IEHC 468 — IEHC 468 — High Court

[2026] IEHC 468

THE HIGH COURT

[2020/3497P]

BETWEEN:

ALO MOHAN

PLAINTIFF

AND

THE REVENUE COMMISSIONERS,

IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

DEFENDANTS

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Barry O’Donnell delivered on the 14th day of July, 2026

INTRODUCTION

1. This judgment concerns an application brought by the plaintiff pursuant to Order 28 of

the RSC for liberty to amend his statement of claim. The case and the application have a long

and somewhat unfortunate history that requires to be set out to understand the reasons for the

conclusions reached by the court. To fully understand this judgment, it should be read in

conjunction with an earlier judgment in these proceedings delivered by Simons J. on the 13

February 2025 and which has the neutral citation [2025] IEHC 63.

2. For the reasons explained in this judgment, the court has concluded that the

amendments should not be permitted, and that having regard to the earlier judgment of Simons

J., the proceedings in their current formulation (the statement of claim dated the 19 February 2020) should be struck out as failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action. As will be

apparent from the judgment, the issues that the plaintiff sought to agitate were extraordinarily

extensive in terms of subject matter and timescale. The court has read all the materials

submitted by the plaintiff and the purpose of this judgment is not to engage with those materials

in a point by point manner but instead to provide a high level explanation for the conclusions

reached on this application.

BACKGROUND

3. The plaintiff is a farmer and businessman and, as explained by him, was involved in

growing broiler chickens for the poultry sector. It should be noted that prior to the events

complained of in these proceedings, the plaintiff seems to have been successful in his business

and also carried out work as a representative for other farmers in the sector and was a prominent

IFA official.

4. While the plaintiff had the benefit of legal representation at certain stages in the lifetime

of the proceedings, ultimately, he represented himself in this application. The plaintiff was

courteous and articulate and there is no doubt that his complaints were heartfelt and, from his

perspective, genuine. The court did not doubt that he sought to present his arguments in an

honest and forthright manner. However, in light of the complexity of the issues and the manner

in which the potential scope of the action ballooned quite extraordinarily over the course of the

proceedings, it was very unfortunate that he did not retain proper representation.

5. It should also be noted that these proceedings were brought against the Revenue

Commissioners and the State. Insofar as the plaintiff made allegations against other parties, such as certain actors in the poultry sector, there was no opportunity for the court to hear from

those parties and the allegations should be treated as allegations and assertions only, and there

is no question of those allegations, regardless of the outcome of this application, being treated

as matters on which the court has made findings.

6. The earlier judgment delivered by Simons J. explains that, based on the current iteration

of the statement of claim, the defendants brought an application to strike out the plaintiff’s

claim on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and/or was bound to fail. For

the reasons summarised below, Simons J. decided that the application was well founded but

that a final decision should be deferred to allow the plaintiff to file an application to amend the

statement of claim. That application was to stand or fall on its merits, and the judgment

expressly went no further than allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to make an application for

leave to amend.

7. The issues that gave rise to the proceedings are complex and the plaintiff has sought to

expand the issues very considerably. The central theme related to claims regarding the approach

adopted to VAT in the poultry sector. It was claimed that, within the poultry sector, a process

developed whereby cooperative societies acted as an intermediary between farmers and poultry

processors. According to the plaintiff, that process was being used as a device to “harvest” VAT,

in light of differing treatments of inputs as between the cooperative society and the individual

growers. The co-ops were VAT registered, and the individual farmers or growers were subject

to a flat rate scheme under s. 86 of the Value-Added Tax Consolidation Act 2010. 8. The issue was summarised in the earlier iteration of the statement of claim by the

plaintiff as:

“[…] Growers would no longer be required to pay VAT on their inputs, as they

would be paid for by the Co-op, which, as a VAT registered entity, could recover

the VAT formally paid to the [Revenue Commissioners] by the Grower. The

recovered VAT would then be paid as a VAT bonus to the Growers in lieu of the

price increase being sought. The Processors further communicated to the

negotiating party that all future price increases would be secured through the

Co-op and not through CBL, by the Co-op increasing the feed price and the flesh

price to fund the agreed increases in price out of increases in the quantum of

Flat Rate VAT recovered by the Co-op.”

