IEHC 427 — IEHC 427 — High Court

1

[APPROVED] [REDACTED]

THE HIGH COURT [2026] IEHC 427

Record No. 2026 56 MCA

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 35 OF THE LEGAL SERVICES

REGULATION ACT 2015

AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY THE LEGAL SERVICES

REGULATORY AUTHORITY

BETWEEN:

THE LEGAL SERVICES REGULATORY AUTHORITY

APPLICANT

AND

JOSEPH SALLABI

RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice David Barniville, President of the High Court,

delivered on the 3rd day of July 2026 2

Table of Contents 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 3 2. Overview and Summary of Judgment ................................................................... 4 3. The nature of the application: section 35 of the 2015 Act .................................. 19 4. Factual Background............................................................................................... 24 5. The Authority’s application for orders under s. 35 of the 2015 Act ................. 40 6. Summary of relevant findings of fact .................................................................. 62 7. Analysis of Submissions on the Legal Issues ....................................................... 67 8. EU Law: Free movement of persons arguments: Right of establishment and Freedom to provide services ..................................................................................... 69 (a) General Comments ........................................................................................... 69 (b) Lawyers’ Services Directive/Regulations ....................................................... 70 (c) Lawyers’ Establishment Directive/Regulations ............................................. 73 (d) Further analysis of Mr Sallabi’s submissions on free movement of persons ………...................................................................................................................... 78 9. EU Law: Solvency II Directive: position of KBC ............................................... 92 10. Brussels Bar policy: Scope of cover and compliance with 2024 Regulations100 (a) Preliminary and general comments .............................................................. 100 (b) Interpretation Principles ............................................................................... 104 (c) Scope of Cover: Article 9 ............................................................................... 106 (d) Compliance of Brussels Bar policy with 2024 Regulations ........................ 112 (i) Regulation 12 ............................................................................................ 112 (ii) Regulation 14 ........................................................................................ 112 13. Alleged unavailability of qualifying insurance policy in the State: the Zurich policy ......................................................................................................................... 120 (a) Preliminary and general comments .............................................................. 120 (b) Compliance of the Zurich Policy with the 2024 Regulations ..................... 123 (i) Regulation 12(1) ........................................................................................... 123 (ii) Regulation 13(2) .......................................................................................... 123 (iii) Regulation 14 ............................................................................................. 128 14. Remaining points relevant to the Authority’s application ............................. 133 15. Concluding comments and orders .................................................................... 137 3

1. Introduction

1. This is my judgment on an application by the Legal Services Regulatory

Authority (the “LSRA” or the “Authority”) for orders under s. 35 of the Legal Services

Regulation Act 2015 (the “2015 Act”) for various orders against the Respondent,

Joseph Sallabi BL, an Irish barrister. In this application, which is the first application

by the Authority under s. 35 of the 2015 Act, the Authority seeks orders prohibiting Mr

Sallabi from providing legal services in the State unless and until he has an approved

policy of professional indemnity insurance in compliance with the applicable

regulations made under the 2015 Act (The Legal Services Regulation Act 2015

(Professional Indemnity Insurance for Barristers) Regulations 2024) (S.I. No. 490 of

2024) (the “2024 Regulations”); prohibiting Mr Sallabi from holding himself out as

being a practising barrister currently entitled to provide legal services in the State unless

and until Mr Sallabi has an approved policy of professional indemnity insurance in

compliance with the 2024 Regulations and requiring Mr Sallabi to produce to the

Authority proof that he has such an approved policy of professional indemnity

insurance which complies with the 2024 Regulations before he provides any legal

services in the State.

2. For the reasons initially communicated to the parties and announced in court and

published as a Note of my Decision on 21 May 2026, I have decided to make the orders

sought by the Authority. The more detailed reasons for my decision are set out in this

judgment. While the Authority was satisfied with the Note of my Decision, Mr Sallabi

requested me, at the hearing on 21 May 2026, to complete my judgment and indicated

that he intended to appeal my decision. 4

3. In the case of any inconsistency between the Note of my Decision and this

judgment, the judgment prevails and provides the complete set of my reasons for

making the orders sought by the Authority.

2. Overview and Summary of Judgment

4. Under s. 35 of the 2015 Act, the High Court may make an order prohibiting a

legal practitioner from contravening any provision of the 2015 Act or regulations made

under it where it is satisfied that a legal practitioner “has contravened, is contravening

or is likely to contravene” any provision of the 2015 Act or regulations made under it.

The Authority maintains that Mr Sallabi (a legal practitioner) has contravened, is

contravening and is likely to contravene the relevant provisions of the 2015 Act and the

2024 Regulations concerning his obligation to have in place a professional indemnity

insurance policy which complies with the provisions of s. 46(1) of the 2025 Act and the

2024 Regulations.

5. The Authority’s application for these orders was first returnable before the Court

on 16 February 2026. Mr Sallabi sought a lengthy adjournment to file a replying

affidavit, relying on (amongst other things) the imminent commencement of Ramadan

as well as his desire to spend time with his family. The Authority made clear that if the

application was to be adjourned for a lengthy period, it would be seeking

interim/interlocutory orders. I granted Mr Sallabi’s application for a lengthy

adjournment, made directions for the delivery of a replying affidavit by Mr Sallabi, and

granted the orders sought by the Authority on an interlocutory basis to last until the

adjourned date, 15 April 2026. On that date, having delivered replying affidavits and

written submissions, Mr Sallabi provided undertakings in lieu of the orders sought by

the Authority to the effect that he would not provide legal services in the State and that

he would not hold himself out as being a practising barrister currently entitled to provide 5

such legal services until after the hearing of the Authority’s application which I listed

for hearing on 28 and 29 April 2026, having made certain further directions.

6. The application was heard over those two days. At the conclusion of the hearing,

I reserve my judgment and indicated I would give it as soon as possible. As I was

anxious to ensure that the parties were informed of my decision at the earliest

opportunity and as it became clear that I would not be in a position to complete my full

judgment by the end of the Easter term, I informed the parties that I would give my

decision on the last day of term, 21 May 2026. I did so and provided the parties, and

published, the Note of my Decision that day. As noted above, Mr Sallabi requested a

full judgment and indicated that he intended appealing. I made interlocutory orders on

21 May 2026, 11 June 2026 and 26 June 2026 pending the completion of this written

judgment. On 26 June 2026, Mr Sallabi asked me to pause the completion of my

judgment as he wished to make an application that I recuse myself from the case,

apparently on the basis of information he obtained on 1 May 2026 (which he did not

disclose). I refused to entertain the application and informed Mr Sallabi that I would

complete my judgment, as he requested me to do on 21 May 2026.

7. As I will explain in greater detail in this judgment, Mr Sallabi is an Irish barrister,

who obtained his professional qualification as a Barrister-at-Law or BL from the

Honorable Society of King’s Inns on 10 October 2023 and was called to the Irish Bar

by the Chief Justice the following day. On his application (made that same day), the

Authority entered Mr Sallabi’s name on the Roll of Practising Barristers by virtue of

his professional qualification and call to the Irish Bar. He remains on the Roll of

Practising Barristers.

8. From the time of his call to the Irish Bar in October 2023 and his commencement

in practice until the end of April 2025, Mr Sallabi had a professional indemnity 6

insurance policy which was arranged by AON Ireland (“AON”) and issued by Zurich

Insurance plc for a premium of €90. That Zurich company was an Irish insurance

company. However, it ceased operations in January 2024. Thereafter, the relevant

policy of insurance for Irish barristers was issued by a branch of Zurich Insurance

Europe AG, a German company, operating in Ireland. I will refer to that policy as the

“Zurich policy”.

9. In May 2025, Mr Sallabi informed the Authority that he had not renewed the

Zurich policy on 1 May 2025 as he had “registered with the Brussels Bar Association”

in early 2025 and had subscribed to the “Brussels Bar insurance policy”, which he

claimed provided coverage for his professional activities across all EU Member States

(including Ireland). Mr Sallabi claims to have moved to Belgium in January 2025 to

establish himself there using and relying on his Irish professional legal qualifications,

namely, his degree of Barrister-at-Law and his call to the Irish Bar. He provided to the

Authority a Dutch language version of the policy which was issued to the Orde van

Vlaamse Balies (the Order of Flemish Bars). He subsequently provided an English

translation of that policy in June 2025 and another English translation in April 2026 in

the course of the Authority’s application. I will refer to this policy for convenience as

the “Brussels Bar policy”. That policy was issued by two co-insurers, MS Amlin

Insurance SE (now MSIG Europe SE) (“MSIG”) and KBC Verzekeringen NV

(“KBC”), both Belgian companies.

10. The Authority was of the view that the Brussels Bar policy (which is described in

greater detail later in this judgment) on its proper interpretation did not cover legal

services provided by Mr Sallabi, as an Irish barrister in Ireland and also that it did not

comply with certain statutory requirements for a policy of professional indemnity

insurance under the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations. The Authority required Mr 7

Sallabi to cease practise unless and until he had a professional indemnity insurance

policy which complied with those provisions.

11. Mr Sallabi declined to put in place another policy and maintained that the Brussels

Bar policy complied with the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations and that, if it did not,

the Authority’s insistence that he take out another policy was in breach of EU law by

imposing, what he considered, to be impermissible restrictions on his entitlement to

move freely between Member States of the EU to provide legal services.

12. In the course of responding to the Authority’s application for orders under s. 35

of the 2015 Act, Mr Sallabi obtained a quotation from AON for renewed cover under

the Zurich policy. The annual premium quoted to him by AON was €235.00. However,

Mr Sallabi chose not to proceed with the Zurich policy and instead maintained his

entitlement to rely on the Brussels Bar policy.

13. Mr Sallabi maintains that the Brussels Bar policy provides a sufficient indemnity

in respect of legal services which he provides as an Irish barrister in Ireland and that

the Authority’s insistence that it does not and that he take out a compliant policy

breaches his right of establishment and his right to provide professional legal services

in the State (under Chapters 2 and 3 of Title IV (Free Movement of Persons, Services

and Capital) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) (the “Treaty”).

Mr Sallabi maintains that he should not be required to take out another policy in respect

of the legal services which he has provided and intends to provide in Ireland following,

what he claims was his establishment in Belgium in early 2025. Mr Sallabi did fairly

acknowledge at the hearing of the Authority’s application that it would be open to the

Authority to require him to take out a compliant policy to cover his legal work as a

barrister in Ireland if he did not have the Belgian policy or if that policy was ineffective

to cover such legal services provided by him as a barrister in Ireland. 8

14. Mr Sallabi gave as his reason for not taking out the Zurich policy (on foot of the

quotation he sought) that it would facilitate claims against him by certain persons and

their legal advisors (with whom he is in dispute in other proceedings in which the

Authority is not a party) and that he was concerned that future insurance premiums

might become unaffordable and lead to his exclusion from the legal profession.

15. While Mr Sallabi maintains that the Brussels Bar policy covers the legal services

he provides as a barrister in Ireland and is compliant with the provisions of the 2015

Act and the 2024 Regulations, he contends that if it is not compliant with those

provisions, the Court is required to disapply the 2024 Regulations and various other

regulations, including the regulations which implement the EU Directives on the

freedom to provide services and the right of establishment (which I refer to below).

16. Mr Sallabi has also advanced a number of rather bizarre and, in my judgement,

wholly inappropriate allegations in the course of his affidavits and submissions in

response to the Authority’s application, which include completely wild and

unsubstantiated allegations against a host of entities, firms and people including the

Authority itself, solicitors and counsel and even a High Court judge. Mr Sallabi chose

not to advance any oral submissions at the hearing in support of these bizarre and

completely inappropriate allegations but he did not in any way resile from or withdraw

them.

17. It is clear from the evidence and from Mr Sallabi’s affidavits and his submissions

that Mr Sallabi has provided legal services in Ireland as an Irish barrister, using the

Barrister-at-Law professional legal qualification which he obtained from the King’s

Inns and in reliance on his call to the Irish Bar and not as a Belgian qualified

avocat/advocaat/rechtsanwalt, since he has not attained that professional title in

Belgium, and that he intends to continue doing so. 9

18. For reasons which are set out in greater detail in my judgment below, I have

concluded that the Authority is entitled to the orders which it seeks against Mr Sallabi

under s. 35 of the 2015 Act. I am satisfied that Mr Sallabi is a “practising barrister”

and a “qualifying barrister” for the purposes of the 2015 Act and that, in holding

himself out as being entitled to, and in intending to, provide legal services in Ireland as

an Irish barrister, without a policy of professional indemnity insurance which complies

with Part 4 of the 2024 Regulations, Mr Sallabi is a person who has contravened and is

likely to contravene the provisions of s. 46(1) of the 2015 Act and Part 4 of the 2024

Regulations.

19. I have concluded that, on its proper interpretation, the Brussels Bar policy is not

intended to cover, and does not cover Mr Sallabi, or provide an indemnity in respect of

legal services provided by him as an Irish barrister providing legal services in Ireland

and that it does not comply with certain provisions of the 2015 Act and the 2024

Regulations in several respects and for several reasons, some of which are referred to

in this overview and summary and will be elaborated upon in greater detail later in my

judgment.

20. I am also satisfied that Mr Sallabi has fundamentally misunderstood the

provisions in the Treaty and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union

(the “CJEU”) on the right of establishment of lawyers and on the freedom of lawyers

to provide services in seeking to rely on those provisions and on the principles contained

in that case law in support of his contention that he has sought to exercise and will be

exercising those freedoms and rights when providing legal services in Ireland as an Irish

barrister.

21. While Mr Sallabi has contended that he established himself as a lawyer in

Belgium in January 2025, relying on his Irish professional legal qualification as 10

barrister, and has provided some evidence to support this (such as his “lawyer’s card”

and the certificate of admission from the Dean of the Brussels Bar (Dutch language

section), confirming his registration on the EU-list of the Brussels Bar since 20 January

2025), other evidence available to the Court is not completely consistent with that

contention. He has not, for example, updated his registration details with the Authority

and his home and correspondence addresses remain as Irish addresses and he remains

registered on the Roll as an Irish practising barrister and not an EU “registered lawyer”.

Nor did he make any mention of a move to establish himself in Belgium when asked

about his professional legal business during various appearances in certain High Court

proceedings before Nolan J in July 2025, where the clear impression was given by him

that his practice was based in an office building in Dublin 4. His letterhead, while

making reference to a “head office” in Brussels, refers to the Dublin 4 premises and

only contains Dublin telephone and fax numbers. Nor does (or did) his website or

Linkedin entry make any reference to Brussels.

22. However, notwithstanding these inconsistencies, and without conclusively

deciding the point, I am prepared to assume for the purpose of this application that Mr

Sallabi has at least taken steps to establish himself in Belgium. Ultimately, however,

that makes no difference to my decision on the Authority’s application.

23. I have concluded that notwithstanding Mr Sallabi’s contention that he moved to

establish himself in Belgium under his professional title as an Irish barrister, he is not

exercising any EU right of establishment or freedom to provide services when providing

legal services in Ireland as an Irish barrister. He may well be doing so when seeking to

establish himself as a lawyer in Belgium in reliance on his Irish professional legal

qualifications or in providing legal services there (or elsewhere in the EU) in reliance 11

on that qualifications but he is not doing so when providing legal services in Ireland,

the state in which he was awarded the qualification.

24. I am satisfied that Mr Sallabi’s “home Member State” for the purposes of

Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (the “Lawyers’

Establishment Directive”) and the Irish implementing regulations, the European

Community’s (Lawyers’ Establishment) Regulations 2003 (S.I. No. 732 of 2003) (the

“Lawyers’ Establishment Regulations”), is Ireland. The “host Member State” for the

purposes of that Directive and those Regulations is Belgium. Similarly, the “Member

State from which [Mr Sallabi] comes” for the purposes of Council Directive

77/249/EEC (the “Lawyers’ Services Directive”) is Ireland and the relevant “host

Member State” is Belgium. Nor is Mr Sallabi a “visiting lawyer” within the meaning

of that term in the Irish regulations which implement the Lawyers’ Services Directive,

namely, the European Communities (Freedom to Provide Services) (Lawyers)

Regulations 1979 (S.I. No. 58 of 1979) (the “Lawyers’ Services Regulations”)).

25. It is clear from Article 1(4) of the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive that it is not

open to a lawyer to rely on both that Directive and the Lawyers’ Services Directive and

I have no doubt that in providing legal services in Ireland as an Irish barrister, Mr Sallabi

is not doing so pursuant to any right or freedom of establishment or right to provide

services under the Treaty. When doing so, he is not a “visiting lawyer” within the

meaning of that term in the Lawyers’ Services Regulations. Nor is he a “registered

lawyer” within the meaning of that term in the Lawyers’ Establishment Regulations.

He is an Irish barrister, albeit one who may be seeking to establish, or who may already

have established, himself in Belgium in exercise of his EU free movement rights.

However, he has not become entitled (and does not claim to have become entitled) to

acquire the Belgian legal professional qualification of avocat/advocaat/rechtsanwalt by 12

either of the two ways that can be done under the Lawyers Establishment Directive

(Article 10) or under Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional

qualifications, as amended by Directive 2013/55/EU of the European Parliament and of

the Council of 20 November 2013 ( the “Professional Qualification Directive”) (Article

13 and 14). He is and remains, therefore, an Irish barrister.

26. As an Irish barrister seeking to provide legal services in Ireland, Mr Sallabi is

required to comply with the provisions of the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations,

including the provisions concerning professional indemnity insurance. When providing

those legal services, in Ireland, he is doing so as an Irish barrister and not as a Belgian

avocat/advocaat/rechtsanwalt. When exercising his right of establishment or his

freedom to provide services in Belgium, Mr Sallabi is doing so by virtue of his

professional qualification as an Irish barrister and similarly not as a Belgian

avocat/advocaat/rechtsanwalt.

27. I have concluded, therefore, that Mr Sallabi’s reliance on the Treaty, the Lawyers’

Establishment Directive and the Lawyers’ Services Directive is fundamentally

misplaced. I have also concluded that there is no basis whatsoever for Mr Sallabi’s

contention that the Lawyers’ Establishment Regulations, the Lawyers’ Services

Regulations and the 2024 Regulations should be disapplied by the Court on any of the

grounds maintained by him. There is simply no basis whatsoever for that contention,

which is based on a complete misunderstanding of the correct position under EU law.

28. Even if I were wrong about that, and if it could be said that Mr Sallabi was

exercising either a freedom to provide services or any aspect of a right of establishment

under the Treaty (or under either of the relevant Directives) by providing legal services

as an Irish barrister in Ireland, having moved, as he contends, to establish himself in

Belgium in early 2025, the Authority would nonetheless be clearly entitled to require 13

that he complies with the provisions of the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations

concerning professional indemnity insurance cover in respect of those services having

regard to the provisions of Article 6 of the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive (and

Regulation 6 of the Lawyers’ Establishment Regulations) and Article 4 of the Lawyers’

Services Directive (and Regulation 5 of the Lawyers’ Services Regulations). Mr Sallabi

is being treated by the Authority in precisely the same way as any other Irish barrister

who provides legal services in Ireland. There is nothing whatsoever discriminatory

about that, contrary to Mr Sallabi’s submissions. The many cases on which he relied in

his written and oral submissions, including several judgments of the CJEU simply have

no bearing on, or relevance to, his particular circumstances. Mr Sallabi chose selected

passages from many of those judgments without in any way demonstrating how they

applied to the facts of his case.

29. The Authority’s considered views on the compliance of insurance policies with

the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations deserves respect in light of its role as the

statutory regulator of legal practitioners (including Mr Sallabi) and its experience of

dealing with such policies and regulations. Insofar as the interpretation of the Brussels

Bar policy is concerned, the Court has not been assisted by the evidence of any expert

on Belgian law and has had to do the best it can by applying Irish principles of

interpretation of insurance policies. I am satisfied that the Authority has established

that, on its proper interpretation, the Brussels Bar policy upon which Mr Sallabi relies

does not provide an indemnity to him in respect of legal services which he provides and

intends to provide in Ireland as an Irish barrister (Article 9 and other provisions of the

policy make that clear). I reject Mr Sallabi’s contention that it does. It is striking that

despite numerous attempts by Mr Sallabi to obtain express confirmation from the

Brussels Bar and from the brokers who arranged the Brussels Bar policy, none of them 14

provided such confirmation. If the policy did provide such cover, one might reasonably

have expected that such confirmation would have been provided. I found the failure to

provide that confirmation very telling.

30. Having carefully considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the Authority

and by Mr Sallabi on the territorial or geographical scope of the Brussels Bar policy

and, in particular, on the interpretation of Article 9, I prefer the interpretation advanced

on behalf of the Authority and I found its position much more compelling. Indeed I

would have been surprised if a policy of insurance provided by the Brussels Bar for its

members would provide an indemnity for members on its EU-list (such as Mr Sallabi)

who provide legal services in their home Member State and under their home

professional qualifications (as Mr Sallabi has done and intends to do in Ireland). I am

not surprised, therefore, that neither the Brussels Bar nor the Brokers were prepared to

confirm that cover applied in such circumstances.

31. I am also satisfied that the Brussels Bar policy does not comply with certain other

provisions of the 2024 Regulations, including Regulation 12(1) and certain of the

paragraphs in Regulation 14. With respect to Regulation 12(1), the evidence establishes

that MSIG, one of the two co-insurers under the Brussels Bar policy, clearly meets the

minimum financial requirements in that provision and is licensed and authorised to

transact business in the State pursuant to Directive 2009/138/EC of the Parliament and

the Council (the “Solvency II Directive”) and the Irish implementing regulations, the

European Union (Insurance and Reinsurance) Regulations 2015 (S.I. No. 485 of 2015)

(the “Solvency II Regulations”), has sought to exercise its right to do so and is registered

on the relevant registers maintained for that purpose by the Central Bank of Ireland (the

“CBI”). However, there is no evidence that KBC has sought to exercise its right to do

so. It does not appear on the relevant registers maintained by the CBI. It is not open to 15

Mr Sallabi to seek to enforce a right that KBC may have to transact business in Ireland

where there is no evidence that KBC has sought to or wishes to do so. It is KBC’s right,

not Mr Sallabi’s. Consequently, I reject Mr Sallabi’s contention that the Brussels Bar

policy complies with the requirements of Regulation 12(1).

32. I have also considered the Authority’s contention that the Brussels Bar policy

does not comply with the requirements contained in Regulation 14 and Mr Sallabi’s

arguments in response. I have concluded, for reasons which are outlined in greater detail

in my judgment below, that the policy may not comply with the requirement in

Regulation 14(a) and does not comply with the requirements contained in Regulation

14 (b) to (d).

33. In those circumstances, the Authority was entitled to take the view that the

Brussels Bar policy does not comply with the provisions of the 2015 Act and the 2024

Regulations, that it was not a “qualifying insurance policy” which covers legal services

provided by Mr Sallabi as an Irish barrister in Ireland and that it is not open to him to

provide such services here unless he puts in place a compliant professional indemnity

insurance policy. I am satisfied that in holding himself out as being entitled to provide

such legal services and intending to do so, Mr Sallabi is likely to contravene the relevant

provisions of the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations and that the Authority is entitled

to an order under s. 35(1)(a) of the 2015 Act prohibiting him from contravening those

provisions.

34. I have also considered the submissions advanced by Mr Sallabi in relation to the

Zurich policy. He maintains that the Zurich policy does not comply with the 2015 Act

and the 2024 Regulations. This is a very surprising position for Mr Sallabi to adopt as

he was insured under that policy between October 2023 and the end of April 2025 (for

a premium or €90) and even sought a quote from AON for cover under the Zurich policy 16

in March 2026 (and obtained a quote for an annual premium of €235.00). Mr Sallabi

relied on the Zurich policy for that period to comply with his obligations under the 2015

Act, under the predecessor regulations to the 2024 Regulations and under the 2024

Regulations themselves. The Authority is satisfied that the Zurich policy does comply

with the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations. I have considered the submissions

advanced by Mr Sallabi to the contrary and I reject them. Having reviewed the terms of

the Zurich policy and the cover provided under that policy (including the run-off cover

which is provided, as is apparent from the material exhibited by Mr Sallabi), I am

satisfied that the Zurich policy does comply with the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations

and there is no basis for Mr Sallabi’s surprising contention to the contrary.

35. I have also considered the other arguments advanced by Mr Sallabi in response

to the Authority’s application. I reject his submission that the Court does not have

jurisdiction and ought not to entertain the Authority’s application on the grounds

advanced by him.

36. First, I reject his contention that it is not possible for the Court to determine the

issues raised in these proceedings in an application by the Authority under s. 35 of the

2015 Act. I am satisfied that the proceedings have been properly brought by the

Authority by an originating notice of motion in accordance with Order 53D and Order

84B of the Rules of the Superior Courts (the “RSC”), and that the evidence in the

proceedings was properly provided on affidavit in accordance with Order 84B, Rule 7

RSC. There were no relevant facts in dispute which may have required cross-

examination or plenary proceedings. Nor were the legal issues raised of such

complexity as to preclude their resolution in the proceedings brought by the Authority.

37. Second, I reject the contention that the Court ought not to have heard the

application on the grounds that there is also a complaint of misconduct against Mr 17

Sallabi pending before the Authority. The existence of the complaint (which includes

an allegation that Mr Sallabi did not have, at the time of the complaint, a valid and

effective professional indemnity insurance policy as well as many other issues) does

not preclude the Court from dealing with the Authority’s application for orders under

s. 35 of the 2015 Act. A different test and different principles apply to the Authority’s

consideration of the complaint alleging “misconduct” (as defined in s. 50 of the 2015

Act) on the part of Mr Sallabi under Part 6 of the Act. It is a matter for the Authority to

determine how it deals with the complaint (and I understand from what Mr Sallabi told

me in his submissions that he has been in correspondence with the Authority about the

complaint but has not sought to prevent it from dealing with the complaint). The

existence of the complaint does not, however, preclude the Court from exercising its

jurisdiction under s. 35 of the 2015 Act and from making orders under that section. The

making of such orders does not amount to a finding of “misconduct” on the part of Mr

Sallabi. Any alleged “misconduct” on the part of Mr Sallabi must be determined in

accordance with the procedures under Part 6 of the 2015 Act.

