open reporting is possible once a series of statutory tests has been met. That is different to the exercise of a jurisdiction dependent solely on Article 34.1 which is not informed by the legislation contemplated by the Constitution.”

39. The judgment in D.F. is not authority for the proposition that the necessity to

establish the existence of interests and circumstances, which are potentially

capable of justifying any departure from a full hearing in public, can be

dispensed with where an anonymisation order is sought pursuant to the common

law power.

40. The identity of the parties is a crucial component of the administration of justice

in public. It cannot be said that the administration of justice is a process which

exists in a vacuum, removed from the realities and nuances of personhood. This

would represent an undervaluation of the scope of open justice and public

scrutiny.

41. The following examples, from the criminal sphere, may assist in illustrating the

principle. It is essential to public confidence in the fairness of the system for the 15

prosecution of criminal offences that the identity of those being prosecuted be

disclosed. It is not enough that only the names of those ultimately convicted of

a criminal offence be published. This is necessary to ensure that in the—

hopefully unlikely—event that prosecutors were to target a particular group on

discriminatory grounds, this would be exposed to public scrutiny.

42. To posit an even more extreme hypothesis: suppose an accused was acquitted by

a non-jury court in circumstances where the evidence against them appeared to

be overwhelming. Next suppose the accused is a powerful politician. It cannot

sensibly be said that the values underlying the open justice principle would be

well served were this fact to be withheld from the public in consequence of an

anonymity order. Equally, were a public prosecutor, at the urging of the

government, to pursue trumped-up charges against an opposition politician, the

open justice principle would not be served if this fact were to be withheld.

PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

43. The factual circumstances in Gilchrist were extreme: the case concerned the

need for confidentiality in the context of a witness protection programme. A full

public hearing had the potential to put lives at risk. The Gilchrist principles have

since been applied in less dramatic circumstances, including, relevantly, in the

context of professional or academic disciplinary proceedings.

44. The parties have very helpfully researched the case law and have brought to my

attention a series of judgments wherein the High Court has held that, in certain

circumstances, it may be appropriate to make anonymisation orders in the

context of professional or academic disciplinary proceedings. 16

45. In the first category of cases, the purpose of the anonymisation order was to

protect the privacy of a person other than the professional accused of

misconduct. For example, in A Social Worker v. CORU [2021] IEHC 756, the

identity being protected was that of a non-party. It seems that, as part of her

response to the disciplinary proceedings, the professional had made a counter-

allegation against one of the witnesses, to the effect that the witness had sexually

assaulted her. An anonymisation order was made to protect that witness’s

identity.

46. In Teaching Council of Ireland v. S.R. [2018] IEHC 582, the identity being

protected was that of the primary school children whose treatment by the

professional had been the subject of the disciplinary proceedings.

47. In Medical Council v. Anonymous [2019] IEHC 109, the identity being protected

was that of the patients said to have been mistreated by the medical practitioner.

48. In M.M. v. A University [2024] IEHC 664, [2026] IEHC 57, the concern was to

protect the identity of a fellow student against whom the plaintiff had made an

allegation of assault. The fellow student was not a party to the court proceedings

and, indeed, appears to have been entirely unaware that the allegation had been

made against him.

49. In the second category of cases, an anonymisation order was made in

circumstances where there was cogent evidence that publication would cause

damage to the health or rehabilitation of the professional. An example of this

approach is provided by Medical Council v. Anonymous [2019] IEHC 109. On

the facts, the medical practitioner had suffered from an opioid addiction and had

been prescribing unnecessary opioids to patients, administering partial doses to

them, and administering the remainder to himself thereafter. The medical 17

practitioner subsequently took steps to address his opioid addiction. The High

Court was satisfied that the medical practitioner’s identity should be protected,

by reporting restrictions, lest a full public hearing would adversely affect his

rehabilitation and recovery. In Teaching Council of Ireland v. S.R.

[2018] IEHC 582, the High Court held that, in the absence of evidence, there

was no basis upon which the court could restrict publication of the professional’s

name on medical grounds.

50. The third category is where a public hearing would undermine or prejudice the

outcome of disciplinary proceedings. The judgment in C. v. Panel of the

Disciplinary Committee of the Teaching Council [2024] IEHC 54 is an example

of such an approach. The court proceedings involved a challenge to the

admissibility of evidence at a disciplinary hearing. One of the concerns had been

that unrestricted reportage of the court proceedings might alert the disciplinary

panel to the existence of the disputed evidence and render moot any subsequent

decision by the court to exclude the evidence as inadmissible.

