IEHC 442 — IEHC 442 — High Court

THE HIGH COURT

[2026] IEHC 442

Record No. 2024/434MCA

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPEAL ON A POINT OF LAW PURSUANT TO SECTION 123(3) OF THE RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES ACT 2004

BETWEEN

LUCY FRIEDMAN

APPELLANT

AND

THE RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES BOARD

RESPONDENT

AND

GILLIAN DRAPER, ROBERT DRAPER, GEORGE DRAPER AND VIVIEN DRAPER

NOTICE PARTIES

JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan, delivered on the 6th day of July, 2026

1 INTRODUCTION

1. This appeal comes before me under s. 123 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2004, as amended, (hereinafter “the 2004 Act”) as an appeal on a point of law. The central issue relates to the determination by the Residential Tenancy Tribunal (hereinafter “Tribunal”) that the First and Second Named Notice Parties were not the Appellant’s Landlords and that, accordingly, her appeal before the Tribunal was not properly constituted, resulting in its dismissal.

2. For ease of reference, the Appellant will be referred to as “the Tenant” and the Notice Parties will be referred to individually by name. The Tenant appeared as a litigant in person while the Residential Tenancies Board (hereinafter “the RTB”) and the Notice Parties were legally represented.

BACKGROUND

3. This case arises from a tenancy dispute concerning residential accommodation at The Gate Lodge, Brownstown Stud Farm, County Kildare. Brownstown Stud Farm is a larger property comprising several residential units, including the home occupied by Gillian and Robert Draper, farmland and equestrian facilities. It appears from the evidence before the Tribunal that the stud farm was purchased in separate parts by members of the Draper family. It is common case that some of the stud farm is owned by Gillian and Robert Draper and some by George and Vivien Draper, while the farm is run and managed as a business by Gillian and Robert Draper.

4. This background is drawn from the summary of the evidence contained in the Tribunal decision under appeal, the transcript of the evidence given and the materials on the RTB file for the purposes of the Tribunal hearing. I do not otherwise rely on the affidavit evidence filed for the purposes of the appeal in setting out the background, although, for completeness, I refer to it briefly below. This summary does not purport to be complete and the papers on file are extensive. It is intended only to contextualise the issues arising and the points of law identified by the Tenant for determination on this appeal.

2 5. On or about the 31st of October, 2020, the Tenant entered into a tenancy agreement for the Gate Lodge property. Separately, she agreed to lease and/or use associated equestrian facilities for a horse and pony. The associated equestrian facilities were the subject of a separate agreement which referred to the residential property as being leased in conjunction with those facilities. On behalf of George and Vivien Draper, significance was attached to the fact that the tenancy agreement was entered into during a period of COVID-19 national lockdown, with implications for travel by George Draper, who lived in Sligo and was over 70 years of age at the time.

6. The tenancy agreement identified the Landlord as “Mr. & Mrs. G. Draper”, giving rise to the ambiguity with which this appeal is concerned, and gave their address as Brownstown Stud, The Curragh, Co. Kildare. George and Vivien Draper live in Sligo, whereas Gillian and Robert Draper live on site. The tenancy agreement specified that rent should be paid to “G. Draper” by payments into an AIB bank account at Stephen Street, Sligo, with the account name given as “Mr. G.H. Draper”. The tenancy agreement separately specified “Gillian Draper” as point of contact, giving her address as Brownstown Stud, The Curragh, Co. Kildare. Under Part 9 of the tenancy agreement, under the heading “Landlord and Tenant Signatures”, Gillian and Robert Draper placed their signatures in the space provided for the signature of the Landlord(s). The agreement was signed by the Appellant as Tenant.

7. In its definition section, “the Landlord” was defined as including “the persons for the time being entitled to the reversion at the end of the tenancy”. The Tribunal was referred to evidence that the folio relating to the Gate Lodge recorded George and Vivien Draper as registered owners since 2011.

8. The tenancy agreement referred throughout to “the Landlord or Landlord’s Agent”, albeit distinguishing at times between the Landlord simpliciter and the Landlord or the Landlord’s Agent; for example, covenant 3.8 required the Tenant “to immediately pay the Landlord or his Agent, the value of replacement of any furniture or effects lost, damaged or destroyed, or at the option of the Landlord, replace immediately any furniture or effects lost, damaged or destroyed.” The version of the tenancy agreement signed by the Tenant contained a handwritten amendment initialled by both “RD” (Robert Draper) and “LF” (Lucy Friedman) on the 31st of October, 2020. This

3 amendment removed the words “not less than” before the phrase “3 years or more”, which would give rise to a requirement for 180 days’ notice of termination. The amendment is of no consequence save that it evidences Robert Draper making a change to the tenancy agreement at the time it was executed.

9. It appears that the tenancy was duly registered with the RTB in December 2020, and the Tribunal had before it several letters addressed to Mr. George Draper as Landlord confirming registration of the tenancy and subsequent rent changes.

10. In the associated equestrian facilities agreement, the names Mr. and Mrs. Robert Draper were typed, without any further description of their capacity. The agreement was signed by Gillian and Robert Draper. It described the rented domain as “The Foaling Yard at Brownstown Stud Farm. Consisting of 5 stable boxes and tack room/feed store together with shared use of barn and yard facilities to include Outdoor School, Indoor School, Loose School, Lunger Ring and Walker together with exclusive use of the ‘Hill Paddock’.” The agreement defined the parties by stating: “Us/The property owners: refers [sic] the Draper Family of Brownstown Stud Farm.” It is stated in the papers that this equestrian facilities agreement (referred to as “Foaling Yard Agreement” has been the subject of District Court proceedings. Separately, a temporary facility was extended permitting use of the Gate Lodge Paddock. This temporary facility was not referred to in the equestrian facilities agreement but is documented in the papers.

11. Over the course of the tenancy, the Tenant dealt directly with Gillian and Robert Draper in relation to the property, but rent payments were made into the bank account identified in the tenancy agreement as being in the name of “Mr G.H. Draper”, with the payee also identified as “G. Draper”.

12. From documents lodged on the RTB file, it appears that a Power of Attorney had been executed in March 2014 by George and Vivien Draper appointing Gillian Draper to act in their name, place and stead in respect of the letting, management and maintenance of the Gate Lodge, the Foaling Yard and lands and facilities located at Brownstown Stud Farm, The Curragh, Co. Kildare. It is common case that this power of attorney was not disclosed to the Tenant until after disputes arose between the parties. The Tenant also drew the Tribunal’s attention to text messages from Gillian Draper in

4 response to messages from the Tenant saying that rent had been paid, confirming that rent had been received. It was not disputed before the Tribunal that George Draper never contacted the Tenant to inform her of the name of his agent in accordance with s. 12(1)(e) of the 2004 Act.

13. In 2021 and 2022, disputes arose between the parties, initially relating to the use of land and equestrian facilities and the management of the tenancy. These disputes escalated significantly and led to multiple communications and notices between the parties, termination notices, formal complaints before the RTB and District Court proceedings arising from aspects of the dispute. In email correspondence with the RTB, referred to before the Tribunal in respect of another dispute involving the Tenant, Gillian Draper described herself as “Landlord” and “RTB registered”.

14. Of note, warning notices served on the Tenant in 2022 were signed by Gillian Draper as “agent”, and termination notices dated the 25th of November, 2022, signed by George and Vivien Draper as “Landlords”, were also served before the dispute which is the subject of this appeal was referred to the RTB. Separately, however, a dispute concerning the validity of a notice of termination and penalisation, referred to the RTB on 3rd of December, 2022, just weeks before the dispute at the heart of these proceedings, was referred by Gillian and George Draper, naming themselves as Landlords in respect of the tenancy.