38. I am satisfied that there is no other reason why I should not grant the orders sought

by the Authority. Everything points in favour of granting the orders. It is essential for

the protection of the public and for clients of Mr Sallabi to whom he provides legal

services as an Irish barrister in Ireland that he has a compliant professional indemnity

insurance policy in place. As things stand, he does not. However, on the evidence, it

appears that that deficiency can easily be remedied. While not directly relevant to the

making of the orders sought by the Authority, I find it astonishing that Mr Sallabi

decided not to proceed with the quotation which he obtained from AON in March 2026

and to subscribe to the Zurich policy which would have provided him with a compliant

policy for an annual premium cost of €235.00. His explanation for not taking out that 18

policy is baffling, contradictory and makes absolutely no sense. He has spent many

multiples of that amount responding to the Authority’s application and has caused the

Authority to incur what are no doubt very substantial costs in engaging external

solicitors and counsel to act for it in this application. This whole exercise is a scandalous

waste of time and money by Mr Sallabi.

39. The allegations which Mr Sallabi has chosen to make against the Authority and

its lawyers, lawyers acting for his opponents in the litigation in the High Court in which

he sought to represent one of the parties, and a High Court judge are quite extraordinary.

As if that was not bad enough, Mr Sallabi’s utterly irresponsible and baseless

allegations against a female solicitor in the firm representing the Authority in this

application who happened to finish up her employment with the firm during the

currency of the application reached the nadir, as far as I am concerned. All of those

allegations were made without any proper basis and, seemingly, without any proper

appreciation of how litigation should be conducted before the Irish courts. This is

particularly regrettable for someone who is qualified as an Irish barrister and was called

to the Irish Bar. It was entirely improper, inappropriate and irresponsible for Mr Sallabi

to make those allegations. They ought not to have been made on affidavit or in Mr

Sallabi’s written submissions and ought to have been immediately withdrawn. They

were not.

40. For these reasons, which are further elaborated on in my judgment below, I have

decided to grant the orders sought by the Authority. I will make the orders sought at

paras. 1, 2 and 3 of the Originating Notice of Motion on a permanent basis and unless

and until Mr Sallabi puts in place a professional indemnity insurance policy which

complies with the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations. 19

3. The nature of the application: section 35 of the 2015 Act

41. This is the first judgment on an application by the Authority for orders under s.

35 of the 2015 Act. Section 35 is headed “Order to prohibit contravention of Act” and

is in the following terms:

“35 (1) Where, on the application of the Authority, it is shown to the

satisfaction of the High Court –

(a) that a legal practitioner or any other person has

contravened, is contravening or is likely to contravene any

provision of this Act or regulations made under it, or

(b) …

the Court may by order prohibit the legal practitioner or other

person concerned from contravening that provision,

notwithstanding that any such contravention may constitute an

offence.

(2) An order under subsection (1) may contain such provisions of a

consequential nature as the Court considers appropriate.”

42. Section 35 of the 2015 Act, therefore, provides for a statutory form of injunction.

It is a civil remedy and is distinct from the prosecution of criminal offences created by

the 2015 Act which may be prosecuted summarily by the Authority (s. 36) and from

Part 6 of the Act which concerns complaints and the disciplinary regime in respect of

legal practitioners, including in the case of alleged misconduct. Complaints of

misconduct are dealt with in accordance with the statutory regime set out in Part 6 of

the 2015 Act. 20

43. The procedure which governs the bringing of an application for orders under s.

35 of the 2015 Act is governed by Order 53D and Order 84B of the Rules of the Superior

Courts. Order 53D, Rule 8(2) provides that every application to the High Court under

the provisions of the 2015 Act set out in Order 53D, Rule 8(1) is required to be brought

and conducted in accordance with Order 84B. Order 53D, Rule 8(1)(vii) refers to

applications brought by the Authority under s. 35(1) of the 2015 Act to prohibit the

contravention of that Act or regulations made under it.

44. Under Order 84B, Rule 2, an application under s. 35(1) of the 2015 Act is required

to be made by originating notice of motion (the “notice of motion”). The remaining

subrules of Rule 2 provide for certain formal requirements in respect of the notice of

motion. Rule 3 requires the notice of motion to be grounded on an affidavit and contains

various formal requirements in respect of that affidavit. Rule 4 provides for service of

the notice of motion, grounding affidavit and exhibits on the respondent. Provision is

made in Rule 5 for the filing of a statement of opposition by the respondent which is

required to set out concisely the grounds of opposition to the application which, if facts

are relied on, must be verified on affidavit. While the Respondent did not file any

statement of opposition in this case, no issue was taken by the Authority. It was, in any

event, clear from Mr Sallabi’s replying affidavits and from his written submissions what

the grounds of his opposition to the Authority’s application were.

45. Significantly, Order 84B, Rule 7 provides that unless the Court otherwise directs,

the evidence in an application under s. 35 of the 2015 Act is required to be given on

affidavit. The Authority and Mr Sallabi swore a number of affidavits in respect of the

Authority’s application.

46. Order 84B, Rule 8 provides that on the return date of the motion (or on any

adjournment from that date) the Court is required to give directions and to make such 21

orders for the conduct of the proceedings as are convenient for the determination of the

proceedings “in a manner which is just, expeditious and likely to minimise the costs of

those proceedings…”. Those directions include directions for the filing and delivery of

further affidavits and for the delivery of written submissions. Rule 8(2) provides that

on the return date of the notice of motion (or on any adjournment from that date), “the

Court may, where it deems fit, hear any application for relief of an interlocutory nature,

whether in the nature of an injunction or otherwise”.

47. When Mr Sallabi sought a lengthy adjournment of the Authority’s application on

the first return date of the motion, the Authority applied for orders to be made during

the period of that adjournment. I was satisfied that interlocutory orders should be made

at that stage and did so in accordance with the Court’s powers under Order 84B, Rule

8(2). Those interlocutory orders were in the terms set out in the notice of motion. I also

gave directions and made orders for the conduct of the proceedings in accordance with

Order 84B, Rule 8(1) providing for the delivery of a replying affidavit by Mr Sallabi.

On the adjourned date (15 April 2026) I gave further directions which included

directions for the delivery of further affidavits and the delivery of the Authority’s

written submissions and listed the application for hearing on 28 and 29 April 2026. Mr

Sallabi agreed to provide undertakings in the terms previously mentioned in lieu of

further interlocutory orders. Those undertakings were renewed on 29 April 2026 and

replaced by interlocutory orders made on 21 May, 11 June and 26 June 2026.

48. Although Mr Sallabi appeared to be under the impression (in the replying

affidavit which he swore on 2 April 2026) that the test which the Court has to apply on

an application by the Authority for orders under s. 35 of the 2015 Act is that applicable

to the granting of an interlocutory injunction (where the court is concerned with whether

there is a serious issue or fair question to be tried and whether the balance of justice lies 22

in favour of or against the granting of the order sought), that is not the test which I have

to apply in determining the Authority’s application. While the orders made on 16

February 2026 and on the other dates referred to above were interlocutory in nature, the

orders which the Authority now seeks are not. They are final orders to last until Mr

Sallabi subscribes to a compliant policy of professional indemnity insurance. I am not

concerned, therefore, on this application as to whether the Authority has established a

fair question or serious issue to be tried or whether the balance of justice lies in favour

of or against granting the reliefs sought by the Authority. Rather, the Authority must

establish to the requisite standard of proof (on the balance of probabilities) that it is

entitled to the reliefs sought. In that respect, the Authority must establish to the

satisfaction of the Court that Mr Sallabi has contravened, is contravening or is likely to

contravene any provision of the 2015 Act or of the 2024 Regulations. If it does establish

to the satisfaction of the Court that he has or is or is likely to contravene any of those

provisions, the Court may (but is not necessarily required to) make orders prohibiting

Mr Sallabi from contravening those provisions.

49. Mr Sallabi also maintained that it is not appropriate to determine the Authority’s

application on the basis of the notice of motion it issued in circumstances where he

contended that there were disputed issues of fact between the parties and complex issues

of law which were not capable of resolution on a summary basis. I do not accept that

submission. As I have indicated, the Authority has brought its application in compliance

with the provisions of Orders 53D and 84B of the RSC. I am satisfied that there are not

relevant disputed issues of fact or sufficiently complex legal issues which would

preclude the court from hearing and deciding the Authority’s application on the basis

of the affidavits and the submissions (written and oral). 23

50. Mr Sallabi further contended that the Court had no jurisdiction to determine the

issues in the case on the basis that they involved the determination of a complaint of

professional misconduct against him. I reject that contention. Section 35 of the 2015

Act gives the Court jurisdiction to determine whether a legal practitioner has

contravened, is contravening or is likely to contravene any provision of the 2015 Act

or of regulations made under it, which, in this case, are the 2024 Regulations. The Court

has that jurisdiction even if the alleged contravention may constitute a criminal offence

(s. 35(1)). Criminal offences may be prosecuted summarily by the Authority (s. 36 of

the 2015 Act). The Authority would have to meet a different standard of proof in order

to sustain a prosecution for an offence under the 2015 Act or under the relevant

regulations.

51. The position is, in my view, somewhat similar in the case of allegations of

misconduct. Complaints, including those alleging misconduct, and the disciplinary

regime to determine those complaints are dealt with in Part 6 of the 2015 Act. Part 6

sets out a very detailed process for the consideration and ultimate determination of

complaints against legal practitioners, potentially involving an inquiry by a panel of the

Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal. The fact that the Authority brings an

application for orders under s. 35 arising from an alleged contravention of the 2015 Act

or of regulations made under it, does not in any way affect or undermine the complaints

and disciplinary process set out in Part 6. The fact that orders may have been made

under s. 35 of the 2015 Act would not in any way remove or detract from the obligations

on the Authority and on the various other bodies referred to in Part 6 to follow the

applicable procedures for considering and determining complaints made against the

legal practitioner, including complaints of misconduct. A different test will apply to the

consideration and determination of such complaints and a different legal standard will 24

apply, including a different standard of proof (the criminal standard of proof beyond a

reasonable doubt). The fact, therefore, that one of the acts or omissions on the part of a

legal practitioner which may be considered as constituting misconduct under s. 50(1)

of the 2015 Act for the purposes of Part 6 is a breach of the 2015 Act or regulations

made under it (s. 50(1)(m)) does not in any way preclude the Authority from seeking

orders under s. 35. If it had been the intention of the Oireachtas to preclude the

Authority from seeking orders under s. 35 in relation to alleged contraventions of the

2015 Act or of regulations made under it, in circumstances where a complaint of

misconduct, including misconduct consisting of an alleged breach of the 2015 Act or

of such regulations, is under consideration by the Authority under Part 6, the Oireachtas

would have likely included such a provision in the 2015 Act. It did not do so. There is,

therefore, nothing, in my view, to prevent the Authority from bringing an application

for orders under s. 35 of the 2015 Act in the case of an alleged contravention of that

Act or of regulations made under it in circumstances where the same conduct could

amount to misconduct under s. 50. Therefore, the fact that a complaint of misconduct

has been made against Mr Sallabi which includes (amongst other things) a complaint

that he did not have a compliant policy of insurance during the course of 2025 does not

preclude the Authority from seeking the orders which it seeks under s. 35.

4. Factual Background

52. The factual background to and the relevant facts for this application are contained

in the affidavits sworn on behalf of the Authority and Mr Sallabi together with the

extensive exhibits to those affidavits. I set out in this section of my judgment and

comment upon the relevant evidence. I summarise the relevant findings of fact in the

next section of the judgment. 25

53. The Authority/LSRA was established pursuant to Part 2 of the 2015 Act. Its

functions are set out in s. 13. Its primary function is to “regulate the provision of legal

services by legal practitioners” and it is required to “ensure the maintenance and

improvement of standards in the provision of such services in the State” (s. 13(1)).

Without prejudice to the generality of that essential function, the Authority has further

functions set out in s. 13(2). They include the requirement to “specify the nature and

minimum levels of professional indemnity insurance in accordance with sections 46 and

47” (s. 13(2)(c)).

54. The Authority is also required under s. 13(4) to have regard to certain objectives

when performing its function of the regulation of the provision of legal services. Those

objectives include “protecting and promoting the public interest” (s. 13(4)(a)),

“protecting and promoting the interests of consumers relating to the provision of legal

services” (section 13(4)(c)) and “promoting and maintaining adherence to the

professional principles specified in subsection (5)” (s. 13(4)(f)). Included in the

professional principles are the requirements for practitioners to “act in the best interests

of their clients” and to “maintain proper standards of work” (s. 13(5)(a)). As part of

its functions, the Authority regulates “practising barristers”. I will return to the

definition of that term later.

55. Mr Sallabi was admitted by the Honorable Society of King’s Inns to the degree

of Barrister-at-Law on 10 October 2023. He was called to the Irish Bar by the Chief

Justice on 11 October 2023. He applied to the Authority to be included on the Roll of

Practising Barristers (the “Roll”) on the same date.

56. The provisions of the 2015 Act in relation to the Roll are contained in Part 9 of

the 2015 Act. Under s. 134(1), a person who is a “qualified barrister” and who intends

to provide “legal services” as a barrister is required to apply to the Authority to have 26

his or her name and certain other information referred to in s. 133(4) entered on the Roll

and the Authority, if satisfied that the person is a “qualified barrister” is required to

enter the name of that person and the relevant information on the Roll. An application

for entry on the Roll must be accompanied by the person’s address for correspondence

and “such other contact details of the person as the Authority may specify” (s. 134(2)).

57. In his application form for inclusion on the Roll, Mr Sallabi confirmed that he

was not a member of the Law Library or in full time service of the State. He provided

a correspondence address (which was an address in Dublin 18) and an email address

(xxxxxxxxxxxxx). He provided two Irish mobile telephone numbers as his telephone

contacts, gave his year of admission to the degree of Barrister-at-Law by the King’s

Inns and the date of his call to the Irish Bar. He confirmed in that form that he was not

registered as a “registered lawyer” by virtue of the Lawyers’ Establishment

Regulations. Mr Sallabi further confirmed in the form that he was a “qualified

barrister” and that he intended to provide legal services as a barrister.

58. There is no doubt, therefore, that Mr Sallabi is a “qualified barrister”. That term

is defined in s. 2(1) of the 2015 Act as meaning a person who (a) has been admitted to

the degree of Barrister-at-Law by the King’s Inns or has been called to the Irish Bar

other than in certain circumstances (which do not apply here) or (b) is a “registered

lawyer” who has the same right of audience as a “practising barrister” or a solicitor

qualified to practise by virtue of the Lawyers’ Establishment Regulations. As he

expressly confirmed in his application form for entry on the Roll, Mr Sallabi is clearly

a “qualified barrister” having been admitted to the degree of Barrister-at-Law by the

King’s Inns and as having been called to the Bar of Ireland. He is not a “registered

lawyer” as confirmed by him in the form. 27

59. Mr Sallabi is also a “practising barrister”. That term is defined in s. 2(1) as being

a person who (a) is a “qualified barrister” and (b) provides, or holds himself out as

providing, “legal services” as a barrister whether or not for a fee or under a contract of

service or a contract for services or describing himself or using the title of “Barrister”,

“Barrister-at-Law” or “Counsel”. Mr Sallabi confirmed in the form, in

correspondence and on affidavit that he provides and intends to provide “legal

services” in Ireland and has done and intends to do so using his professional

qualification of Barrister-at-Law and describing himself as a “barrister”, as “Joseph

Sallabi Barrister-at-Law” and as “Joseph Sallabi, BL” (as is clear from the affidavits

which he has sworn in these proceedings and in the proceedings before the High Court

and from his letterhead, to which I will return shortly).

60. Having considered Mr Sallabi’s application for entry on the Roll, and being

satisfied that he was a “qualified barrister”, the Authority entered his name and the

relevant information on the Roll on 16 October 2023. The Authority wrote to him on

that date confirming the position and asking him to notify the Authority in the event

that his relevant details, including his address, changed.

61. On 20 November 2024, Mr Sallabi wrote to the Authority requesting an update

to his registered address. He noted that his residential address (in Dublin 18) was

unchanged but that he preferred to use his “business address as [his] preferred contract

(sic) address for all future correspondence”. The “business address” which he

provided was “Sallabi Law Office, Mespil House, Sussex Road, Ballsbridge, Dublin 4,

D04 T4A6”. That letter was sent on headed notepaper which on the top centre described

Mr Sallabi as a Barrister-at-Law with the address at Mespil House. On the top left his

academic and other qualifications including various diplomas were set out, including a

Diploma in Legal Studies in the King’s Inns and a Diploma in Law in the Law Society 28

of Ireland. On the top right his email address, xxxxxxxxxxxxxx, (which was different

to that previously notified to the Authority) and his telephone and fax contact details

(which were all Dublin telephone numbers) were set out. On the same date (30

November 2024), Mr Sallabi wrote to the Authority (using the same later head) seeking

letters from the Authority confirming his active registration on the Roll and a “letter of

reciprocity” to assist him in “joining a global attorney partnership in Turkey”. Mr

Sallabi has not sought to update his address (whether personal or professional) since

November 2024.

62. Following his call to the Irish Bar in October 2023 and his entry on the Roll, Mr

Sallabi took out a policy of professional indemnity insurance which was issued by

Zurich Insurance plc and arranged through brokers, AON Ireland (“AON”), (the

“Zurich policy”). That Zurich company was an Irish insurance company. It ceased

operations in January 2024. Thereafter, the relevant professional indemnity insurance

policy provided by Zurich for Irish barristers was issued by a branch of Zurich

Insurance Europe AG, a German company, operating in Ireland (it too will be referred

to as simply as the Zurich policy).

63. Mr Sallabi was covered under the Zurich policy in respect of his legal services as

a practising barrister up to and including 30 April 2025. The Authority was satisfied

that the Zurich policy complied with the relevant provisions of the 2015 Act and the

2024 Regulations (and the previous Regulations which were made in 2019, namely,

The Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 (Professional Indemnity Insurance)

Regulations 2019 (S.I. No. 572 of 2019) (the “2019 Regulations”)).

64. From mid-May 2025 onwards, Mr Sallabi engaged in correspondence with the

Authority concerning his professional indemnity insurance position. He sent an email

to the Authority on 14 May 2025 stating that he did not renew the Zurich policy on its 29

renewal date of 1 May 2025 because he had “registered with the Brussels Bar

Association in February 2025”. He stated that as part of that registration, he subscribed

to the “Brussels Bar insurance policy”(i.e. the Brussels Bar policy) and stated that that

policy “provides coverage for [his] professional activities across all EU countries”.

He stated that he was so notifying the Authority to comply with its obligations under

the 2019 Regulations. He sent a copy of the Dutch-language version of the Brussels Bar

policy, noting that it was due for renewal for a further three-year term on 1 January

2026.

65. The Authority responded to Mr Sallabi’s email on 29 May 2025. It pointed out

that the 2019 Regulations had been revoked and replaced by the 2024 Regulations. It

referred to the obligations on practising barristers providing “legal services” (which

term is defined in s. 2(1) of the 2015 Act as meaning “legal services provided by a

person, whether as a solicitor or as a barrister” and, is elaborated on in s. 2(4)(b) which

provides that a person provides legal services as a barrister where he or she does one or

more than one of a number of specified actions, including, in relation to proceedings

before a court, tribunal or arbitral tribunal in or outside the State, representing or

advising a person in those proceedings or providing legal advice).Those obligations

include the obligation to have in place a “qualifying insurance policy” which covers

such legal services and to provide evidence of such within 14 days of the

commencement date of the policy and within 14 days of each renewal date (Regulation

4(1) and (2) of the 2024 Regulations). The Authority requested Mr Sallabi to provide

evidence that he had a policy of insurance in place which covered the legal services

which he was providing in accordance with the 2024 Regulations. It requested evidence

that the policy on which Mr Sallabi was relying satisfied the requirements of a

“qualifying” policy of insurance under the 2024 Regulations. It also sought evidence 30

that the relevant policy applied to Mr Sallabi in circumstances where it appeared to be

between the Orde van Vlaamse Bailes (the Order of Flemish Bars) and the relevant

insurance companies under the policy. The Authority also sought an English or Irish

translation of the policy.

66. On 24 June 2025, Mr Sallabi sent an email to the Authority in which he provided

an English translation of the Brussels Bar policy and a copy of his “lawyer’s card”.

Both he and the Authority proceeded on the basis that the version sent with his email

of 24 June 2025 was a correct and accurate translation of the policy. As we shall see,

very late in the day and by way of a replying affidavit served shortly before the hearing

of the application, Mr Sallabi provided another English translation of the policy (which

was produced by Word Perfect Translations (“Word Perfect”)). I am satisfied that there

is no significant difference between the two versions of the translation of the policy and

no objection was made on behalf of the Authority to Mr Sallabi’s reference to the later

version. In fact Mr Sallabi referred to both versions at various points in his written and

oral submissions. My conclusions on the scope of the Brussels Bar policy apply equally

to both translated versions. The “lawyer’s card” enclosed with the email referred to Mr

Sallabi as a Belgian “Advocaat – Avocat – Rechtsanwalt – Attorney”. However, it is

clear from an examination of the relevant Directives that Mr Sallabi’s entitlement to

practise law in Belgium is under his “home-country professional title” i.e. that of

Barrister (see, for example, Article 2 of the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive) and not

as a Belgian qualified lawyer. Mr Sallabi has not yet become entitled (and does not

claim to have become entitled) to acquire a Belgian legal professional qualification by

either of the two ways that can be done under the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive

(Article 10) or under the Professional Qualifications Directive (Articles 13 and 14). Mr 31

Sallabi confirmed in his email that he had requested and would forward to the Authority

a certificate of membership of the “Flemish Order in Brussels Bar Association”.

67. Later that day (24 June 2025), Mr Sallabi sent another email to the in which he

attached a copy of what he described as the “Certificate of Membership in Brussels Bar

Association (sic)”. This was in fact a “Certificate of Admission” (the “Certificate”)

signed by Mr Frank Judo, Dean of the Brussels Bar (Dutch language section) certifying

that Mr Sallabi has been registered on the EU-list of the Brussels Bar since 20 January

2025, that he is of “good standing and reputation” and that he is “insured for the

activities covered by the collective professional liability insurance policy that was taken

out by the Flemish Bar Association with Amlin in Europe NV and Vanbreda as a broker

for the amount of a maximum of €2,500,000 per damage event”.

68. The Authority claims that while it received the email of 24 June 2025 it did not

receive the attached certificate. The Authority did not raise this with Mr Sallabi on

receipt of the email as it ought to have done. Mr Sallabi did not accept that the Authority

had not received a copy of the Certificate notwithstanding the averments of Anthony

Watson, then Interim CEO of the Authority, that no attachment to the email was

received and that that position was confirmed having rechecked the position following

receipt of one of Mr Sallabi’s affidavits. This is ultimately a red herring as the Authority

did not suggest that Mr Sallabi did not attach a copy of the Certificate but that the

Certificate was not received by it. What is, however, of some significance is that Mr

Sallabi chose to seize on that issue in his affidavits and in his submissions to make wild,

irresponsible and inappropriate allegations against the Authority that it provided

“potentially deliberate misleading” evidence and “fabricated and false evidence” and

that it presented a “false document”. That approach is consistent with a number of other 32

wild and unsubstantiated allegations made by Mr Sallabi in his affidavits and in his

submissions.

69. I accept that Mr Sallabi did attach a copy of the Certificate to his email and I also

accept that the Authority did not receive it, as confirmed on affidavit by Mr Watson.

However, the Authority ought to have drawn this to the attention of Mr Sallabi

following receipt of the email. As it happens the certificate is relevant to the issue as to

whether Mr Sallabi is a person entitled to the benefit of the Brussels Bar policy and

whether that policy covers legal services which Mr Sallabi provides and intends to

continue providing as a Irish Barrister. Once the Authority saw a copy of the Certificate

(with Mr Sallabi’s first replying affidavit in this case), the Authority confirmed that it

was satisfied that Mr Sallabi is a person entitled to whatever benefits are provided under

the policy.

70. While the Authority and Mr Sallabi were engaged in correspondence in relation

to his professional indemnity insurance, the Authority was contacted by a High Court

Registrar, in July 2025, concerning certain Companies Acts proceedings involving Al

Maktoum Foundation CLG (the “Al Maktoum proceedings”). Mr Sallabi was

purporting to represent the applicants in those proceedings, including the company Al

Maktoum Foundation CLG (“Al Maktoum”) and issue was taken by the notice parties

to those proceedings to his entitlement to represent that company. As appears from

transcripts exhibited by Mr Watson in support of the Authority’s application, the Al

Maktoum proceedings were before Nolan J in the High Court on 18 July 2025. In the

course of the application before Nolan J that day, the judge queried Mr Sallabi’s

entitlement to represent the applicants as counsel in the proceedings and directed that

the Authority be provided with copies of the papers in the proceedings and requested to

appear before him the following week so that Mr Sallabi’s entitlement to act as counsel 33

in the proceedings could be considered. The judge adjourned the matter from 18 July

2025 to 24 July 2025.

71. On the adjourned date, a solicitor attended in court before Nolan J on behalf of

the Authority. The judge directed that further papers (including the transcript from that

day’s hearing) be provided to the Authority. By that stage, Mr Sallabi had confirmed to

the court that he was no longer appearing as counsel acting in the proceedings but would

be continuing to act “in the background”. The Al Maktoum proceedings were

subsequently dealt with by another High Court judge (Kennedy J) and it seems he made

orders striking out the proceedings on 11 February 2026, the effect of which, Mr Sallabi

contends, is to prevent him from providing legal services in the State.

72. Mr Sallabi has made numerous wild and serious allegations, unsubstantiated by

any evidence, against various parties in the Al Maktoum proceedings and their Irish

solicitors and counsel and against the judge who originally dealt with the matter and

against the Authority itself, including seeking to impugn the motivation of the Authority

in bringing this application under s. 35 of the 2015 Act. As I have previously indicated,

those allegations were inappropriately made, ought not to have been made by Mr Sallabi

and ought to have been unequivocally withdrawn by him.

73. Following the referral of papers by Nolan J to the Authority in July 2025, a

complaint of misconduct was made to the Authority in relation to Mr Sallabi by Ms

Eleanor Carmody of the Authority on 22 October 2025 (the “Complaint”). Mr Watson

referred to the Complaint in his grounding affidavit and exhibited a copy of the

Complaint. One of the complaints of misconduct made against Mr Sallabi is his alleged

failure to have a qualifying policy of insurance in place to cover legal services provided

by him as a barrister. A number of other allegations of misconduct and breaches of

regulations made under the 2015 Act are also made against Mr Sallabi. I am not 34

concerned with the Complaint in this application. As I have explained earlier in this

judgment, that Complaint must be dealt with in accordance with the relevant provisions

of the 2015 Act. The fact that one of the allegations against Mr Sallabi concerns his

professional indemnity insurance cover does not preclude me from hearing and

deciding the Authority’s application under s. 35 of the 2015 Act, for the reasons I have

explained earlier.