9. The plaintiff claimed that he had been advised by his own accountant that the use of the

co-operative society for that purpose was fraudulent and that the plaintiff would have

committed a crime had he participated. As a result, the plaintiff refused to participate in a co-

op which was established in 2013. In 2015 the plaintiff ceased trading with the poultry

processors involved. He claims that he sustained loss and damage as a result of his refusal to

engage in what he believed to be VAT fraud. In very broad terms, the focus of the proceedings

is on the response of the State, and particularly the Revenue Commissioners, to that scenario

and his complaints.

10. Another feature of the manner in which the plaintiff addressed his concerns is that in

2018 he commenced separate proceedings (Mohan & Ors v. Department of An Taoiseach &

Ors, 2018 6927 P). Those proceedings engage claims that emerged from much the same issues

and overlap with some of the claims in these proceedings, but they are directed against a wider range of parties, including the Revenue Commissioners. Those proceedings remain extant and

suggest that the loss and damage now claimed by the plaintiff are attributable to other parties.

11. As noted by Simons J., these proceedings were commenced on the 14 May 2020. The

Revenue Commissioners delivered a defence in these proceedings on the 22 May 2021. The

difficulty identified by Simons J. was that the case was presented as a claim for misfeasance in

public office, but the plaintiff failed to plead the requisite ingredients of that tort. That issue

crystallised when Owens J. refused the plaintiff’s application for discovery in February 2024,

finding that the shortcomings in the statement of claim were such that there was no basis for

discovery, and the application was adjourned pending the outcome of an application to strike

out that was proposed by the defendants.

12. The plaintiff’s then solicitors indicated an intention to bring a motion to amend the

proceedings, but that motion was not brought, and the solicitors came off record in July 2024.

The defendant’s strike out motion came on before Simons J. in January 2025. As recorded in

his judgment, there was agreement that the ingredients of the tort of misfeasance in public

office were set out in Eustace v. Drogheda Borough Council [2019] IEHC 455, which in turn

considered Kennedy v. Law Society of Ireland [2005] IESC 23 and Three Rivers District

Council v. Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No.3) [2003] 2 A.C. 1. Simons J.

was satisfied for the reasons explained by him that the statement of claim was deficient and

made clear that if the proceedings were to go to trial on the basis of the current pleadings (which

remain the current pleadings) the action would have to be dismissed.

13. In addition, Simons J. noted that the claims against the Revenue and its officials related

to events that occurred more than six years prior to the institution of the proceedings. Those events were claimed to have occurred principally in August / September 2014, and the

complaints related to the responses of the Revenue to the issues raised by the plaintiff. That

raised serious limitations issues. A final note is that the court commented on the “non-linear

and illogical structure of the statement of claim.”

14. Having regard to the fact that the plaintiff then proposed to amend his statement of

claim, the court on balance agreed to defer striking out the claim and to allow the application

to amend to proceed. That was framed cautiously on the basis that a proposed amended

statement of claim that had been prepared by the plaintiff was still deficient and still failed to

plead the case properly. The court took a similar view in relation to the limitation period issues,

noting that the proposed amendments may address that issue. Hence, as noted above, the court

went no further than to allow an adjournment to facilitate the making of an application to

amend.

SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

15. The plaintiff was permitted to make an application in proper form to amend the

statement of claim, and that application was to be brought and served by the 27 March 2025. I

pause to note that the plaintiff framed his subsequent actions as a response to the directions of

Simons J. to amend the statement of claim. That framing is incorrect. The correct description

of events is that Simons J. did not direct the plaintiff to amend his statement of claim. The

direction was that if the plaintiff wanted the opportunity to apply to amend his statement of

claim and thereby attempt to avoid the consequences of his deficient pleading, then that

application was to be brought within a specified time-scale. 16. The application eventually came on for hearing before me on the 18 September 2025.

At that hearing, it was clear that the proposed amendments were very strongly opposed by the

defendants on substantial grounds. The plaintiff explained that he was continuing to seek out

legal representation and expected to have that issue resolved. It was therefore apparent that

even if the court permitted the amendment as it then was presented there was a strong prospect

that there would be a further application to amend on foot of the receipt of legal advice.

17. In those premises, in order to ensure a fair opportunity to the plaintiff to present a

properly formulated case, the court decided that the application to amend in effect should not

proceed on that date and the plaintiff should have a final opportunity to obtain legal

representation and prepare a proper draft amended statement of claim. Consequently, I made

an order striking out the plaintiff’s motion to amend his statement of claim while expressly

permitting the plaintiff to file a subsequent motion to amend the statement of claim. The

rationale of this approach, as considered in court with the parties was to provide the plaintiff

with an opportunity to instruct legal representation. However, the court made clear that if legal

representation could not be obtained, the proceedings will need to be progressed in some

manner.

