IEHC 496 — IEHC 496 — High Court

APPROVED

REDACTED

FOR PUBLICATION

THE HIGH COURT

FAMILY LAW

IN THE MATTER OF PART III OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT, 1995

AND IN THE MATTER OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION (CONSEQUENTIAL PROVISIONS) ACT 2020, SECTION 126 THEREOF

AND IN PARTICULAR IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION SEEKING RELIEF AFTER THE GRANTING OF A FOREIGN DIVORCE

[2026] IEHC 496

Record No. H.M. 2022 101

BETWEEN/

A.A.

APPLICANT

AND

C.B.

RESPONDENT

AND

H.I., D.B., E.B., F.B., G.B. AND J.K.

NOTICE PARTIES

Judgment of Ms. Justice Nuala Jackson delivered on the 30th June 2026: INTRODUCTION

1. The application before me concerns a determination of the beneficial ownership of a property, [REDACTED] (‘the Property’) and the manner in which the asset should be dealt with in the context of the application for relief before me pursuant to Part III of the Family Law Act, 1995 (relief after a foreign divorce), brought as between the Applicant and the Respondent. Ms. E.B. and Ms. F.B. were joined as Notice Parties (by Order of the 27th May 2025) in respect of this part of the proceedings in circumstances in which it is common case as between the parties that legal title to the Property concerned is vested in them. This is a matter which I will consider further below. I have already ruled that such beneficial interest in the said property as is held by the Respondent, C.B., should be divided between him and the Applicant, A.A., as to 75% to the Applicant and 25% to the Respondent with the arrangements in relation to financial and tax advice to be as provided for in my Order of the 21st July 2025. The matter which I must determine is what, if any, beneficial interest does the Respondent have in the Property?

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2. The facts are not significantly in dispute. The legal consequences of them is not so clear. 3. The Notice Parties are the adult daughters of the Respondent, his children from his first marriage (the Applicant in these proceedings being his second spouse). Neither of the Notice Parties resides within the jurisdiction. D.B. has sworn an Affidavit dated the 13th June 2025 in which she avers that the Affidavit of her sister, E.B., sworn on the 13th June 2025 has been read and understood by her and in which she confirms that she agrees the content thereof in its entirety. E.B. swore a second supplementary Affidavit on the 9th March 2026. An Affidavit was also provided by the Respondent, although the copy presented to me is unsworn. It is unclear if it was sworn. It would not appear to have been filed. Submissions were made by the Respondent in relation to the matter presently at issue before me in accordance with the unsworn document which I received, together with additional submissions. I have considered all of these Affidavits together with the submissions made by all of the parties. 4. It would appear that in the early 1990’s, leasehold title to the Property was owned by a company called [REDACTED] (‘COMPANY ONE’), derived from two leases for a period of 150 years entered into between The Right Honourable the Lord Mayor Aldermen and Burgesses of Dublin and the Minister for Local Government and a lessee, Prima Foods (Ireland) Limited, by Indentures of Lease dated the [REDACTED] 1962 and the [REDACTED] 1966 respectively. COMPANY ONE is a company which was registered on the [REDACTED] 1988 and which is now dissolved, such dissolution date being [REDACTED] 1995.1 It would appear that COMPANY ONE was owned and/or controlled by the Respondent. A Deed of Assignment was executed in respect of the Property on or about the [REDACTED] 1995 between COMPANY ONE and the Notice Parties. The consideration stated in the Deed is IR £75,000. It was accepted at hearing that the purchase monies to COMPANY ONE was not paid by the Notice Parties. The Respondent informed me that he had paid this sum to COMPANY ONE but no real evidence of this was produced. It does appear that the transfer of the Property to the Notice Parties was arranged, orchestrated and implemented by the Respondent. 5. The evidence before me indicates that prior to such 1995 assignment, there was an Agreement entered into between the Respondent and the Notice Parties, this is dated the [REDACTED] 1994. This Agreement is difficult to understand in circumstances in which the Respondent did not have any legal or beneficial interest in the Property at the time it was executed, although I accept that he owned and/or controlled COMPANY ONE, the company that did own it. The Agreement states that the Respondent agrees to transfer the Property to the Notice Parties jointly “by means of a joint tenancy agreement”. In consideration of such transfer is stated to be: (i) That the property will not be sold during the lifetime of the Respondent and that he will hold the deeds of the property for the duration of his life, such deeds to be handed over to the Notice Parties by the Respondent’s executor within 60 days of the death of the Respondent; (ii) That the Respondent would exercise complete control over the property and would be entitled to any or all benefits that may subsequently accrue, with the Notice Parties renouncing all the rights to the property during the life of C.B.;