74. On 23 October 2025 (the day after the Complaint was received), the Authority

wrote to Mr Sallabi referring to its email of 29 May 2025 and noting that it had received

an English translation of the Brussels Bar policy on 24 June 2025. The letter noted that

the Authority was not satisfied that the policy met the requirements of the 2024

Regulations. In particular, the Authority was not satisfied that the policy complied with

Regulations 12(1) or 14 “or that the policy covers services provided other than from

an office established in Belgium”. The letter then referred to the obligations on a

practising barrister under Regulation 4(1) and (3) of the 2024 Regulations.

Significantly, the Authority invited Mr Sallabi to engage on the issue with his insurance

providers and/or with the Flemish Bar Association or any other Bar Association of

which he was a member. The Authority requested a response within 14 days and noted

that if it did not receive a satisfactory response it could make an application to the High

Court under s. 35 of the 2015 Act.

75. Mr Sallabi replied by letter dated 10 November 2025. The letter, sent on note-

paper, was headed “Sallabi Law Office”. Underneath that heading there were three

columns of information. In the first column (on the left) it was noted that Mr Sallabi

was a member of the “Brussels Bar Association”. It then referred to a “Head Office”

as being an address in Brussels and to certain advanced diploma qualifications obtained

by Mr Sallabi from the King’s Inns. In the middle column Mr Sallabi was identified as 35

a Barrister-at-Law and his address was given as “Mespil House, Sussex Road,

Ballsbridge, Dublin 4, County Dublin D04 T4A6”. In the right hand column were two

telephone numbers and a fax number as well as an email address “xxxxxxxxxxxxx”. The

telephone and fax numbers were all Dublin numbers. The Mespil House address, the

Dublin telephone address and fax numbers and the email address were all identical to

the information contained in the letters sent to the Authority in November 2024. What

was new was the reference to him being a member of the “Brussels Bar Association”,

the reference to a “Head Office” in Brussels and the reference to the various King’s

Inns diplomas. Mr Sallabi’s letterhead does not include any Belgian telephone or fax

number. Mr Sallabi signed the letter as “Joseph Sallabi, BL”.

76. In the body of his letter Mr Sallabi contended that no issue of non-compliance

with the 2024 Regulations arose in respect of the period up to 30 April 2025 as he had

a qualifying insurance policy during that time which was accepted by the Authority

without objection. That was, of course, the Zurich policy (a policy which,

notwithstanding what he said in the letter of 10 November 2025, Mr Sallabi

subsequently sought somewhat inconsistently and surprisingly to contend in these

proceedings did not comply with the 2024 Regulations). Similarly, he asserted that no

issue of non-compliance should arise during the period of his alleged employment with

Al Maktoum between 12 May 2025 and 13 October 2025 as, he contended, a policy

was not required for barristers in employment. I observe here, however, that Mr Sallabi

was clearly incorrect in that respect as the relevant exemption under Regulation 3(1)(d)

of the 2024 Regulations only applies to practising barristers providing legal services

other than as “an employee providing legal services exclusively to their employer” and

Mr Sallabi confirmed to Nolan J on 18 July 2025 that he was only working part-time

for Al Maktoum, that he was in-house counsel with two companies and that he was also 36

otherwise providing legal advice. The exemption on which he relied at the time did not,

therefore, apply to his situation.

77. Mr Sallabi sought to respond to the various other matters raised by the Authority.

He noted that MSIG (formerly MS Amblin) had an “A” (excellent) rating and was

included in the list of licensed and authorised insurance companies in Ireland on the

relevant CBI register. He further contended that the Brussels Bar policy complied with

the requirements of the 2024 Regulations and was a “qualifying insurance policy” for

the purposes of those regulations. He referred to certain clauses or articles of that policy

(Articles 7, 17 and 21). He then stated that he had been admitted to the Brussels Bar on

20 January 2025 and that his registration with that Bar constituted his “official

establishment in Belgium” for the purposes of the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive.

He contended that since that date his “Brussels office” has been the “centre of [his]

main interests”. He drew attention to the top left of his letterhead which designated his

“Brussels office” as his “Head Office”. He explained that with respect to his “Dublin

Office” it served solely as a “point of contact, with all inquiries (sic) being directed to

[him] while … based abroad.” As further evidence supporting his assertion that Ireland

was “no longer [his] primary place of business”, he explained that he was not present

in Ireland during 2025 prior to 16 May 2025, and that he travelled to Ireland on that

date to fulfil his employment duties to Al Maktoum and departed Ireland as soon as he

believed that his presence was “no longer necessary”. He contended that in respect of

the period between 1 May and 11 May 2025, he provided advice to “two clients from

Ireland”, that that advice was given remotely, in his capacity as a “Belgian lawyer”

and that he had made that clear to both clients. In respect of the period between 14

October and 23 October 2025 and thereafter, he could not recall providing any services

to “individuals in Ireland”. He stated that should he be approached for services in the 37

future, he intended to provide such services “solely in [his] capacity as a Belgian

lawyer, operating from [his] office in Brussels.”

78. I observe here that nowhere in the various exchanges Mr Sallabi had with Nolan

J in the High Court on 18 July and 24 July 2025 did Mr Sallabi state that he had moved

his establishment from Dublin to Brussels or that his “Dublin office” served solely as

a point of contact. The clear impression one would get from reading the transcripts of

those exchanges is that Mr Sallabi was providing whatever services he was providing

(including those he stated he was providing for Al Maktoum) from his office at Mespil

House in Dublin. I should also clarify at this point that, although he asserted in his letter

of 10 November 2025 that he was providing legal services (in the time periods he

mentioned in the letter) as a “Belgian lawyer”, he confirmed in answer to a question I

asked him at the hearing on 29 April 2026 that, in providing legal services in Ireland,

he was doing so as a barrister (a professional qualification he obtained from the King’s

Inns on foot of which he was called to the Irish Bar and registered with the Authority)

and not as a Belgian advocaat/avocat/rechtsanwalt. Finally, notwithstanding what he

said in his letter to the Authority of 10 November 2025, Mr Sallabi has never sought to

change his registered address with the Authority to a Brussels address. Rather, as noted

earlier, on 20 November 2024 he wrote to the Authority requesting that it change his

registered address from the Dublin 18 address to the Mespil House address, stating that

while his residential address was unchanged, his preference was to use the latter address

for all future correspondence.

79. The Authority replied on 12 December 2025. It explained that its concern was not

confined to the time periods mentioned by Mr Sallabi but applied to all periods where

Mr Sallabi was providing legal services as a “practising barrister”. The Authority was

not satisfied that the Brussels Bar policy complied with the requirements of the 2015 38

Act and, in particular, with the requirements of the 2024 Regulations. The letter outlined

that the Authority’s concerns had not been satisfactorily addressed and again pointed

out that it might have no alternative but to apply to the High Court for orders under s.

35 of the 2015 Act. The letter then went on to identify a number of areas of concern

which the Authority had.

80. The first was Mr Sallabi’s entitlement to an indemnity under the policy. That

concern arose as Mr Sallabi was not specifically named in the policy and the indemnity

provided under the policy was in respect of certain specified classes of persons. As I

have indicated, this concern fell away once the Authority saw Mr Sallabi’s certificate

of admission to the Brussels Bar and received confirmation that he has been registered

on the EU-list of the Brussels Bar since 20 January 2025.

81. The second concern related to the application of the Brussels Bar policy to legal

services provided by Mr Sallabi in the State. The Authority referred to Article 9 of the

policy as being of particular concern. Significantly, the Authority requested Mr Sallabi

to furnish confirmation from both the Brussels Bar Association (Order of Flemish Bars)

and the insurers that, contrary to what it regarded as the “clear impression” conveyed

by Article 9, Mr Sallabi was entitled to an indemnity in respect of all legal services

provided by him in Ireland (as a barrister). Unfortunately, despite a number of requests

to Mr Sallabi for such confirmation, it has never been forthcoming. Neither the Brussels

Bar Association nor the Brokers for the policy (Vanbreda Risk & Benefits (the

“Brokers”) (nor indeed the insurers themselves) have provided such confirmation.

82. The third concern of the Authority related to Regulation 12(1) of the 2024

Regulations and the entitlement of the co-insurer, KBC Verzekeringen NV (“KBC”) to

transact business in the State and the absence of any information as to its financial 39

strength. Mr Sallabi was requested to demonstrate that KBC satisfied the requirements

under Regulation 12(1).

83. The fourth concern related to Regulation 14 and, in particular, the requirement

that a “qualifying insurance policy” must satisfy the provisions of paragraphs (a) to (d)

of Regulation 14. Mr Sallabi was requested to demonstrate how the Brussels Bar policy

complied with those requirements.

84. The fifth concern identified by the Authority was whether the Brussels Bar policy

complied with Regulation 16 of the 2024 Regulations concerning any self-insured

excess provisions. Finally, the Authority noted that the policy appeared to be due for

renewal on 1 January 2026 and sought details about any such renewal. Mr Sallabi was

requested to respond within 21 days.

85. Mr Sallabi replied by email (using the same letterhead) on 1 January 2026. In that

letter he raised issues in relation to the Complaint made against him to the Authority

and contended that the Complaint should be treated as void and of no legal effect on

the basis that it, and the direction given by Nolan J in the High Court, were made in

excess of jurisdiction. Mr Sallabi also contended that his Belgian insurance policy

complied with the 2024 Regulations. He contended that the “entirety of this matter”,

by which he appeared to be referring to the Complaint and to the Authority’s concerns

in relation to his professional indemnity situation, arose from the Al Maktoum

proceedings which he said concerned “serious offences of asset theft and money

laundering” and contended that there were “powerful actors who appear intent on

whitewashing the criminal activities at issue”. He further contended that the objective

of those “powerful actors” appeared to be to “scapegoat” Mr Sallabi “by utilising [the

Authority] and others” to lend credibility to their position in the litigation and to seek

“the revocation of [his] practising certificate”. With respect to the Brussels Bar policy, 40

Mr Sallabi relied on the contents of his earlier letter of 10 November 2025. He also

called on the Authority to immediately withdraw or terminate the Complaint against

him. He concluded by threatening proceedings against the Authority. No such

proceedings appear to have been issued by Mr Sallabi against the Authority.

86. In a further email (on the same letterhead) sent on 19 January 2026, Mr Sallabi

invited the Authority to enter into direct discussions with him on a “without prejudice”

basis with a view to reaching a “mutually acceptable resolution” of the Authority’s

concerns.

87. Fieldfisher, on behalf of the Authority, replied on 30 January 2026. They

maintained that Mr Sallabi had failed to demonstrate compliance with his obligation to

have in place compliant professional indemnity insurance. They contended that

compliance with the provisions of the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations was

mandatory and not a matter for negotiation. They referred again to Regulation 4(3) of

the 2024 Regulations and to the obligation on a practising barrister who is unable to put

in place a compliant professional indemnity insurance policy to cease practise

immediately. They stated that the Authority would be proceeding with an application

for orders against Mr Sallabi under s. 35 of the 2015 Act in light of his failure to

demonstrate his compliance with that Act and with the 2024 Regulations.

5. The Authority’s application for orders under s. 35 of the 2015 Act

88. The Authority issued an originating notice of motion on 6 February 2026 seeking

orders prohibiting Mr Sallabi from providing legal services in the State and from

holding himself out as being a practising barrister currently entitled to provide legal

services in the State unless and until he has in place an approved policy of professional

indemnity insurance which complies with the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations and 41

an order requiring him to produce to the Authority proof that such a policy is in place

before he provides any legal services in the State. The Authority’s application was

grounded on an affidavit sworn by Mr Watson, then Interim CEO of the Authority.

89. Having set out the background and the requirements under the 2015 Act and the

2024 Regulations for a barrister who provides legal services in the State to have in force

a compliant policy of professional indemnity insurance at the time of the provision of

such services, Mr Watson addressed the position with regard to Mr Sallabi’s

professional indemnity insurance. He referred to and exhibited the correspondence

which I have just summarised.

90. He also referred to Mr Sallabi’s website (which has since been disabled) and

exhibited various screenshots from the website. Mr Watson noted that the homepage of

the website included contact information. An Irish telephone number was provided and

his office’s address was stated to be the Mespil House address. The website stated that

the “Sallabi Law Office” which it said was “led by barrister Joseph Sallabi, BL” offers

“access to a broad network of legal and non-legal professionals, ensuring

comprehensive, full service for a wide range of needs in Ireland and internationally”.

It stated that the work done goes “beyond simply providing legal services”. The home

page of the website also outlined Mr Sallabi’s areas of expertise including business law,

defamation law, financial crime, social media and online platforms, planning and

environmental law, procurement law, international law and property law.

91. There was a separate section of the website that provided information in relation

to Mr Sallabi himself. In the section headed “About Me”, and beside a photograph of

Mr Sallabi, the website referred to Mr Sallabi as being a “qualified lawyer in Ireland”

with a right of audience before all courts in Ireland, the Court of Justice of the European

Union and the European Court of Human Rights. It stated that Mr Sallabi was “proud 42

to serve a diverse clientele, both domestically and internationally, providing legal

services to governments, companies and private individuals”. He stated that he was

“committed to providing the best of legal services”. The website further stated that:

“When the client chooses Sallabi Law Office, they are not just hiring a

lawyer, they are gaining a dedicated advocate who will promote their rights

and work tirelessly to protect their interests”.

92. The website contained a biography of Mr Sallabi and noted that his legal practice

focuses on financial crime and procurement law. The contact details referred only to an

Irish telephone number, an email address and the Mespil House address. The

screenshots exhibited by Mr Watson were taken on various dates in January 2026 (more

than 12 months after Mr Sallabi claimed to have moved to establish himself in Belgium)

and yet no mention was made of Mr Sallabi’s move to Belgium in January 2025.

93. Mr Watson also referred to Mr Sallabi’s LinkedIn profile (and exhibited a

screenshot dated 20 January 2026). His profile describes him as a “barrister” and as

“counsel for corporates, diplomats and VIP’s (sic)” and gives his location as “Dublin,

County Dublin, Ireland”. His LinkedIn profile describes Mr Sallabi as a “barrister with

a diverse background and a passion for achieving the best possible outcomes for [his]

clients” and states that he provides “strategic legal counsel to individuals,

corporations, VIP’s (sic) and SME’s (sic) in Ireland and internationally”.

94. Mr Watson then provided information in relation to the Complaint made to the

Authority in relation to Mr Sallabi in October 2025 and noted that one of the matters

the subject of that complaint was that Mr Sallabi had failed to have a qualifying policy

of insurance in place despite providing legal services in the State. He summarised the

background to the complaint and referred to the Al Maktoum proceedings and to the 43

directions given by Nolan J for the Registrar to contact the Authority in relation to

matters which arose in the course of those proceedings. Mr Watson exhibited transcripts

of the hearing before Nolan J on 18 July and 24 July 2025. Those transcripts were

provided to the Authority on the direction of Nolan J. The Authority was also provided,

at the direction of Nolan J, with an affidavit sworn by Jahid Jamil on 18 July 2025. That

affidavit was sworn for the purpose of addressing the issue of Mr Sallabi’s attempted

representation of Al Maktoum in the proceedings. Mr Jamil disputed Mr Sallabi’s

contention that he was employed as an in-house counsel by Al Maktoum and contended

that that was inconsistent with some of Mr Sallabi’s other “representative

engagements”. Mr Jamil referred to a message sent by Mr Sallabi in April 2025 in

which he stated that he was a “practising Irish barrister with an office in Dublin”, that

he had been instructed by 25 clients who had potential claims against Al Maktoum and

that he was keen to explore an amicable resolution of those claims. Mr Jamil exhibited

a subsequent message sent by Mr Sallabi in which he stated that he was no longer

representing those clients. Various other matters were addressed in Mr Jamil’s affidavit

which are unnecessary for me to record here.

95. Mr Watson then summarised the concerns which the Authority had in relation to

Mr Sallabi’s professional indemnity insurance situation. He explained that it was the

Authority’s position that Mr Sallabi has not had the required insurance in place covering

the provision of legal services in Ireland since the Zurich policy expired on 1 May 2025.

That was of particular concern to the Authority in circumstances where Mr Sallabi was

clearly holding himself out as being a practising barrister entitled to practise in Ireland

and offering his services as a barrister to members of the public in this jurisdiction,

referring to his Irish address and contact details in doing so. Mr Watson referred to other

evidence that Mr Sallabi was providing and intending to provide legal services in the 44

State as a barrister. It was the Authority’s position that Mr Sallabi had acted and that it

was likely that he would continue to act in contravention of the 2015 Act and the 2024

Regulations unless the orders which it was seeking were made by the Court. The

Authority was concerned that it was likely that Mr Sallabi would provide legal services

in the State without having appropriate professional indemnity insurance cover in place

and of the risk that created for those who might engage Mr Sallabi to provide such legal

services.

96. While noting that the precise deficiencies in the Brussels Bar policy on which Mr

Sallabi was relying would be dealt with by way of legal submission, Mr Watson

summarised a number of the concerns the Authority had in relation to that policy. The

first was that the policy appeared to be limited geographically by Article 9 to activities

carried out from a law office established in Belgium and did not therefore appear to

provide cover in respect of legal services provided by Mr Sallabi in Ireland. The second

concerned the identity of the two insurers, MSIG and KBC. Mr Watson noted that

Article 24 of the policy confirms that it did not create joint liability between the two co-

insurers and instead each is responsible for their respective shares of liability as though

there were two separate policies. While Mr Sallabi demonstrated that MSIG complies

with the requirements contained in Regulation 12 of the 2024 Regulations, he did not

demonstrate that KBC similarly complied with those requirements. In particular, Mr

Sallabi did not demonstrate that KBC is an insurer which is licensed and authorised to

transact business in the State (as required under Regulation 12(1) of the 2024

Regulations) and that it met the “minimum financial strength rating” referred to in

Regulation 12(1) and (2). The third concern was that Mr Sallabi had not attempted to

identify which category of persons covered by the policy he fell into. I observe here

that that concern fell away when the Authority saw the certificate of admission signed 45

by the Dean of the Brussels Bar (Dutch language section) which certified that Mr

Sallabi was registered on the EU-List of the Brussels Bar since 20 January 2025. The

fourth concern was that there was a lack of clarity surrounding the policy’s compliance

with Regulation 14(a) and (b). Those paragraphs require a “qualifying insurance

policy” to “indemnify the insured in respect of all valid claims made and notified during

the period of cover” (para. (a)) and “be fully retroactive and cover any valid claims

made during the period of cover regardless of when the work was undertaken” (para

(b)). While noting that Articles 7 and 8 of the policy provide for retroactive cover, the

Authority maintained that they do so in a “qualified manner”.

97. The fifth concern of the Authority related to the apparent non-compliance with

Regulation 14(c) which requires that a policy “provide that cover will not be refused

or reduced on the basis of innocent or unintentional non-disclosure”. Mr Watson noted

that while Article 11 of the Brussels Bar policy deals with disclosure and an entitlement

on the insurers to impose penalties in the event of default on the part of the insured,

including a reduction in benefit where the insurers are prejudiced by reason of a non-

disclosure by the insured, there did not appear to be any express carve out in the case

of innocent or unintentional non-disclosure, as required by Regulation 14(c).

98. The sixth concern related to Regulation 14(d) which requires that a compliant

policy “provide that, following the period of cover, the insurer will offer annually

renewable run-off cover at a fixed premium for the run-off period on terms that are no

less favourable than the terms of the qualifying insurance policy”. Mr Watson noted

that there was no clause in those terms in the Brussels Bar policy.

99. Finally, Mr Watson noted that the policy relied on by Mr Sallabi expired at the

end of 2025 and that Mr Sallabi had not produced proof of any policy in force in 2026. 46

100. As I explained earlier, the Authority’s application was returnable before the Court

on 16 February 2026. On that date, Mr Sallabi sought a lengthy adjournment to file a

replying affidavit, relying on (amongst other things) the imminent commencement of a

significant religious period as well as his desire to spend time with his family (having

just dealt with other litigation in the High Court). The Authority made clear that if the

application was to be adjourned for a lengthy period, it would be seeking

interim/interlocutory orders to last for the period of the adjournment. Having heard

from counsel for the Authority and from Mr Sallabi, I granted Mr Sallabi’s application

for a lengthy adjournment, made directions for the delivery of a replying affidavit by

Mr Sallabi and granted the orders sought by the Authority on an interlocutory basis, to

last until the adjourned date, 15 April 2026.

101. On the adjourned date, having delivered replying affidavits and written

submissions, Mr Sallabi provided undertakings in lieu of the orders sought by the

Authority to the effect that he would not provide legal services in the State and that he

would not hold himself out as being a practising barrister currently entitled to provide

such legal services until after the hearing of the Authority’s application which I listed

for hearing on 28 and 29 April 2026, having made certain further directions.

102. Mr Sallabi swore the first of his three affidavits in response to the Authority’s

application on 2 April 2026. He swore further affidavits on 10 April 2026 and 22 April

2026. Mr Watson swore a second affidavit on the 22 April 2026. Mr Sallabi advanced

a number of rather bizarre and, in my judgement, wholly inappropriate allegations in

the course of his affidavits and in his submissions in response to the Authority’s

application. They include completely wild and unsubstantiated allegations against a

host of entities, firms and people including the Authority itself, the Authority’s

solicitors and solicitors and counsel representing opposing parties in the Al Maktoum 47

proceedings and even against a High Court judge. While, at the hearing, Mr Sallabi

chose not to advance any oral submissions in support of these bizarre and completely

inappropriate allegations, he did not in any way resile from or withdraw them.

103. In the first of his affidavits (sworn on 2 April 2026) Mr Sallabi explained that he

was opposing the Authority’s application on the grounds that it failed to identify any

bona fide, fair, serious or prima facie case to be determined and, alternatively, on the

basis that the balance of convenience and/or justice lay decisively against granting the

orders sought. As I have pointed out earlier, Mr Sallabi appeared to be under the

impression that the test which the court had to apply on an application by the Authority

for orders under s. 35 of the 2015 Act is that applicable to the granting of an

interlocutory injunction (where the court is concerned with whether there is serious

issue or fair question to be tried and whether the balance of justice lies in favour of or

against the granting of the orders sought). However, that is not the test applicable to the

determination of the Authority’s application. While the Authority sought interlocutory

orders on 15 February 2026, the orders which the Authority now seeks in this

application are not interlocutory in nature. They are final orders which are intended to

last until Mr Sallabi subscribes to a compliant policy of professional indemnity

insurance. The Authority must, therefore, establish that it is entitled to the reliefs it

seeks on a final orders basis and not on an interlocutory basis.

104. In resisting the Authority’s application, Mr Sallabi explained in his first affidavit

that he was relying on six grounds. The first was that the Authority had no right,

entitlement or authority to prevent him from providing services or from exercising his

right of establishment under the Treaty and that the public interest which the Authority

claimed it was seeking to protect, namely, consumer protection, has already been

protected in Belgium, being the Member State in which he claims to have established. 48

The second ground relied on by Mr Sallabi was that the Authority had no right or

entitlement to compel something that is impossible. He maintained that “no qualifying

insurance policy” is available in the State (and sought to contend that the Zurich policy

did not comply with the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations). The third ground relied

on by Mr Sallabi was that the Authority had no right or entitlement to impose an

approval-based insurance system on barristers instead of, what he called, the self-

regulation system established by law. He contended that the 2015 Act does not confer

any such power on the Authority.

105. The fourth ground relied on was that as a matter of procedure, it was

impermissible for the Authority to seek a finding of serious professional misconduct

(such as a breach of insurance obligations) against him by way of a summary

application to the High Court and that the court cannot resolve disputed issues of fact

on a summary basis nor could it make a finding tantamount to serious professional

misconduct in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. I rejected that latter contention

earlier, finding that the court has jurisdiction under s. 35 of the 2025 Act to determine

whether a legal practitioner has contravened, is contravening or is likely to contravene

any provision of the 2015 Act or of the 2024 Regulations even if the alleged

contravention may be capable of being and may in fact be the subject of a complaint of

misconduct to the Authority. A different legal test will be applicable to the Authority’s

consideration and determination of the complaint against Mr Sallabi. A different legal

standard will apply, including a different standard of proof.

106. The fifth ground of opposition raised by Mr Sallabi was that the Brussels Bar

policy does comply with the relevant Irish statutory requirements in all material

respects. He contended that the only manner in which the policy departs from those

statutory requirements is “minor and technical in nature and is properly regarded as 49

de minimis” (para. 4(5) of his affidavit of 2 April 2026). He maintained that there was

nothing in the policy which gave rise to any immediate or imminent risk to the public.

107. The sixth and final ground relied on by Mr Sallabi was that the Authority’s

application is frivolous and vexatious as it pursues objectives that have not been

disclosed to the court. He contended that the application is in fact:

“driven by collateral and improper motives, namely:

(i) to lend assistance to my adversaries who are currently prosecuting

parallel proceedings which I believe to be for a fraudulent purpose;

(ii) to act as a proxy for those adversaries and to advance their interests;

(iii) to destroy the career of a lawyer for daring to fight for the truth; and

(iv) to frustrate an imminent appeal process on behalf of that lawyer’s

client.”

108. I have no hesitation in concluding that that last ground of resistance is

unsubstantiated by the evidence and entirely without merit. Mr Sallabi’s reliance on EU

law and the freedom to provide services and right of establishment under the Treaty,

his reliance on the alleged deficiencies in the Zurich policy and the alleged compliance

of the Brussels Bar policy with the Irish statutory requirements do require further

analysis and consideration which I undertake later in this judgment. The balance of the

grounds of his response, however, can be rejected as being utterly misconceived.