51. There was some suggestion that there might be a fourth category of cases where

reporting restrictions were imposed in respect of court proceedings, which

related to the very early stage of a disciplinary process, on the basis that as of

yet unsubstantiated allegations of sexual assault had been made against a

professional.

52. As appears, the case law indicates that reporting restrictions will only be imposed

in very limited circumstances. In most instances, the rationale is to protect the

rights of parties other than the professional who is the subject of the disciplinary

proceedings. The case law certainly does not support an argument that reporting 18

restrictions will be routinely imposed to protect the good name or professional

reputation of the person who is the subject of the disciplinary proceedings.

RIGHT TO A GOOD NAME AND RIGHT TO EARN A LIVELIHOOD

53. The gravamen of Student A’s complaint is that if these judicial review

proceedings are heard and determined in public, without any reporting

restrictions, there is a significant risk that he will be publicly identified as a

person who has not only admitted to academic plagiarism but who has also been

found—following what he says is an unlawful process—to be unfit to practise

as a pharmacist. It is argued that such public identification would represent an

interference with his constitutional right to a good name and his constitutional

right to earn a livelihood. The implication being that a prospective employer

might be reluctant to employ a person against whom such a finding has been

made.

54. The logic of Student A’s argument is that any reputational or professional

damage which may be caused to him by reportage of the judicial review

proceedings will not be remedied by a successful outcome of those proceedings.

More specifically, Student A’s argument does not countenance that a public

determination by the High Court to the effect that the university’s proceedings

were invalid will vindicate his reputation.

55. With respect, this argument is premised on a misunderstanding of the interaction

between the constitutional rights to a good name and to earn a livelihood, on the

one hand, and the constitutional imperative that justice be administered in public,

on the other. The general position is that the reputational rights of a party to

litigation are vindicated by a public hearing and determination of the court 19

proceedings. Neither common law nor constitutional law has ever insisted, as a

general proposition, that the identity of parties, against whom allegations of

wrongdoing have been made, must be withheld until the conclusion of the court

proceedings. That this is so is illustrated by the approach taken in criminal

proceedings. Save in certain limited circumstances where it is necessary to do

so to protect vulnerable victims, or the integrity of related criminal proceedings,

an adult accused of a criminal offence may, generally, be publicly identified from

the outset of the criminal proceedings.

56. This principle applies with equal force to judicial review proceedings. The High

Court exercises a supervisory jurisdiction over certain acts or decisions of public

bodies, including, relevantly, universities in receipt of significant public funding.

The only potential remedy for a person who contends that they have been

unlawfully expelled from a university course, and who has exhausted all internal

rights of appeal, is to seek vindication by way of a public hearing and

determination by the High Court. This approach has been applied in the specific

context of allegations of academic plagiarism: Flanagan v. University College

Dublin [1988] IR 724, [1989] ILRM 469.

57. Student A appears to contend that a different approach should be applied to the

members of a regulated profession and to aspiring students seeking to enter that

profession. I will return to address (at paragraphs 68 to 86 below) the specific

arguments which he makes by reference to the Pharmacy Act 2007. For present

purposes, it is sufficient to make the following general observation. It is

incorrect to suggest that judicial review proceedings in relation to regulated

professions are routinely subject to reporting restrictions in order to protect the

identities of the professionals. One need only consider the titles of the published 20

judgments on the courts.ie website to appreciate that the default position is that

the parties to legal challenges to disciplinary proceedings are almost always

identified. To take an example of a single category of cases: there are numerous

published judgments wherein members of An Garda Síochána, who are

challenging the legality of disciplinary decisions, are named. This is so

notwithstanding that, in some instances, the disputed breach of discipline

involves allegations of conduct—such as sexual assault—which if substantiated

would attract public opprobrium. The applicant’s right to a good name is

vindicated by a public hearing and determination of the judicial review

proceedings.