15. When issues were raised regarding the level of rent and the significance of the fact that the Gate Lodge was located in a rent pressure zone (“RPZ”), the Tenant was furnished with a copy of the previous tenancy agreement dating to 2018, which was signed by George and Vivien Draper as Landlords, while again naming Gillian Draper as “Point of Contact”.

16. During this period, there was also correspondence relating to the temporary facility extended for use of the Gate Lodge Paddock. That facility was not extended, but it appears that the Tenant continued to pay for it after being informed that it was no longer available. This led to the repayment by cheque of monies paid by the Tenant for use of the Paddock after she had been advised that the facility was no longer available to her. Correspondence stating that the facility was no longer available was signed by “G.

5 Draper, Agent”, and the cheque returning the payment of €280, dated the 17th of August, 2022, was signed by Robert Draper and drawn on his account.

17. On the 17th of August, 2022, a Notice to Inspect was served in respect of the residential tenancy at the Gate Lodge, stating that the person authorised by the Landlord intended, pursuant to covenant 3.11 of the agreement, to attend at the premises on the 24th of August, 2022, at 11.00 am for the purposes recited in that covenant. The notice was signed by Gillian Draper as “person authorised by the Landlord.”

18. As a result of the various disputes between the parties, the file before the Tribunal also contained formal solicitor’s correspondence predating the referral of the dispute which is the subject of these proceedings, in which it was stated that the Landlords were George and Vivien Draper. See, for example, letter dated the 24th of November, 2022, from Michael J. Horan, Solicitor, writing on behalf of his clients George and Vivien Draper with respect of the Foaling Yard Agreement dated the 30th of October, 2020, withdrawing the Termination Notice dated the 17th of August, 2022. This letter clearly referred to the Tenant’s Landlords by name as George Draper and Vivien Draper.

19. A further letter dated the 8th of December, 2022, from Michael J. Horan, Solicitor to the Tenant’s solicitor on behalf of each of the named Notice Parties herein was more explicit. In this letter Michael J. Horan responded to an assertion made in a previous letter from the Tenant’s solicitors dated the 2nd of December, 2022, in which it had been claimed that the Drapers were attempting to evade their legal obligations by replacing Gillian and Robert Draper with George and Vivien Draper and that a second writ would be issued in the District Court as against George and Vivien Draper to protect the Tenant’s position, stating:

“With respect this allegation is absolutely denied. You will recall that during a telephone conversation with you some time ago the author of this letter informed you that the ownership of the Gate Lodge and the Foaling Yard rested with George Draper and Vivien Draper. George Draper and Vivien Draper are your client’s Landlords and Robert and Gillian Draper acts as their Agents.”

6 As regards the suggestion that a second set of proceedings would issue, it was confirmed that Michael J. Horan, Solicitor, had authority to accept service of any proceedings the Tenant deemed “fit to issue”.

20. On the 22nd of December, 2022, the Tenant made an application to the RTB referring the dispute which is the subject of this appeal. The dispute related to the validity of a notice of rent review and was expressed by the Tenant as follows on the Dispute Application Form:

“I signed the lease for the Gate Lodge on 30th October 2020. The Gate Lodge was in a Rent Protection Zone at this time. The contract provided to me fails to mention this. Additionally, the landlord did not provide myself, nor the RTB, with the required rental calculation. The rent for the Gate Lodge was set at 1,750 euros per month. This was increased by 3.9% on 1st November 2021.

I was provided with a redacted contract that was dated and signed by the previous tenants on 1st January 2018 by the landlords. Subsequent to this I saw the Gate Lodge rental advert online dated September 2017 which advertised the [the] rent for the Gate Lodge at 1,500 euros, per month. I request that the landlords provide the rental calculation that should have been given to me prior to the commencement of the lease. On 25/11/22 the landlords gave me an illegal rent increase notice.”

21. Also included on the RTB file were copies of the tenancy agreement, the separate equestrian facilities agreement, text exchanges between the Tenant and Gillian Draper in respect of the Tenant’s residency and use of equestrian facilities and a letter and warning notice, both dated the 25th of November, 2022, in respect of a number of matters including the rent increase the subject of the dispute which had been signed by Gillian Draper as “agent”. The file included a Notice of Termination signed by George and Vivien Draper, also dated the 25th of November, 2022, the Tribunal Report in Case Ref No: 1222-81681 in respect of a dispute referred by the Landlord in respect of alleged anti-social behaviour in which George and Gillian Draper were both named as Landlords.

7 22. Further materials included the Tribunal’s rejection of the anti-social behaviour dispute (in respect of which the Landlords did not appear), its finding that the Tenant had been penalised contrary to s. 14(1) of the 2004 Act by the service of warning notices, inter partes solicitors’ correspondence postdating the referral of the dispute concerning payments for a paddock by the Tenant (which were rejected by the Drapers on the basis that the paddock had been made available as a temporary convenience only and was not the subject of a letting agreement), correspondence addressed to the proper calculation of the rent due and the Tenant’s contention that she was being overcharged as to rent having regard to RPZ Rules, a copy of a prior tenancy agreement dating to 2018 with previous tenants and other documents concerning the RPZ.

23. A written response was lodged to the dispute referred by the Tenant, in which it was contended that the rent increases were in accordance with RPZ restrictions. It was stated that the initial rent of €1,750 from the 1st of December, 2020, was based on what the previous tenants had been paying, the fact that the previous tenants had vacated the property in late October 2020, days before the new tenancy commenced, and market comparables for a newly refurbished four-bedroom detached bungalow with garden and separate storage building, situated behind security gates and located approximately 6 km from Newbridge, Kilcullen, Kildare and the M7 motorway exit (with reference to comparable local properties as detailed on daft.ie 11/11/2023).

24. It was contended in the written response provided that after 12 months of occupation in November, 2021, rent was increased by 3.9% to €1818.25, an increase claimed to have been conducted validly in line with RPZ regulations. On the 1st of March, 2023, after 28 months of occupancy and 16 months after the first rent increase, it was claimed that rent was increased by 2% to €1854.36, an increase said to have occurred in line with RPZ regulations. It was claimed that advance notice of the increases was given, the duration advised by the RTB, and increases in rent were also communicated to the RTB who recorded same. It was pointed out that insofar as the Tenant had claimed her current rent to be €2,720 per month, this was incorrect and referred to the total amount for the tenancy and the equestrian facilities. Details were provided in respect of the previous tenancy which had begun in March, 2018. It was also pointed out that that the Tenant took occupancy of The Gate Lodge just 30 days after the property's inclusion in

8 a RPZ and it was contended that at this time there was no obligation on a landlord to include in the Tenancy Agreement a provision noting that the subject property is in a rent pressure zone. It was pointed out that when the RTB registration form to register the tenancy was lodged with the RTB, no request for information on comparables/rent calculations was made in circumstances where the previous tenancy (and the rent paid) had also been registered with the RTB.

25. It was further noted that, prior to signing a tenancy agreement for the Gate Lodge, the Tenant spent a considerable amount of time examining the detail of the tenancy agreement and requesting that additions and changes be made to it. It was said that she did not request information concerning rent pressure zones or the rent paid by the previous tenants. It was contended that she had been provided with a redacted copy of the previous tenants’ lease agreement to enable her to understand the terms and conditions relating to the premises before entering into her own tenancy agreement. The rent previously charged was subsequently also communicated in solicitors’ correspondence.

26. The dispute was first determined by an RTB Adjudicator, who found in favour of the Tenant on certain issues, including rent matters, and treated Gillian and Robert Draper as the Landlords, notwithstanding an objection raised at the hearing that they were not. In reaching that conclusion, the Adjudicator considered that it was more likely that the reference to Mr and Mrs G. Draper in the tenancy agreement referred to Gillian and Robert Draper, rather than George and Vivien Draper. He noted that Gillian Draper was the main point of contact for the tenancy, had signed the tenancy agreement and had signed the Notice of Rent Review and other important correspondence and emails relating to the tenancy. He considered those factors more indicative of a landlord-and- tenant relationship than the fact that the rental payments were made into a bank account associated with George Draper.