1 This information is derived from a CRO search in relation to the company. (iii) That the Notice Parties would not contest any of the provisions of the last will and testament of the Respondent. 6. In the Affidavit of E.B., she exhibits Schedule 1 Part 1 of the Capital Acquisitions Tax Consolidation Act 2003 and a letter from Independent Valuations dated the 12th June 2025, evidencing that the value attributable to a life interest of a person of the age and gender of the Respondent to be 17.83%. 7. The Notice Parties assert a reversionary interest in the property. The first Affidavit of E.B avers:

“I say that it is evident from my father’s actions surrounding the transfer, his promises to my sister D.B. [redacted] and me as well as his subsequent actions in relation to the Property that my father intended to and did in fact assign both legal and beneficial interest in the Property to my sister D.B. [redacted] and me.”

8. It is averred that the Applicant was aware of this transaction. 9. The Notice Parties state that, at divers dates subsequent to the date of the Agreement, over a long number of years, the Respondent sought to and made offers to purchase the property from them. They reference correspondence in this regard which dates from 2004 to 2022. This correspondence indicates that the Respondent was controlling the Property and having the benefit of it, although legal title was in the name of the Notice Parties. He retained possession of all of the title deeds pertaining to the property and it is clear in the correspondence that he expressed a clear intention to retain such possession. The correspondence might be described as fractious. In the correspondence, the Respondent alternatively speaks of continuing with the agreement, altering the agreement and applying “to the courts to have our original agreement and the subsequent transfer of title set aside”. In 2007 (referenced below), the Respondent would appear to rescind the agreement due to alleged breaches of it. Such breaches are unspecified. Over a long number of years, the Respondent would appear to have sought to develop the property, sell it and pay a portion of the proceeds of sale to the Notice Parties. However, there are clear inconsistencies in such correspondence. I. In 2004, the Respondent wrote that he “would apply to the courts to have our original agreement and the subsequent transfer of title set aside. This would effectively bring us back to the position that pertained prior to the [REDACTED] 94. If you or your legal advisors challenged such a move it could turn to be slow, painful and expensive process for all concerned.”;

II. In 2005, the Respondent wrote to D.B. stating, inter alia:

“Our agreement prohibits the premises being sold to a third party and I cannot see any third party being interested without first obtaining vacant possession. Apart from the status quo there are only two other realistic options. Either I purchase your interest and the title is transferred into my name or your purchase may interest and you are given vacant possession and our agreement is ended by mutual consent. The premises could then be sold on the open market, with vacant possession, to the highest bidder which may, or may not, be me. I would be prepared to favourably consider any offer which you are prepared to make as this would help to achieve my objective of ending our ‘partnership’ and your objective of avoiding ‘…conflict or mistrust’.”;

III. In July 2007, the Respondent wrote, inter alia:

“As you are aware the above agreement was a precondition to the transfer of [THE PROPERTY], in the spring of 1995, to the names of you and D.B.. If the agreement had not been signed the transfer would never have taken place. The agreement has been breached consistently, over the last few years, and [THE PROPERTY], will now form part of my estate in Ireland. In my case, this will change nothing as I will continue to honour my part of agreement i.e. I will remain the beneficial owner and the premises will not be sold during my lifetime. This will also mean the section of the agreement, where you agree not to contest the contents of my will, also, be null and void. Your entitlements under the Succession Act will now be reinstated. This means that my six children will be entitled to one third of my Irish estate, which is an approximately entitlement of 5.5% each per child.”

IV. In 2018, the Respondent wrote, concerning a proposed third-party purchase of the property, that:

“they are prepared to make an offer to you on the transfer of the premises to them with me remaining as the beneficial owner.”

V. It is unclear to me if related to IV above or not, but E.B. exhibits a letter from a solicitor for a third party, dated 31st May 2018 which states:

“Your father has indicated that you and your sister, D.B. [redacted], jointly own the above property at [REDACTED] subject to a restriction that the property cannot be sold during the lifetime of your father”

with the solicitor concerned proceeding to express an interest in the Notice Parties’ “share in the property”; VI. In 2022, the Respondent wrote:

“There is some very good news on the potential redevelopment prospects on [THE PROPERTY]. I have already turned down an offer on [ADDRESS FOUR]/ [ADDRESS FIVE] as I feel the optimum purchase price can be achieved by including [ADDRESS TWO] and [THE PROPERTY].”