58. Similarly, a snapshot of judgments over the past twelve months reveals that

student-applicants are normally named in judicial review proceedings. See, for

example, Igweze v. Dundalk Institute of Technology [2025] IEHC 232 and

Khimji v. University College Dublin [2026] IEHC 55. The fact that an applicant

is in pursuit of further education or a professional qualification is insufficient, in

and of itself, to justify reporting restrictions.

59. It is correct to say that—under specific legislation—an interim application to

suspend a professional from practice, pending the completion of a disciplinary

process, is presumptively heard in private. The rationale for such an approach

is, in part, to protect the reputation of a professional in circumstances where

allegations against them have not been assessed by a preliminary proceedings

committee. (See paragraphs 77 to 79 below).

60. This rationale does not apply to Student A. This is not a case where an

application has been made to the court at the initial stages of the university’s

process, prior even to a prima facie assessment of the case. Rather, the 21

university’s process has been completed and the allegations have been

considered in detail and adjudicated upon. The student has exhausted his rights

of appeal to the College Fitness to Practise Committee and to the University’s

Visitors. The prescribed process is at an end, and the findings are final subject

only to the potential intervention of the High Court by way of judicial review.

61. There was also some suggestion that even absent an express statutory power to

hold a hearing in private, the older case law contains examples where reporting

restrictions were imposed where the allegation against the professional was one

of sexual assault. The circumstances of the present case are entirely removed

from that. This is because the risk of the temporary reputational damage

apprehended by Student A is of a lesser order. Whereas academic plagiarism is,

undoubtedly, a serious matter under the University Calendar, it is not a criminal

offence and the fitness to practise proceedings were not a criminal trial.

Academic plagiarism falls well short of the type of alleged misconduct the

subject of those older cases where temporary reporting restrictions were allowed.

Moreover, the fact of the plagiarism is not disputed; rather, the gravamen of the

student’s complaint relates to the characterisation of the severity of the

plagiarism. It is said that the consequences imposed, i.e. his expulsion from the

postgraduate course and the negative “fitness to practise” finding, were

disproportionate to the misconduct.

62. Student A has challenged the findings made against him. If these judicial review

proceedings are successful, then those findings will be set aside by the High

Court. The decision of the High Court will be embodied in a written judgment

which will be posted on the courts.ie website. Members of the media will be 22

entitled to publish or broadcast a fair and accurate report of the proceedings and

the written judgment. All of this will represent a public vindication of Student A.

63. Student A’s argument for reporting restrictions is predicated on a bleak

assessment of the effectiveness of the administration of justice, implying that

success in the judicial review proceedings would be of no benefit if publicly

reported. This assessment is incorrect both as a matter of constitutional principle

and of practice. The principle has already been discussed above. As to practice,

reasonable members of society can be credited with understanding the

significance of a court order setting aside the impugned findings of the College

Fitness to Practise Committee and the University’s Visitors. A reasonable

member of society would understand that the earlier finding that Student A is not

a fit person to be a pharmacist no longer stands. This is not an arcane concept

that only a trained lawyer might be expected to comprehend. Rather, the

vindication will be clear to all.

64. As an aside, it should be noted that—even in advance of any decision on the

judicial review proceedings setting aside the findings—a number of potential

employers have provided favourable character references in respect of

Student A. These references have been exhibited as part of the judicial review

proceedings. The existence of such references tends to undermine any

suggestion that any future employer would not understand the significance of a

court order setting aside the impugned findings.

65. Perhaps at least part of the explanation for Student A’s pessimism lies in the

distinguishing feature of the present case, namely that he has admitted academic

plagiarism. This is not a case where temporary reporting restrictions are sought

to prevent a party being identified with misconduct which is denied. 23

66. It seems that the ambition of these proceedings is not simply to set aside the

subjective findings as to the characterisation of the severity of his admitted

misconduct and its implications for his fitness to practise as a pharmacist, but

also to conceal the objective fact that he had committed academic plagiarism.

67. Even if he is successful in setting aside the findings made by the College Fitness

to Practise Committee and upheld by the University’s Visitors, it will remain a

fact that Student A did commit academic plagiarism. The object of the

constitutional right to a good name is to protect the reputation which somebody

actually possesses. It is not intended to prevent disclosure of facts which are not

disputed. A litigant cannot rely on the risk of embarrassment caused by their

own admitted misconduct to justify a derogation from the constitutional

imperative that justice be administered in public.