27. The Adjudicator awarded the Tenant €14,000, comprising overpayment of rent of €9,000 in respect of the tenancy, damages of €2,000 pursuant to s. 22 of the 2004 Act for failure to follow the correct procedure in relation to rent reviews, and €3,000 damages for failure lawfully to set an initial rent in an RPZ based on the relevant calculations. The award related to the tenancy of the dwelling at the Gate Lodge,

9 Brownstown Stud Farm, The Curragh, County Kildare. The Adjudicator also directed a rent reduction, namely rent at the rate of €1,500 per month from the 21st of November 2023, the date of the adjudication hearing.

28. Gillian and Robert Draper appealed against the Adjudicator’s decision to the Tribunal.

29. Both sides were legally represented before the Tribunal. A preliminary issue was raised as to who, in law, was the Landlord of the dwelling. Evidence was offered by both sides on this question on the 4th of March, 2024.

30. George Draper gave evidence that he and his wife, Mrs. Vivien Draper, were the Landlords of the dwelling. He stated that he and his wife were the people referred to in the lease agreement entered into between the Parties on the 30th of October, 2020. He said that Mrs. Gillian Draper, his daughter in law, was the point of contact with the Tenant as she was in the property business. Specifically, he said that Gillian Draper was responsible for the letting and management of the dwelling and for all matters relating to the dwelling. Mr. George Draper confirmed that the said tenancy agreement had been signed on his behalf by Gillian and Robert Draper in circumstances where he and his wife had been unable to travel outside the county boundaries on account of the restrictions in place at the time arising from the Covid-19 pandemic.

31. George Draper confirmed in evidence that he was the recipient of the rental payments made by the Tenant in respect of the tenancy of the dwelling. He stated that his account was based in a bank in County Sligo, and that the ‘payment method’ section of the tenancy agreement referenced his bank account details. He confirmed that Gillian Draper did not have access to his bank account. He also stated that a cheque had been paid by him and related to a payment concerning the Tenant. He accepted under cross- examination that he had not contacted the Tenant during the tenancy as he was happy that Gillian Draper was on site. He accepted that he could have signed the lease agreement and posted it to the Tenant but he said that he was informed by Gillian Draper that the Tenant did not want to delay matters further and, as a result, he gave permission to sign the tenancy agreement on behalf of himself and his wife.

10 32. Gillian Draper told the Tribunal that the tenancy agreement had been signed by her and Robert Draper because Mr. George Draper and Mrs. Vivien Draper were both elderly and were not allowed to travel at the time due to the restrictions in place as a result of the Covid19 pandemic. She gave evidence in line with the evidence of Mr. George Draper, stating that she acted as agent for Mr. George Draper and for Mrs. Vivian Draper in respect of the dwelling, placing emphasis on the fact that payments were made to Mr. George Draper’s bank account in line with details recorded in the tenancy agreement and that she did not have access to the said account. She claimed that she did not receive any benefit from the rental income paid by the Tenant. She stated that when issues were raised with her, there was sometimes a delay in dealing with them as she had to contact Mr. George Draper and Mrs. Vivian Draper in relation to the issues raised as they were the Landlords.

33. Gillian Draper acknowledged that in an email sent to the RTB dated the 1st of August, 2022, she had held herself out as the Landlord of the dwelling as she wanted to be taken seriously and was hoping for a quick response. She said that any search undertaken by the RTB would have shown that she was not the Landlord of the dwelling. Under examination, Gillian Draper said she did not know why, when signing the said tenancy agreement, she had not indicated that she was signing “on behalf of” the actual Landlords of the dwelling. She also stated that, notwithstanding the fact that she had signed the said tenancy agreement as Landlord, it was clear from the body of the agreement who the identities of the Landlords were. She confirmed that she was not a registered property agent and that she was acting in this capacity by virtue of Power of Attorney documentation.

34. For her part, the Tenant gave evidence that a previous dispute between the parties had been initiated by Mrs. Gillian Draper in December, 2022 and that, in this other dispute, Mrs. Gillian Draper had made the application as Landlord of the dwelling. She also stated that another dispute initiated by her naming Mrs. Gillian Draper and Mr. Robert Draper as Landlords of the dwelling, had not been objected to. The Tenant gave evidence that the commencement date for the tenancy of the 1st of November, 2020, had been a condition imposed on her. She said that she had an existing tenancy and that the dwelling needed painting and therefore there was no urgency on her behalf to move into the dwelling. The Tenant referred to the address of the Landlord given on the

11 tenancy agreement which was ‘Brownstown Stud, The Curragh, Co. Kildare’, the same address given in the said tenancy agreement for the ‘point of contact address’. The Tenant said that Mrs. Gillian Draper held herself out as being the Landlord and owner of the dwelling and that she only became aware of Mr. George Draper’s existence in October, 2022. The Tenant gave evidence that she had never been contacted by Mr. George Draper, that Mr. George Draper had not provided her with any details regarding any agent acting on his behalf and that she was not aware of any Power of Attorney documentation.

35. The Tenant also gave evidence that Mrs. Gillian Draper had contacted her during the tenancy requesting that rent be paid and had never stated to her that she was not the Landlord of the dwelling. She said that she first became aware that Mrs. Gillian Draper was purporting to act as agent for the Landlord of the dwelling was on the 17th of August, 2022. The Tenant also stated that there had been a previous dispute between the Parties in the District Court in which Mrs. Gillian Draper and Mr. Robert Draper had been recorded as being the Landlord of the dwelling without any issue being raised regarding the identity of the Landlord. She did not accept that Gillian and Robert Draper were not her Landlords, contending that the fact that they had formally communicated that they were acting as agents to the Landlord and that George and Vivien Draper were the true Landlords in notices and correspondence since August, 2022 (and ever before the dispute was referred) did not make it so.

36. Submissions were made by counsel on both sides. The Tribunal raised the question of substitution but did not hear full submissions on this question. The Tribunal adjourned to consider its decision. The Tribunal reconvened on the 13th of May, 2024 and orally communicated their decision. This decision was subsequently communicated more fully in writing in a Tribunal report dated the 18th of July, 2024 and Determination Order dated the 24th of July, 2024.

37. The Tribunal ultimately determined that George and Vivien Draper were the Landlords and Gillian Draper had acted only as an agent, including by virtue of a Power of Attorney. In consequence, the Tribunal found that it had no jurisdiction to hear the dispute originally brought by the Tenant as against Gillian Draper and Robert Draper. This finding had the consequence of reversing the earlier adjudication and removing

12 the basis for the relief previously awarded to the Tenant. The Board Determination dated the 24th of July, 2024, issued by letter dated the 30th of July, 2024.

38. The Tribunal’s reasoning for finding that Gillian and Robert Draper were not the landlords placed reliance on the statutory definition of “landlord” under s. 5 of the 2004 Act. Under s. 5, a landlord is the person entitled to receive the rent (otherwise than as agent). The Tribunal concluded that as George Draper was entitled to receive the rent and Gillian (and Robert) Draper were not entitled to rent, they could not be the Landlords.

39. The Tribunal accepted evidence that Gillian Draper acted under a Power of Attorney (2014) and that she was acting on behalf of George Draper. Therefore, the Tribunal found that even if she signed documents or dealt with the Tenant, she was doing so as an agent, not as landlord. The Tribunal placed weight on the fact that rent was paid into a bank account belonging to George Draper and from this it inferred that George Draper was the person legally entitled to rent reflecting his status as Landlord.