10. There would appear to have been issues concerning the payment of rates relating to the premises in 2018 with the Respondent informing E.B. that [REDACTED] Council might have a judgment mortgage registered against the property. A rates demand letter, addressed to E.B., is exhibited, dated August 2018, together with other documentation relating to rates upon the Property. It is unclear why the Respondent would believe E.B. to be responsible for rates when he was the person having control of and deriving the entire benefit from the premises (and, indeed, this would be in accordance with the Agreement). I conclude that the Respondent was referencing the possibility of the Property becoming encumbered in respect of such debts with a view to advancing his desire to alter the arrangements in being per the 1994 Agreement. 11. The Notice Parties have averred and have informed me that they very much wish the property to be sold by public auction but they aver that an outstanding debt in respect of commercial rates in respect of the premises should not be deducted from their share. The Respondent and the Notice Parties both assert that the Property has been problematic over the years due to its poor condition. 12. The reply of the Respondent (which I have only seen in unsworn format) says that the Agreement was “made specifically to guarantee my children’s inheritance and for no other purpose”. He states that he has been trying to “offload” the Property for many years. 13. A Supplemental Affidavit was sworn by E.B. on the 9th March 2026. She references a nominal consideration having been paid in respect of the 1995 Assignment (IR£1). This is contrary to the express terms of that assignment. She proceeds to make averments in relation to the purchase of the freehold of the Property in or about 2006. It is averred, that the freehold was purchased from [REDACTED] Council in 2006 for a sum of €8,675. She avers that she and D.B. purchased the freehold at that time as legal owners. She states that considerable expense has been incurred over the years relating to the Property in relation to attempted sales of the property, the purchase of the freehold and the defence of her title to it. The sum stated to be so expended is €34,675. She references negotiations with the owners of [ADDRESS TWO] with offers being made in 2006 and 2018 (I presume in relation to the purchase of [THE PROPERTY]). She references proposals made over the years for development in relation to Numbers [ADDRESS TWO], [THE PROPERTY], [ADDRESS FOUR] and [ADDRESS FIVE]. She avers that the property has been occupied by the Respondent throughout and that during this time he failed to pay rates due and owing. She avers that such arrears were discharged by the Notice Parties in 2006 in the context of buying out the freehold. She avers to further arrears having since accrued. She states that the building has been allowed to fall into disrepair and has been declared by the Respondent to be uninsurable and has been designated a “dangerous building” by [REDACTED] Council. She references the Notice Parties’ ongoing liabilities and risk exposure in this regard, hence their desire that the Property be sold. The Notice Parties dispute that the Applicant ought to have any claim to the proceeds of sale of [THE PROPERTY] but that

“…, a combined sale of the Property and adjacent properties may still be beneficial to her and will enable her to close this difficult chapter of her life.”

THE LAW AND APPLICATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO FACTS

14. The Property was acquired by assignment in 1995 with legal title vesting in the Notice Parties. It is clear they did not provide the consideration for the purchase provided for in the Deed of Assignment. The case, as presented to me, indicates that such consideration as was paid to COMPANY ONE came from the Respondent. In consequence, he became the beneficial owner by way of resulting trust absent such presumed resulting trust being rebutted. As stated in Keane, “Equity and the Law of Trusts in the Republic of Ireland” at para 12.41.2

“A presumption of a resulting trust arises where A has conveyed or transferred property to B, or A and B jointly, there is no consideration for the conveyance or transfer and the document is silent as to the intention of the donor. It must be stressed at the outset that it is no more than a presumption and may be easily rebutted.”3

15. There are four possible ways in which such rebuttal or the presumption of resulting trust might have occurred in this case: 16. (i) By way of proof of gift from the beneficial owner to the Notice Parties, the intention of gift rebutting the presumption of resulting trust. Keane states:

2 Ronan Keane, Equity and the Law of Trusts in the Republic of Ireland (3rd edn, Bloomsbury Professional 2020), para 12.41. 3 Insofar as section 62(3) of the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 impacted upon this presumption, it does not impact on the present case, the transaction involving not a conveyance but the assignment of leasehold and, in addition, the transaction long pre-dating the commencement of that statute. “Presumed resulting trusts also come into being where property, whether it is land or personal property, is acquired by a person who has it conveyed to or registered or otherwise put into the name of another, or himself and another jointly, without receiving any consideration from that other person. In such cases, he law presumes that the trust of the legal estate thus vested in the transferee ‘results’ to the transferor. However, the inference drawn by the law as to the intention of the owner, being no more than a presumption, may be rebutted by evidence that he intended a gift of the property. This general principle was recently reiterated by the Supreme Court in Stanley v. Kieran4. There was, however, no issue between the parties as to the law in that case, but simply as to its application to the particular – and highly unusual – facts.”5 (underlining added)

Keane continues on to address how the presumption of resulting trust is to be rebutted in the context of adducing evidence of intended gift:

“In determining whether there is evidence to rebut the presumption of resulting trust, the law distinguishes between acts and statements made before or at the time of the gift and those occurring subsequently. Acts and statements made by a person before or at the time of the transaction giving rise to the presumption are admissible either against him or in his favour. Thus a statement by a person that the property is to be held in trust for him and that a gift is not intended will be admissible in his favour if made before or at the time of the transaction. Equally, a statement by him that he intended the gift of the property will be admissible against him if made at the time. But where the statement is made after the transaction, the law is different: such statements will only be admissible against the person making them. Thus, a statement by the owner that he intended a gift will be admissible against him

4 [2011] IESC 19 5 Ronan Keane, Equity and the Law of Trusts in the Republic of Ireland (3rd Ed, Bloomsbury Professional 2020), para 12.56 although it was made after the transaction. But a statement made after the transaction that no gift was intended will not be admitted in his favour.”6

17. (ii) By way of the presumption of resulting trust being rebutted by the presumption of advancement and the presumption of advancement itself not being rebutted. The presumption of advancement between a child and a parent was recognised in the judgment of Sullivan MR in O’Brien v Sheil (1873) IR 7 Eq 255 where he stated it to be:

“now settled law that a lodgement by a father in the joint names of himself and his child is as powerful and strong an indication of advancement as a lodgement in the name of the child alone”

18. While continued existence of this presumption in the context of voluntary transfers to adult children has been questioned in more recent times,7 no such argument was advanced before me in this matter. In addition, if the weakening of the presumption is linked to the degree of independence of the adult child and parental obligation, as well as relating to parental affection, it must be recalled that the current situation involved a transfer to adult children of a first marriage when the father was, it would appear, contemplating marrying a second time;8

19. (iii) By way of the Notice Parties proving that they paid valuable consideration for the transfer with the transaction therefore ceasing to be voluntary;

20. (iv) By way of some kind of promissory/proprietary estoppel arising in favour of the Notice Parties. The perfection of an imperfect gift in the context of the application of equitable estoppel principles is discussed in Biehler and Gavin at p. 1070:

6 Ronan Keane, Equity and the Law of Trusts in the Republic of Ireland (3rd Ed., Bloomsbury Professional 2020), para 12.47. 7 See Biehler and Gavin “Equity and the Law of Trusts in Ireland” (8th Ed.) p. 226 and ACC Loan Management Ltd. v. Fryday [2019] IEHC 103. 8 In this regard, reference is made to the judgment of Barber J. in Wood v. Watkin [2019] EWHC 1311 (Ch). “While the general principle is that equity will not complete an imperfect gift, in some circumstances the courts will allow the perfection of a gift in favour of a volunteer, usually in the context of a voluntary gift of reality. The main authority for this proposition is the decision of Lord Westbury in Dillwyn v Llewelyn.9 A son built a house on his father’s land with the latter’s consent and an informal memorandum was signed which showed that the father’s intention was that it should be given to the son for this purpose. After the father died, it was held by the House of Lords that the father’s intention to convey the fee simple estate would be carried into effect by the court, although the land had been left in trust for the benefit of third parties by virtue of the provisions of the fathers will. Lord Westbury pointed out that a promise of a gift had been made and on the strength of that promise and with the father’s knowledge, the son had incurred substantial expenditure on the land. He stressed that a voluntary agreement would not be completed by a court of equity in the case of a mere gift and that it was instead the subsequent acts of the donor that gave rise to the claim. This decision was stated by Kenny J in Cullen v Cullen10 to be authority for the proposition that ‘a person claiming under a voluntary agreement will not be assisted by a court of equity but that the subsequent acts of the donor may give the done a ground of claim which he did not acquire from the original gift””