109. In his affidavit of 2 April 2026, Mr Sallabi provided details about himself and his

professional activities. He claimed that having qualified (as a Barrister-at-Law from the

King’s Inns) in 2023, he faced “significant barriers and unfavourable legal conditions”

(upon which he did not elaborate) and opted to exercise his right to establish himself in

“a more favourable legal environment”, Belgium. He applied for admission to the 50

Brussels Bar under the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive. He was admitted to the EU

List of the Dutch language section of the Brussels Bar on 20 January 2025. He stated

that he was notified by the Brussels Bar that he had to maintain his registration with his

“Bar of origin”, which he said was the Authority. He maintains that Belgium has

become his “primary place of establishment”, that he has become subject to Belgian

law and that his office in Brussels has become the “centre of [his] administration and

operations (i.e., the centre of [his] main interests)” (para. 9). He stated that his primary

area of practice is financial crime and that between January and May 2025 he worked

on several cases in that area in “five to seven jurisdictions”, working with Belgian

colleagues on cases in Belgium, a Spanish colleague on a case in Spain, a Swiss

colleague on a case in Switzerland, a German colleague on a case in Germany and with

an Irish solicitor on a case in Ireland. He said that prior to his establishment in Brussels,

he maintained a “virtual office” in Dublin which he said “served mainly as a

forwarding point for telephone calls and post” and was not a physical office. He

claimed that he retained that virtual office to maintain an address in Ireland for the

purposes of his registration with the Authority and “to maintain a minimum setup for

temporary activities”. He acknowledged that his website and LinkedIn account were

not fully up to date and the content in them was largely written before he relocated to

Brussels.

110. Mr Sallabi contended in his affidavit that as a lawyer operating under the

fundamental guarantees in Articles 49 and 56 of the Treaty, he provides legal services

in Ireland on a temporary basis. He contended that those EU rights cannot be restricted

by the national rules of any Member State, including Ireland, and that the Irish national

rules do not apply to him in the same way as they apply to domestic lawyers and their

application to him constitutes an infringement of the Treaty. 51

111. Mr Sallabi stated that in 2025 he provided legal services to two Irish companies

under contracts of employment. One of those contracts was with a company in Cavan

(for whom he worked for periods in 2025 and also in 2026). The other was Al Maktoum,

for whom he claims to have worked between May and October 2025 and February 2026

and for whom he claims to have acted in the Al Maktoum proceedings. He drew

attention to the fact that he was entitled to provide services under those two contracts

of employment remotely from a location of his choosing.

112. Mr Sallabi maintained that he is an EU lawyer exercising fundamental freedoms

guaranteed by the Treaty and that he provides legal services in Ireland, and in other EU

Member States, on a temporary basis. While he acknowledged that the Authority’s

concern for the public is a legitimate concern, he contended that that concern has been

safeguarded by Belgium, which he describes as his “Member State of establishment”.

Mr Sallabi pointed to alleged deficiencies in the 2024 Regulations and, in his

submissions, he contended that the Court should disapply those regulations in his case.

He further contended that the provisions of Regulation 12(1), which include a

requirement that the insurer under a qualifying insurance policy must be “licensed and

authorised to transact business in the State”, breaches a number of the provisions of

the Treaty and creates a de facto monopoly, whereby a single insurer, Zurich, controls

the entire market. Mr Sallabi exhibited documents relating to his 2023 Zurich policy

and documents provided in respect of a 2026 Zurich policy. Those documents include

a quote from AON dated 10 March 2026 for a barrister’s professional indemnity policy

with Zurich for an annual premium of €235.00. Mr Sallabi decided not to take out the

policy with Zurich and provided an explanation for this in his affidavit.

113. He contended that the Authority “applied pressure” on him to take out the policy

with Zurich to “facilitate” the possibility of his opponents in the Al Maktoum litigation 52

and their Irish solicitors to “cash out money from [his] insurer on foot of a designed

and pre-planned wasted costs order”. He expressed concern that if he were to take out

the policy with Zurich he would suffer “irreparable financial harm, as future insurance

premiums may become unaffordable” and that would “effectively lead to [his] exclusion

from [the] legal profession” (para. 60).

114. I find that that explanation makes absolutely no sense and is baffling and

contradictory. If Mr Sallabi is correct that his Brussels Bar policy covers him for legal

services in the State, the same risk for him would arise under that policy. The risk would

not, of course, arise if the Brussels Bar policy does not provide cover for him in respect

of the legal services he performs in this jurisdiction. If that is correct then it completely

undermines his reliance on the Brussels Bar policy and further strengthens the

Authority’s application.

115. However, the whole thing is completely far-fetched. I reject the contention that

the Authority applied any pressure on Mr Sallabi to take out the Zurich policy with the

objective alleged by Mr Sallabi. The Authority regards the Zurich policy as being in

compliance with the Irish statutory requirements and, if Mr Sallabi had renewed that

policy or taken out a fresh policy with Zurich, the Authority would have considered that

Mr Sallabi was in compliance with his obligations under the 2015 Act and the 2024

Regulations. As I explain later, Mr Sallabi’s failure to renew the Zurich policy or to

subscribe to a new policy on the basis of the quotation which he obtained from AON in

March 2026 is relevant to the issue as to whether the orders sought by the Authority

should be granted. The deficiency in Mr Sallabi’s insurance situation could readily be

remedied with relatively minimal expenditure had he subscribed to the Zurich policy in

March 2026 or at any time before or since then. 53

116. Mr Sallabi contended in his affidavit that the Zurich policy is not compliant with

the 2024 Regulations. He contended that the Zurich policy fails to comply with (inter

alia) Regulation 13(2) concerning the minimum level of indemnity cover required

under Regulation 13(1), Regulation 14(c), which requires that the policy must provide

cover that will not be refused or reduced on the basis of innocent or unintentional non-

disclosure and Regulation 14(d) which provides that the insurer must provide run-off

cover on terms that are no less favourable than the terms of the qualifying insurance

policy (Mr Sallabi sought to rely on other grounds of alleged non-compliance in his

submissions). As I explain later, apart from the deep irony of Mr Sallabi claiming that

the Zurich policy does not comply with the Irish statutory requirements when he relied

on that policy between October 2023 and May 2025 to demonstrate compliance with

those requirements, he is simply wrong in his claims that the Zurich policy is non-

compliant.

117. With respect to his contention that the Authority is applying an approval-based

system requiring a barrister to obtain prior authorisation from the Authority in relation

to its insurance before providing legal services and that that is not permitted under the

2015 Act (or the 2024 Regulations), Mr Sallabi is also wrong about that. Section 46(1)

of the 2015 Act prohibits a legal practitioner (including a barrister) from providing legal

services unless the practitioner has at the time of the provision of those services a

professional indemnity policy which complies with regulations made under s. 47, which

are now the 2024 Regulations. The positive obligation to have in place such a policy of

insurance is contained in Regulation 4(1). Under Regulation 4(2) a practising barrister

(to whom Part 2 of the Regulations applies, and includes Mr Sallabi) must ensure that

the Authority is provided with evidence that the policy the barrister relies on is in place

within 14 days of the commencement date of the policy and of each renewal date of the 54

policy. Under Regulation 4(3), if the practising barrister is unable to put in place such

a compliant policy then he or she is required to cease practice immediately upon the

expiry of the existing period of cover. This is not an approval-based system and does

not involve the Authority’s prior authorisation, as Mr Watson correctly pointed out in

his second affidavit sworn on 22 April 2026.

118. Mr Sallabi then proceeded to set out in his affidavit the basis upon which he

contends that he is covered by the Brussels Bar policy and that that policy complies

with the provisions of the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations. As regards the first of

the issues initially raised, once the Authority became aware of the Certificate of

Admission to the Brussels Bar (when it was exhibited to Mr Sallabi’s affidavit), the

Authority accepted that Mr Sallabi was entitled to whatever indemnity is provided

under the policy as he is registered on the EU-list of the Brussels Bar.

119. Mr Sallabi contended in his affidavit that an exclusion in Article 5(a) of the policy

(which excludes “damage that results from activities foreign to the profession of

lawyer”) does not apply to him and contended that as long as he remains a lawyer

allegedly established in Belgium and a member of the Flemish Order of the Brussels

Bar, all of his professional activities as a lawyer are covered by the policy. He also

relied on Articles 8 and 9 of the policy and contended that by virtue of Article 8, the

policy expressly provides EU-wide cover in respect of cross-border activities and under

Article 9 that cover is “linked to the lawyer’s Belgian office, rather than to the physical

location of the work or the client”. He asserted that the policy covers professional

activities and acts carried out in other Member States “provided that those activities

originate from a lawyer established in Belgium, or operate from a professional

office/practice in Belgium” and that the Brussels Bar policy is consistent with the

Lawyers’ Services Directive and the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive. Mr Sallabi 55

asserted that, irrespective of his physical location at any given time, he falls within the

meaning of an “office established in Belgium” under Article 9 of the Brussels Bar

policy by virtue of his establishment in Belgium, regardless of the location of his clients

or where the activities are carried out within the EU.

120. Mr Sallabi then addressed the issue of compliance of the Brussels Bar policy with

Regulations 12, 14 and 16 of the 2024 Regulations. With respect to Regulation 12, Mr

Sallabi provided some information in relation to MSIG and KBC and their financial

strength ratings. Both are licensed and authorised insurers in Belgium and, he

maintained, are “automatically licensed and authorised in Ireland”, relying on Articles

14(1) and 15(1) of the Solvency II Directive. Mr Sallabi contended that the court is

required under Article 29.4.6º of the Constitution and s. 2 of the European Communities

Act 1972 to apply EU law (including the Solvency II Directive) and, if necessary, to

disapply any domestic law to the contrary. Mr Sallabi also relied on Article 24 of the

Brussels Bar policy which provides that the policy does not create joint liability

between the two co-insurers and that each insurer is “deemed to have subscribed to

their share as if it were a separate policy”.

121. Mr Sallabi contended that the Brussels Bar policy complies with Regulations

14(a), (b), (c) and (d) and sought to explain in his affidavit why that was so. He further

contended that the policy complies with Regulation 16.

122. Mr Sallabi concluded his first affidavit by seeking to impugn the bona fides of

the Authority in relation to the application and provided certain information in relation

to the Al Maktoum proceedings which he asserted were “intimately connected” with

the Authority’s application. In that part of his affidavit Mr Sallabi made a series of

wholly inappropriate allegations against the Authority, the solicitors and counsel

representing other parties involved in the Al Maktoum proceedings and a High Court 56

judge (who he described as having played a “central role” in “frustrating” the Al

Maktoum proceedings) and of seeking to “whitewash” the criminal activities of the

agents of the Ruler of Dubai and the solicitors acting for the other parties in the Al

Maktoum proceedings. Mr Sallabi further contended that the “true purpose” of the

Authority in bringing its application included precluding Mr Sallabi’s alleged client, Al

Maktoum, from bringing an appeal from a judgment and order made in the Al Maktoum

proceedings by another High Court judge (Kennedy J) on 11 February 2026. He also

stated that he considered bringing proceedings against the Authority and others but

subsequently withdrew the threat to do so.

123. He accused the Authority of a “potentially deliberate misleading” of the court

when it said that it had not received the attachment to his email of 24 June 2025 (and

subsequently doubled down on that allegation against the Authority and its solicitors in

his later affidavits). Mr Sallabi concluded that part of his affidavit by contending that

the Authority failed to disclose its “true motives” to the court in bringing the

application, that it did not come to court with “clean hands”, that its “true purpose”

was the “protection of offenders, namely the Dubai Agents, [their solicitors] and their

counsel, and to support their costs proceedings” and that the Authority misled the

court. He suggested that these matters, individually or together, were sufficient to

warrant a referral of the matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions and consented to

such referral. I am satisfied that these allegations are all completely baseless and ought

not to have been made by a member of the Bar. I reject them in their entirety and refuse

to refer any matter arising in this application to the DPP or to An Garda Síochána.

124. Mr Sallabi’s second affidavit (sworn on 10 April 2026) exhibited further

correspondence and corrected a number of typographical errors. Included in that further

correspondence was a letter from Fieldfisher, the Authority’s solicitors, dated 12 March 57

2026 which was expressly stated to be “without prejudice save as to costs”. Mr Sallabi,

as a member of the Bar, ought to have known that it was not appropriate to exhibit that

letter.

125. Mr Watson swore his second affidavit on 22 April 2026 in response to Mr

Sallabi’s two affidavits. He rejected the serious allegations made against the Authority

in the first of those affidavits and reiterated that the Authority’s application was brought

in furtherance of its statutory objectives under s. 13(2)(c) of the 2015 Act (to “specify

the nature and minimum levels of professional indemnity insurance in accordance with

sections 46 and 47”), and in the exercise of its statutory functions under s. 13(4)(c)

(“protecting and promoting the interests of consumers relating to the provision of legal

services”).

126. While noting that Mr Sallabi’s reliance on the free movement and right of

establishment provisions of the Treaty and of the relevant EU Directives was more

properly a matter for legal submissions, Mr Watson highlighted that Mr Sallabi is a

“practising barrister” under the 2015 Act and that his status as such is derived from

his qualification in this jurisdiction. Mr Sallabi is not a “registered lawyer” in Ireland

under the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive. Mr Watson stressed that the Authority’s

concerns related to the provision of legal services by Mr Sallabi in Ireland as a barrister

qualified in this jurisdiction and entitled to provide legal services here arising from the

qualification he obtained from the King’s Inns and his call to the Irish Bar. He rejected

the contention that the 2024 regulations create a de facto monopoly or that they

impermissibly exclude insurers that are licensed and authorised to transact business in

other Member States of the EU. He noted, for example, that the Zurich policy is now

underwritten by a German company (Zurich) that provides services in Ireland under the

Solvency II Directive. While acknowledging that Zurich underwrites the vast majority 58

of insurance policies obtained by barristers in Ireland, Mr Watson averred that it is not

the only insurance company in the market, that a number of different insurance

companies have offered such insurance to barristers since the original 2019 Regulations

came into effect and that there is currently at least one other insurer of which the

Authority is aware that offers professional indemnity insurance to barristers in Ireland

at the present time. None of this evidence was contradicted by Mr Sallabi and, therefore,

I accept it as a matter of fact.

127. Mr Watson confirmed that the Authority was and is satisfied that the Zurich

policy, under which Mr Sallabi was insured between October 2023 and May 2025,

complies with the 2024 Regulations (and prior to that, with the 2019 Regulations).

128. Mr Watson confirmed that, having received the Certificate of Admission to the

Brussels Bar by way of an exhibit to Mr Sallabi’s first affidavit, the Authority accepted

that Mr Sallabi is a person who benefits from the cover provided by that policy. Mr

Watson also confirmed again that there was no attachment to Mr Sallabi’s email of 24

June 2025 as received by the Authority.

129. With respect to the status of the two insurers under the Brussels Bar policy, MSIG

and KBC, Mr Watson explained that the Authority examined the register maintained by

the CBI in respect of non-life undertakings regulated by the CBI as at 7 April 2026 and

the register maintained by the CBI in respect of non-life undertakings operating on a

freedom of services basis in Ireland as at the same date and that MSIG is on the latter

register whereas KBC is not on either register. Zurich appears on both registers as it

operates in Ireland on a freedom of services basis and also has a branch office in Dublin.

130. Mr Watson also confirmed in that affidavit that Mr Sallabi’s registered address

with the Authority remains as Mespil House and that Mr Sallabi has not sought to 59

update his address since 20 November 2024 (notwithstanding his case that he moved to

establish himself in Belgium in January 2025).

131. Mr Watson reiterated the Authority’s deep concern that Mr Sallabi does not have

the benefit of a compliant professional indemnity insurance policy in respect of his

activities in Ireland and that persons who retain his services in this jurisdiction might

well be prejudiced as a consequence.

132. Mr Sallabi’s final affidavit was sworn on 22 April 2026 following a direction I

made at the hearing on 15 April 2026. In that affidavit Mr Sallabi referred to and

exhibited emails he sent to the Brussels Bar and to the Brokers for the Brussels Bar

policy, Vanbreda Risk & Benefits. In his email to Ms Liz Cloet of the Brussels Bar of

15 April 2026, Mr Sallabi stated:

“I recall that in January 2025 when we discussed the Bar’s insurance policy,

you confirmed that it covers the activities of the Bar members in all EU. Can

you please check with the relevant unit in the Bar and/or the insurance

company and confirm this point please?”

133. Ms Cloet replied that day and referred to Article 9 of the Brussels Bar policy and

provided a free translation of that Article which translated Article 9 as follows:

“The cover provided by this policy applies to the consequences of acts committed

anywhere in the world, in respect of activities carried out by the insured parties

from their office based in Belgium and subject to the clarifications set out in

Article 8…”.

134. In his email to Ms Cindy Raemaekers of the Brokers of 15 April 2026, Mr Sallabi

referred to the issue which had arisen in relation to his insurance cover, to various

arguments in relation to his entitlement to cover and to Article 9 of the policy (which 60

he stated appeared to contain “an internal inconsistency”, in that it expressly covered

professional activities carried out in other countries but, on the other hand, appeared to

restrict coverage solely to activities performed inside a law office located in Belgium).

Mr Sallabi’s email to the Brokers continued:

“Against this background, the President directed me to inquire from the

insurer or the broker to obtain a definitive answer to one simple question:

does the policy provide coverage for the insured’s professional activities in

Ireland?

I would be grateful if you could kindly contact MSIG Europe SE (the lead

insurer) to obtain clear confirmation of the right position …”

135. Following an initial acknowledgment of that query by the Brokers, Mr Sallabi

sent another email to Ms Raemaekers later on 15 April 2026 as follows:

“Just to simplify the question for the insurance company.

The judge inquires (sic) from the insurance company, if I contract from my

office in Belgium with a client in Ireland, to represent the client in Irish court,

does the policy’s coverage apply in Ireland?

My understanding is that it does, because Article 9 states ‘the cover provided

by this policy applies to the consequences of acts committed anywhere in the

world.’”

136. Ms Raemaekers replied on behalf of the Brokers on 22 April 2026. She stated:

“You are insured for your activities in your capacity as an EU lawyer through

the [Brussels Bar] policy subject to compliance with the provisions of Article

9 regarding territoriality. 61

Whether or not coverage is acquired in the event of damage can only be

assessed upon the occurrence of a concrete claim.

Regarding your question about annually renewable run-off cover we must

confirm that we have no offer for this.

We hope to be of better service to you next time.”

137. Rather than providing a direct answer to the question raised, and confirming that

the Brussels Bar policy provides an indemnity for members of the Brussels Bar on its

EU-list (such as Mr Sallabi) who provide legal services in their home Member State

under their home professional qualifications (which Mr Sallabi has done and intends to

do as a Barrister when providing such services in Ireland), no such confirmation was

provided by the Brussels Bar, the Brokers or by the insurers under the policy.

138. Mr Sallabi also exhibited to this affidavit another English translation of the

Brussels Bar policy, this time prepared by Word Perfect. While there are some minor

differences between the two versions of the English translation of the policy and while

the Word Perfect version corrects some minor differences in paragraph lettering, I am

satisfied that there is no significant difference between the two versions and my ultimate

conclusions on the scope of the policy and its compliance or otherwise with the 2015

Act and the 2024 Regulations apply equally to both versions.

139. Mr Sallabi also exhibited to this affidavit a letter from the manager of the Mespil

Business Centre at Mespil House confirming that Mr Sallabi has a business address at

Mespil House which includes a mailing address and telephone services but not a

physical office.

140. Mr Sallabi concluded his last affidavit with another series of bizarre and

completely unfounded allegations, this time directed to a female solicitor who 62

previously worked in Fieldfisher, the Authority’s solicitors, as well as allegations

against other people in the UAE. He contended that there was “strong evidence” of a

connection between the Authority’s application and UAE officials. However, that

contention is based solely on speculation and is not supported by any of the purported

evidence relied on by him. His allegations against a female solicitor who previously

worked in Fieldfisher are particularly egregious, inappropriate and unfair. I have no

hesitation in rejecting them in their entirety.

6. Summary of relevant findings of fact

141. I now summarise the findings of fact which I make on this application. The facts

summarised below are admitted or established on the basis of the evidence and material

before the court for the purposes of the Authority’s application or are incontrovertible.

142. Mr Sallabi obtained his professional legal qualification as a Barrister-at-Law or

BL from The Honourable Society of King’s Inns on 10 October 2023. He was called to

the Irish Bar by the Chief Justice on 11 October 2023. On the same date, he applied to

the Authority for entry on the Roll of Practising Barristers. The Authority entered his

name on the Roll on 16 October 2023 by virtue of his professional qualification and

call to the Irish Bar. He remains on the Roll of Practising Barristers maintained by the

Authority. He gave an Irish correspondence address and Irish mobile telephone contact

details with his application. He confirmed that he was not seeking to be entered on the

Register as a “Registered Lawyer” pursuant to the Lawyers’ Establishment

Regulations. He confirmed that he was a “qualified barrister” and that he intended to

provide legal services as a barrister. Mr Sallabi, therefore, is a “qualified barrister” and

a “practising barrister” within the meaning of those terms in s. 2(1) of the 2015 Act.

He is not a “registered lawyer” within the meaning of that term in s. 2(1) or the

Lawyers’ Establishment Regulations. 63

143. The only change made to his registered details since his entry on the Roll was that

his correspondence address was changed from the initial address notified to the

Authority to the Mespil House address. He requested the Authority to change his

registered address to the Mespil House address on 20 November 2024. That address

remains as Mr Sallabi’s registered address on the Roll. That address appeared and still

appears on Mr Sallabi’s letterhead. He does not have a physical office in Mespil House

but avails of services including a mailing address and telephone services.

144. From October 2023 up to 1 May 2025, Mr Sallabi had in place professional

indemnity insurance cover (for a premium of €90) which was arranged by AON and

underwritten by Zurich (the relevant Zurich company which underwrote the policy was

originally an Irish company but, since January 2024, is a German company which

operates through a branch in Dublin). The Zurich policy was accepted by the Authority

as being in compliance with the 2015 Act and the regulations made by the Authority

under s. 47 of that Act, namely, the 2019 Regulations and, subsequently, the 2024

Regulations. The Zurich policy is considered by the Authority to be a “qualifying

insurance policy” which complies with Part 4 of the 2024 Regulations.

145. Mr Sallabi claims to have moved to establish himself in Brussels in Belgium in

January 2025 and to move his “Head Office” there. His current letterhead contains a

reference to a “Head Office” in Brussels as well as him continuing to refer to the Mespil

House address in Dublin. He was registered on the EU-list of the Brussels Bar on 20

January 2025 and remains so registered (as confirmed by the Certificate of Admission

signed by the Dean of the Brussels Bar (Dutch Language Section)). Mr Sallabi was

entitled to be registered on that list with the Brussels Bar by virtue of his professional

legal qualification as an Irish barrister, in reliance on the Lawyers’ Establishment

Directive. Mr Sallabi’s professional legal qualification remains as an Irish barrister. He 64

is not a Belgian advocaat/avocat/rechtsanwalt. He has not yet become entitled (and does

not claim to have become entitled) to acquire that Belgian legal professional

qualification by either of the two routes by which that can be done under the Lawyers

Establishment Directive (Article 10) of the Professional Qualifications Directive

(Articles 13 and 14). Mr Sallabi is and remains, therefore, an Irish barrister.

146. Mr Sallabi has provided legal services in Ireland as an Irish barrister and has

worked on cases in other Member States of the European Union and in Switzerland. He

has provided legal services as an Irish barrister, since his purported establishment in

Belgium in January 2025, at least from April 2025 onwards, including appearing in the

Irish High Court and drafting proceedings and affidavits for a party in Companies Acts

proceedings before the Irish court (the Al Maktoum proceedings), where his entitlement

to represent parties in those proceedings became an issue before the court. He

subsequently ceased acting as counsel in those proceedings in court but continued to

work “in the background”.

147. Mr Sallabi intends to continue providing legal services in Ireland (unless

restrained by the court). He has appeared before at least two judges of the High Court

(Nolan J and Kennedy J) in the course of the Al Maktoum proceedings. Mr Sallabi did

not inform Nolan J when he appeared before him in July 2025 that he had allegedly

moved to establish himself in Belgium in January 2025. The clear impression given by

Mr Sallabi when asked certain questions about his practice by Nolan J in the Al

Maktoum proceedings in July 2025, was that his practice was based in Mespil House in

Dublin 4. Neither his website nor his LinkedIn entry made any reference to Brussels.

However, notwithstanding those inconsistencies, and without conclusively deciding the

point, I have assumed for the purposes of this application that Mr Sallabi has at least

taken steps to establish himself in Belgium. Ultimately, however, that makes no 65

difference to my decision on the Authority’s application or on the correct application

of the principles of EU law on which Mr Sallabi relied in response to that application.

148. Mr Sallabi is the subject of a complaint made to the Authority. The complaint

was made by an official in the Authority. The complaint was made following a direction

by Nolan J that the papers be referred to the Authority and that a representative of the

Authority appear in court in July 2025. The complaint against Mr Sallabi includes a

number of allegations of misconduct including an allegation that he does not have a

qualifying policy of insurance in place to cover legal services provided by him as a

barrister in breach of Regulation 4(1) of the 2024 Regulations. The complaint is being

dealt with by the Authority. The Court is not dealing with the complaint.

149. Mr Sallabi did not renew his Zurich policy when it expired on 1 May 2025. He

informed the Authority on 14 May 2025 that he had subscribed to the Brussels Bar

policy which he contended provided coverage for his professional activities in all EU

Member States. Mr Sallabi is entitled to whatever cover is provided under the Brussels

Bar policy on the basis of his registration on the EU-list of the Brussels Bar. There are

two insurers under the policy. Both are insurance companies incorporated in Belgium.

The lead insurer is MSIG. The other insurer is KBC. MSIG is registered on the register

of non-life undertakings operating on a freedom of services in Ireland maintained by

the CBI. KBC is not registered on that register or on the register of non-life undertakings

regulated by the CBI. There is no evidence before the Court that KBC wishes to provide

insurance services in Ireland. The fact that KBC does not appear on either of the

relevant registers would suggest that it does not.

150. The Brussels Bar policy was renewed in 2026 and remains in force. There is a

dispute as to the proper interpretation of the Brussels Bar policy and as to whether it

covers legal services provided by Mr Sallabi as an Irish barrister in Ireland (irrespective 66

of where he is based or established). Despite being asked to do so by Mr Sallabi, the

Brussels Bar, the Brokers and the insurers under the Brussels Bar policy have not

expressly confirmed that it does provide professional indemnity insurance cover for Mr

Sallabi when he provides legal services as an Irish barrister in Ireland. In response to

his requests, they have simply referred to Article 9 of the policy without elaboration.

151. The Authority does not accept that the Brussels Bar policy complies with the 2015

Act and the 2024 Regulations. It is concerned that Mr Sallabi does not have the benefit

of professional indemnity insurance cover in respect of the provision of those services

that complies with the 2024 Regulations and that persons who retain Mr Sallabi to

provide such services in Ireland might well be prejudiced as a consequence. I accept

that this is a real and appreciable risk.