PHARMACY ACT 2007

Overview 68. It is submitted that Student A is entitled to be “treated as if he were a practising

pharmacist” and to the benefit of the protections afforded to such persons. It is

further submitted that—in circumstances where his stated objective is to practise

as a pharmacist—any publication of his identity would engage the same

constitutional interests, i.e. the right to a good name and the right to earn a

livelihood, as would be engaged for registered pharmacists subject to

disciplinary proceedings under the Pharmacy Act 2007.

69. This submission runs to the effect that although he is not yet on the statutory

register of pharmacists, the standard actually applied to him throughout the

university’s process was that of a professional pharmacist. The core finding 24

under challenge is the finding that Student A is “not fit to practise as a

pharmacist”. It is submitted that his conduct has been assessed by reference to

professional norms rather than ordinary student discipline. Counsel draws

attention to the fact that the University’s Code of Conduct for Pharmacy Students

is expressed to be “guided” by the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland’s Code of

Conduct for Pharmacists and by the Medical Council’s guidance.

Part 6, Pharmacy Act 2007 70. Part 6 of the Pharmacy Act 2007 (“PA 2007”) establishes a comprehensive

disciplinary regime for registered pharmacists and registered retail pharmacy

businesses. The disciplinary regime is administered through the Pharmaceutical

Society of Ireland’s various committees of inquiry. These consist of a

preliminary proceedings committee, a professional conduct committee, and a

health committee.

71. The first formal step in the disciplinary regime is the reference of a complaint to

the preliminary proceedings committee. The function of the preliminary

proceedings committee is to advise on whether there is “sufficient cause” to

warrant further action being taken. The Act does not envisage that the

preliminary proceedings committee will convene a hearing.

72. In the event that a decision is made to take further action, other than mediation,

the complaint is referred to either (i) the professional conduct committee, or

(ii) the health committee.

73. Section 42 of the PA 2007 draws a sharp distinction, in terms of default public

or private hearings, as between the two committees. The default is that hearings

before the professional conduct committee “shall be held in public”, but may be

held in private on request where the committee considers it appropriate. 25

Conversely, the default is that hearings before the health committee “shall be

held in private”, but may be held in public on request where appropriate.

74. This distinction is indicative of a legislative intention to protect the privacy of a

registered pharmacist in respect of matters relating to their personal health. In

all other instances, the default is a public hearing.

75. In the event that a committee of inquiry finds that the complaint is substantiated,

the council is obliged to impose a disciplinary sanction. If the proposed

disciplinary sanction goes beyond an admonishment or a censure—for example,

if it is proposed to suspend or cancel the pharmacist’s registration—then it is

necessary to apply to the High Court for confirmation.

76. The Pharmacy Act 2007 does not make provision for a confirmation application

to be heard in private. It follows that the default position is that a confirmation

application is to be heard fully in public, subject to the common law power

described in Gilchrist.

77. For completeness, it should be explained that provision is made for the interim

suspension of a registered pharmacist (PA 2007, section 45). An interim

suspension may only be ordered if the court considers that there is a risk to the

health and safety of the public which is of such magnitude that the pharmacist’s

registration should be suspended pending further procedure under Part 6 of the

Act. An application for interim suspension shall be heard in private, unless the

court, on a request by the registered pharmacist that it be heard in public,

considers that it should be so heard. The presumption in favour of a private

hearing reflects the fact that the complaint procedure is incomplete. Indeed,

there may not even have been an initial assessment as to whether there is

“sufficient cause” to warrant further action being taken. 26

78. The nature of the hearing—and the role of the court—at this early stage is very

different from an application to confirm disciplinary sanctions. At the stage of

an application for an interim suspension, the allegations comprising the

complaint have not yet been assessed and the pharmacist has not yet been

afforded a full hearing before the professional conduct committee. The relief

sought, i.e. an interim suspension, is precautionary in nature and will only arise

where the protection of the public requires that a pharmacist’s entitlement to

practise be suspended pending the outcome of the statutory process. An interim

suspension application does not involve the court adjudicating upon the truth of

the allegations comprised in the complaint.

79. The presumption in favour of a private hearing is intended to allow the court to

address the exigency of the protection of the public without the risk of

undermining the, as of yet, incomplete disciplinary process. The High Court

(Barniville P.) has described the rationale underlying the equivalent provision

under the Medical Practitioners Act 2007 as follows in Medical Council v.