21. It is amply clear that the beneficial owner subsequent to the Deed of Assignment of 1995 did not and never intended to hand over to the Notice Parties the entirety of his interest in the Property. At most, the 1994 Agreement evidences an intention to bestow upon the Notice Parties a remainder interest in the Property, a life interest being retained by the Respondent. 22. It is also amply clear that the mindset of the Respondent changed on a number of occasions subsequent to the assignment to the Notice Parties. Save and except for the 2007 correspondence, the position of the Respondent was unaltered in recognising that a voluntary transfer had occurred. In 2007, he appears to have expressed the view that there had not been any transfer of the beneficial interest and he expressed

9 (1862) 4 De GF & J 517 10 Cullen v Cullen [1962] IR 268, 282. himself as retaining same on a number of occasions. In 2004, he envisaged legal proceedings to set aside the 1994 Agreement and to restore in pre-Agreement position. While the subsequent, post-assignment evidence of non-intention to gift are clearly against the interest of the donor, viewing the evidence as a whole I find the positive proof of intention to gift unsatisfactory. Quite frankly, I am unable to determine on the evidence before me what was the intention of the Respondent in transferring the leasehold interest to the Notice Parties. His intention would appear to have related to a general lack of transparency in relation to his affairs which has been a hallmark of these proceedings. Therefore, if the burden of rebutting the presumption of resulting trust was to be based upon proof of gift (concurrent or subsequent), I would have difficulty in finding this burden discharged. However, the situation is somewhat different if a further presumption arises, namely the presumption of advancement, which shifts the onus to proving that there was no intention to advance the property to the Notice Parties. 23. The following facts are without doubt: 24. The Respondent recognised and acknowledged the rights and entitlements of the Notice Parties on many occasions. The Notice Parties are the children of the Respondent and there would appear to be a clear intention that they would benefit from the Property on his death but not before. The Notice Parties acted to their detriment on the basis of believing and it being represented to them that they would eventually own the Property and they did so, inter alia, in the payment over of monies to buy out the freehold in the Property. 25. I have concluded that the Notice Parties did acquire a beneficial interest in the remainder subsequent to the death of the Respondent. I do not believe the evidence is sufficiently strong to support a finding of gift such as rebuts the presumption of resulting trust. The actions and statements of the Respondent are too erratic and inconsistent to rebuttal the presumption of resulting trust. However, as children of the Respondent, a presumption of advancement arises and the evidence is insufficient to rebut such presumption of advancement in favour of the Notice Parties. It is also arguable that their promise in the 1994 Agreement to accept this remainder interest as their full entitlement in the estate of their father and that they would not challenge the Will of the Respondent in consequence of such entitlement constitutes good consideration. Additionally, they clearly acted to their detriment in buying out the freehold in the belief that they owned the leasehold remainder. 26. It must be remarked that the aim and intention of the Respondent would appear to have been to be related only to conferring the benefit of the real property on the Notice Parties on his death without doing so by way of Will but rather through deferred conferral inter vivos. Biehler and Gavin, at p. 193 state, in the context of the jurisprudence concerning joint bank accounts where one named account holder is not to have access to the funds during the lifetime of the other:

“The main policy argument against allowing the survivor or transferee to take a beneficial interest in circumstances where he was made no contribution to the monies in the account is that such an interest many be considered as passing as required by the Succession Act 1965. As we have seen above in relation to secret trusts, the courts in this jurisdiction have not always taken such a strict approach to this issue, It is ironic, then, that in the area of presumed resulting trusts, which are in theory supposed to give effect to a settlor’s or testator’s intentions, the judiciary had, until the Supreme Court decision in Lynch v Burke,11 adopted a more restrictive approach to this policy question and often succeed in arriving at a result that might be quite contrary to the transferor’s actual intentions”

27. However, in this context, regard must also be had to the dicta of O’Flaherty J. in Lynch v. Burke [1995] 2 IR 159 at p. 167:

“As to Owens v. Greene and Freeley v. Greene [1932] I.R. 225, the requirement that that case seems to lay down for a donee to benefit, is that the deposit receipt is a joint one and that it is payable to the parties or the survivor thus putting it out of the depositor's power to deal with the fund without the concurrence of his co-owner during his lifetime. This certainly appears from the judgment of Fitzgibbon J. at pp. 245 and 246 of the report. This concept appears to be implicit, also, in the judgment of Kennedy C.J. (the relevant passage is quoted at length by the learned trial judge); or, at the least, that the donee should be entitled equally with the donor to resort to the