152. The Authority accepts that the Zurich policy, under which the vast majority of

barristers in Ireland are insured, and which is approved by the Authority under s. 46(3)

of the 2015 Act as a group scheme provided under the aegis of the Bar of Ireland for

members of the Law Library, complies with the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations and

that it is a “qualifying insurance policy” for the purposes of those Regulations. There

is currently at least one other insurer that offers professional indemnity insurance to

barristers in Ireland at the present time. The Authority has experience and expertise in

relation to the policies available to barristers and as to the compliance of those policies

with the relevant regulations.

153. Mr Sallabi obtained a quotation from AON in March 2026 for cover under the

Zurich policy. The policy would operate to cover his activities arising from his practice

in Ireland. The annual premium quoted was €235.00. Mr Sallabi chose not to take out

that policy but to rely on the Brussels Bar policy for reasons which I have concluded

make no sense and are baffling and contradictory. 67

154. Mr Sallabi has been restrained from providing legal services in the State and from

holding himself out as a practising barrister entitled to provide such services in the State

on foot of orders made and undertakings given from time to time since 16 February

2026. He is currently the subject of orders made following my written decision to the

parties on 21 May 2026. Orders were last made on 11 June 2026 to last until after the

listing on 26 June 2026, pending the delivery of this judgment.

7. Analysis of Submissions on the Legal Issues

155. Having set out those relevant facts, I now turn to consider the essential

submissions advanced by Mr Sallabi in response to the Authority’s application. The

Authority’s position is that Mr Sallabi is a “practising barrister”, and a “qualified

barrister” (by virtue of his admission by the King’s Inns to the degree of Barrister-at-

Law and his call to the Irish Bar) and not a “registered lawyer” for the purposes of the

Lawyer’s Establishment Regulations). As a result and in addition to this, the Authority’s

position is that: Mr Sallabi is precluded from providing legal services without having

in place a professional indemnity insurance policy which complies with the 2024

Regulations, being regulations made under s. 47; that the Brussels Bar policy on which

Mr Sallabi relies is not a “qualifying insurance policy” within the meaning of that term

in 2024 regulations; and that it is and has at all times been open to Mr Sallabi to take

out a policy which does comply with those regulations, one of which is the Zurich

policy, under which Mr Sallabi was previously insured between October 2023 and 1

May 2025 and for which he obtained a recent quotation.

156. In response, Mr Sallabi’s position is that while he accepts that in principle a

lawyer in his position would be required to comply with the 2024 Regulations, in this

case the Authority’s requirement that he does so is in breach of EU law in a number of

respects, namely, by breaching his right of establishment and freedom to provide 68

services guaranteed under Articles 49 (Establishment) and 56 (Services) of the Treaty

and the Lawyers’ Services Directive and the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive and by

breaching the provisions of the Solvency II Directive and the freedom to provide

services of the insurers under the Brussels Bar policy by failing to recognise the

entitlement of those insurers to transact insurance business in the State. Mr Sallabi

contends that the Court should disapply the provisions of the 2024 Regulations and the

domestic regulations which implement into Irish law the Lawyers’ Establishment

Directive and the Lawyers’ Services Directive (namely, the Lawyers’ Establishment

Regulations and the Lawyers’ Services Regulations). Mr Sallabi disputes the

Authority’s contention that the Brussels Bar policy does not provide professional

indemnity insurance cover in respect of legal services which he provides as a barrister

in Ireland and that the policy does not comply with the 2024 Regulations. Mr Sallabi

also contends that the Zurich policy does not comply with the 2024 Regulations and

that if he is not entitled to rely on the Brussels Bar policy, there is no policy on which

he can rely and that, in those circumstances, the Court should not make the orders

sought by the Authority as it would be relying on him to do the impossible.

157. Finally, the Authority has advanced various other reasons why the court should

grant the orders and Mr Sallabi has made various points in response. I have addressed

a number of those already when commenting on some of the points made by Mr Sallabi

in his correspondence and in his affidavits.

158. I will deal with the arguments advanced by Mr Sallabi in turn and will then deal

with any remaining issues at the end of this judgment. 69

8. EU Law: Free movement of persons arguments: Right of establishment and

Freedom to provide services

(a) General Comments

159. I have set out earlier the facts relevant to the issues which arise under this general

heading. I have also touched on the relevant EU legislative provisions. To recap, Article

49 of the Treaty provides for the right of establishment of nationals of Member States.

It provides that restrictions on the freedom of establishment of such nationals in the

territory of another Member State are prohibited. It makes clear that freedom of

establishment includes the right to take up and pursue activities as a self-employed

person and to set up and manage undertakings, and in particular companies or firms,

under the conditions laid down for the Member State’s own nationals by the law of the

country where the establishment is effected. Article 56 provides for the freedom of

persons to provide services. It states that restrictions on the freedom to provide services

within the European Union are prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who

are established in a Member State other than that of the person for whom the services

are intended. Under Article 47, services include the activities of the professions and it

provides that the person providing the service may, in order to do so, temporarily pursue

his or her activity in the Member State where the services are provided, under the same

conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals.

160. In the case of lawyers, the Lawyers’ Services Directive was made to facilitate the

effective exercise by lawyers of the freedom to provide services. The provisions of that

Directive were implemented into Irish law by the Lawyers’ Services Regulations in

1979. The Lawyers’ Establishment Directive was made in 1998 to facilitate the practice

of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in 70

which the qualification was obtained. That Directive was implemented into Irish law in

2003 by the Lawyers’ Establishment Regulations.

161. It is difficult to discern the real essence of Mr Sallabi’s case as, in his oral

submissions, he submitted that the court should disapply not only the 2024 Regulations

but also the Lawyers’ Services Regulations and the Lawyers’ Establishment

Regulations as breaching his right to provide services and his freedom of establishment.

(b) Lawyers’ Services Directive/Regulations

162. So far as the Lawyers’ Services Directive is concerned, the Directive uses the

terms “host Member State” and “Member State from which [the lawyer] comes”. The

recitals provide that if lawyers are to exercise effectively the freedom to provide

services, “host Member States” must recognise as lawyers those persons practising the

profession in the various Member States and that when exercising the freedom to

provide services provided under the Directive, “a person to whom the Directive applies

must adopt the professional title used in the Member State in which he is established,

hereinafter referred to as ‘the Member State from which he comes’”.

163. The professional title which is used by Mr Sallabi is that of barrister and it is on

the basis of his Irish professional qualification as barrister that he secured membership

of the Brussels Bar (on the EU-list).

164. Article 1(2) of the Directive refers to the different designations of “lawyer” in

the then Member States. In the case of Belgium, the designation at the time of the

Directive was “Avocat-Advocaat”. In the case of Ireland, the designation is “barrister”

and “solicitor”. Article 3 requires the person referred to in Article 1 to adopt the

professional title used in the “Member State from which he comes” when providing

services. In the case of Mr Sallabi, the professional title used by him in the Member 71

State from which he comes, namely, Ireland, is that of barrister. It is not that of “Avocat-

Advocaat”. Mr Sallabi describes himself as a “barrister” and a “practising barrister”,

including in all of the affidavits which he has sworn in these proceedings and in the Al

Maktoum proceedings and on his letterhead and in his emails. He does not claim to be,

and is not, entitled to use the professional designation of a lawyer in Belgium, “Avocat”

or “Advocaat”.

165. Article 4 of the Lawyers’ Services Directive provides that a lawyer providing

services involving the representation of a client in legal proceedings or before public

authorities in each “host Member State” must do so “under the conditions laid down

for lawyers established in that State” with certain exceptions which are not relevant

here. Although Mr Sallabi submitted that in his case Ireland is the “host Member State”,

that cannot be the case as he is using, and is required to use, the professional title from

the “Member State from which he comes”, which is that of barrister. Under Article 4(1),

a lawyer seeking to exercise his or her freedom to provide services in a host Member

State must comply with the conditions laid down for lawyers established in that State

as mentioned. Further, under Article 4(2), a lawyer pursuing those activities is required

to observe the rules of professional conduct of the “host Member State” and this is

“without prejudice to his obligations in the Member State from which he comes”.

166. The Lawyers’ Services Directive was implemented into Irish law by the Lawyers’

Services Regulations. Those regulations were made to enable lawyers from other

Member States to provide legal services in Ireland. The Regulations distinguish

between two types of lawyer. The first is a “lawyer established in the State”, which

term is defined as meaning a “barrister or a solicitor established in the State and

lawfully engaged in the practice of his profession”. The second is a “visiting lawyer”.

That term is defined as meaning “any person who is established in a Member State 72

(other than this State) and is entitled to pursue in that Member State the professional

activities of a lawyer under a designation shown opposite the name of that Member

State” in a list which follows. In the case of Belgium, the designation is “Avocat-

Advocaat”.

167. Ireland and the two professional designations of lawyers in Ireland, namely,

barrister and solicitor, do not appear in that list. Mr Sallabi submitted that the Lawyers’

Services Regulations are defective and breach EU law by failing to include Ireland and

the professional designation of barrister in that list. However, that submission is not

correct. The Regulations did not have to list Ireland and the profession of barrister as

the Regulations are not intended to apply to Irish barristers who provide legal services

as such in Ireland. They are intended to apply to a person in another Member State who

is entitled to pursue professional activities as a lawyer under the relevant designation

for lawyers in that other Member State.

168. Mr Sallabi is not a “visiting lawyer”. That is clear from several other provisions

in the Regulations. For example, under Regulation 4 a “visiting lawyer, when providing

legal services in Ireland, is required to use the professional title used in the Member

State from which he comes” (reflecting Article 3 of the Directive). Mr Sallabi is not

permitted to use the relevant professional designations in Belgium of “Avocat” or

“Advocaat” and has moved or established there (if that be the case) in reliance on his

Irish professional qualification of barrister.

169. However, even if it could be said that in providing legal services as a barrister in

Ireland, Mr Sallabi is exercising a right to provide services in Ireland as a “visiting

lawyer” (which I do not accept is the case), he would still be required to comply with

the provisions of Regulation 5 of the Regulations (which gives effect to Article 4 of the

Directive). Under Regulation 5(1) and (2), a “visiting lawyer” who represents a client 73

in legal proceedings or before public authorities must do so “under the conditions laid

down for lawyers established in the State”, save for certain exceptions which are not

relevant to Mr Sallabi’s case. Further, under Regulation 5(2), a “visiting lawyer” who

represents a client in legal proceedings or before local authorities, must observe the

rules of professional conduct of the State, without prejudice to the lawyer’s obligations

in the Member State from which he or she comes. Under Regulation 5(3), a “visiting

lawyer” who provides legal services (other than representing a client in legal

proceedings or before public authorities) remains subject to the conditions and rules of

professional conduct in the Member State from which he or she comes without

prejudice to respect for the rules which govern lawyers established in the State.

170. I agree with the Authority that Mr Sallabi’s reliance on the Lawyers’ Services

Directive is misplaced and is a “red herring”. In his case, Ireland is not the “host

Member State” and he has provided and intends to provide legal services in Ireland

under the professional designation and using the professional qualification which he

obtained here in Ireland. There is no basis on which the court could or should disapply

the Lawyers’ Services Regulations insofar as Mr Sallabi is concerned.

(c) Lawyers’ Establishment Directive/Regulations

171. Mr Sallabi’s reliance on the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive is even more

difficult to understand. It is clear from the title to the Directive, from its recitals and

from several of its substantive provisions that the Directive applies to facilitate the

practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than

that in which the lawyer obtained the professional qualification. Recital (1), having

referred to the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to free movement of

persons and services being one of the objectives of the then European Community,

refers to the possibility for nationals of Member States to practise a profession, whether 74

in a self-employed or salaried capacity, “in a Member State other than that in which

they obtained their professional qualifications” (emphasis added). That context is clear

from many of the recitals to the Directive. Article 1 makes very clear that the purpose

of the Directive is to “facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent

basis in a self-employed or salaried capacity in a Member State other than that in which

the professional qualification was obtained” (emphasis added).

172. In this case Mr Sallabi obtained his professional qualification in Ireland and has

provided, and intends to provide legal services as a barrister in Ireland which is the

Member State in which his professional qualification was obtained. Ireland is not a

Member State “other than that in which [his] professional qualification was obtained”.

Mr Sallabi presumably sought to rely on this Directive in order to seek to practise on a

permanent basis or to establish himself in Belgium, which is a Member State other than

that in which he obtained his professional qualification.

173. Article 1(2) of the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive defines a “lawyer” as

meaning a person who is a national of a Member State and who is authorised to pursue

his professional activities under one of a number of different professional titles. In the

case of Belgium, the professional titles under this Directive are “Avocat-Advocaat-

Rechtsanwalt”. In the case of Ireland the professional titles are “barrister/solicitor”.

174. The Directive contains important definitions of “home Member State”, “host

Member State” and “home-country professional title”. The term “home Member State”

is defined as meaning “the Member State in which a lawyer acquired the right to use

one of the professional titles referred to in (a) before practising the profession of lawyer

in another Member State”. The term “host Member State” is defined as meaning the

“Member State in which a lawyer practises pursuant to this Directive”. The term

“home-country professional title” is defined as meaning “the professional title used in 75

the Member State in which a lawyer acquired the right to use that title before practising

the profession of lawyer in the host Member State”.

175. The position in relation to Mr Sallabi could not be clearer. In his case, the “home

Member State” is clearly Ireland. That was the Member State in which he acquired the

right to use the professional title of barrister before seeking to practise the profession

of lawyer in Belgium (and also, it appears, in other Member States). In his case, the

“host Member State” is clearly Belgium as that is the Member State in which he has

sought to establish himself pursuant to the Directive. The “home-country professional

title” in the case of Mr Sallabi is clearly that of barrister as it is the professional title

used in the Member State in which Mr Sallabi acquired the right to use that title (i.e.,

Ireland) before seeking to practise the profession of lawyer in the host Member State,

namely, Belgium.

176. While it is not entirely clear the basis on which Mr Sallabi seeks to rely on the

Lawyers’ Establishment Directive, and the Directive does not appear to have any

relevance to his wish to continue providing legal services as a barrister in Ireland, it

should be noted that under Article 1(4), the practise of the profession of lawyer within

the meaning of the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive is expressly stated not to include

the provision of services, which is covered by the Lawyers’ Services Directive. In other

words, a lawyer cannot seek to rely on both Directives. They are mutually exclusive.

177. Article 2 makes clear that the right conferred on a lawyer under the Directive is

“to pursue on a permanent basis in any other Member State under his home-country

professional title, the activities specified in Article 5” (emphasis added). Having regard

to the definition of “home-country professional title” and the particular circumstances

of Mr Sallabi’s case, it is presumably under this provision that Mr Sallabi has sought to

establish himself in Belgium in reliance on his professional title of barrister, by virtue 76

of his degree from the King’s Inns and his call to the Irish Bar. That this Directive is

intended to cover a situation where a person such as Mr Sallabi seeks to establish

himself in another Member State by using his Irish professional title of barrister is also

clear from several of the other substantive provisions of the Directive, including

Articles 3, 4 and 5. It seems to me, therefore, that Mr Sallabi in seeking to provide legal

services as a barrister in Ireland cannot rely on the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive.

Contrary to the submissions which he advanced at the hearing, his “home Member

State” (as that term is defined in the Directive) is clearly Ireland and his “host Member

State” is clearly Belgium.

178. Article 6 of the Directive would, therefore, require Mr Sallabi to be subject to the

same rules of professional conduct as lawyers practising under the relevant professional

title in Belgium in respect of all activities he pursues there irrespective of the rules of

professional conduct to which he is subject in Ireland (Article 6(1)). Even if, despite

the very clear manner in which the relevant terms are defined in the Directive, it could

be said that Belgium is Mr Sallabi’s “home Member State” and that Ireland is his “host

Member State” (which is just not the case), Mr Sallabi would still be required to comply

with the same rules of professional conduct as other lawyers practising as barristers in

Ireland are. He would also be required to comply with the requirements in Ireland to

take out professional indemnity insurance unless exempted from that requirement if he

could prove that he is covered by insurance taken out in accordance with the rules

applicable in Belgium where the relevant insurance cover is equivalent and where it is

only partial he might be required to take out additional insurance (Article 6(3)). Even

on that rather contorted (and incorrect) reading of Article 6 of the Directive, the

Authority would be required to assess the extent of cover to which Mr Sallabi is entitled

under the Brussels Bar policy and if it is not satisfied as to the adequacy of that cover 77

it could require Mr Sallabi to put in place the appropriate cover. But that, of course, is

not the correct reading of Article 6 and in particular Article 6(3) which is intended to

ensure that the authorities in Belgium can require Mr Sallabi to ensure that he has

adequate professional indemnity insurance in accordance with the rules which it lays

down for professional activities pursued in its territory.

179. Before leaving the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive, I should note that the

Directive does provide the opportunity for Mr Sallabi to acquire one of the professional

titles in Belgium on the basis of his barrister qualification from Ireland. This can be

done in one of two ways. The first, under Article 10 of the Directive, is through practice

under his home State title (that of barrister) in the host State law (i.e., in Belgium) for

a period of three years. The second is through Professional Qualifications Directive

(Directive 2005/36/EC) (Articles 13 and 14) by sitting an aptitude test or passing an

adaptation period. Mr Sallabi does not claim to have pursued either of those two routes

and so he remains practising in Belgium under his Irish barrister professional title.

180. The Lawyers’ Establishment Directive was implemented in Ireland by the

Lawyers’ Establishment Regulations in 2003. I do not propose to say much about these

Regulations (as I do not believe that they have any relevance to Mr Sallabi’s case for

the reasons just explained in the case of the Directive). The Regulations give effect to

the entitlement under the Directive for a lawyer from another Member State to pursue

the professional activities of a barrister or a solicitor, as the case may be, on a permanent

basis under their professional title as if the person were a barrister or a solicitor (see,

for example, Regulation 10). The Regulations provide for the establishment of a register

for those lawyers who seek to establish here. A lawyer who is registered on the relevant

register and who receives a certificate to that effect is defined in Regulation 2 as a

“registered lawyer”. That is also the term used in para. (b) of the definition of 78

“qualified barrister” in section 2(1) of the 2015 Act. Mr Sallabi confirmed in his

application to the Authority (and has not sought to change the relevant details in that

application) that he is not a “registered lawyer” and that the relevant part of the form

which refers to “registered lawyers” was not applicable to him (he marked “N/A” on

the form.

181. It is clear, therefore, on facts of this case that insofar as Mr Sallabi seeks to

provide legal services in Ireland as a barrister he is not exercising any rights conferred

under the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive or under the Lawyers’ Establishment

Regulations. He may well have sought to rely on that Directive when seeking to

establish himself as a lawyer in Belgium in reliance on his Irish professional legal

qualifications when providing legal services there (or elsewhere in the EU) in reliance

on those qualifications but he is not doing so when providing legal services as a barrister

in Ireland, the Member State in which he received his professional qualification as a

barrister.

182. I am satisfied that as an Irish barrister seeking to provide legal services in Ireland,

Mr Sallabi is required to comply with the provisions of the 2015 Act and the 2024

Regulations. When providing those legal services in Ireland, Mr Sallabi is doing so as

an Irish barrister and not as a Belgian Avocat/Advocaat/Rechtsanwalt. While in his oral

submissions, Mr Sallabi submitted that the court should disapply the provisions of the

Lawyers’ Establishment Regulations as being in breach of his EU law right of

establishment, I agree with the Authority that since those regulations do not apply to

him, there is no basis on which they should be disapplied.

(d) Further analysis of Mr Sallabi’s submissions on free movement of persons

183. In his written and oral submissions, Mr Sallabi referred to a large number of

judgments of the CJEU. Many of the judgments have no relevance whatsoever to the 79

circumstances of his case. Space does not permit a full discussion and consideration of

all of the cases on which Mr Sallabi relied. I will, nonetheless, attempt to deal with

some of those cases. However, I am satisfied that the cases on which he relied do not

support his fundamental submission that the Authority is not entitled to require him to

put in place a professional indemnity insurance policy which complies with the 2024

Regulations.

184. Mr Sallabi contended that it is a breach of his rights to free movement and, in

particular, his right to provide legal services in Ireland for the Authority to apply the

2024 Regulations in his case since they do not permit an exception for EU lawyers

exercising their rights of free movement under the Treaty either to provide services or

to set up a secondary establishment in the State and that the Authority’s requirement,

therefore, constitutes a measure that prohibits, impedes or renders less attractive the

exercise of those Treaty freedoms. He relied in support of that contention on the

judgments of the CJEU in C-427/85, Commission v Germany, ECLI: EU:C:1988:98

and C-739/19, V.K. v An Bord Pleanála, ECLI: EU:C:2021:185. However, those cases

addressed completely different situations and are in no way comparable to Mr Sallabi’s

position as he is seeking to provide legal services in Ireland, being the Member State in

which he obtained his professional qualifications, and is not being prevented from or

restricted in providing those legal services provided he complies with the obligations

on all lawyers (whether Irish barristers or lawyers from other Member States), to ensure

that there is in place adequate professional indemnity insurance to cover their work.

The cases relied on by Mr Sallabi do not provide any support for his claim that the 2024

Regulations ought to distinguish between someone in his position and other Irish

barristers or to provide an exception for someone in his position. Having regard to what

I have said in relation to the scope of application of the Lawyers’ Services Directive 80

and the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive and the national regulations implementing

those provisions in Ireland, I do not accept that the application of the 2024 Regulations

to Mr Sallabi constitutes a breach of the Treaty provisions on which he relies or of those

Directives. Nor, for the reasons already stated, is there any infirmity with the national

implementing regulations (the Lawyers’ Services Regulations and the Lawyers’

Establishment Regulations).

185. Mr Sallabi seeks to disapply the 2024 Regulations insofar as they apply to what

he terms as barristers established in other Member States. I have to deal with Mr

Sallabi’s position as a barrister who seeks to rely on his Irish professional qualification

as a barrister to provide legal services in the State. I do not see any breach of the Treaty

or secondary legislation on which Mr Sallabi relies by the Authority seeking to apply

the 2024 Regulations in his case and, in particular, seeking to require that he has in

place adequate professional indemnity insurance. In those circumstances, I do not see

any basis for his reliance on judgments of the CJEU in cases such as Case 11/70

Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, Case 106-77 Simmenthal [1978]

ECR 629 and Case C-213/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame

Limited [1990] ECR 1-2433 or the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Danqua v

Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 2) [2017] IECA 20. I do not agree that there is

any basis for the court to disapply the 2024 Regulations in Mr Sallabi’s case. Nor is

there any basis for Mr Sallabi’s contention that the Lawyers’ Services Regulations and

the Lawyers’ Establishment Regulations should be disapplied in his case as being in

breach of his EU law rights.

186. While I agree with the Authority that neither the Lawyers’ Services Directive nor

the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive applies in Mr Sallabi’s case, for the reasons

which I have already explained, if either of them does (and if, as the Authority believes, 81

Mr Sallabi is not covered under the Brussels Bar policy for legal services which he

provides as a barrister in Ireland) then the Authority’s requirement that Mr Sallabi has

in place such professional indemnity insurance cover which complies with the 2024

Regulations is permissible under both of those Directives – Article 4(1) and (2) of the

Lawyers’ Services Directive and Article 6(1) and (3) of the Lawyers’ Establishment

Directive – and by imposing that requirement, the Authority is not otherwise in breach

of EU law.

187. In the case of the Lawyers’ Services Directive, that position is supported by

several judgments of the CJEU, including C-427/85 Commission v Germany (paras. 11

and 12), Case C-294/89 Commission v France [1991] ECR I-3591 and Case C-739/19

VK (paras. 21 to 23).

188. While Mr Sallabi relied on the judgment in Case C-294/89 Commission v France

[1991] ECR I-3591, in support of his claim that it is in breach of the Lawyers’ Services

Directive to apply the 2024 Regulations to his case, I do not accept that the judgment

in that case supports Mr Sallabi’s position. Apart from anything else, the facts of that

case were so different to the facts of this case. That case concerned a French law which

had a number of problematic features from the point of view of the freedom of lawyers

from other Member States to provide legal services in another Member State.

189. The first was that the French law provided that nationals of Member States other

than France who were practising as lawyers in a Member State other than France were

entitled to the benefit of the provisions on the freedom for lawyers to provide services

in France. However, French nationals who were practising in other Member States

under one of the “lawyer” designations in Article 1(2) of the Lawyers’ Services

Directive were not entitled to avail of that freedom. France conceded that that was a

breach of EU Law. The CJEU held that not only nationals of other Member States but 82

also French nationals were entitled to have their professional qualifications obtained in

other Member States recognised in France and that the failure by the legislation to make

such provision meant that it was in breach of France’s obligations under the Treaty.

That is completely different to this case. This case does not involve any restriction on

Mr Sallabi, an Irish barrister, from providing legal services in Ireland as a barrister. He

is subject to precisely the same requirements as any other Irish barrister who provides

legal services here.

190. The second problem with the French legislation was that it required the lawyer

with the professional qualifications from another Member State to work in conjunction

with the lawyer who was a member of the French Bar in proceedings before bodies and

authorities which were not involved in the administration of justice and in proceedings

in which, under French law, the assistance of a lawyer was not compulsory. Again

France conceded that this was a breach of the Treaty. The CJEU held (para. 17) that as

had previously been held in Case 427/85 Commission v Germany, Article 5 of the

Lawyers’ Services Directive could not have the effect of imposing on a lawyer

providing services requirements for which there was no equivalent in the professional

rules which would apply in the absence of any provision of services within the meaning

of the Treaty. Again nothing like that arises in this case. No requirements are being

imposed on Mr Sallabi which are not imposed on other Irish barristers, including those

who choose to provide services or to establish themselves in another Member State.

191. The third problem with the French law was that it provided that a lawyer from

another Member State who sought to provide services by appearing before a court was

required, in civil cases where it was necessary to be represented by a lawyer, to retain

a lawyer who was a member of the Bar of that particular court or who was authorised

to plead before it, in order to conduct the proceedings or to carry out relevant procedural 83

formalities. The CJEU held that that part of the French law also amounted to a breach

by France of its obligations under the Treaty (at paras. 35 to 37). Nothing like that arises

in this case. I do not believe, therefore, that the judgment Commission v France supports

the position advanced by Mr Sallabi in this case.