40. The Tribunal also considered the tenancy agreement and the surrounding evidence and concluded that the agreement identified George and Vivien Draper as the Landlords and that the references in the agreement to Gillian Draper were consistent with her role as agent/contact person. Although Gillian and Robert Draper signed the tenancy agreement, the Tribunal treated those signatures as having been made on behalf of the Landlord.

41. The Tribunal accepted that, as George and Vivien Draper owned the property, they were entitled to rent and to the reversion at the end of the tenancy and these facts further supported that they were the Landlords of the dwelling.

42. For completeness, it is appropriate to record that when the Tribunal reconvened on the 13th of May, 2024, it invited the parties to address the question of substitution. Counsel for the Notice Parties indicated that there was no proper application for substitution, they were not consenting to substitution and the dispute was statute barred. The Chair pointed out that the RTB has a jurisdiction to enlarge the period within which to make an application and that, accordingly, the dispute might not be automatically time-barred. The Chair indicated that, without consent, the Tribunal could not proceed to substitute

13 parties. In essence, the Tribunal indicated that a fresh dispute could be referred to the RTB and that it would be a matter for the RTB to decide whether to extend time under s. 88 of the 2004 Act. It is unclear whether any such application was in fact made.

43. The Tenant subsequently brought this statutory appeal to the High Court under s. 123(3) of the 2004 Act, challenging the Tribunal’s determination on points of law. The appeal was filed on the 20th of August, 2024.

44. The appeal sought to raise multiple legal issues (albeit in affidavit rather than in the originating Notice of Appeal), namely, whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to determine the identity of the landlord, whether the Tribunal properly applied contract law and statutory provisions and whether the Tribunal provided adequate reasons for its decision.

45. A preliminary issue arose regarding whether the appeal had been lodged within the “relevant period” of 21 days prescribed by s. 123(8) of the 2004 Act.

46. The RTB argued that the appeal was out of time and should be dismissed. The Attorney General was joined as a party to the appeal for the purposes of the determination of this preliminary issue. Submissions were made on his behalf that the appeal was in time.

47. The High Court (Barr J., [2025] IEHC 477) rejected the RTB’s argument that the appeal was out of time, holding that the appeal period runs from when the determination is “issued to” (i.e. received by) the parties, and the Appellant’s appeal was therefore filed within time. The Court held that the appeal was not out of time and the RTB’s strike- out application failed. The Appellant was awarded costs for this issue.

48. Following the resolution of the preliminary issue, the appeal proceeded to be listed for substantive hearing, coming on before me. The substantive issue concerns the correct identification of the Landlord, the legality of the Tribunal’s decision and the alleged errors of law, remain to be determined by the High Court. Although I understand that the Appellant had issued separate motions seeking leave, inter alia, to cross-examine the Notice Parties’ deponents, these motions were not pursued and were not before me for determination.

14 49. The summary of the background set out above does not refer to the affidavit evidence in respect of this appeal, other than by reference to exhibited materials which were before the Tribunal. For completeness, it should be noted that there was an extensive exchange of affidavits in the context of this appeal from the Tenant, the RTB and the Notice Parties.

50. Specifically, I had affidavits from the Tenant in she maintained that Gillian and Robert Draper are her Landlords, relying principally on the tenancy/associated agreements signed by them, their conduct, correspondence, and alleged failure to notify her properly of any agency arrangement.

51. In addition, the Acting Head of Disputes at the RTB, swore an affidavit raising a preliminary objection that the appeal was issued outside the 21-day statutory period. A separate RTB deponent confirmed that the Determination Order was issued to all parties on the 30th of July, 2024 and verified the RTB’s Statement of Opposition, exhibiting a consolidated Booklet of Exhibits, including the adjudication report, tribunal case files, transcripts, Tribunal report and Determination Order. He deposed the appeal does not identify a true point of law but is in substance an impermissible challenge to factual findings. A further Affidavit was sworn by the Director of the RTB whose evidence was directed to the meaning of “issued to” under s.123 of the 2004 Act and the practical consequences if the appeal period ran from delivery/receipt rather than posting.

52. Ms. Gillian Draper swore an affidavit in which she says she was not the Landlord but acted only as agent for Mr. George Draper under a Power of Attorney dated the 3rd of March, 2014. She maintained her position in evidence before the Tribunal to the effect that Mr. George Draper was the Landlord named in the tenancy agreement, that she and Mr. Robert Draper signed because of Covid travel restrictions and that she was never entitled to receive rent or reversion. She further alleged that the Tenant’s claim that Gillian and Robert Draper are Landlords is misconceived and designed to delay termination.

53. Mr. George Draper also swore an affidavit in which he confirmed that he, with Vivien Draper, purchased the relevant property and that he is the Landlord of the Gate Lodge. He relied on property registration records, the Power of Attorney appointing Gillian

15 Draper as agent, the tenancy agreement and the fact that rent was paid into his bank account. He also referred to the Notice of Termination served in June, 2023 and contended that the Tenant is overholding.

54. Finally, the Deputy Director of the RTB swore a short affidavit for the purpose of exhibiting a missing transcript of the 4th of March, 2024, Tenancy Tribunal hearing to complete the evidentiary record. She did not advance substantive factual or legal argument on the landlord-tenant dispute.

THE APPEAL

55. As summarised above, the Tenant challenges the Tribunal’s decision on four distinct grounds, arguing:

I. that the Tribunal failed to give adequate reasons, in that it allegedly did not explain its decision properly;

II. that the Tribunal erred in law by misapplying contract law and common law

III. that the Tribunal erred in law by misapplying provisions of the 2004 Act;

IV. that the Tribunal erred in law by determining who the Landlord was, it being contended that this was a matter for the High Court (jurisdictional issue).

56. On the substantive appeal, the primary grounds of Opposition advanced by the RTB may be summarised as being that the Tenant has not identified a true appealable point of law under s.123(3) of the 2004 Act but instead seeks to re-argue the Tribunal’s factual finding as to who the landlord was. The RTB maintains that the Tribunal had sufficient evidence to find that George and Vivien Draper, not Gillian and Robert Draper, were the landlords, including the tenancy agreement, rent-payment evidence and the statutory definition of “landlord” in s.5(1) of the 2004 Act. Reliance is placed on the

16 evidence in relation to the Power of Attorney/agency arrangement and the exclusion of an agent from the statutory landlord definition where rent is received on behalf of another.

57. It was denied that the Tribunal failed to give reasons and the RTB maintains that the Tribunal engaged with the evidence and submissions, applied the statutory definition, and gave a reasoned explanation for concluding that George and Vivien Draper were the Landlords. The RTB’s core substantive point is that the High Court, on a statutory appeal on a point of law, cannot rehear the facts or substitute its own view for the Tribunal’s unless there was no evidence, irrationality, or a clear legal error. The RTB maintain that none is shown in opposing these proceedings.

58. Accordingly, the RTB ask that the appeal be dismissed and that the Tribunal’s determination that George and Vivien Draper were the Landlords and the dispute against Gillian and Robert Draper could not proceed should stand.

59. Although an issue was raised in relation to the form of the appeal and compliance with Order 84C of the Rules of the Superior Courts (as amended) (“RSC”) because the grounds of appeal were not identified in the Notice of Motion, in circumstances where the issues which the Tenant has sought to advance at the hearing were discernible from the affidavit grounding the appeal and the Tenant was not legally represented for the purpose of the appeal, I have decided I should proceed to determine the issues identified (as Gearty J. did in Elhindy v. RTB [2024] IEHC 478). In so doing, I am satisfied there is no prejudice to the Notice Parties or the RTB arising from any identified non- compliance with the Rules in the form of the appeal.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

60. As made clear in the Long Title to the 2004 Act, the purpose of the Act is to make provision, inter alia, in accordance with the exigencies of the common good, for a measure of security of tenure for tenants of certain dwellings, to amend the law of landlord and tenant in relation to the basic rights and obligations of each of the parties to tenancies and to establish a body with powers and functions in relation to the cheap

17 and speedy resolution of disputes between parties to tenancies of dwellings coming within the scope of the Act.