18. Throughout the course of events, the Revenue Commissioners did not expressly consent

to the various adjournments but instead pragmatically accepted that it was appropriate to permit

the plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to address his difficulties. That pragmatic course was

both fair and reasonable, but at all times the Revenue Commissioners stressed their deep

concerns not just about the delay and difficulties, but specifically about the manner in which

the plaintiff utilised the court process to make adverse comments about the conduct of

identified officials and lawyers. 19. The matter returned to court on a number of occasions and eventually the plaintiff

retained solicitors and counsel. That legal team sought some time to obtain instructions, provide

advice and formulate an amended statement of claim in proper form. The court made an

“unless” type order on the 11 December 2025, effectively requiring the delivery of a draft

amended statement of claim to the defendants before the 23 December 2025. The object of that

course of action was to ensure that the defendants at least were in a position to form a view as

to how they would approach the proposed application to amend. In the events, a document, in

the form of a Revised Draft Amended Statement of Claim was furnished to the defendants on

the 23 December 2025. On 28 January 2026, the court gave directions in relation to the issuing

of a motion to amend.

20. Unfortunately, the relationship between the plaintiff and his legal representatives broke

down and the solicitors applied to come off record by motion dated the 11 February 2026. That

motion was heard on the 24 February 2026. The solicitors’ application was grounded on a short

affidavit that quite properly did not disclose the content of what had passed between the firm

and their client, but which made clear that the relationship had broken down.

21. Nevertheless, the plaintiff took that opportunity to deliver a lengthy affidavit (44 pages)

with extensive exhibits (circa 350 pages) which ventilated a large amount of commentary about

the underlying claim and materials and discussions over which the plaintiff was entitled to

assert privilege. I will not rehearse the detail of that affidavit save to note that it entirely

supported the view that there was a fundamental difference of view about the case as between

the plaintiff and his advisors. Frankly, this was not material that a plaintiff should have shared

with the defendants or the court, and if he has a difficulty with the approach to his case advised

by his then lawyers this was a matter for a different forum. In any event the court was fully satisfied that the application to come off record should be granted, and the order was made. To

a very large extent, this meant that whatever progress had been achieved in the proceedings

since September 2025 had been set at nought.

22. The plaintiff was afforded further time to prepare an amended statement of claim in the

format that he wished to pursue and to bring an application to amend. That application

encountered difficulties but eventually it was listed for the 21 April 2026.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

23. The proposed amendments involved the deletion of most of the existing statement of

claim and its replacement with 513 paragraphs of closely typed material. The document

produced before the court as the proposed amended statement of claim ran to 142 pages, which

includes what the plaintiff refers to as a series of appendices. The application to amend was

accompanied by 92 pages of written submissions.

24. It is important to pause at this stage to make some observations of general application

to the situation that presented in connection with the application.

25. First, as noted above, it is almost impossible to make sense of or summarise the

proposed claim within a reasonably concise judgment. The court has read the papers and will

provide a high-level explanation for the decision that has been made.

26. Second, this is a case that, in the most general of terms, involves claims that for a very

considerable period, emanations of the State and individual entities ignored or even encouraged and then covered up serious fraud. The extent of the issues and entities involved are

extraordinary and it is clear that very serious allegations are levelled at many individuals and

entities that are not parties to the proceedings. The claims are factually complicated and engage

legal principles that are neither straightforward nor easily understood by the lay person.

27. Litigants are entitled to ignore their legal advice, to choose to represent themselves, and

proceed to conduct proceedings in person. Insofar as reasonably practicable, the courts tend to

afford litigants in person a degree of flexibility to reflect the fact that a person may have a case

to agitate but lack the knowledge of the substantive law and practice and procedure to present

or articulate it properly. The entitlement to act as a litigant in person does not exempt the litigant

from the need to conduct the litigation properly; and the latitude afforded by courts cannot

operate at the expense of treating the other party fairly or in a way that means legal principles

and procedure are ignored.