192. Nor do Case 427/85 Commission v Germany and Case C-739/19 support Mr

Sallabi’s position. In Commission v Germany the German law at issue provided that a

lawyer from another Member State who was providing legal services in Germany was

required to work in conjunction with a German lawyer, even where there was no such

requirement for representation by a lawyer in the proceedings under German law. The

CJEU held that the impugned provisions of the law were excessive and went beyond

what was permitted since German law did not require representation by a lawyer and

any person could represent a person under German law. Therefore, the burden imposed

on lawyers from other Member States who sought to exercise their freedom to provide

services in Germany was held to be excessive. I agree with the Authority that this case

is not relevant and is of no assistance to Mr Sallabi. Nor is the judgment in VK. On the

contrary, I accept that the judgment in VK supports the Authority’s position. The facts

of that case, which arose from an Article 267 reference by the Supreme Court, were

very different to the facts of this case. The reference concerned the interpretation of

Article 5 of the Lawyers’ Services Directive and it was made in proceedings between

VK and An Bord Pleanála concerning the obligation imposed on the applicant’s visiting

lawyer to work in conjunction with a local lawyer for the purposes of representing that

applicant before the Supreme Court. Provision was made in Regulation 6 of the

Lawyers’ Services Regulations for such a visiting lawyer to work in conjunction with

a lawyer who is entitled to practise before the court in question and who would, where

necessary, be answerable to that Court. In its judgment, the CJEU provided a very 84

useful summary of the requirements of Article 57 of the Treaty and the Lawyers’

Services Directive and of the permissible restrictions which can be imposed by Member

States. Having stated that the obligation imposed by the national legislation to work in

conjunction with a domestic lawyer constitutes a restriction on the freedom of lawyers

from other Member States to provide services in that it will involve the litigant who

wishes to use a lawyer established in another Member State having to bear additional

costs compared to the person who decides to retain the services of a lawyer established

in the Member State of the proceedings concerned, the CJEU went on to state:

“21. [The Lawyers’ Services Directive] must also be interpreted in the light of the

third paragraph of Article 57 [of the Treaty], from which the court has inferred that,

regard being had to the particular nature of certain services, specific requirements

imposed on the provider of the services cannot be considered incompatible with the

… Treaty where they have as their purpose the application of rules governing such

activities, but that the freedom to provide services is one of the fundamental

principles of the … Treaty and may be restricted only by rules which are justified

by the general good and are imposed on all persons pursuing activities in the host

Member State, insofar as that interest is not safeguarded by the rules to which the

provider of the service is subject in the Member State in which he or she is

established (see, to that effect, the judgment of 25 February 1988, Commission v

Germany, 427/85 …, paragraph 12).

22. In that regard, it must be noted that, first, the protection of consumers, in

particular recipients of legal services provided by persons involved in the

administration of justice and, second, the proper administration of justice are

objectives which feature among those which may be regarded as overriding

requirements in the public interest capable of justifying a restriction on the freedom 85

to provide services (judgment of 18 May 2017, Lahorgue C-99/16, EU:C 2017:391,

paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

23. In the case at hand, it is apparent from the order for reference that the Irish

legislation in question seeks to protect the proper administration of justice and the

protection of the litigant as a consumer.”

193. While I have accepted the Authority’s submission that the Lawyers’ Services

Directive does not apply in the case of Mr Sallabi (for reasons already explained), if I

am wrong about that, I would nonetheless be satisfied that the 2024 Regulations, by

requiring adequate professional indemnity insurance for barristers providing legal

services here, would be compatible with Article 4 of the Lawyers’ Services Directive

and Regulation 5 of the Lawyers Services Regulations and insofar as those requirements

could be said to amount to a restriction on the freedom of a person such as Mr Sallabi

to provide legal services here (which I do not believe to be the case), such restrictions

would clearly be justified by the “general good” and would be imposed on all persons

pursuing the relevant activities in Ireland. The case law of the CJEU, including VK and

Lahorgue (referred to by the CJEU in VK), confirms that the protection of consumers

and, in particular, recipients of legal services provided by persons involved in the

administration of justice, such as barristers, is an objective which features among the

overriding requirements in the public interest which are capable of justifying a

restriction on the freedom to provide services.

194. The requirement in the 2024 Regulations that a practising barrister must have in

place a professional indemnity policy which covers the legal services provided by the

barrister and which complies with the 2024 Regulations is intended to protect the

recipients of the legal services provided by such barristers. That is clear from the fact

that one of the overall objectives of the Authority is to protect and promote the interests 86

of consumers in relation to the provision of legal services (s. 13(4)(c)) and from the

requirements in s. 47(4) of the 2015 Act that, in making regulations in relation to the

professional indemnity insurance required to be maintained by practising barristers

under s. 47(1), the Authority is required to have regard to various objectives including

ensuring that the interests of clients of practising barristers are protected (s. 47(4)(a))

and ensuring that there is adequate consideration given to different levels of risk which

may arise in the case of practising barristers (s. 47(4)(c)).

195. It is clear from the evidence before the court on this application that the

Authority’s concern is that Mr Sallabi has provided and intends to provide legal services

in the State without having appropriate indemnity cover in place and that that creates a

risk for those who might engage Mr Sallabi to provide such services (para. 40 of Mr

Watson’s first affidavit and para. 37 of his second affidavit). Therefore, even if the

Lawyers’ Services Directive applies (which it does not), it would still be open to the

Authority to require Mr Sallabi to comply with the 2024 Regulations concerning his

professional indemnity insurance situation.

196. A similar position applies if the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive applies to his

case. For reasons which I have sought to explain earlier, I am satisfied that that

Directive does not apply to Mr Sallabi’s case. Mr Sallabi is not seeking to establish in

Ireland. He has sought to establish in Belgium in reliance on his Irish professional

qualifications. However, if I am wrong about that and if the Lawyers’ Establishment

Directive does apply in Mr Sallabi’s case, I am satisfied that the Authority would

nonetheless be entitled to require him to comply with the 2024 Regulations with respect

to his professional indemnity insurance cover. I accept that the case law relied on by

the Authority, by way of a fall-back position, demonstrates that that is the case. 87

197. Support for the Authority’s fall-back position can be seen in, for example, the

judgments of the CJEU in Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165 and Case C-

168/98 Luxembourg v European Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-9131. In

Gebhard, a reference to the CJEU from Italy concerning a German lawyer seeking to

practice in Milan, the Court considered aspects of the right of establishment under the

Treaty. At paras. 32 to 35 of its judgment, the CJEU stated:

“32. It follows that the question whether it is possible for a national of a Member

State to exercise his right of establishment and the conditions for exercise of that

right must be determined in the light of the activities which he intends to pursue

on the territory of the host Member State.

33. Under the terms of the second paragraph of Article 52, freedom of

establishment, is to be exercised under the conditions laid down for its own

nationals by the law of the country where establishment is effected.

34. In the event that the specific activities in question are not subject to any rules

in the host State, so that a national of that Member State does not have to have

any specific qualification in order to pursue them, a national of any other Member

State is entitled to establish himself on the territory of the first State and pursue

those activities there.

35. However, the taking up and pursuit of certain self-employed activities may be

conditional on complying with certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or

administrative action justified by the general good, such as rules relating to

organisation, qualifications, professional ethics, supervision and liability…”

198. Later, at para. 37, the CJEU reiterated that it was clear from the Court’s case law

that national measures which were liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise 88

of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty had to fulfil four conditions: they

had to be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they had to be justified by imperative

requirements in the general interest; they had to be suitable for securing the attainment

of the objective which they pursue; and they could not go beyond what was necessary

in order to obtain it. In other words a requirement in a host Member State that a lawyer

from another Member State seeking to establish in the host Member State had to comply

with certain provisions, had to be justified by the general good and comply with the

principle of proportionality.

199. The protection of consumers, and, in particular, Mr Sallabi’s clients in respect of

the legal services he provides in Ireland, is a requirement justified by the general good

(and is an objective required to be secured by the Authority under the 2015 Act) and,

to the extent that the Brussels Bar policy does not provide an indemnity for the work

which Mr Sallabi does as a barrister in Ireland, the requirement that he have in place

adequate professional indemnity insurance cover is required under the 2024

Regulations, in my view, plainly complies with the principle of proportionality.

200. Case C-168/98 Luxembourg v European Parliament and Council, which

concerned an unsuccessful application to annul the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive,

is also supportive of the Authority’s position in identifying relevant considerations to

be taken into account in relation to the imposition of restrictions on lawyers from

another Member State exercising their rights to free movement. In explaining how the

Community legislature went about facilitating the freedom of establishment of lawyers

in the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive and put in place a plan of action which

included a requirement to comply with rules of professional conduct, “compulsory

insurance” and a system of discipline involving both the competent authorities of the

home Member State and the host State (as provided for in Article 6 of the Lawyers’ 89

Establishment Directive) (para. 43 of the judgment of the CJEU in Case C-168/98

Luxembourg). At para. 44, the CJEU stated:

“In making such a choice of the method and level of consumer protection and of

ensuring the proper administration of justice, the Community legislature has not

overstepped the limits of its discretion.”

The Court, therefore, confirmed the legitimate concern to make provision for adequate

consumer protection in the context of the exercise by lawyers of their rights of

establishment under the Treaty and under the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive.

201. While reiterating that the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive does not apply to Mr

Sallabi, I conclude that there is a clear public interest in ensuring that a person, such as

Mr Sallabi, who seeks to practise as a barrister in Ireland, irrespective of whether he

provides services or has sought to establish himself in another Member State, has

adequate professional indemnity insurance in respect of the services he provides in

Ireland. I accept the Authority’s submission that the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations

do not discriminate between lawyers who attained their professional legal qualifications

in Ireland and those from other Member States, referred to as “registered lawyers” in

the Lawyers’ Establishment Regulations, in terms of their professional indemnity

insurance obligations. Both categories of practising barrister must comply with the

2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations. I see no breach of EU law in relation to that

requirement.

202. I am also satisfied that the Authority is entitled to assess whether the Brussels Bar

policy on which Mr Sallabi relies provides adequate professional indemnity insurance

cover. For reasons explained in a later section of the judgment, the Authority was

entitled to have doubts about the adequacy of that cover and to conclude that the policy 90

did not provide cover that complied with the 2024 Regulations. To the extent that Mr

Sallabi relied on the judgment of the CJEU in Case C-540/22 SN & Others

ECLI:EU:C:2024:530 and, in particular, para. 75 of that judgment, I do not believe that

it provides the support sought by him. In that case (and in several earlier cases), the

CJEU made clear that although a piece of national legislation which applies without

distinction may, despite the restrictive effect produced by that legislation in respect of

the freedom to provide services, nonetheless be justified if it pursues “an overriding

reason in the public interest”. The court confirmed however that such a justification

cannot be accepted unless the particular interest which the legislation seeks to protect

is not already safeguarded by the rules to which the person providing the service is

subject to in the Member State in which they are established. A similar point was made

by the CJEU in VK. However, by reason of the doubts in relation to the scope of

application of the Brussels Bar policy and the Authority’s conclusion that the policy

does not provide cover for the legal services which Mr Sallabi provides as a barrister in

Ireland, it cannot be said that the objective of protecting consumers and, in particular,

compliance of Mr Sallabi in respect of the legal services he provides in Ireland, are

already safeguarded by the rules which apply to him in Belgium.

203. Finally, Mr Sallabi submitted (in reliance on various judgments of the CJEU) that

the application of the 2024 Regulations to him is discriminatory because the Authority

seeks to apply those regulations to him in the same way as it does to Irish barristers who

are based here in Ireland. He relied, in particular, on the judgment of the CJEU in Case

C-341/05 Laval in support of that submission in particular (para. 115 of the judgment).

The facts of that case were very different to this case. However, at para. 115, the Court

expressed the general principle that “discrimination can arise only through the

application of different rules to comparable situations or the application of the same 91

rule to different situations…”. The Authority did not dispute that general principle.

However, the application of the 2024 Regulations to Mr Sallabi does not involve either

the application of different rules to comparable situations or the application of the same

rules to different situations. The position of Mr Sallabi as a person with an Irish

professional qualification of Barrister-at-Law who seeks to provide legal services as a

barrister in Ireland and also seeks to do so or to establish himself in other Member States

or in another Member State, is not significantly different to the position of an Irish

barrister who seeks to provide such services in Ireland but who does not seek to provide

them or to establish himself or herself in any other Member State. No discrimination

on the grounds of nationality or otherwise, therefore, arises.

204. Nor do I accept the submission made by Mr Sallabi based on a number of other

judgments of the CJEU, including joined cases C-53/13 and C-80/13 AC Industries

EU:C:2014:2011 that the Authority’s requirement that he comply with the professional

indemnity insurance provisions in the 2024 Regulations amounts to a restriction on his

freedom to provide services as prohibiting, impeding or rendering less attractive the

exercise of that freedom. That is simply not the position on the facts of this case.

205. In conclusion therefore, I reject Mr Sallabi’s claim that the Authority’s

requirement that he comply with the 2024 Regulations with respect to his professional

indemnity insurance cover breaches the right of establishment or the freedom to provide

services provisions of the Treaty or the Lawyers’ Services Directive or the Lawyers’

Establishment Directive or that in requiring such compliance the Authority has acted

otherwise in breach of Mr Sallabi’s rights of free movement under EU law. His request

that the court disapply the provisions of the 2024 Regulations, the Lawyers’ Services

Regulations and the Lawyers’ Establishment Regulations on the grounds of an alleged

breach of his rights to free movement under EU law must, therefore, be rejected. 92

9. EU Law: Solvency II Directive: position of KBC

206. A discrete issue of EU law relevant to the compatibility of the Brussels Bar policy

with the 2024 Regulations was raised by Mr Sallabi in response to the Authority’s

application. The issue concerns the regulatory status in Ireland of one of the two co-

insurers under the policy, namely, KBC.

207. There are two co-insurers under the Brussels Bar policy, MSIG and KBC. Under

Article 24 of the policy (incorrectly referred to as Article 25 in the Word Perfect

translation) which is headed “Co-insurance” the risks covered under the policy and the

premiums paid are shared between the two insurers according to the percentages for

each of them. The percentage specified earlier in the policy for MSIG is 80% and that

specified for KBC is 20%. MSIG is stated to be the “lead insurer”. Article 24 expressly

states that the policy does not create joint (and several) liability as between the two co-

insurers. Each of them is deemed to have underwritten or subscribed to its share as if it

were a separate policy (subject to a proviso that is not relevant here). In light of these

provisions, the regulatory status of the two co-insurers is relevant.

208. Both MSIG and KBC are Belgian insurance companies and are authorised and

supervised by the relevant Belgian authorities. Under the Solvency II Directive, both

are entitled to pursue their activities in other Member States by establishing branches

or by providing services in those states. The essential principle is set out in Recital (11).

It states that since the Directive “constitutes an essential instrument for the achievement

of the internal market, insurance and reinsurance undertakings authorised in their

home Member States should be allowed to pursue, throughout the Community, any or

all of their activities by establishing branches or by providing services”. The Recital

then states: 93

“It is therefore appropriate to bring about such harmonisation as is necessary

and sufficient to achieve the mutual recognition of authorisations and

supervisory systems, and thus a single authorisation which is valid

throughout the Community and which allows the supervision of an

undertaking to be carried out by the home Member State.”

209. The terms “home Member State” and “host Member State” are defined in Article

13(8) and (9). In the case of non-life insurance, “home Member State” is defined as

meaning “the Member State in which the head office of the insurance undertaking

covering the risk is situated”. The term “host Member State” is defined as meaning

“the Member State, other than the home Member State, in which an insurance …

undertaking has a branch or provides services”. The definition further states that “for

life and non-life insurance, the Member State of the provision of services means,

respectively, the Member State of the commitment or the Member State in which the

risk is situated, where that commitment or risk is covered by an insurance undertaking

or a branch situated in another Member State”. In this case, the “home Member State”

for both MSIG and KBC is Belgium.

210. Title I Chapter III of the Solvency II Directive contains the provisions governing

the taking up of business by insurance or reinsurance undertakings. Article 14 provides

for the “principle of authorisation”. Article 14(1) provides that the taking up of the

business of direct insurance covered by the Directive is subject to “prior

authorisation”. Under Article 14(2), that authorisation must be sought from the

supervisory authorities of the “home Member State” by any undertaking which is

establishing its head office in the territory of that Member State or any insurance

undertaking which wishes to extend its business to cover other insurance classes not

already authorised. Article 15 covers the “scope of authorisation”. The fundamental 94

principle is contained in Article 15(1) which provides that an authorisation provided

pursuant to Article 14:

“… shall be valid for the entire Community. It shall permit insurance and

reinsurance undertakings to pursue business there, that authorisation covering

also the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services.”

211. Chapter VIII of the Solvency II Directive fleshes out the provisions governing the

right of establishment and the freedom to provide services of insurance undertakings.

Section 1 (Articles 145 and 146) deals with the establishment by insurance

undertakings. Section 2 (Articles 147 to 152) deals with the freedom to provide services

by insurance undertakings. Insofar as establishment by insurance companies is

concerned, Article 145 sets out the conditions for the establishment of a branch in

another Member State. Article 145(1) requires Member States to ensure that an

insurance undertaking which proposes to establish a branch in another Member State

notifies the supervisory authorities of its “home Member State”. Article 145(2) requires

that Member States must require every insurance undertaking that proposes to establish

a branch in another Member State to provide certain specified information to the

supervisory authorities (of the “home Member State”) when making the notification

referred to in Article 145(1). Among the information which the insurance undertaking

must provide is an explanation of the type of business envisaged.

212. Article 146 provides that, subject to a proviso that is not relevant here, the

supervisory authorities of the “home Member State” must within three months

communicate the information notified to it to the supervisory authorities of the “host

Member State” and inform the insurance undertaking of that. The supervisory

authorities of the “home Member State” must also attest to the insurance undertaking’s

compliance with certain capital requirements. Article 146(3) provides that before the 95

branch of an insurance undertaking starts business in the “host Member State” the

supervisory authorities of that state must, where applicable, within two months of

receiving the relevant information, inform the supervisory authority of the “home

Member State” of the conditions under which the business must be pursued in the “host

Member State”. The supervisory authority in the “home Member State” is then required

to communicate that information to the insurance company concerned. It is only after

compliance with those requirements that the insurance undertaking may establish the

branch and start business in the “host Member State”.

213. Chapter VII section 2 contains the provisions concerning the freedom to provide

services by insurance undertakings. Under Article 147, any insurance undertaking that

intends to pursue business for the first time in one or more Member States under the

freedom to provide services is required first to notify the supervisory authorities of the

“home Member State”, indicating the nature of the risks or commitments which it

proposes to cover. Under Article 148(1), within one month of that notification, the

supervisory authorities of the “home Member State” must communicate certain

information and documentation to the Member State or States in which the insurance

undertaking intends to pursue business under the freedom to provide services. The

information and documentation includes a certificate attesting to the undertaking’s

compliance with the relevant capital requirements, the classes of insurance which the

insurance undertaking has been authorised to offer and the nature of the risks or

commitments which it proposes to cover in the “host Member State”. Certain other

information must also be provided. Under Article 148(4), the insurance undertaking is

permitted to start business as from the date on which it is informed of the

communication provided for in Article 148(1). 96

214. The Solvency II Directive was implemented into Irish law by the Solvency II

Regulations in 2015. The provisions governing the right of establishment and freedom

to provide services are contained in Part 11. The provisions governing the establishment

of a branch in the State are contained in Article 157. Under that provision, before the

branch of an insurance undertaking authorised in a Member State other than Ireland

starts business in Ireland, the CBI must, where applicable, within two months of

receiving the information referred to in Article 145(2) of the Solvency II Directive and

a certificate in relation to the relevant capital requirements, notify the supervisory

authority of the “home Member State” of the conditions under which, in the interests

of the general good, that business must be pursued in the State. Article 157(2) provides

that the insurance undertaking may establish the branch and start business in Ireland as

from the date on which the supervisory authority of the “home Member State” has

received the notification from the CBI referred to in Article 157(1) or, if no notification

is received, after the end of the two-month period referred to in Article 157(1).

215. The position in relation to the freedom of insurance undertakings to provide

services into Ireland is dealt with in Article 162. Under Article 162(1), an insurance

undertaking which is authorised in another Member State may provide insurance

services into Ireland on or after the date in which it is informed by the supervisory

authority of its “home Member State” that it has communicated to the CBI the

certificate and information referred to in Article 148(1) of the Solvency II Directive.

Article 162(2) provides that where the insurance undertaking intends to carry on

insurance business by way of services into Ireland, the CBI must notify the supervisory

authority of the “home Member State” of the conditions under which in the interest of

the general good, the insurance business may be carried on in Ireland. 97

216. The CBI maintains different registers of insurance undertakings authorised to

provide insurance services in Ireland. The two relevant registers for present purposes

are those concerning non-life undertakings regulated by the CBI and the register of non-

life undertakings operating on a freedom of services basis. I referred earlier to the

evidence provided by Mr Watson at para. 20 of his second affidavit in relation to these

registers. He explained that the Authority examined both registers as they stood on 7

April 2026. Mr Watson confirmed that MSIG was on the register of non-life

undertakings operating on a freedom of services basis in Ireland. However, KBC was

not on either register.

217. One of the concerns of the Authority was that Mr Sallabi had not demonstrated

that KBC, as one of the two co-insurers under the Brussels Bar policy, was “licensed

and authorised to transact business in the State” as is required by Regulation 12(1) of

the 2024 Regulations in order for the policy at issue to constitute a “qualifying

insurance policy” for the purposes of those Regulations. The Authority’s position was

that it was for Mr Sallabi to demonstrate that KBC was an insurer licensed and

authorised to transact business in the State and also that it met the “minimum financial

strength rating” referred to in Regulation 12(1) and (2). The Authority has confirmed

that no issue arises with respect to the financial ratings of either of the co-insurers. The

Authority has no issue whatsoever in relation to MSIG. The Authority is satisfied that

MSIG has chosen to exercise its entitlement to transact non-life insurance business in

Ireland on a freedom of services basis as provided for in the Solvency II Directive and

the Solvency II Regulations, as evidenced by the fact that its name appears on the

relevant register maintained by the CBI. However, the Authority was not satisfied that

Mr Sallabi had demonstrated that KBC had exercised its entitlement to transact such

business in Ireland whether on an establishment or freedom of services basis. 98

218. In his submissions, Mr Sallabi contended that Regulation 12(1) is a

discriminatory measure in that in order for an insurance policy to be a “qualifying

insurance policy” it must be provided by an insurer which is “licensed” and

“authorised” in the State in that it must obtain its prior licence and authorisation from

the CBI. He argued that that amounted to a direct discrimination on the grounds of

nationality and an infringement of Article 18 of the Treaty which prohibits any

discrimination on the grounds of nationality. He also argued that the requirement that a

qualifying insurance policy may only be provided by an insurer licensed and authorised

in the State (in the sense of obtaining a prior licence and authorisation from the CBI)

infringes his freedom to receive services (and he relied on the judgment of the CJEU in

cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 377).

219. Mr Sallabi’s arguments are wrong for a host of different reasons. He has misread

Regulation 12(1) and misunderstood the Authority’s reliance on that provision with

respect to the position of KBC. Regulation 12(1) does not require an insurer to obtain

a licence and authorisation from the CBI in order to be “licensed and authorised to

transact business in the State” for the purposes of Regulation 12(1). An insurer which

is entitled to establish a branch or to provide services on a freedom of services basis

under the Solvency II Directive is an insurer which is “licensed and authorised to

transact business in the State”. The Authority never suggested otherwise. There is no

basis for Mr Sallabi’s contention, therefore, that Regulation 12 discriminates in favour

of Irish insurance companies. Nor is there any basis for his argument that either KBC’s

freedom to provide services or his freedom to receive services has been infringed by

the Authority’s application of Regulation 12 of the 2024 Regulations. As I have sought

to demonstrate, while KBC, as a Belgian insurance company authorised by the Belgian

supervisory authorities, would have been entitled to establish or to transact insurance 99

business on a freedom to provide services basis in Ireland, the Directive required certain

steps to have been taken by KBC, by the supervisory authorities in Belgium (being

KBC’s “home Member State”) and by the supervisory authorities in the “host Member

State” or in the Member State in which it intended to pursue insurance business

(whether that be Ireland or some other Member State). Mr Sallabi has provided no

evidence of any of those steps being taken in the case of KBC. There is no evidence

from KBC. There is no evidence from the Belgian supervisory authorities. There is

evidence from the CBI and that is that KBC does not appear on either of the registers

which it maintains of insurance undertakings who have exercised their entitlement to

establish or to provide insurance services in Ireland under the Solvency II Directive and

the Solvency II Regulations. It is not open to Mr Sallabi to seek to enforce any right or

entitlement that KBC may have to transact business in Ireland where there is no

evidence that KBC has taken any of the steps required under the Directive or under the

Regulations in order to do so. Moreover, there is no evidence that KBC has any interest

whatsoever in providing insurance services in Ireland. I am satisfied, therefore, that

there is no basis whatsoever for Mr Sallabi’s contention that Regulation 12 of the 2024

Regulations and the Authority’s requirement that there be evidence that both the co-

insurers under the Brussels Bar policy comply with the provisions of that regulation

breaches any provision of EU law.

220. For completeness, I also reject the submission advanced by Mr Sallabi that the

Brussels Bar policy complies with Regulation 12(1) on the basis that MSIG provides

cover under the policy up to €2,000,000 (being 80% of the total amount insured,

€2,500,000). Mr Sallabi’s contention was that in those circumstances there is cover in

place which exceeds the minimum level of cover required under the 2024 Regulations

(which is €1,500,000). I agree with the Authority that that contention is based on a 100

misunderstanding of the obligations on the two co-insurers under the policy. I accept

the submission of the Authority that, under the policy, MSIG is required to discharge

80% of the share of the insured liability in respect of each claim and that KBC is liable

to discharge the remaining 20% of the claim. KBC cannot, therefore, be written out of

the policy. The fact that Mr Sallabi has not demonstrated that it has sought to exercise

any right or freedom to provide insurance services in Ireland is fatal to Mr Sallabi’s

submission.

221. Accordingly, I reject the submissions made by Mr Sallabi based on the position

of KBC, the Solvency II Directive and EU law.

10. Brussels Bar policy: Scope of cover and compliance with 2024 Regulations

(a) Preliminary and general comments

222. The Authority contends that the Brussels Bar policy does not provide professional

indemnity insurance cover in respect of legal services which Mr Sallabi provides in

Ireland as a barrister in reliance on the professional qualifications he obtained in the

King’s Inns and on his call to the Irish Bar. It relies principally on Article 9 of the policy

on that question. The Authority also contends that the Brussels Bar policy is not a

“qualifying insurance policy” under the 2024 Regulations in that it does not comply

with the requirements of Part 4 of those Regulations (Regulations 12 to 16) and that,

therefore, Mr Sallabi is not permitted to provide legal services in the State and should

be prevented from providing such services until he puts in place a policy which does

comply with those requirements.