61. Relevant to the issues arising in this appeal, s. 5(1) of the 2004 Act provides that the term “landlord” means:

“the person for the time being entitled to receive (otherwise than as agent for another person) the rent paid in respect of a dwelling by the tenant thereof...”

62. A “tenant” is defined as meaning the person for the time being entitled to the occupation of a dwelling under a tenancy and, where the context so admits, includes a person who has ceased to be entitled to that occupation by reason of the termination of his or her tenancy.

63. Section 12 of the 2004 Act makes provision for landlords’ obligations upon entering into a tenancy including under s. 12(1)(e) an obligation to notify the tenant of the name of the person, if any, who is authorized by the landlord to act on his or her behalf in relation to the tenancy for the time being.

64. Part 6 of the 2004 Act addresses the dispute resolution process established under the Act to deal with any disagreement arising between parties regarding the compliance by either with his or her obligations as landlord or tenant under the tenancy and any matter with regard to the legal relations between the parties that either one or both requires to be determined. Section 76 provides for a right of referral of a dispute by parties to a tenancy and certain other parties. Section 77 provides for the referral of complaints concerning a breach of either landlord or tenant duties. Section 78 provides, non- exhaustively, for the types of disputes which may be referred and expressly provides, at s. 78(1)(e), for referral of a dispute concerning the alleged failure by the landlord to comply with any of the obligations applicable to the landlord.

65. Section 84 of the 2004 Act provides, inter alia, that if the RTB is of the opinion that, in relation to a dispute referred, the dwelling, the subject of the dispute does not come

18 within its jurisdiction, then it shall not deal with the matter unless otherwise directed by the Circuit Court on appeal. Under s. 85(1) of the 2004 Act a similar power to refuse to deal with a dispute is conferred on the Tribunal, including where the Tribunal concludes that the appeal falls outside its jurisdiction.

66. Under s. 88 of the 2004 Act, the RTB may, on application to it, extend the time limited by any provision of the Act for the referral of a dispute to it for resolution or an appeal under s. 100 to the Tribunal against a determination of an adjudicator under section 97(4)(a). Section 88(2) provides that the RTB may extend time only where the applicant for the extension shows good grounds for doing so. An appeal lies to the Circuit Court against a decision of the RTB in respect of an extension of time.

67. Section 110 of the 2004 Act provides that:

“The title to any lands or property shall not be drawn into question in any proceedings before a mediator, an adjudicator or the Tribunal under this Part.”

68. Section 123(3) of the 2004 Act provides in relation to an appeal on a point of law that:

“Any of the parties concerned may appeal to the High Court, within the relevant period, from a determination of the Tribunal (as embodied in a determination order) on a point of law.”

69. A register of landlords and tenants is maintained under Part 7 of the 2004 Act. Under s. 132(1) a landlord or tenant is entitled to apply to the RTB for a copy of the entry in respect of that dwelling in the register.

70. Order 84C, rule 2(3) of the RSC provides, in relation to statutory appeals:

19 "Where the relevant enactment provides only for appeal to the High Court on a point of law, the notice of motion shall state concisely the point of law on which the appeal is made."

APPEAL ON A POINT OF LAW

71. The scope of an appeal on a point of law is now well established and is addressed in several of the authorities contained in the Book of Authorities prepared for this appeal, including my earlier decision in Alsaleh v. RTB [2025]IEHC 702. I do not propose to repeat the review of relevant caselaw carried out in that decision save to reiterate that when a court is considering only a point of law, it is confined as to its remit and it cannot set aside findings of primary fact unless there is no evidence to support such findings and it ought not to set aside inferences drawn from such facts unless such inferences were ones which no reasonable decision-making body could draw. The court can also reverse such inferences if they were based on the interpretation of documents and should do so if incorrect.

72. In addition, if the conclusion reached is based on an erroneous view of the law, this is a ground for setting aside the resulting decision. In a series of cases including Marwaha v. RTB [2016] IEHC 308; Nowak v. RTB [2017] IEHC 111; Doyle v. RTB [2015] IEHC 724; Gunn v. RTB [2020] IEHC 635; Stulpinaite v. RTB [2021] IEHC 178; Carroll v. RTB [2022] IEHC 326; WebSummit v. RTB [2023] IEHC 634; Pszonka v. RTB [2025] IEHC 291 and Ó Laoire v. RTB [2025] IEHC 384 the High Court has consistently emphasized the constraints of its role in an appeal on a point of law.

73. In particular, with regard to findings of fact based on the assessment of evidence, in O’Sheehan v. RTB [2024] IEHC 409, Simons J. emphasised that (at para. 90):

“[t]he Tenancy Tribunal will be afforded a significant margin of appreciation in relation to findings of fact.”

20 74. In Iyaba v. RTB [2023] IEHC 491, Simons J. further reiterated (at para. 39) that the assessment of the evidence is quintessentially a matter for the Tribunal, subject to intervention by the High Court in exceptional circumstances where it concludes that there was no evidence before the decision-maker which could reasonably be said to support its findings.

75. In short, for an appeal on a point of law under s. 123 of the 2004 Act to succeed, there must be a clear error of law established. It is not sufficient that the court might have reached a different decision on the merits. Therefore, the onus is on the Tenant on this appeal to establish a mistake on a point of law in the Tribunal decision. Properly reasoned findings of fact, reached by the Tribunal within jurisdiction, applying the correct legal test and in accordance with fair procedures, cannot be interfered with save on irrationality grounds.

ANALYSIS AND DECISION

76. I propose to address each of the four issues arising from the Affidavit grounding this appeal in turn. Before doing so, and for completeness, I should record that the Tenant raised a further fair procedures concern in respect of an alleged failure on the part of the RTB to advise her of the possibility of proceeding by way of judicial review or plenary action or otherwise when it wrote to inform her of the determination by letter dated the 30th of July, 2024. The letter in question is the standard form letter sent by the RTB when communicating the outcome of the Tribunal process in which it states that the Determination Order will become binding on the parties unless an appeal on a point of law is made within a period of 21 days pursuant to s. 123(3) of the 2004 Act as follows:

“This Determination Order shall, on expiry of a period of 21 days from the date of issue, become binding on the parties concerned, unless an appeal is made by any of the parties directly to the High Court on a point of law before then, pursuant to Section 123(3) of the Residential Tenancies Act 2004. The determination of the High Court on any such appeal in relation to the point of law concerned shall be final and conclusive.

21 Please note that the Tribunal Members are independently appointed and they undertake their respective functions in an autonomous capacity and act in a quasi-judicial manner. The staff of the RTB cannot comment on or investigate the findings of the Tribunal nor can the Tribunal revisit a judgment that has already been made. As such the Determination Order is final.”

77. The issue of whether the RTB should refer in this letter to other possible means of challenge is not before me, as it does not arise from the Tribunal decision.

Failure to give adequate reasons (Error of Law)

78. The Tenant claims the Tribunal did not give sufficient reasons for its decision and that, in consequence, the decision was flawed by reason of an error of law. The Tenant argues the Tribunal did not properly explain why it rejected key evidence (e.g., the signed contract). She relies on O’Sheehan v. RTB [2024] IEHC 409 where the decision of the Supreme Court in Connelly v. An Bord Pleanala [2018] IESC 31 was applied by Simons J. to quash a Tribunal decision which it was found failed to disclose the reasoning of the Tribunal in relation to the principal issues on the appeal before it on the basis that a failure to state adequate reasons is an error of law. No issue is taken with this proposition, but it is contended on behalf of both the RTB and the Notice Parties that the decision of the Tribunal in this case is adequately reasoned.