28. Separately, the entitlement to act for oneself is not to be equated by a judicial

imprimatur that this is a wise decision; very often it is far from wise. It has never been the case

that litigation is a matter that can be conducted confidently without legal advice. The practice

of law is complex and, among other matters, requires a firm grasp of the interlocking elements

of substantive law, practice and procedure, and the laws of evidence. This is reflected in the

fact that lawyers undergo extensive training and are subject to stringent regulation. Very few

people would or should decide that they need their appendix removed without obtaining a

medical view, let alone set about carrying out the operation by themselves. The entitlement to

act as a litigant in person does not exempt the litigant from the need to conduct the litigation

properly. 29. Third, there are two further guidelines that should be noted, and which will be adopted

by the court in approaching this application. First, as noted by McGovern J. in Doherty v.

Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2009] IEHC 246 at para. 14:

“Where the extent of the scandalous or vexatious pleading is sufficiently gross

and extensive, it seems to me that it is not the function of the court to sift through

the material in the statement of claim to see if, perhaps, somewhere within it, a

claim can be found in proper form. The court is entitled to have regard to the

document as a whole. There might well be cases where there is an isolated

pleading here or there which may be scandalous or vexatious, but the greater

part of the document contains pleadings in a proper form. In those cases, the

courts can strike out the offending part of the pleadings.”

30. While that case concerned an application involving slightly different concerns, for the

purposes of this application, the point taken from the observations of McGovern J. is that it is

not the task of the court to try to parse a deficient and prolix pleading to explore whether it can

be shortened and reformulated to present a properly presented case. That is not the task of the

court, and if it was undertaken, would involve the court in what in effect amounts to redrafting

a pleading for the benefit of one party.

31. The second point relates to the degree of latitude that has been afforded to the plaintiff.

Here the court is mindful of the observations of Butler J. in Tesco Ireland v. Stateline [2024]

IECA 46 where she made the apposite comment at para 67, that, while the appellant there was

entitled to be heard, “the application was not an iterative one in which the court was obliged

to enter into an exchange with the appellant identifying weaknesses in the appellant’s case and

affording the appellant an unlimited opportunity to mend its hand.” 32. In this case, entirely properly in my view, Simons J. followed well established precedent

and afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to apply to amend his statement of claim to address

the issues that had been identified by the defendant. Since Simons J. gave judgment, the

plaintiff retained and then parted ways with legal representatives and presented the defendants

with a number of iterations of the proposed amended statement of claim. The plaintiff now has

presented an entirely reformulated and far more extensive case. The process must be concluded

and despite the difficulties that have been encountered the amendment must be addressed on

its own terms. The court, having afforded the plaintiff ample opportunity to correct his

pleadings, is not engaging in a dialogue or extensive back and forth with the aim of eventually

obtaining a pleading that complies with the relevant legal requirements.

THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

33. The plaintiff has produced a vast amount of documentation and detail to the court,

which he considered relevant to the claims that he seeks to make. The most recent

documentation includes material that the plaintiff obtained from the European Commission DG

for Taxation and Customs Union, which he contended supports his claim that Ireland accepted

an overcompensation risk in 2016 and 2017.

34. In his written submissions, he framed his claims as stemming from the fact that since

2007 he had been advised that the VAT structures employed in the poultry/broiler sector

involved fraud. He complained about the termination of a valuable contract with a poultry

processor in 2016 and the apparent refusal of other processors to deal with him, and the

consequent effects on his business and standing in the farming sector. The plaintiff claimed that

his difficulties are attributable to the actions of the State in their oversight and complicity in the VAT regime with which he refused to participate. According to the plaintiff, every material

factual allegation he has been making since 2014 has been confirmed by the State. He claimed

that he is entitled to be compensated in the amount of circa €32 million. The scope of the

proposed amendments is illustrated, but perhaps minimised, by his introduction to the draft

amended statement of claim where it is said:

“[The proceedings] arise from the systematic misuse of the flat-rate VAT

addition for farmers in the broiler sector over a period exceeding thirty years

and from the coordinated actions of the Defendants in conceiving,

implementing, maintaining, and defending that misuse, causing loss and

damage to the Plaintiff …”

35. The introduction to the draft amended statement of claim outlined that it addresses the

deficiencies identified by Simons J. by more detailed pleading of Francovich type claims

(Francovich v. Italy, Case C-6/90) and misfeasance in public office claims, and sets out a

response to Statute of Limitation issues by raising issues of discoverability and concealment

points.