223. Mr Sallabi contends that the Brussels Bar policy does provide cover in respect of

the legal services he provides in Ireland. He disputes the Authority’s interpretation of

Article 9 of the policy. He also contends, without prejudice to his various other 101

arguments, including that the Authority’s reliance on the 2024 Regulations is in breach

of EU law (which I have rejected earlier), that there is no “qualifying insurance policy”

available for barristers in the State as, in his submission, the Zurich policy (on which

he relied between October 2023 and May 2025 to comply with his obligations under s.

46 of the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations and prior to them, the 2019 Regulations)

does not comply with Part 4 of the 2024 Regulations (which submission I reject later in

my judgment for various reasons).

224. My finding and conclusions that the Brussels Bar policy is not compliant with

Regulation 12(1) of the 2024 Regulations and, therefore, is not a “qualifying insurance

policy”, as there is no evidence that KBC has sought to exercise its entitlement under

the Solvency II Directive (and the Solvency II Regulations) to establish or to provide

insurance services in Ireland on a freedom to provide services basis, and the evidence

available to the court (in the form, for example, of the CBI Registers exhibited by Mr

Watson) demonstrates that it has not, and is not, therefore, “licensed and authorised to

transact business in the State” under Regulation 12(1), is sufficient to deal with this

aspect of the case. Once the Brussels Bar policy does not comply with Regulation 12(1)

of the 2024 Regulations, which is in Part 4 of those Regulations, it does not comply

with Part 4 of the Regulations. If it does not comply with Part 4 of the 2024 Regulations,

it is not a policy which complies with s. 46(1)(a) of the 2015 Act and is not a “qualifying

insurance policy” within the meaning of that term in the definitions in Regulation 2 of

the 2024 Regulations. Therefore, Mr Sallabi is prohibited by s. 46(1)(a) of the 2015 Act

from providing legal services in the State and is required by Regulation 4(3) of the 2024

Regulations to cease practice immediately (since the cover he had under the Zurich

policy expired on 1 May 2025). Mr Sallabi’s provision of, and his clear intention to

continue providing, legal services in the State is, therefore, a contravention and a likely 102

continued contravention of the 2015 Act and of the 2024 Regulations. The Authority

is, therefore, entitled to the orders which it seeks under s. 35 of the 2015 Act.

225. In light of that finding and of those conclusions, it is not strictly speaking

necessary for me to go on to address the various other grounds on which the Authority

contended that the Brussels Bar policy does not cover Mr Sallabi’s work as a barrister

in Ireland and does not comply with the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations and Mr

Sallabi’s response to those grounds. However, for completeness, I will go on to address

them below. Some further preliminary observations are, however, first necessary.

226. In considering the Authority’s stance in relation to the Brussels Bar policy (and

its acceptance of the Zurich policy as being compliant with the 2024 Regulations and

prior to them, with the 2019 Regulations), I am entitled to attach some weight to the

views of the Authority as the statutory regulator of legal practitioners in this jurisdiction

and to afford its views some respect. It is clear from Mr Watson’s affidavit that the

Authority is well aware of, and has considerable expertise in dealing with, professional

indemnity insurance policies taken out by and available to barristers in Ireland

(including those like Mr Sallabi who have obtained their professional Barrister-at-Law

qualification in the King’s Inns and have been called to the Irish Bar but who are not

members of the Law Library). The Authority carried out a public consultation process

with those involved in the sector, including a number of insurance companies

incorporated in Ireland and elsewhere in the EU, when it was preparing the 2024

Regulations (see para. 10 of Mr Watson’s second affidavit). A number of different

insurance companies have offered professional indemnity insurance cover to barristers

since the 2019 Regulations came into effect and there is currently at least one other

insurance company (as well as Zurich) which offers such insurance to barristers in the

State. I am satisfied, therefore, that the Authority has significant experience and 103

expertise in this area and that its views on the compliance or otherwise of the

professional indemnity insurance policies for barristers (including the Brussels Bar

policy relied on by Mr Sallabi) with the 2024 Regulations are entitled to weight and

respect. That, of course, does not mean that the Authority cannot get it wrong, but it

does mean that it is a difficult task for a person such as Mr Sallabi to ask the court to

second guess the views of the Authority on this issue. That said, if I were satisfied that

the Authority was wrong and that Mr Sallabi was right in relation to his submissions

concerning the Brussels Bar policy’s compliance with the 2024 Regulations, I would

have had no hesitation in so holding. However, I am not.

227. Another difficulty facing Mr Sallabi is that the Brussels Bar policy, being a policy

offered by two Belgian insurance companies to members of the Flemish Bar

Association, is subject primarily to Belgian law, in terms of the proper interpretation of

its provisions. Article 21 of the policy (headed “Applicable Law”) provides that

notwithstanding any contrary provision in the general terms and conditions of the

policy, the Belgian Insurance Act of 4 April 2014 applies (with the express exclusion

of Article 85 of that Act). While Mr Sallabi is registered on the EU list of the Brussels

Bar, by virtue of his professional qualifications as an Irish barrister, he is not, and does

not claim to be, a Belgian Avocat/Advocaat/Rechtsanwalt. Apart from his own views

(as an Irish barrister) as to the scope of cover under the Brussels Bar policy and as to

the true meaning and proper interpretation of key provisions of the policy, Mr Sallabi

has not put before the court any evidence from a Belgian lawyer to address those areas

of dispute concerning the policy.

228. Yet another difficulty faced by Mr Sallabi in terms of the scope of cover provided

by the Brussels Bar policy and, in particular, by Article 9 of the policy, is that

notwithstanding that Mr Sallabi tried to obtain express confirmation from the Brussels 104

Bar and from the Brokers that the policy provided him with professional indemnity

insurance cover for legal services he provides and intends to provide as a barrister in

Ireland (such as, for example, his work in the Al Maktoum case), no such express

confirmation was provided by them. Similarly, neither MSIG nor KBC (the two insurers

under the policy) has provided such confirmation. The absence of such confirmation is

very significant and makes Mr Sallabi’s task of resisting the Authority’s application all

the more difficult. The failure by those persons or entities to provide the confirmation

Mr Sallabi requested strongly suggests that the policy does not cover Mr Sallabi for the

work which he does as a barrister in Ireland. If the policy did provide such cover, one

might reasonably have expected that the confirmation requested would have been

provided.

229. It is perhaps not surprising that the confirmation requested was not provided. I

would have been surprised if a policy of insurance provided by the Brussels Bar for its

members would provide an indemnity for members on its EU-list (such as Mr Sallabi)

who provide legal services in their home Member State and under their home

professional qualifications (as Mr Sallabi has done and intends to do). It is perhaps not

surprising that neither the Brussels Bar nor the Brokers were prepared to confirm that

the policy provided cover to Mr Sallabi in respect of such work.

230. Those preliminary observations having been made, I will now turn to consider

the question of cover under the Brussels Bar policy. I will then consider the other

disputed aspects of that policy’s compliance with the 2024 Regulations (leaving aside

the issue concerning KBC which I have already dealt with).

(b) Interpretation Principles

231. In considering the policy, the Court is somewhat hamstrung by the absence of an

expert in Belgian law. In the absence of evidence from such an expert, it is necessary 105

to try to interpret as best as can be done in the circumstances the relevant provisions of

the policy by applying the Irish legal principles applicable to the interpretation of

insurance policies including those summarised by McDonald J (in the High Court) in

Brushfield Limited T/A the Clarence Hotel v Arachas Corporate Brokers Limited and

AXA Insurance DAC [2021] IEHC 263, drawing on the various judgments of the

members of the Supreme Court in Law Society of Ireland v Motor Insurers Bureau of

Ireland [2023] 1 IR 479, which summary I endorsed and applied in Charwin Limited

T/A Charlie’s Bar v Zavarovalnica Sava Insurance Company DD [2021] IEHC 489.

232. The two most relevant of the principles summarised by McDonald J, which give

effect to what Clarke J in his minority judgment in MIBI described as the “text in

context” approach to interpretation, are paras. (b), (c) and (d) where McDonald J stated:

“(b) … the Court is required to interpret the written contract by reference to the

meaning which the contract would convey to a reasonable person having all the

background knowledge which would have been reasonably available to the

parties at the time of conclusion of the contract;

(c) The Court, therefore, looks not solely at the words used in the contract but

also the relevant context (both factual and legal) at the time the contract was

put in place;

(d) For this purpose, the context includes anything which was reasonably

available to the parties at the time the contract was concluded … The context

includes any objective background facts or provisions of law which would affect

the way in which the language of the document would have been understood by

a reasonable person”. 106

(c) Scope of Cover: Article 9

233. As previously stated, Mr Sallabi provided two English language translations of

the Brussels Bar policy and a further translation of Article 9 was provided by Ms Cloet

of the Brussels Bar. The first version was provided by Mr Sallabi to the Authority in

June 2025. The second version ( the Word Perfect translation) was exhibited by Mr

Sallabi to the last of his three affidavits, which were sworn on 22 April 2026. Also

exhibited to that affidavit was the email from Ms Cloet of the Brussels Bar to Mr Sallabi

sent on 15 April 2026.

234. The key article in terms of the scope of cover is Article 9. It is headed “Territorial

Extent” in the first translated version, “Territorial Scope” in the Word Perfect version

and “Territorial Coverage” in Ms Cloet’s email. There is no difference between those

headings.

235. In the first version Article 9 was translated as follows:

“The coverages of this agreement apply to the consequences of liability-causing

facts that occurred anywhere in the world, provided that the activity that caused

the damage was carried out from a law office established in Belgium and without

prejudice to the provisions in Article 8 of this agreement.

However, the claims made against the insured persons in the United States of

America or in Canada or under the law or jurisdiction of the United States of

America or Canada are excluded from the coverages of this agreement.”

Article 9 of the Word Perfect version reads as follows:

“The cover provided by this contract applies to the consequences of acts

committed throughout the world, in respect of activities carried out by the insured 107

parties from their legal practice based in Belgium, and subject to the

clarifications set out in Article 8.

However, claims brought against the insured parties in the USA or Canada, or

under the laws or jurisdiction of the USA or Canada, are not insured.”

Finally, the version in Ms Cloet’s email reads as follows:

“The cover provided by this policy applies to the consequences of acts committed

anywhere in the world, in respect of activities carried out by the insured parties

from their office based in Belgium and subject to the clarifications set out in

Article 8.

However, they are not insured against claims brought against the insured parties

in the USA or Canada under the laws or jurisdictions of the USA or Canada.”

236. The key provisions (in all of the translations) are those underlined which refer to

the activity or activities covered being carried out “from a law office established in

Belgium” or “from their [i.e. the insured party’s] legal practice based in Belgium” or

“from their office based in Belgium”. In each case cover is expressly subject to the

provisions of or the clarifications in Article 8. Claims brought in the USA and Canada

are excluded

237. In his first replying affidavit, Mr Sallabi disputed the Authority’s position that he

was not covered under the policy in respect of legal services he provided in Ireland and

that it only covered his activities in Belgium. He disputed that position, first of all

relying on his inclusion on the EU-list of the Brussels Bar. There is no issue about that.

He is on the EU-list and is, therefore, entitled to whatever cover is provided under the

policy. However, he contended that he was covered in respect of “all [his] activities as

a lawyer” and noted that Article 5(a) excluded only “damage that results from activities 108

foreign to the profession of lawyer” (the Word Perfect version translates that paragraph

of Article 5 as excluding “damage arising from activities unrelated to the profession of

solicitor”). I will confine myself to the first translated version which is the version

relied on by Mr Sallabi.

238. Relying on Article 5(a), Mr Sallabi contended that as long as he remained a

lawyer established in Belgium and a member of the Flemish Order of the Brussels Bar

“all of [his] professional activities as a lawyer are covered by the policy”. Mr Sallabi

also relied on Article 8 (which is referred to in Article 9). He relied on the first translated

version. Article 8 deals with the “amount of the coverage”. In Article 8(a) it covers

“civil professional activity” and states that “the coverage is granted for the risks

mentioned in Article 1(a), Article 2, Article 2 bis, and Article 3 together, up to an

amount of €2,500,000.00 per damage case.” It then goes on to state (in a passage relied

on by Mr Sallabi at para. 34 of his first affidavit):

“In no case can the insurer be held to a higher compensation than that resulting

from the application of Belgian legislation or the legislation applicable in the

other Member States of the EU, Switzerland, Austria, Andorra, Channel Islands,

Lichtenstein or Monaco concerning liability.”

239. Mr Sallabi submitted that it is apparent from the wording of Article 8 that the

policy expressly provides EU-wide cover in respect of cross-border activities and that

the cover is “linked to the lawyer’s Belgian office, rather than to the physical location

of the work or the client”. He stated that his understanding is that the policy does not

confine indemnity to claims in Belgium or claims governed solely by Belgian law but

extends to claims governed by the laws of other Member States. He asserted, therefore,

that that could “only be understood to mean the policy covers professional activities

and acts carried out in other Member States, provided that those activities originated 109

from a lawyer established in Belgium or operates from a professional office/practice in

Belgium” (para 35 of Mr Sallabi’s first affidavit).

240. However, I agree with the submissions advanced by the Authority that Mr

Sallabi’s submissions ignored the proviso in Article 9 (or at least in the first English

translation) which draws a clear distinction, in geographical terms, between the acts or

omissions that are covered and the losses that are covered by the indemnity (while the

Word Perfect version does not include an express proviso, it does nonetheless make

clear in very similar terms what activities are covered by the policy). Both versions

make clear that while the policy will cover losses occurring anywhere in the world (i.e.

the consequences of acts or “liability-causing facts” that occurred or are committed

anywhere in the world), the policy will only provide such cover “provided that the

activity that caused the damage was carried out from a law office established in

Belgium…” (in the first translated version) or “in respect of activities carried out by

the insured parties from their legal practice based in Belgium …” (in the Word Perfect

version).

241. I agree with the submission on behalf of the Authority that the proviso or

qualification to the cover is clear. The activity or activities covered are those which

caused the loss (or the consequences referred to) and they must have been “carried out

from a law office established in Belgium” or “by the insured parties from their legal

practice based in Belgium”. I agree with the Authority that Mr Sallabi’s interpretation

ignores the proviso or qualification in Article 9 and that the legal services which Mr

Sallabi has provided and intends to provide in Ireland using his Irish professional

qualification as barrister will not be “carried out from a law office established in

Belgium …” or by Mr Sallabi “from [his] legal practice based in Belgium”. Nor will it

be carried out by Mr Sallabi “from [his] office based in Belgium” (to use the translation 110

in Ms Cloet’s email). I accept that Article 9 links the professional activities which are

covered under the policy to the physical location of the work (rather than to the place

at which the loss occurs). I also agree with the Authority that Article 9 does not merely

require that the activities “originate from a lawyer established in Belgium” or “from a

professional office/practice in Belgium” as contended by Mr Sallabi. I accept that the

clear purpose of Article 9 is to impose a geographical limitation on the scope of cover

which appears clear also from the heading to the various versions of the translation of

the policy. I also agree that the use of language such as “from a law office established

in Belgium” and “from their legal practice based in Belgium” and “from their office

based in Belgium” is all consistent with a reference to and a geographical limitation to

the place or physical location where the relevant professional activity is carried out.

242. With respect to Mr Sallabi’s reliance on Article 5(a) and Article 8, I do not accept

that those articles support the submission advanced by Mr Sallabi. I agree with the

Authority that Article 5(a) is intended to exclude cover under the policy in respect of

damage from activities which are “foreign to the profession of lawyer” (in the first

English translation provided by Mr Sallabi) and “unrelated to the profession of

solicitor” (in the Word Perfect version). This does not appear to me to apply to the

geographical or territorial scope of the policy or to the place or location from which the

activities must be performed in order to attract cover under the policy. With respect to

Mr Sallabi’s reliance on Article 8, I agree with the Authority that in seeking to rely on

Article 8 Mr Sallabi has ignored, or has at least completely elided, the distinction

between the acts or omissions giving rise to the cause of action and the loss sustained

as a consequence of those acts or omissions. Article 8 is directed to the issue of the loss

and the compensation payable in respect of the loss and limits the amount of cover in

respect of compensation payable under the policy. Article 8 is not concerned with the 111

professional activities involved or with the territories in which or from which they are

carried out. The reference to Article 8 in Article 9 must, therefore, be understood as

applying to the limitation on the amount of coverage provided under the policy and not

to the critical issue of the scope of cover in territorial terms.

243. I am satisfied, therefore, that having regard, in particular, to the provisions of

Article 9, the Brussels Bar policy provides professional indemnity insurance cover to

Mr Sallabi in respect of the professional activities carried out by Mr Sallabi as a member

of the Flemish Order of the Brussels Bar and does not provide such cover in respect of

legal services provided by Mr Sallabi in Ireland as a barrister. The most likely correct

interpretation of Article 9 is that it imposes a territorial restriction on the scope of the

cover provided and does so by reference to the place where the relevant activities are

performed. On that interpretation, Mr Sallabi is not covered in respect of legal services

he provides as a barrister in Ireland.

244. While Mr Sallabi attempted to rely on Article 21 of the policy and Article 23 of

the Belgian Insurance Act 2014 (at para. 7 of his last affidavit), those provisions do not

appear to me to assist him. Acknowledging all of the difficulties caused by the absence

of expert evidence from a Belgian lawyer, and working on the basis of the translation

of Article 23 provided by Mr Sallabi in that affidavit, it appears to require that

conditions and clauses in an insurance contract must be drafted in “clear and precise

wording” and that in the event of any doubt as to the meaning of a term the

interpretation most favourable to the policyholder must prevail. That would seem to be

similar to the contra proferentem principle in Irish law. On the assumption that it is, it

does not assist Mr Sallabi as, in my view, there is no doubt as to the meaning of Article

9 and it is clearly drafted so as to limit the geographical or territorial scope of cover 112

provided under the policy. I have not been persuaded by Mr Sallabi that there is any

doubt as to the meaning of Article 9.

(d) Compliance of Brussels Bar policy with 2024 Regulations

(i) Regulation 12 245. I have already dealt with the fact that the Brussels Bar policy does not comply

with Regulation 12(1) in that one of the two co-insurers under the policy (KBC) is not

“licensed and authorised to transact business in the State”, for the reasons I have set

out earlier. The policy is not, therefore, a “qualifying insurance policy” for the purposes

of the 2024 Regulations.

(ii) Regulation 14 246. Regulation 14 provides as follows:

“14. A qualifying insurance policy shall –

(a) indemnify the insured in respect of all valid claims made and notified

during the period of cover,

(b) be fully retroactive and cover any valid claims made during the

period of cover regardless of when the work was undertaken,

(c) provide that cover will not be refused or reduced on the basis of

innocent or unintentional non-disclosure, and,

(d) provide that, following the period of cover, the insurer will offer

annually renewable run-off cover at a fixed premium for the run-off

period on terms that are no less favourable than the terms of the

qualifying insurance policy.” 113

247. It is clear that the Brussels Bar policy does not comply with the requirements

contained in a number of the paragraphs of Regulation 14. I will deal with them in

reverse order.

248. With respect to Regulation 14(d), the required “run-off period” is defined in

Regulation 2 of the 2024 Regulations as meaning “the period of six years immediately

following the cessation of the provision of the legal services concerned”. While Mr

Sallabi relies on Article 7 of the policy as providing for a “run-off period” which he

says is more favourable than the six year run-off period required under the 2024

Regulations, it is notable that in her email to Mr Sallabi of 22 April 2026, Ms

Raemaekers of the Brokers responded to a query apparently raised by Mr Sallabi in a

telephone conversation the previous day concerning run-off cover. In that email she

said:

“Regarding your question about annually renewable run-off cover we must

confirm that we have no offer for this.”

This suggests that the Brokers do not believe that the Brussels Bar policy provides for

“annually renewable run-off cover” as required by Regulation 14(d). That would

appear, therefore, to confirm that the policy does not comply with the requirement in

Regulation 14(d).

249. It is necessary however also to deal with Mr Sallabi’s reliance on Article 7 of the

policy. Curiously he relies (at para. 50 of his first affidavit and at para. 46 of his written

submissions) on an English translation of Article 7 of the policy which does not appear

in the first English translation of the policy provided by Mr Sallabi or in the Word

Perfect version. The English translation of Article 7 on which Mr Sallabi relies is as

follows: 114

“Termination of Professional Activities.

To the extent necessary, it is stipulated that the guarantees of this insurance

agreement remain acquired for insured persons who cease their professional

activity as lawyers and that these guarantees pass to heirs and beneficiaries. In

this case, the maximum intervention of the insurer per insured person is limited

to once the guarantee of the policy for all claims combined that occur in this

situation.”

250. Mr Sallabi contends (despite the confirmation in the Brokers’ email of 22 April

2026) that the plain meaning of Article 7 is that there is run-off cover for an unlimited

period following cessation of practice without any additional premium on the same

terms as the policy, save that the maximum aggregate indemnity for all claims during

the entire run-off period (i.e., for an unlimited period following cessation) is €2.5m. On

his case, therefore, the Brussels Bar policy provides for an aggregate indemnity level

of €2.5m for all claims in the so-called run-off period. Mr Sallabi acknowledged in his

first affidavit that this aggregate limit “may fall short of the requirement in Regulation

14(d) that the run-off cover be provided on terms no less favourable than those of the

qualifying insurance policy” (para. 50) and that this departure from the statutory

requirement “is minor and technical in nature and is properly regarded as de minimis”

(para 4(5)). In his written and oral submissions, Mr Sallabi made a number of points to

support his assertion that, notwithstanding that aggregate limit which he acknowledged

“may fall short” of the requirements in Regulation 14(d), nonetheless the policy

complies with that provision. These points include the fact that under Regulation 6 of

the 2024 Regulations the obligation is on the practitioner who ceases to provide legal

services to put in place a policy of run-off cover and to maintain that policy for the

duration of the run-off period. Another point made by Mr Sallabi was that he is “young 115

in age and profession” and that there is “no foreseeable risk arising” (para. 49 of his

written submissions). He also suggested that “claims against lawyers are rare and the

aggregate value of all claims over the full career of a lawyer does not generally exceed

the indemnity level of one claim” (also at para. 49). I do not accept that these are valid

points. The fact that a practitioner is required to have run-off cover does not render

compliant a policy which would otherwise not comply with the requirements in

Regulation 14(d). Nor can the Authority assume that there is no foreseeable risk arising

in relation to the provision of legal services by Mr Sallabi as a barrister in Ireland. Nor

either can the Authority reasonably take comfort from Mr Sallabi’s contention that

claims against lawyers are rare and do not generally exceed the indemnity level of one

claim. On the contrary, leaving aside the Brokers’ express confirmation that “annually

renewable run-off cover” is not offered by the Brokers (under the policy), the

Authority’s concern that the aggregate limit on the extent of such run-off cover as exists

under the policy appears to me to be a reasonable one. As is its concern that there is a

very real risk that clients of Mr Sallabi could be prejudiced by reason of the aggregate

limit for such run-off cover as may be provided under the policy. I accept the

Authority’s submission that such run-off period as is provided under the policy is not

provided on terms that are “no less favourable than cover provided under the policy

during the period in which the person insured is providing legal services.” I accept

therefore that the Brussels Bar policy does not comply with the requirements contained

in Regulation 14(d).

251. I now turn to Regulation 14(c) which requires that in order to be a “qualifying

insurance policy”, the policy must “provide that cover will not be refused or reduced

on the basis of innocent or unintentional non-disclosure”. Mr Sallabi contends that the

Brussels Bar policy does comply with the requirement in this paragraph of Regulation 116

14. He relies on Article 21 of the policy which, as previously noted, provides that the

Belgian Insurance Act 2014 applies to the policy. He then refers to certain provisions

in the 2014 Act, including Article 58 (duty of disclosure) and Article 60. He contends

that Article 60(3) confirms that cover under the policy will not be refused or reduced

for innocent or unintentional non-disclosure and that cover will be reduced only where

the policyholder has made a negligent misrepresentation. On that basis, he claims that

the court should be satisfied that the Brussels Bar policy complies with Regulation

14(c).

252. In response, the Authority refers to Articles 59 and 60 of the Belgian 2014 Act.

Article 59 provides for what is to happen when there is an intentional omission or

inaccuracy in a declaration to the insurance company. It provides that when an

intentional omission or inaccuracy in a declaration to the insurance company misleads

the insurer in relation to the risk assessment, the insurance contract is void and that

premiums due up to the time the insurer became aware of the unintentional omission or

inaccuracy are payable to the insurer.

253. Article 60 deals with unintentional inaccuracy. It provides in Article 60(1) that

when the omission or inaccuracy in the declaration to the insurer is unintentional, the

contract is not void. However, Article 60(1) goes on to provide that in such a situation,

the insurer shall propose an amendment to the contract which would be effective from

the day on which it became aware of the omission or inaccuracy, within one month on

which it became so aware. It further provides that if the insurer provides proof that it

would not have insured the risk under any circumstances, the insurer may terminate the

contract within that same period. If the amendment proposed by the insurer is refused

by the policyholder or if it is not accepted within that same period, the insurer is entitled

to terminate the contract within a further period of 15 days. An insurer who has not 117

terminated the contract or proposed a modification or amendment within those time

limits will not be permitted to rely on the facts known to them in the future.

254. Article 60(2) provides that if the omission or inaccurate declaration to the insurer

cannot be attributed to the policyholder and if a claim arises before the contract

modification or termination takes effect, the insurer must provide the benefit agreed

under the policy. Article 60(3) provides that if the omission or inaccurate declaration

can be attributed to the policyholder and if a claim arises before the contract

modification or amendment or termination of the policy takes effect, the insurer is only

obliged to provide a benefit in proportion to the ratio between the premium paid and

the premium the policyholder would have had to pay had it properly declared the risk.

It further provides that if, in the event of a claim, the insurer proves that it would not

have insured the risk the true nature of which is revealed by the claim, the insurer’s

liability is limited to the reimbursement of all premiums paid.