79. As summarised above, the decision in this case contained a detailed summary of the evidence given by each of the witnesses before the Tribunal and the submissions made on each side. Having done so, the Tribunal proceeded to make a clear finding that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the dispute originally brought by the Tenant as against the named Landlords, “Gillian Draper and Robert Draper”, in respect of the tenancy of the dwelling at the Gate Lodge, Brownstown Stud Farm, The Curragh, County Kildare.

80. Under the heading “Reasons” immediately following this finding, the Tribunal referred to s. 5(1) of the Act where the definition of ‘Landlord’ is given as “...the person for the time being entitled to receive (otherwise than as agent for another person) the rent paid

22 in respect of a dwelling by the tenant thereof and, where the context so admits, includes a person who has ceased to be so entitled by reason of the termination of the tenancy" and identified the jurisdictional issue which flowed from the preliminary issue identified before the Tribunal. Notwithstanding its earlier summary of the evidence and submissions, the Tribunal again summarised the respective positions of the parties before stating that (paras. 7-11 of its “Reasons”):

“in determining the correct identities of the Landlords of the dwelling the Tribunal focus is preliminary [sic] on the tenancy agreement entered into by, and agreed, between the Parties. The said tenancy agreement is the core document used in establishing the relationship between the Parties and in determining the rights and obligations owed by the respective Parties (in addition to the provisions of the Act). Therefore, in relation to the said tenancy agreement, the Tribunal notes, by way of initial comment, that there is vagueness to the identity of the Landlords owing to the fact that the initial ‘G’ is inserted in place of the appropriate forename. However, it is also noteworthy that there is a distinction in the description of the name of the 'Landlord’ being ‘Mr. & Mrs. G. Draper’ and later ‘Mr. & Mrs. Draper’ and the name ascribed to the ‘point of contact address’ being 'Gillian Draper’.

Ultimately, in reaching its decision on the question raised by way of the said preliminary issue, the Tribunal accepts the evidence of Mr. George Draper in respect of the fact that the monthly rent paid by the Respondent Tenant was received into his bank account. The Tribunal further accepts Mr. George Draper’s evidence that the bank account details referenced in the said tenancy agreement were the details for his bank account located in a bank in Sligo, being in proximity to his place of residence, and that Mrs Gillian Draper did not have access to his bank account.

Based on the oral evidence given and having regard to the documentation furnished in advance of the hearing, the Tribunal is satisfied that Mr. George Draper and Mrs. Vivian Draper are the persons entitled to receive the rent paid by the Respondent Tenant in respect of the tenancy of the dwelling. Accordingly,

23 the Tribunal finds that Mr. George Draper and Mrs. Vivian Draper are the Landlords of the dwelling.

Arising from the findings set-out hereinabove, the Tribunal finds that it has no jurisdiction to hear the dispute originally brought by the Respondent Tenant as against the named Appellant Landlords, 'Gillian Draper and Robert Draper’, in respect of the tenancy of the dwelling.

For the avoidance of doubt, the finding made by the Tribunal as set-out hereinabove does not act as a bar to any future dispute that may be brought in respect of the tenancy of the dwelling at Gate Lodge, Brownstown Stud Farm, The Curragh, County Kildare, N56 NR24. In this regard, the Tribunal makes no determination in relation to the substantive matters in dispute between the Parties, the Tribunal having only determined the said preliminary issue raised and having only heard evidence in relation to same.”

81. It seems to me that this case is entirely distinguishable from O’Sheehan in that it cannot be concluded that the Tribunal decision is “inscrutable” or fails to disclose the rationale for the decision arrived at. Indeed, the Tenant’s complaint is not so much that no reasons were given, or that the reasons given were unintelligible, but rather that the Tribunal did not address all elements of the evidence before it. She highlights the fact that Gillian and Robert Draper had signed the tenancy agreement and contends that the Tribunal did not explain why this was not determinative of the issue of who the Landlord was. She also complains that it was not explained why the evidence of the Notice Parties was preferred over her own evidence, referencing the fact that Gillian Draper had admitted to corresponding with the RTB as Landlord for the purpose of getting information about the process, whilst at the same time contending that she was not the Landlord in this appeal. In essence, the Tenant contends that this showed Gillian Draper to be unreliable in her evidence and in consequence, the Tribunal ought to have explained why the Notice Parties’ evidence was preferred over her own in concluding that Gillian and Robert Draper were not her Landlords for the purpose of the 2004 Act.

82. Having regard to the terms of the Tribunal decision in this case, summarised above, I am not persuaded that the decision is inadequately unreasoned and therefore flawed by

24 reason of error of law. The Tribunal gave clear and intelligible reasons for its determination, identifying the precise preliminary issue, setting out the statutory definition of “landlord”, recording that the original dispute application named Gillian and Robert Draper as Landlords and explained that it was, therefore, necessary first to determine whether the correct landlord had been named.

83. The Tribunal further recorded the terms of the tenancy agreement, including that the landlord was described as “Mr. & Mrs. Draper”, that the payment method directed rent to “G. Draper”, and that the account name was recorded as “Mr. G.H. Draper” at a bank in Sligo. It also expressly addressed the ambiguity arising from the use of the initial “G” and the distinction between the references to “Mr. & Mrs. G. Draper”, ”Mr. & Mrs. Draper” and the separate point of contact entry for Gillian Draper. The Tribunal also expressly acknowledged that there had been occasions on which Gillian Draper had held herself out as Landlord, but it recorded that explanations had been given for those matters and it noted that those explanations were accepted.

84. Having considered the documentation and oral evidence, the Tribunal then stated that it accepted George Draper's evidence that the rent was received into his bank account, that Gillian Draper had no access to that account and that George Draper and Vivien Draper were therefore the persons entitled to receive the rent paid in respect of the dwelling. The Tribunal then identified the legal consequence of that finding, namely that the dispute, as constituted against Gillian and Robert Draper, could not be entertained and it expressly confined itself to that jurisdictional issue without determining any other matter.

85. The Supreme Court, per Clarke CJ, in Connelly clarified and restated the law in relation to the duty to give reasons as requiring that the reasons given must enable understanding of the decision. Reasoning must be intelligible and coherent and should allow the parties (and a court) to understand both why the decision was made and identify the basis for rejecting opposing arguments. It was reiterated in Connelly, however, that it is not necessary to give exhaustive detail. The Court confirmed that there is no obligation to deal with every submission and the duty to give reasons is satisfied if it is shown that the main issues were considered. Based on the decision in Connelly, the duty to give reasons is discharged where the decision, read with the surrounding

25 materials, allows the parties and the court to understand why the decision was reached, even if the reasoning is not detailed or elaborate. Simons J. also acknowledged in O’Sheehan in the context of a Tenancy Tribunal decision that the obligation to state the reasons for the principal findings of fact is not an onerous obligation and does not require a detailed discursive decision (para. 89).

86. In this case, the Tribunal report expressly states that the submissions section was a summary rather than a full transcript but it nevertheless recorded the core elements of the Tenant's case, including her evidence that Gillian Draper had held herself out as Landlord, that George Draper had not contacted her, that no agent details or power of attorney had been disclosed to her and that Gillian Draper had requested rent from her. It is apparent from the content of the report that the Tribunal fully considered both the evidence of the Tenant and the submissions made on her behalf. This view is further confirmed from an examination of the transcripts of the hearings.