Bukhari [2022] IEHC 723 (at paragraph 49). The first objective is to protect the

reputation of the medical doctor the subject of the complaint. The judgment

observes that it will be necessary in most cases for the hearing of a suspension

application to be in private because of the serious damage which could be caused

to a medical doctor by a public ventilation of allegations against them at a very

early stage in the professional disciplinary process and before there has been any

sifting of the complaint by the preliminary proceedings committee to determine

whether there is a prima facie case. The second objective is to protect the rights

of patients or other third parties who would be adversely affected by a public

hearing. 27

Discussion 80. If one were to assume, for the purpose of argument only, that a disciplinary

process applicable to a postgraduate student should be broadly analogous to that

applicable to a registered pharmacist, this would not advance Student A’s

argument. This is because the argument is predicated on the mistaken premise

that the default position is that disciplinary proceedings applicable to a registered

pharmacist are heard in private. In fact, the position is the obverse. The default

position is that hearings before the professional conduct committee “shall be

held in public”. This is subject to a discretion to hold all or part of the hearing

in private. The type of factors which inform the exercise of this discretion would

include, for example, the need to protect the privacy of patients, especially those

who are vulnerable.

81. Student A’s argument, however, requires reading the discretion as mandating a

private hearing in any case where an allegation is made against a registered

pharmacist of a type which, if upheld, would reflect badly on their reputation.

This is contrary to the architecture of the legislation and would result in most

cases being heard in private.

82. In the event that a committee of inquiry finds that the complaint is substantiated,

and it is proposed to, say, cancel the pharmacist’s registration, the default

position is that the court application to confirm the proposed disciplinary

sanctions would similarly be held in public.

83. The only contingency in which the PA 2007 leans in favour of court proceedings

being heard in private is where an interim suspension application is made at an

earlier stage of the disciplinary process. As discussed at paragraphs 77 to 79

above, the presumption in favour of a private hearing is intended, primarily, to 28

allow the court to address the exigency of the protection of the public without

the risk of undermining the, as of yet, incomplete disciplinary process.

84. Student A has travelled well beyond this point in the university’s process. The

university’s process has been completed and the allegations have been

considered in detail and adjudicated upon. The student has exhausted his rights

of appeal to the College Fitness to Practise Committee and to the University’s

Visitors. The prescribed process is at an end, and the findings are final subject

only to the potential intervention of the High Court by way of judicial review.

85. If and insofar as it might be legitimate to draw an analogy between the

university’s process and the statutory process, the student’s position

approximates more closely to that of a registered pharmacist resisting a

confirmation application before the court. This is because in each instance the

non-judicial stage of the process has been completed and an adverse finding

made. The potential that the finding by the non-judicial decision-makers might

not be accepted by the High Court does not mandate a private hearing. As

explained earlier, the default position is that the court application to confirm

proposed disciplinary sanctions is held in public. Indeed, the earlier hearing

before the professional conduct committee is presumptively in public too.

86. In summary, the contended-for analogy with a registered pharmacist actually

undermines Student A’s argument for reporting restrictions.

SOCIAL MEDIA

87. Student A has averred on affidavit that he has a concern that, were he to be

publicly identified as the applicant in these judicial review proceedings, he and

his family members would be subject to abuse and vilification on social media. 29

This risk is said to be heightened by the fact that his is an unusual surname and

the fact that [details redacted]. It is argued that if the anonymisation order were

to be lifted, there is a potential for further articles to be published online and

shared on social media, with potentially serious consequences for the student

and his family. See, in particular, the supplemental affidavit filed on

10 November 2025.

88. In assessing this argument, it is salutary to recall that the rationale underlying

Article 34.1 of the Constitution of Ireland is to allow for the judicial process to

be scrutinised. The Supreme Court, in Irish Times Ltd v. Ireland [1998] 1 IR

359, recognised that justice is best served in an open court where the judicial

process can be scrutinised and that in a democratic society, justice must not only

be done but be seen to be done.