36. The plaintiff also contended that the case is strengthened by matters that he recently

discovered from the European Commission and what he described as “corrective admissions”

made by the Government. The plaintiff expressly acknowledged at para 6 of his proposed

pleading that “the amendments to this Statement of Claim are, in their cumulative effect, of

such magnitude as to render it, in substance, a new pleading.” Strikingly, the plaintiff purported

to reserve the right to bring separate proceedings against individuals named in the draft

amended statement of claim, “if the outcome of these proceedings does not adequately

compensate the Plaintiff for the totality of the loss and damage suffered.” 37. The extent of the proposed pleading is highlighted by para 17 where the plaintiff states

that his claim is not focussed on “isolated events or episodic administrative failures” but

instead is a “history of a coherent programme of action … over a period exceeding thirty four

years” from February 1991 to June 2025. Hence, the claim is not directed to specific actions,

or not just restricted to specific actions, but seeks to encompass, as far as I can ascertain, the

entire State policy relating to VAT in the poultry sector from 1991 to date. As such, the draft

amended statement of claim sets out factual contentions that span 34 years of decision-making

and actions, and suggests that what is in contemplation is more in the nature of a full-scale

tribunal of inquiry process with extremely broad terms of reference rather than a legal case.

38. In parallel with the pleaded case relating to the overall government approach to VAT,

the plaintiff has sought to plead a detailed narrative of his own business endeavours and the

business endeavours of others, together with a narrative of the business practices of the poultry

sector including matters relating to insurance issues. The claims identify multiple potential

witnesses and their actions, including claims levelled at the legal representatives of the

defendants and lawyers approached or retained by the plaintiff.

39. The appendices to the draft amended statement of claim are very lengthy and detailed.

In his appendix titled “Misfeasance Grid” the plaintiff claims to have identified over eighty

acts of misfeasance in public office. There is a second appendix that sets out “supplementary

particulars” of the claims; a third appendix that sets out particulars in relation to claims

concerning the plaintiff’s business endeavours (which concern claims against entities that are

not parties to the proceedings and about companies in which the plaintiff was an investor); a

schedule setting out further particulars of what appear to be governmental and

interdepartmental decision-making related to the VAT issues; a schedule setting out claims about the involvement of social partnership and industry decision making; and three lengthy

appendices that provide further particulars dealing with a “technical analysis” of the “rolling

average system”; a summary of the discovery that the plaintiff intended to seek; and particulars

of Garda misfeasance.

40. A stark illustration of the breadth of the case can be extracted from the discovery

proposed by the plaintiff in one of the appendices to the draft amended statement of claim.

Without setting out an exhaustive account of what the plaintiff stated he wants to obtain, the

discovery appendix sets out multiple categories of documents, including documents predating

1991, that will be sought from entities such as Enterprise Ireland, the Department of

Agriculture, the Department of An Taoiseach, KPMG, the Competition and Consumer

Protection Authority, Bank of Ireland, FBD Insurance plc, the Cabinet, co-operatives, and the

Garda National Bureau of Criminal Investigations. The document concludes with a reservation

of the right to seek further documents under a variety of headings.

DISCUSSION AND ARGUMENTS

41. The general principles relating to an application to amend a pleading are very well

established. O. 28, r. 1 of the RSC gives the court the power to allow an amendment at any

stage of the proceedings, subject to the proviso that the proposed amendments must be

necessary for the purpose of determining the issues in controversy.

42. The Court of Appeal in Stafford v. Rice & Ors [2022] IECA 47 has reiterated the

applicable principles, and those are set out by Collins J. at para. 23 of his judgment. What is

permitted are amendments that could have been pleaded ab initio. The general approach is intended to be understood liberally, and, generally, the amendments must be directed to matters

that are necessary to determine the real issues in controversy between the parties, being issues

arising from the subject matter of the proceedings. There are unresolved questions as to how

the court should approach a proposed amendment that would deprive the other party of the

benefit of a defence under the Statute of Limitations.

43. Finally, while the court is not generally concerned with the prospects of the amended

claims’ success or failure at trial, the Court of Appeal noted at para. 23 (13), that:

“Where, however, it is manifest that an amended claim is doomed to fail, the

amendment should not be permitted. Requiring a defendant to plead and defend

such a claim may be seen as a form of prejudice.”

44. The latter point is particularly relevant to this application. A claim may be doomed to

fail for a variety of reasons. This can be linked with the principle that the amendment must be

something that could have been pleaded ab initio. I consider that it is not appropriate for the

court to permit a party to amend pleadings if the result is that the consequent pleading is one

that could not be allowed to proceed on the basis of the existing rules, i.e. by way of examples,

it is a claim that very clearly would be struck out on the basis that it is scandalous, abusive,

prolix, prejudicial, unnecessary or fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action, as those terms

are understood in the case law relating to applications pursuant to Order 19, rules 28 and 29. 45. Moreover, the pleading must as a bare minimum comply with the basic requirements

set out in Order 19, rule 3:

“Every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in summary form

of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence

… but not the evidence by which they are to be proved.”