87. The Tribunal was not obliged to rehearse every contention advanced by the Tenant, still less to answer every point in the manner she preferred, provided that its reasoning on the issue was sufficiently clear to explain why it reached its conclusion. I am satisfied that the reasoning of the Tribunal in this case discharges the separate requirement of informing the Tenant in general terms why the decision was made as an incident of fair procedures and transparency, whilst at the same time providing enough information to allow for consideration of whether legal grounds for challenge arose in respect of the basis for the decision. It is manifest that the Tribunal weighed the evidence on both sides and, having assessed competing evidence capable of supporting opposing conclusions, considered the weight of the evidence to support the conclusion that George and Vivien Draper, not Gillian and Robert Draper, were the Landlords. There was evidence before the Tribunal to support this conclusion, just as there was evidence to support the contrary but the Tribunal were persuaded on the balance of the evidence as a whole and as a matter of probability as to the proper identity of the Landlords. In the circumstances, the Tenant’s complaint that the Tribunal failed to state adequate reasons for its finding cannot be sustained.

Misapplication of Contract Law and Common Law Errors

26 88. On this appeal the Tenant complains that the Tribunal failed to properly apply contract law and common law principles. In particular, she relies on the fact that Gillian and Robert Draper signed the lease as Landlords and she relied on that contract when entering into the tenancy. I cannot accept as substantiated the Tenant’s complaint that the Tribunal ignored the tenancy agreement or misapplied contract or common law in arriving at its findings in this case. The tenancy agreement was treated by the Tribunal as a core document governing the relationship between the parties stating (at para. 7 of its reasoning under Finding 7.1):

“The said tenancy agreement is the core document used in establishing the relationship between the Parties and in determining the rights and obligations owed by the respective Parties (in addition to the provisions of the Act).”

89. The Tribunal carefully analysed that agreement, including the features which the Tenant relied upon in relation to the designation of the Landlord, the payment clause and the point of contact details. There were some ambiguities in the terms of the tenancy agreement and as noted by the Tribunal in its decision (also at para. 7):

“…there is vagueness to the identity of the Landlords owing to the fact that the initial ‘G’ is inserted in place of the appropriate forename. However, it is also noteworthy that there is a distinction in the description of the name of the 'Landlord’ being ‘Mr. & Mrs. G. Draper’ and later ‘Mr. & Mrs. Draper’ and the name ascribed to the ‘point of contact address’ being 'Gillian Draper’”.

90. It was a matter for the Tribunal to interpret the provisions of the tenancy agreement to ascertain its meaning and effect. In view of apparent ambiguities, it was necessary for the Tribunal to decide what the tenancy agreement meant insofar as the identity of the Landlord was concerned. Where words are capable of bearing more than one meaning, the interpretation of an ambiguous agreement is not a precise or scientific exercise (hence in this case, different conclusions by the Adjudicator and the Tribunal based on the same tenancy agreement and similar evidence).

27 91. I am satisfied that the task of interpreting the tenancy agreement undertaken by the Tribunal was properly done by an analysis of the words used, viewed on an objective basis within the context of the factual matrix against which the agreement was concluded, the factual matrix having been established by reference to both oral evidence and extrinsic documentary evidence. There was no error in the approach of the Tribunal in determining who the Landlord was within the meaning of s. 5 of the 2004 Act by having regard both to the terms of the tenancy agreement together with the other oral and extrinsic evidence available. The other evidence available included the fact that rent payments were made into the account name of “Mr. G.H. Draper” with the relevant BIC and IBAN details set-out, established in evidence as referring to the bank account of Mr. George Draper and land registry records before the Tribunal identifying him as registered owner of the property the subject of the tenancy agreement

92. The core question for the Tribunal was to determine the correct identity of the Landlord, as it proceeded to do, having regard to the statutory definition of landlord under s. 5 of the 2004 Act and based on all the evidence (which included the tenancy agreement but was not confined to that agreement). The Tribunal explains its decision saying (at para. 9):

“Based on the oral evidence given and having regard to the documentation furnished in advance of the hearing, the Tribunal is satisfied that Mr. George Draper and Mrs. Vivian Draper are the persons entitled to receive the rent paid by the Respondent Tenant in respect of the tenancy of the dwelling. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that Mr. George Draper and Mrs. Vivian Draper are the Landlords of the dwelling.”

93. It is regrettable that there was ambiguity in the tenancy agreement. The issues which have arisen as regards the correct identity of the Landlord might have been avoided had the tenancy agreement been more clearly worded or had there been express notification by the Landlord, as required under s. 12(1)(e) of the 2004 Act, that Gillian Draper had been appointed as the Landlord’s agent by George and Vivien Draper. Identifying her

28 merely as “point of contact” did not serve to remove ambiguity as to her role in circumstances where she (and her husband) proceeded to sign the tenancy agreement without noting that they were doing so as agent for the Landlord rather than as the Landlord.

94. In circumstances where an ambiguity arose, I see no error of law, by reason of any asserted misapplication of contract law or common law, in the Tribunal’s decision that Gillian and Robert Draper were not the people entitled to receive the rent. It is not my role in an appeal on a point of law to stand in the shoes of the Tribunal and engage in a merits-based assessment of the evidence to arrive at my own conclusions as to who the Landlord is.

95. While I note the Tenant’s reliance on my decision in Alsaleh v. RTB [2025] IEHC 702, it is not clear to me how it assists the Tenant in this case. In Alsaleh, there was no written tenancy agreement and the existence of a tenancy was disputed in circumstances where the Landlord claimed that it had not been established that he was the owner of the property. It was a case on its peculiar facts whereby it was found that the Tribunal was entitled to determine a tenancy existed on the totality of the evidence before it, without determining ownership of the property and even where ownership was disputed by the putative Landlord. As reiterated in Alsaleh (para. 78), the assessment of evidence is a matter for the Tribunal.

Misapplication of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2004 (Statutory Interpretation)

96. The Tenant further argues the Tribunal misinterpreted and misapplied key provisions of the 2004 Act, referring expressly to the definition of “landlord” in s. 5, the obligations to notify tenants of agents in s. 12 and the fact that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to determine title to lands under s. 110 of the 2004 Act. Specifically, she disputes the idea that receiving rent alone determines landlord status and refers to the terms of the Power of Attorney executed in favour of Gillian Draper which she maintains permits her to act in the place of George and Vivien Draper which she argues could be construed as extending to receiving rent as Landlord and not merely receiving rent on behalf of the Landlord as an agent would.

29 97. This submission does not address the fact that the evidence establishes that the rent was paid into an account in George Draper’s name and does not bear out the Tenant’s contention that Gillian (with or without Robert) was the person entitled to receive the rent under the tenancy agreement. Her reliance on s. 110 does not assist her, as at no point does the Tribunal purport to determine title to lands or ownership.

98. The Tenant separately relies on agreements entered into by Gillian and Robert Draper with third parties in respect of other parts of the stud farm in this part of her submissions, seemingly to counterbalance the evidence in relation to payment of rent into George Draper’s account under her tenancy agreement. It should not be lost sight, however, that these agreements are between different parties in respect of different properties and are in different terms with the result that the significance of this evidence in making findings in this case should not be over-stated. The Tenant’s reliance on this material as carrying real weight ignores the fact that these agreements concerned different parties, different properties and different contractual terms

99. Having regard to the s. 5 definition, the Tribunal quite properly attached significant weight to the fact that under the tenancy agreement, rent was to be paid into the bank account of Mr G.H. Draper. The agreed evidence was also to the effect that payments were, in fact, made into this account. Having regard to the s. 5 definition, the Tribunal was entitled to attach significant weight to the fact that, under the tenancy agreement, rent was payable into the account of Mr G.H. Draper. The Tenant’s complaint that the Tribunal’s findings that Gillian and Robert Draper were not her Landlord constitutes a failure to have proper regard to s. 5 of the 2004 Act is not substantiated.

100. The Tenant similarly emphasises the obligation on the Landlord under s. 12(1)(e) of the 2004 Act to notify a tenant of the name of the agent, which did not occur in this case. It may well be that the failure by the Landlord to notify the Tenant of the identity of his agent is a breach of obligations arising under s. 12(1)(e) of the 2004 Act but it is not determinative of the separate issue as to the identity of the Landlord as found to have been established on the totality of the evidence and the finding made to the effect that George and Vivien Draper are the Landlords under the tenancy agreement in reliance on the definition of landlord in s. 5 of the 2004 Act is not negatived by non- compliance with the obligation on the Landlord under s. 12(1)(e).