89. The courts have consistently acknowledged the crucial role that the traditional

print and broadcast media play in giving practical effect to the constitutional

imperative that justice be administered in public. The position was summarised

as follows by Keane J. (as he then was) at page 409 of the reported judgment in

Irish Times Ltd v. Ireland:

“[…] However, the very fact that physical and other constraints prevent more than a minuscule section of the entire population from being present in court while justice is being administered makes it all the more imperative that the media should have the widest possible freedom to report what happens in court which is consistent with the proper administration of justice. It is manifest that the right of the public to know what is happening in our courts, a right which is clearly recognised and guaranteed by Article 34, would be eroded almost to vanishing point if the public had to depend on the account that might be transmitted to them by such people as happened to gain admission to the court room for the trial in question. In modern conditions, the media are the eyes and ears of the public and the ordinary citizen is almost entirely dependent on them for his knowledge of what goes on in court. 30

Justice must be administered in public, not in order to satisfy the merely prurient or mindlessly inquisitive, but because, if it were not, an essential feature of a truly democratic society would be missing. Such a society could not tolerate the huge void that would be left if the public had to rely on what might be seen or heard by casual observers, rather than on a detailed daily commentary by press, radio and television. The most benign climate for the growth of corruption and abuse of powers, whether by the judiciary or members of the legal profession, is one of secrecy.”

90. The Supreme Court (per Donnelly J.) emphasised in Smith v. Director of Public

Prosecutions [2025] IESC 42 that openness and transparency enhance, rather

than detract from, the rule of law because the public are put in the position where

they can see justice in action, a process in which press access facilitates wider

dissemination of information about hearings where ordinary members of the

public are not permitted.

91. These judgments recognise the reality that most members of the public, owing

to work and personal commitments, could not attend court in person as observers

even if they wished to do so. Instead, they rely on media reports as their principal

source of information. The courts cannot be blind to the fact that, in more recent

times, online platforms and social media also have a role to play. Many

mainstream media outlets now have a significant online presence. Indeed, there

are more articles published in the online version of a newspaper than in the print

version. The articles which are published online are often shared or reposted by

ordinary members of the public on their own social media accounts. It is possible

for others to post “comments” in relation to an article, whether underneath the

original publication on the mainstream media’s own account or on a third-party’s

user account. Regrettably, the comments, in some instances, engage in vulgar 31

abuse of the parties or the judges involved. The fact that such commentary is

often ill-informed and wrong does not render it, in and of itself, unlawful.

92. Of course, a point may be reached where online commentary goes beyond the

legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and, instead, entails

criminality. There is ample legislation on the statute book which addresses the

contingency of unacceptable online abuse. For example, the offence of

“harassment” is defined, under the Non-Fatal Offences against the Person Act

1997 (as amended), as including the act of communicating with or about a person

in circumstances where such communication seriously interferes with that

person’s peace and privacy, or causes alarm, distress or harm to that person. It

is also open to apply for a civil restraining order under Part 5 of the Criminal

Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2023.

93. Save in exceptional cases, where the evidence before the court indicates that

there is a real risk to the health and safety of the parties involved, it will rarely

be appropriate to impose reporting restrictions, in advance, on an anticipatory

basis. Were it otherwise, the open justice principle would be undermined. The

precise purpose of the principle is to allow for public scrutiny of, and discussion

of, the administration of justice. It would defeat this purpose were the courts to

retreat behind a veil of reporting restrictions for fear that someone, somewhere,

might engage in criminal behaviour by harassing the parties online. This is

especially so where no specific evidence has been adduced on affidavit as to the

likelihood of criminal behaviour, beyond a generalised and vague fear of

harassment.

94. I turn now to apply the foregoing principles to the facts of the present case. As

of today’s date, the substantive application for judicial review has been heard 32

and judgment reserved. Were the reporting restrictions to be lifted prior to the

delivery of the reserved judgment, then Student A would be identifiable as the

applicant in these judicial review proceedings. The mainstream media—which

has already reported, on an anonymised basis, on the existence of these

proceedings—would be entitled to publish Student A’s name as part of a fair and

accurate report of the proceedings. Once the reserved judgment is delivered, any

fair and accurate report would have to refer to the outcome of the proceedings.

95. If Student A succeeds in his judicial review proceedings, then he will have the

benefit of a favourable decision of the High Court which will be embodied in a

written judgment posted on the courts.ie website. Members of the media will be

entitled to publish or broadcast a fair and accurate report of the proceedings and

the written judgment. All of this will represent a public vindication of Student A.