11 Lynch v Burke [1995] 2 IR 159. funds during the joint lives. The judgments were also concerned to emphasise the importance in the legal scheme of things that testamentary dispositions should be required to comply with the relevant statutory requirements. Of course, if one were dealing with a testamentary disposition there would have to be compliance with the relevant requirements of the legislation in question. But that is to beg the question; if the arrangement made was not testamentary (which in my judgment it was not) then the legislative provisions (see Part VIII of the Succession Act, 1965) have no application.”

Similarly in this case, I do not believe that the arrangement made was fully testamentary, demonstrated and indicated by the involvement, actions, burden and detriment experienced by the Notice Parties during the lifetime of the Respondent. 28. In consequence, I am satisfied that the appropriate orders to make herein are to order the sale of the Property forthwith by way of public auction, orders to which the Notice Parties are consenting. There will clearly be a benefit to the Notice Parties over and above the remainder interest conferred as they will obtain the benefit earlier than envisaged and the Respondent (and, in consequence, the Applicant) will be deprived of the accruing income benefit during the remainder of his life. Having regard to the statutory valuation percentages and the advanced receipt of benefit by the Notice Parties and the loss of benefit by the Respondent, I am of the view that the net proceeds of sale (after deduction of all outstanding debts relating to the Property and legal and auctioneering costs of sale) to be divided as to 75% to the Notice Parties and 25% to the Respondent, the Respondent’s share to be divided 75% to the Applicant and 25% to the Respondent. All income from the Property pending sale, should be retained and applied in discharge of debts accumulated in respect of the Property, any surplus to be divided in shares equivalent to the distribution of the proceeds of sale. I will allow the Notice Parties 14 days to nominate the auctioneer to act in the sale, in default if so nominating, the Applicant may do so. All parties are to be bound by the reasonable advices of the auctioneer concerned and particularly so in relation to the most advantageous sale to be achieved having regard to the other adjacent properties to be sold in the context of the main proceedings herein (whether held by the Respondent, legally and/or beneficially or [COMPANY TWO]). The solicitor for the Applicant in these proceedings to have carriage of sale, keeping the Respondent and the Notice Parties informed of progress in this regard. 29. I believe it to be relevant that the Respondent married the Applicant in 1997 and the Notice Parties were children of his first marriage. The financial affairs of the Respondent are far from transparent and I have concluded that many of the Respondent’s actions over many years have been calculated to maintain such lack of transparency but there does appear, amongst other possible objectives, to have been a desire on the part of the Respondent to make arrangements for these children after his death, prior to his second marriage.

ADDENDUM

30. The matter currently before me relates, as I understand it, to the Property. The Affidavit of E.B. avers to it vouching her ownership of the Property. The 1994 Agreement references “the Property”. However, the correspondence from the Respondent of the 17th April 2022, exhibited by E.B., indicates that the Respondent had an interest in [ADDRESS TWO] and [ADDRESS FOUR]/[ADDRESS FIVE]. The latter two properties comprise registered land (REDACTED FOLIO) and [COMPANY TWO] is the registered owner.12 This company and its assets have been dealt with in my main judgment herein. It would appear that the unregistered title concerning the Property (“REDACTED”) likely comprises number the Property only (having regard to the averments in the Supplemental Affidavit of E.B. and, in particular, Exhibit “E.B.7” thereof) and, if so, this judgment relates to that property. The exhibited rates demand letters refer only to the Property. If I am incorrect in this regard, I will give liberty to apply in relation to numbers [ADDRESS TWO] and in relation to [ADDRESS SIX], [ADDRESS SEVEN], [ADDRESS EIGHT] and [ADDRESS NINE] (insofar as these latter four are not encompassed in the orders made relating to COMPANY TWO) and the beneficial ownership of the Respondent in these properties or any of them. 31. I will also give all parties liberty to apply in relation to any other matters arising from this judgment.

12 I note also that a letter from [REDACTED] Council dated 24th October 2018, exhibited by E.B., references [ADDRESS SIX] & [ADDRESS FIVE, SEVEN, EIGHT, NINE]. This letter indicates that [ADDRESS SIX] & [ADDRESS FIVE, SEVEN, EIGHT, NINE] are owned by COMPANY TWO.