30 101. There was no dispute before the Tribunal as to non-compliance with Landlord obligations under s. 12(1) by reason of non-notification of the identity of the Landlord’s agent as required in that section. This is not a case like Argutinski v. RTB [2026] IEHC 225 where Simons J. was concerned with an appeal on a point of law concerning the validity of a notice of termination under s. 62(1) of the 2004 Act. For a notice of termination to be valid, s. 62(1) of the 2004 Act requires service of a notice of termination in writing signed by the landlord or the landlord’s authorised agent. Simons J. found that a failure to inform the Tenant of the identity of the Landlord had consequences for the validity of any steps taken by the agent, including the signing of a notice of termination.

102. No such issue arises in this appeal where the preliminary question determined related solely to the identity of the Landlord under the tenancy agreement, the requirement for joinder of the Landlord to the dispute being a precondition to the exercise of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. I see no failure in the Tribunal decision to properly apply any provision of the 2004 Act.

Jurisdictional Issue

103. Finally, the Tenant argues that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by declining jurisdiction based on its decision as to who the Landlord is. Her position is that jurisdictional questions are matters for the High Court, not the Tribunal. She relies in this regard on the decision of Simons J. in Anderson v. Fitzgerald [2023] IEHC 309 where he found that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, rather its function is to determine disputes referred to it. It seems to me that the Tenant misconstrues the effect of the decision in Anderson.

104. In Anderson, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to determine the existence of a jurisdictional fact was acknowledged. In this instance, the determination of who is landlord is a jurisdictional fact. If it is determined that someone who is not a landlord has been joined as respondent to the dispute, it follows that the Tribunal must conclude that, by reason of the failure to join the correct person as landlord, it cannot proceed against persons who are not landlords. This follows from the fact that the Tribunal’s

31 jurisdiction is limited by statute to determining disputes between the parties to a tenancy agreement or in a case to which s. 50(7) applies, a licensee and the Landlord (s. 76 of the 2004 Act).

105. The Court went on to find in Anderson that the RTB’s conclusion that it had no jurisdiction because no tenancy ever existed is not final and conclusive. It is a finding which is amenable to challenge on grounds of error of law. Accordingly, it is not in dispute that the Tribunal’s decision that it had no jurisdiction to determine this dispute is amenable to challenge in these proceedings as an error of law. The burden is, however, on the Tenant to demonstrate that the Tribunal’s finding that it lacked jurisdiction was tainted by error of law if the Tenant is to succeed on this issue.

106. The determination that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction in this case was based on a finding made on the evidence in respect of a jurisdictional fact, namely the requirement for a dispute to be referred as against the correct person. It was found that this had not occurred by reason of misidentification of the Landlord. This finding was supported by ample evidence and was a finding which it was open to the Tribunal to make, notwithstanding evidence to the contrary which was also available to the Tribunal and could have supported an alternative conclusion.

107. The decision in Anderson may also be cited as authority for the distinct proposition that the High Court, as a court of full original jurisdiction, has jurisdiction to determine whether a tenancy agreement existed. In Anderson, this arose in the context of proceedings to recover possession of lands pursuant to a charge registered under s. 62 of the Registration of Title Act, 1964. The question which arose was whether possession proceedings should be adjourned on the basis that the asserted validity of a tenancy agreement under Part 4 of the 2004 Act which it was claimed could only be determined by the RTB. Simons J. relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in AIB plc v. Fitzgerald [2022] IECA 286 where it was found that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the mortgagee and the third party in the context of repossession proceedings and reliance cannot be placed by a tenant on the existence of a lease to resist complying with an order for possession made in court proceedings.

108. Simons J. was satisfied that the validity of the tenancy in the context of possession proceedings was a question which the High Court had jurisdiction to determine. He

32 noted that in certain circumstances the RTB had exclusive jurisdiction. In this regard, he referred to s. 182 of the 2004 Act, which provides that, save in prescribed circumstances, proceedings cannot be instituted in any court in respect of a dispute which may be referred to the RTB for resolution. The exclusive jurisdiction of the RTB, however, presupposes the existence of a tenancy agreement between the parties to the dispute. Simons J. proceeded to find that there is nothing in the 2004 Act to suggest that the RTB has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether a valid tenancy ever existed, rather the legislation treats the existence of the tenancy as a condition precedent to the exercise of the RTB’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, he concluded that the RTB does not have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether, in a particular set of circumstances, a residential tenancy exists.

109. These proceedings are not possession proceedings, and I am not being asked to determine whether there exists a tenancy agreement valid as against a charge holder. Indeed, the Tribunal in this case did not decide that the tenancy agreement was invalid but rather that the Tenant had not properly joined the Landlord in her complaint by naming parties which the Tribunal found were not her landlord.

110. The matter comes before me by way of an appeal under s. 123 of the 2004 Act and my jurisdiction is confined on such an appeal to making orders under s. 123(5) of the 2004 Act arising from my determination of points of law arising. It is not for me, on an appeal under s. 123 of the 2004 Act, to decide who the Tenant’s Landlord was under the tenancy agreement. Rather, my task is to decide whether, by reason of an identified error of law, I should direct the Director of the RTB to cancel the determination order made or vary that order in some specified manner. As I have not been persuaded that the determination order is flawed by error of law, however, I have no power to direct a different outcome in this case based on my own assessment of the evidence as to the identity of the Landlord under the tenancy agreement.

111. I note that in oral submissions the Tenant referred to other proceedings she had instituted (including other disputes referred to the RTB). For the avoidance of doubt, these proceedings are not before me and I make no findings in respect of any such proceedings.

33 Final Observations

112. While it is unsatisfactory that the effect of this decision is to leave the Tenant without a remedy in respect of the dispute she referred under the 2004 Act in December, 2022, my concern in this regard is mitigated when regard is had to the fact that the Tenant, legally advised at the time, was informed in writing on several occasions prior to the referral of this dispute that George and Vivien Draper were her Landlords, not Gillian and Robert Draper. Considering this information, even without accepting its veracity, there were several options open to her which for unexplained reasons were not pursued.

113. By way of example of steps open to the Tenant when George and Vivien Draper were said to be her Landlords in circumstances where she claims to believe that it was Gillian and Robert Draper, the Tenant could have sought details from the RTB as to the identity of the Landlord as recorded on the Register maintained by the RTB. Alternatively, she could have referred the dispute naming all four Drapers as respondents, having regard to the ambiguity as to which of them were the Landlords. Afterall, her solicitors appear to have issued two sets of District Court proceedings (or at least they appear to have said they would issue a second set in their letter of the 2nd of December, 2022) in order to ensure that all four Drapers were named in proceedings before that Court.

114. It was also open to the Tenant to make an application for an extension of time to refer a new dispute following the determination of this one (as indeed was pointed out by the Tribunal in its decision), albeit that the outcome of such an application could not be a foregone conclusion.

115. For her own reasons, the Tenant elected not to take any of these steps but instead chose to pursue her complaint only as against Gillian and Robert Draper. This has led to protracted and otherwise unnecessary proceedings before the High Court which were entirely avoidable. Insofar as this means that she may now find herself without a remedy under the 2004 Act, a significant measure of responsibility for this outcome rests with her procedural choices and her decision to pursue a complaint only against Gillian and Robert Draper.

34 CONCLUSION

116. As no error of law has been established, and as the Tribunal made its decision based on evidence before it, I have decided that this appeal should be dismissed. I will hear the parties as to the form of my final order and any consequential matters.

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