96. The nature of the online abuse, which Student A apprehends will be directed

towards him and his family, has not been elaborated upon in either evidence or

submission. Presumably, the concern is in respect of events prior to the delivery

of the reserved judgment, the concern being that ill-informed individuals will

publish abusive comments in respect of the proceedings. No evidence has been

put before the court to suggest that the proceedings have excited any hostile

reaction online to date. This is so notwithstanding that details in relation to the

proceedings have been published in the mainstream media and have been

available online since June and July 2025.

97. The constitutional imperative that justice be administered in public cannot be

departed from on the basis of speculation or conjecture. It would be

inappropriate to impose reporting restrictions in relation to proceedings simply

because one of the parties apprehends that any online discussion of the case 33

might descend into personal abuse. As already explained, there is ample

legislation on the statute book which addresses the contingency of unacceptable

online abuse.

98. For completeness, it should be acknowledged that there may be extreme cases

where the public identification of the parties to proceedings might give rise to a

real risk to their health and safety. In such a case, it may be appropriate to impose

reporting restrictions at least on a temporary basis. For example, there have been

recent instances where community tensions have been high in the immediate

aftermath of allegations of child sexual abuse. A court might consider that there

is justification to impose temporary restrictions on the public identification of

those suspected of criminal involvement until tensions have subsided.

99. The circumstances of the present case are at a different remove. There is simply

no evidence before the court which suggests that the public identification of

Student A as the applicant in these proceedings will give rise to a real risk to his

health and safety or to that of his family members. This is because academic

plagiarism, although a serious matter in the University Calendar, is unlikely to

attract the type of public opprobrium or vigilantism which might spill over from

the online world into the real world. It is only in cases where an individual has

been identified as having been accused of a heinous crime, such as child sexual

abuse, that such a risk might arise. Even then, the risk is likely to be temporary

only.

CIVIL LAW (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) ACT 2008

100. For completeness, it is necessary to refer briefly to the Civil Law (Miscellaneous

Provisions) Act 2008. Section 27 of the Act empowers a court, in limited 34

circumstances, to prohibit the publication or broadcast of any matter which

would, or would be likely to, identify a party to the proceedings as a person

having a medical condition.

101. The cumulative criteria to be satisfied are prescribed as follows at sub-

section 27(3):

“The court shall grant an order under this section only if it is satisfied that—

(a) the relevant person concerned has a medical condition,

(b) his or her identification as a person with that condition would be likely to cause undue stress to him or her, and

(c) the order would not be prejudicial to the interests of justice.”

102. Student A, in an affidavit dated 20 May 2025, has raised concerns as to the

impact of the judicial review proceedings upon his mental health. It is said, in

particular, that the judicial review proceedings are taking a “toll” on his mental

health. No further detail is provided and no independent medical evidence has

been put before the court.

103. I have carefully considered whether any of this might potentially engage the

statutory power to impose reporting restrictions under the Act. I have concluded

that none of the statutory pre‑conditions have been met. The section permits

only a narrow curtailment of reporting, namely a prohibition on publication that

would identify a relevant person as a person having a medical condition, and it

obliges the court to grant an order only where it is satisfied, cumulatively, that

the person has a medical condition, that identification as a person with that

condition would be likely to cause undue stress, and that the order would not be

prejudicial to the interests of justice. The language of the provision is precise and 35

confined to the fact of the medical condition; it does not contemplate a wider

anonymisation of the proceedings.

104. No independent medical evidence has been adduced to suggest that Student A

might have a qualifying medical condition, still less that identification as a

person with that condition would be likely to cause undue stress within the

meaning of the section. All that has been asserted are generalised concerns about

the ordinary strains of litigation and reputational worry, which do not satisfy the

section’s cumulative and condition‑specific requirements. As explained in

Teaching Council of Ireland v. S.R. [2018] IEHC 582, in the absence of

evidence, there is no basis upon which a court could restrict publication of an

individual’s name on medical grounds.

105. For completeness, even if the statutory requirements were met, any order under

the section would be confined to prohibiting publication that would identify

Student A as a person having the medical condition; it would not operate as a

blanket anonymisation order and it would not prevent fair and accurate reporting

of the proceedings generally, including publication of the findings. To construe

the section otherwise would be to expand it beyond its text and purpose.

CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED FORM OF ORDER

106. The identity of the parties is a crucial component of the administration of justice

in public. It cannot be said that the administration of justice is a process which

exists in a vacuum, removed from the realities and nuances of personhood. This

would represent an undervaluation of the scope of open justice and public

scrutiny. 36

107. The request for reporting restrictions is premised on a misunderstanding of the

interaction between the constitutional rights to a good name and to earn a

livelihood, on the one hand, and the constitutional imperative that justice be

administered in public, on the other. The general position is that the reputational

rights of a party to litigation are vindicated by a public hearing and determination

of the court proceedings. Neither common law nor constitutional law has ever

insisted, as a general proposition, that the identity of parties, against whom

allegations of wrongdoing have been made, must be withheld until the

conclusion of the court proceedings.

108. The same principles apply to the members of a regulated profession and to

aspiring students seeking to enter that profession. The case law indicates that

reporting restrictions will only be imposed in very limited circumstances. In

most instances, the rationale is to protect the rights of parties other than the

professional the subject of the disciplinary proceedings. The case law certainly

does not support an argument that reporting restrictions will be routinely

imposed to protect the good name or professional reputation of the person the

subject of the disciplinary proceedings. (Paragraphs 43 to 67 above).

109. If one were to assume, for the purpose of argument only, that a disciplinary

process applicable to a postgraduate student should be broadly analogous to that

applicable to a registered pharmacist, this would not advance Student A’s

argument. This is because the argument is predicated on the mistaken premise

that the default position is that disciplinary proceedings applicable to a registered

pharmacist are heard in private. In fact, the position is the obverse.

(Paragraphs 68 to 86 above). 37

110. The constitutional imperative that justice be administered in public cannot be

departed from on the basis of speculation or conjecture. It would be

inappropriate to impose reporting restrictions in relation to proceedings simply

because one of the parties apprehends that any discussion of the case on social

media might descend into online abuse. There is ample legislation on the statute

book which addresses the contingency of unacceptable online abuse.

(Paragraphs 87 to 99 above).

111. In the circumstances, the request for reporting restrictions in the form of an

anonymisation order is refused. The reporting restrictions imposed under the

order of 30 June 2025 will be vacated, subject to what is said under the next

heading below.

112. As to costs, my provisional view is that the university, having been entirely

successful in having the reporting restrictions set aside, should be entitled to

recover its costs against the student in accordance with the default position under

section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 as applied, by analogy, to

interlocutory applications under Order 99, rule 3 RSC. The proceedings will be

listed before me on Thursday 19 February 2026, for oral submissions on costs

and on the final form of order.

REPORTING RESTRICTIONS

113. Notwithstanding that the court has held that there is no proper basis for making

a permanent anonymisation order, it is nevertheless necessary to impose

temporary reporting restrictions to safeguard the applicant’s right of appeal. To

elaborate: it would render any appeal to the Court of Appeal, or any application

for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, nugatory were the applicant’s name to 38

be published immediately. The very thing that the applicant seeks to prevent

would have occurred prior to the determination of any appeal or application for

leave to appeal.

114. Accordingly, the reporting restrictions described below are to apply for a period

of twenty-eight days from the date of the perfection of the order pursuant to this

judgment. In the event that an appeal or an application for leave to appeal is

filed, then reporting restrictions will continue thereafter until such time as the

appeal proceedings are finally determined or until further order.

115. The reporting restrictions are as follows. The publication of, or broadcast of,

any matter relating to the proceedings which would or could identify the student

as applicant in these judicial review proceedings is prohibited. This prohibition

is directed to matters such as the student’s name, address, age, family

circumstances, and secondary schooling. There is no restriction on the

publication of the names and details of the respondents to the proceedings, the

course of study undertaken by the student, the years during which the student

attended Dublin University, nor of the allegations and findings made against him.

This judgment will be published on the courts.ie website and there is no

prohibition on the fair and accurate reportage of any matter referred to herein.

116. Any media organisation or bona fide member of the media may apply, on seven

days’ notice, to have these reporting restrictions lifted, varied or clarified. The

parties to the proceedings also have liberty to apply.

Appearances Rosario Boyle, SC and Conor Duff for the applicant instructed by Sonia McEntee Solicitors Patrick Leonard, SC and Liam O’Connell for the first respondent instructed by Byrne Wallace Shields LLP