46. Faced with a draft amended statement of claim of this type, the defendants quite

properly in my view chose not to engage in a point-by-point analysis of the documents. Instead,

the defendants began from the point that what was put before the court clearly did not comply

with Order 19, rule 3, pointing to the well-established principles articulated in cases such as

McGee v. O’Reilly [1996] 2 I.R. 229, ASI Sugar Limited v. Greencore Group plc (unreported

High Court, Finnegan P., 11 February 2003) and Begley v. Damesfield Ltd & Ors [2020] IECA

171.

47. I am satisfied that this must be correct. The rules relating to how a case should be

pleaded are not esoteric or exist for their own benefit, they are the product of extensive

experience and are directed to ensuring that litigation is manageable and fair to both parties.

This is not simply a situation where the proposed pleading contains material that blurs the line

between statements of material facts and proposed evidence. To the extent that it is capable of

being understood as a pleading or a description of the claims that the plaintiff seeks to progress,

the draft amended statement of claim contains hundreds of pages of factual assertion and

narrative with very little comprehensible linkage to properly formulated legal claims.

48. This is a problem that, if permitted to proceed, would lead to an entirely unmanageable

pre-trial situation and, in all likelihood, an equally unmanageable trial. Any defendant, even the most resourced, that wished to dispute this claim would be faced with the almost impossible

task of having to attempt to plead a defence to a document that is wildly prolix and largely

incomprehensible. If the defendant chose simply to attempt to deliver a “traverse defence” this

immediately will lead to a discovery request – already flagged in an appendix to the pleading

– that would present extraordinary and enormously prejudicial challenges. In addition, it is hard

to imagine the difficulty that would be encountered in preparing for trial by seeking to identify

and preserve evidence, seeking to identify and locate potential witnesses or obtain expert

witnesses.

49. Fundamentally, I am not expressing a concern that the litigation will be extensive,

complex or difficult. Courts and litigants regularly have to deal with cases of enormous

complexity. The problem here is that the draft amended statement of claim is so prolix and

poorly pleaded that the court is fully satisfied that it will be impossible for the defendant to

understand with any confidence the case that it is expected to meet, and that would lead to

extreme unfairness and prejudice.

50. In as much as the court has been able to understand precisely what the plaintiff seeks

to claim in the draft amended statement of claim after a number of readings, it is also reasonably

clear that the plaintiff has not in fact addressed the concerns expressed by Simons J. regarding

the existing statement of claim. The 2018 proceedings remain extant and overlap considerably

with the present proceedings. The issue of causation in light of those extant proceedings

remains very unclear. The misfeasance in public office elements also remain unclear, and the

thrust of the claim fundamentally appears to be that identified Revenue officials unreasonably

failed to exercise discretion rather than engaged in misfeasance; this in turn raises a very real

issue about whether and to what extent the Order 84 time limits applicable to judicial review proceedings should apply here. Furthermore, the proposed amendments raise very serious

issues regarding the operation of the Statute of Limitations.

51. Notwithstanding those serious deficiencies, the primary reasons why the court will not

accede to the application to amend the statement of claim are that it is prolix, disregards the

provisions of O.19, r. 3 of the RSC, is incapable of being properly pleaded to by the defendants,

and, if permitted, highly prejudicial in terms of its effect on the proper future conduct of the

litigation.

52. In those premises, the court will refuse the application to amend the statement of claim.

That being so, it seems clear on the basis of the earlier judgment from Simons J. in these

proceedings that the manner in which the existing statement of claim has been pleaded must

also lead to the proceedings being struck out as bound to fail and / or failing to disclose a

reasonable cause of action.

53. As this judgment is being delivered electronically my provisional view is that the

defendants should be entitled to their costs to be adjudicated in default of agreement. However,

in case the parties or either of them seek a different form of order I will list the matter before

me for final orders at 10.30am on Tuesday, the 28 July 2026. While the plaintiff will be

disappointed by this outcome, it has to be made clear that the purpose of the next hearing is

solely to deal with final orders, and the court does not intend to entertain arguments regarding

the substance of this judgment.