255. Article 60(4) provides that if circumstances unknown to both parties at the time

the contract was concluded comes to light during its performance, Article 80 or Article

81 of the Belgian 2024 Act applies, depending on whether the particular circumstance

constitutes a reduction or an increase in the insured risk. The Authority contends that

as a matter of Belgian law, the Brussels Bar policy would not be rendered void as a

result of an innocent or unintentional inaccuracy. However, it maintains that the insurer

can terminate the policy, reduce the level of cover or choose to limit its liability to the

reimbursement of all premiums paid where there has been an unintentional omission or

inaccuracy which can be attributed to the policyholder. In those circumstances, the

Authority contends that the policy does not comply with the requirement contained in

Regulation 14(c). 118

256. While it would be much more preferable that the Court had available to it

evidence from a Belgian lawyer, since both the Authority and Mr Sallabi rely on Article

60 of the Belgian 2014 Act and where there is an English translation of that Act, I am

satisfied that I can determine whether the requirement in Article 14(c) is complied with

in the case of the Brussels Bar policy. Having considered the provisions of Article 60

of the Belgian 2014 Act, in particular, I am satisfied that the Authority is correct in its

view that it is likely that the policy does not comply with Regulation 14(c). It is clear

that under Article 60(1), in the case of an unintentional omission or inaccuracy in a

declaration to the insurer, there are circumstances in which the insurer can propose an

amendment or a termination of the contract within that period. Where the unintentional

omission or inaccuracy can be attributed to the policyholder, the insurer’s obligations

under the policy will be significantly reduced in certain circumstances referred to in

Article 60(3) under which the insurer will only be obliged to provide a benefit “in

proportion to the ratio between the premium paid and the premium the policyholder

would have had to pay had they properly declared the risk”. Further, if the insurer

establishes that it would not have insured the risk had it known the true situation, its

liability would be further limited to reimbursement of premiums paid. In those

circumstances, it seems to me that the Authority is correct in concluding that under

Article 60 of the Belgian 2014 Act the insurer can terminate the policy, reduce the level

of cover and in certain circumstances, limit its liability to the reimbursement of

premiums paid in the case of an unintentional omission on disclosure to the insurer. I

am satisfied therefore that the Brussels Bar policy does not comply with the requirement

contained in Regulation 14(c).

257. The position in relation to Regulation 14(b) is perhaps not quite as clear. The

requirement in that paragraph is that the policy must be “fully retroactive and cover 119

any valid claims made during the period of cover regardless of when the work was

undertaken”. Mr Sallabi’s position is that the Brussels Bar policy complies with

Regulation 14(b). He relies on portions of Article 7 and Article 8 of the policy. Under

the heading “retroactivity” Article 7 (in the first English translation provided by Mr

Sallabi) provides that:

“The insurance also covers claims for liability-causing events that occurred

before the start date of the policy, if they are submitted during the duration of this

insurance.”

Article 8 (in the same English translation version) states that:

“The liability-causing facts that occur before the start date of this insurance

agreement but that are declared during its validity period are insured up to the

amounts previously insured, without however exceeding the amounts covered by

this agreement.”

258. The Authority’s concern is that while Articles 7 and 8 of the policy do provide

for retroactive cover, they do so in a qualified manner. In that respect, Article 8 refers

to the amount of the coverage in the case of a retroactive claim that has been limited

“up to the amounts previously insured”. The Authority’s concern is that it is not clear

from that provision whether retroactive cover is provided under the policy with the

minimum level of indemnity cover of €1.5m for each and every claim made and not for

the aggregate value of all claims made, as required under Regulation 13(1) and (2). I

agree that the Authority’s concerns in relation to this issue are reasonable and have not

been assuaged by the terms of the policy and by the evidence and submissions of Mr

Sallabi. It seems to me, therefore, that the policy does not make clear that when

providing for retroactive cover it ensures that the minimum level of such cover will 120

apply to each and every claim made in reliance on that retroactive cover. In those

circumstances, I am satisfied that the Authority was entitled to conclude that the

Brussels Bar policy did not comply with the requirement in Regulation 14(b).

259. While the Authority expressed concerns in relation to the compliance of the

Brussels Bar policy with Regulation 14(a) and while Mr Sallabi contended that the

policy did comply with that requirement, I do not consider it necessary to analyse the

parties’ arguments and submissions on this point. The position is not clear cut and while

it may be that the policy does not comply with the requirement in Regulation 14(a), I

do not find it necessary to express a concluded view on that issue having regard to my

conclusions in relation to the non-compliance of the Brussels Bar policy with the other

paragraphs of Regulation 14.

260. In conclusion, therefore, I am satisfied that the Brussels Bar policy does not

comply with the requirements contained in Regulation 12(1) and with the requirements

in Regulation 14(b), (c) and (d) of the 2024 Regulations. The Brussels Bar policy is,

therefore, not a “qualifying insurance policy” for the purposes of the 2024 Regulations.

Mr Sallabi was not, therefore, entitled to rely on the Brussels Bar policy as complying

with his obligations under s. 46(1) of the 2015 Act and Regulation 4 of the 2024

Regulations. He does not, therefore, have in place a “qualifying insurance policy”

which covers the legal services which he has provided and intends to provide as a

barrister in Ireland.

13. Alleged unavailability of qualifying insurance policy in the State: the Zurich policy (a) Preliminary and General Comments

261. One of the grounds raised by Mr Sallabi for resisting the Authority’s application

is that he says there is no policy available in the State for practising barristers which 121

satisfies the requirements of the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations for a “qualifying

insurance policy” and that, therefore, the Authority has no right, entitlement or

authority to “compel the impossible” (para. 4.2 of Mr Sallabi’s first affidavit). Mr

Sallabi relied on such cases as Protect East Meath Limited v Meath County Council

[2026] IESC 1 (per Woulfe J at paras 53-54 and Collins J at para. 1), Aranbel Limited

v Darcy and Others [2010] IEHC 272 (per Clarke J at para. 2.1) and Adoption Authority

of Ireland v AB [2021] IEHC 829 (per Barrett J at para. 9)). I explain below that the

principle relied on by Mr Sallabi has no application in this case as the Authority is not

seeking to compel Mr Sallabi to do anything that is impossible. Mr Sallabi’s submission

is based on the misplaced contention that the Zurich policy does not comply with the

2024 Regulations. As I have observed earlier in this judgment, this is a somewhat

unusual position for Mr Sallabi to adopt in circumstances where he relied on the Zurich

policy (which covered his practice as a barrister for the period between 11 October 2023

and 30 April 2025) to comply with his obligations under the 2015 Act, the 2019

Regulations and the 2024 Regulations.

262. The Authority’s position is that it has carefully examined the Zurich policy and

is satisfied that it complies with the 2015 Act and with the 2024 Regulations (and

previously with the 2019 Regulations) and that it is a “qualifying insurance policy” for

the purposes of those regulations. The Authority has approved the Zurich policy under

s. 46(3) of the 2015 Act as a group scheme of professional indemnity insurance for legal

practitioners who are practising barristers where the scheme is provided under the aegis

of a professional body, namely, the Bar of Ireland. In order to approve a group scheme

under that provision, the Authority had to be satisfied that the scheme complies with

regulations made under s. 47 in respect of practising barristers. In approving the Zurich

policy as a group scheme for such practising barristers, the Authority was, therefore, 122

clearly satisfied that the policy complied with the applicable regulations (being

originally the 2019 Regulations and now the 2024 Regulations).

263. It is clear from the material exhibited by Mr Sallabi to his first affidavit that the

Zurich policy is also made available by AON to practising barristers who are not

members of the Law Library and practising under the aegis of the Bar of Ireland. That

is clear both from the fact that Mr Sallabi was insured under the Zurich policy until the

expiry of the policy on 1 May 2025 and from the fact that Mr Sallabi recently applied

for and obtained a quotation from AON for cover under the Zurich policy for an annual

premium of €235, notwithstanding that he is not a member of the Law Library.

264. In light of the Authority’s role as statutory regulator for legal practitioners

(including practicing barristers) and its experience of assessing professional indemnity

insurance policies for compliance with the relevant regulations including its conduct of

a public consultation process (as previously described), I am satisfied that I should

afford the Authority some weight and afford it some respect in terms of its view as to

the compliance of the Zurich policy with the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations.

I must also bear in mind when considering the impossibility argument advanced by Mr

Sallabi that Mr Watson has sworn that there is at least one other insurance company

providing professional indemnity cover to barristers in the State. Mr Sallabi did not

dispute that evidence. That undisputed fact as well as the fact that he has obtained a

quotation for cover under the Zurich policy significantly undermines Mr Sallabi’s claim

that there is no “qualifying insurance policy” available to practising barristers in the

State and that he is being asked by the Authority to do something that is impossible, i.e.

to put in place a policy of professional indemnity insurance which complies with the

2024 Regulations. Apart from anything else the Authority is not seeking to compel Mr

Sallabi to take out a policy with Zurich. 123

(b) Compliance of the Zurich Policy with the 2024 Regulations

265. I will now consider briefly each of the grounds on which Mr Sallabi contends that

the Zurich policy does not comply with the 2024 Regulations.

(i) Regulation 12(1)

266. Mr Sallabi makes the point that the Zurich entity which was originally the insurer

under the Zurich policy was an Irish company, Zurich Insurance Plc., but that the

relevant Zurich entity, since 2024, has been Zurich Insurance Europe AG, a German

company. Mr Sallabi contends that the German Zurich company is not an insurer which

is “licensed and authorised to transact business in the State” within the meaning of

that term in Regulation 12(1) of the 2024 Regulations. However, as confirmed by Mr

Watson on affidavit and as is clear from the copies of the two registers maintained by

the CBI, the German Zurich company, which is authorised by the German supervisory

authorities, has chosen to exercise its right to establish and its freedom to provide

insurance services in Ireland under the Solvency II Directive (and the Solvency II

Regulations). The German Zurich company appears on the register of non-life

undertakings operating on a freedom of services basis in Ireland maintained by the CBI.

It also appears on the register maintained by the CBI of non-life undertakings regulated

by the CBI. I am satisfied, therefore, that the German Zurich company is “licensed and

authorised to transact business in the State”, unlike KBC, and that it is an insurer which

meets the requirements contained in Regulation 12(1). There is no basis, therefore, for

Mr Sallabi’s contention to the contrary.

(ii) Regulation 13(2)

267. The next allegation made by Mr Sallabi in relation to the Zurich policy is that it

does not comply with Regulation 13(2). Regulation 13(1) requires a “qualifying 124

insurance policy” to have a “minimum level of indemnity cover of €1.5m”. Regulation

13(2) provides that the minimum level of indemnity cover required under Regulation

13(1) “shall relate to each and every claim made, and not to the aggregate value of all

claims made”. Mr Sallabi notes that the term “claim” in the Regulations is defined in

Regulation 2 as meaning “a request or demand for, or an assertion of a right to, or an

indication of an intention to seek, civil damages or compensation of any nature”. He

then draws attention to the section of the Zurich policy entitled “limits of indemnity”

which is in the following terms:

“(1) The liability of the insurer shall not exceed the limit of indemnity stated

in the schedule.

(2) All claims attributable to the same act, error or omission or series of

acts, errors or omissions consequent upon or attributable to the same

original cause or source will be regarded as one Claim.”

He contends that that provision in the policy does not comply with Regulation 13(2) as

it seeks, in effect, to apply the relevant limit of indemnity to the aggregate value of all

claims made.

268. The Authority disputes that contention and maintains by reference to the proper

interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Zurich policy that the policy does not

breach the requirement in Regulation 13(2). As I now explain, I agree with the

Authority’s position.

269. Before explaining why that is so, I should observe that Mr Sallabi has exhibited

two versions of the Zurich policy and two sets of documents relating to the policy. The

first version of the policy and the first set of documents he exhibited was the Zurich

policy which identified the Irish Zurich company as the insurer and under which he 125

initially obtained cover in respect of the period from 11 October 2023 to 30 April 2025.

The documents he exhibited with that policy included the professional indemnity

renewal schedule, the cover details schedule, the endorsements schedule, the 2023

certificate of professional indemnity insurance dated 22 November 2023, the

professional indemnity new policy payment confirmation sent to him by email on 22

November 2023 and a brochure explaining the cover under the Zurich policy issued by

AON, as the brokers under the policy, which bears the heading “professional indemnity

for barristers” (the “Brochure”). Mr Sallabi also exhibited a copy of the Zurich policy

naming the German Zurich company as the insurer, together with a series of

communications which he had with AON in March 2026 in which he sought and

received a quotation and details of insurance cover to cover his work as a practising

barrister. The two policy documents themselves are virtually identical save for the fact

that in one the insurer is now the German Zurich company.

270. In considering Mr Sallabi’s argument based on Regulation 13(2), it is necessary

to refer to a number of the relevant provisions of the Zurich policy. On p. 4 of the policy

it is stated that “the policy, schedule and any endorsements should be read as if they

were one document”. The insuring clause provides that the insurer (which was the Irish

Zurich company and is now the German Zurich company) will ensure the insured (who

is defined in the policy as meaning “the individual barrister stated in the schedule as

the insured and shall not mean the General Council of the Bar”) under the relevant

sections shown in the schedule during any period of insurance for which the insurer has

accepted the insured’s premium provided all the terms and conditions of the policy are

kept (also on p. 4 of the policy).

271. The term “claim” is defined in the definitions section of the policy (on p. 5) in

the following terms: 126

“(1) Claim means

(a) service of a claim form, counter claim, other additional claim

application notice, notice of appeal, witness summons or similar legal

document including an application for any related injunction; or

(b) a reference to or notification of intention to commence or the

commencement of proceedings of any kind including arbitration

proceedings or a complaint to an ombudsman; or

(c) a written communication including electronic communications

(whether or not containing a demand for compensation or damages)

asserting a legal liability on the part of the Insured.”

272. Clause 1 of the insurance clauses (on p. 8) provides as follows:

“1. Civil liability

The Insurer will indemnify the Insured up to the limit of indemnity specified

in the schedule in respect of Claims first made against the Insured and

notify to the Insurer during the period of insurance in respect of any civil

liability (including liability for wasted costs orders and claimant’s costs

and expenses) incurred in connection with the conduct of the Insured

Practice.”

The term “insured practice” is defined in para. 13 of the Definitions as “the Insured’s

practice as a barrister”.

273. The policy states in relation to “limits of indemnity” as follows (on p. 9):

“1. The liability of the Insurer shall not exceed the limit of indemnity stated

in the schedule. 127

2. All Claims attributable to the same act, error or omission or series of acts,

errors or omissions consequent upon or attributable to the same original

cause or source will be regarded as one claim.”

274. The relevant schedule provided by Mr Sallabi is the cover details schedule in

respect of the period in which he was insured under the Zurich policy. The limit of

indemnity stated there was €1,500,000 and the basis of that limit of indemnity was

stated in the schedule to be “any one claim plus costs and expenses”. The limit of

indemnity specified in the schedule (€1,500,000) is the minimum level of indemnity

required for a “qualifying insurance policy” (under Regulation 13(1)). It should be

noted that higher levels of cover can be obtained (for a higher premium). The schedule

makes clear that the limit of indemnity applies to “any one claim plus costs and

expenses”.

275. The limit of indemnity does not apply to the aggregate value of all claims made

as alleged by Mr Sallabi. Paragraph 2 of the provisions of the policy under the heading

“Limits of Indemnity” does not mean that separate claims are aggregated and subjected

to the limit of indemnity in the schedule. It means that claims which are attributable to

the same event or series of events will be regarded as one claim. That is also made clear

in the Brochure. It does not mean that all claims made against the insured cannot, in

aggregate, exceed €1,500,000. That is not what para. 2 under the heading “Limits of

Indemnity” says. Nor is it what the relevant schedule says is the limit of indemnity in

the Zurich policy taken out by Mr Sallabi. I am satisfied therefore that there is no basis

for Mr Sallabi’s contention that the Zurich policy does not comply with the

requirements in Regulation 13(2) of the 2024 Regulations. 128

(iii) Regulation 14

276. Mr Sallabi contends that the Zurich policy does not comply with the requirements

of a “qualifying insurance policy” set out in Regulation 14(b), (c) and (d). I will deal

with each of those paragraphs in turn.

277. With respect to Mr Sallabi’s argument in relation to Regulation 14(b), I am

satisfied that he has completely misread and misinterpreted the Zurich policy and the

documents furnished with it. Mr Sallabi contends that the policy does not comply with

the requirement in Regulation 14(b) that the policy “be fully retroactive and cover any

valid claims made during the period of cover regardless of when the work was

undertaken”. He relies on one provision of the policy and a statement in the certificate

issued by AON on 22 November 2023 in support of his submission. The first provision

he relies on is para. 12 of the exclusions in the policy (on p. 11). That provides that the

insurer shall not be liable in respect of:

“12. Previous Circumstances

The consequences of any circumstances notified under any policy of insurance

which preceded this insurance.”

The statement in the certificate on which he relies is in the “important notes” at (A) in

which it was stated by AON that the insurer will not be liable for the consequences of

any circumstances:

“ – notified under any insurance which was in force prior to the inception of this

insurance;

– any claim made against the insured prior to the Period of Insurance.”

278. As the Authority pointed out, the Zurich policy is a “claims made” policy. It

covers claims made during the period of cover irrespective of when the work which 129

gave rise to the claim was undertaken. It was made clear in the Brochure (exhibited by

Mr Sallabi) under the heading “Claims made basis of cover” as follows:

“Professional indemnity operates on a ‘claims made’ basis. This means that it is

the policy that is in force at the time a claim is first notified to you, or at the time

you first became aware of a circumstance which could give rise to a claim that

will respond, not the policy that may have been in force at the time the acts, works,

services, etc., giving rise to the claim actually took place.”

279. Paragraph 12 of the exclusions on which Mr Sallabi relies simply provides that

Zurich will not provide an indemnity to the insured in respect of the consequences of

circumstances notified under any earlier policy of insurance. In other words, the insured

cannot notify a claim made prior to the commencement of the Zurich policy to an

insurer under another policy and then seek to be indemnified by Zurich under the Zurich

policy. That could not be clearer. The certificate makes the same point as is made in

para. 12 of the exclusions and that is that Zurich will not be liable under the policy in

respect of a claim notified under any other insurance policy which was in force prior to

the inception of the Zurich policy. The second point made in the certificate is that Zurich

will not be liable under the policy in respect of any claim made against the insured prior

to the period of insurance under the Zurich policy. In Mr Sallabi’s case, if a claim was

actually made against him prior to 11 October 2023 (being the commencement of the

period of insurance), that claim would not be covered by the Zurich policy.

280. None of these exclusions or statements preclude cover in respect of valid claims

made during the period of insurance irrespective of when the work which gave rise to

the claim was undertaken. On the contrary, that is precisely what the Zurich policy

provides as it is a “claims made” policy. There is no basis, therefore, for Mr Sallabi’s 130

contention that the Zurich policy does not comply with Regulation 14(b) of the 2024

Regulations.

281. With respect to Regulation 14(c), Mr Sallabi contends that the Zurich policy does

not comply with the requirements of that paragraph in that he claims that the policy

does not provide cover which will not be refused or reduced on the basis of innocent or

unintentional non-disclosure. Mr Sallabi relies on Condition No. 1 and Condition No.

6 of the policy. Condition No. 1 provides for the circumstances in which the nature of

the risk changes from those provided by the insured to the insurer prior to the

commencement or renewal of the policy. Condition No. 6 provides for a duty on the

insured to comply with the provisions of the policy and makes that a condition

precedent to any liability on the part of the insurer to make any payment of the policy.

It also provides that breach of any notification-related term or condition will entitle the

insurer (although both copies of the Zurich policy exhibited by Mr Sallabi contain a

typographical error which refers to the insured rather than the insurer in this provision)

to refuse payment of a claim where the insurer was prejudiced by the breach of that

term or condition. Mr Sallabi maintains that those provisions mean that cover can be

refused or reduced on the basis of innocent or unintentional non-disclosure under the

Zurich policy. However, the Authority has comprehensively answered that claim by

drawing attention to Condition No. 9(2)(d) (on page 15 of the policy) which falls under

the heading “Remedies for Misrepresentation”. That paragraph of Condition No. 9(2)

states:

“(d) Nothing in this clause shall permit the Insurer to avoid the policy based on

an innocent misrepresentation provided that the insured has discharged the

insured’s duty to answer questions asked by the insurer honestly and with

reasonable care. In this clause, the term ‘innocent misrepresentation’ means a 131

misrepresentation which was neither a negligent misrepresentation nor a

fraudulent misrepresentation.”

282. I accept the Authority’s submission that there is nothing in the Zurich policy

which would allow Zurich to refuse or reduce cover on the basis of innocent or

unintentional non-disclosure. Accordingly, I reject Mr Sallabi’s claim that the Zurich

policy does not comply with the requirements of Regulation 14(c).

283. Finally, Mr Sallabi alleges that the Zurich policy does not comply with the

requirements in Regulation 14(d). It will be recalled that that is the paragraph which

requires that an insurer under a “qualifying insurance policy” must offer “annually

renewable run-off cover at a fixed premium for the run-off period on terms that are no

less favourable than the terms of the qualifying insurance policy”. Mr Sallabi contends

that the Zurich policy contains no such provision and also relies on Condition No. 1 to

support his claim that the Zurich policy does not comply with Regulation 14(d). I do

not see how Condition No. 1 supports his argument. It has nothing to do with run-off

cover.

284. The Authority points out that Zurich does provide run-off cover to barristers who

are insured under the Zurich policy. The Authority correctly points out that what is

required is that the relevant insurer must offer the annually renewable run-off cover on

the terms required by Regulation 14(d). The evidence supports the Authority’s position.

While the Zurich policy document itself does not refer to run-off cover, the supporting

material exhibited by Mr Sallabi provides clear evidence that such run-off cover is

provided to those insured under the policy when such cover is required (i.e., when they

cease practice). The Brochure lists as one of the “key benefits” of the Zurich policy that

“run-off cover following retirement, elevation to the bench or a leave of absence is

available at a flat rate, regardless of circumstances”. It also provides that “free run- 132

off cover is automatically provided for the benefit of the estates and heirs of deceased

members”. The “cover details schedule” in respect of Mr Sallabi’s previous period of

cover under the Zurich policy made reference to “run-off” and stated that it was not

applicable. It was clearly not applicable at that stage as Mr Sallabi was practising as a

barrister and had not ceased practice and, therefore, he did not need or have run-off

cover at that time. The “endorsements schedule” also refers to the availability of “run-

off cover” and states:

“It is understood and agreed that we shall only be liable to indemnify you against

claims or losses arising from work commenced or contracts entered into prior to

the cessation of the practice”.

285. Similarly in the correspondence sent by AON to Mr Sallabi on 11 March 2026 in

connection with the quotation he sought for cover under the Zurich policy, reference is

also made to the availability of run-off cover and similar wording is contained to the

extent that under such cover Zurich will only be liable to indemnify the insured against

claims or losses arising from works commenced or contracts entered into prior to the

cessation of the practice. The quote details contained in the email from AON to Mr

Sallabi sent on 10 March 2026 contains an entry for “run-off cover” with the words

“no”. Again this is clearly because what Mr Sallabi was looking for was a quote for

professional indemnity insurance cover while he was continuing to practice as a

barrister and not while he was in a run-off period following his cessation of practice as

a barrister. It is clear that the Authority was satisfied that the run-off cover which would

be offered by Zurich to barristers when they cease practice fully complies with the

requirements of the 2024 Regulations including the requirements of Regulation 14(d).

The material before the court (which was exhibited by Mr Sallabi himself) supports the 133

Authority’s position. I am satisfied therefore that Mr Sallabi’s contention that the

Zurich policy does not comply with the requirements of Regulation 14(d) is incorrect.

286. In conclusion on this issue, therefore, as the Zurich policy does comply with the

requirements of the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations and as there is at least one other

policy provided to barristers in the State, there is no basis for Mr Sallabi’s claim that

the Authority is asking Mr Sallabi or is asking the court to order Mr Sallabi to do

something that is impossible, namely, to put in place professional indemnity insurance

cover under a “qualifying insurance policy”. The principle lex non cogit ad

impossibilia on which Mr Sallabi relies and the authorities which he relies on have no

application to the circumstances of this case. The Authority is not requiring Mr Sallabi

to do something which is impossible. Nor in making orders in relation to Mr Sallabi

under s. 35 of the 2015 Act, prohibiting him from providing legal services in the State

and from holding himself out as being a practising barrister entitled to provide such

services in the State without a policy of professional indemnity insurance which

complies with the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations, is the Court requiring Mr Sallabi

to do anything that is impossible.

14. Remaining points relevant to the Authority’s application

287. I have already addressed most of the other points advanced by Mr Sallabi in

response to the Authority’s application and have rejected his arguments on those points.

288. In summary, I am satisfied that the court does have jurisdiction to grant the orders

sought by the Authority under s. 35 of the 2015 Act. On the basis of the evidence before

the court, I am satisfied that Mr Sallabi, as a “practising barrister” under the Act, has

contravened, is contravening and is likely to contravene the provisions of s. 46 of the

2015 Act and the provisions of Regulation 4(1), (2) and (3) of the 2024 Regulations. 134

289. For the reasons I have explained earlier, I reject Mr Sallabi’s submission that the

Court does not have jurisdiction and ought not to entertain the Authority’s application.

I reject his claim that it is not possible for the Court to determine the issues raised in

these proceedings in an application made by the Authority under s. 35 of the 2015 Act.

The Authority was entitled to bring the proceedings in the way in which it did, i.e. by

originating notice of motion in accordance with O. 53D and O. 84B of the RSC. The

evidence provided by the Authority in the proceedings was properly provided on

affidavit in accordance with O. 84B, r. 7. There were no relevant facts in dispute which

may have required cross-examination or plenary proceedings. Nor were the legal issues

raised of such complexity as to preclude their determination in the application brought

by the Authority.

290. I reject Mr Sallabi’s argument that the court ought not to have entertained the

Authority’s application on the grounds that there is also a complaint of misconduct

against Mr Sallabi pending before the Authority. The existence of that complaint (which

includes an allegation that Mr Sallabi did not have, at the time of the complaint, a valid

and effective professional indemnity insurance policy as well as raising several other

issues) does not preclude the Court from dealing with the Authority’s application for

orders under s. 35 of the 2015 Act. A different test and different principles apply to the

Authority’s consideration of a complaint alleging “misconduct” on the part of Mr

Sallabi under Part 6 of the 2015 Act. It is a matter for the Authority to determine how

it deals with that complaint and to apply the procedures under the 2015 Act to its

consideration of the complaint. The existence of the complaint does not preclude the

Court from exercising its jurisdiction under s. 35 of the 2015 Act and from making

orders against Mr Sallabi under that statutory provision. The making of such orders

does not amount to a finding of “misconduct” (as that term is defined in s. 50 of the 135

2015 Act) on the part of Mr Sallabi. Any alleged “misconduct” on the part of Mr Sallabi

must be determined in accordance with the procedures under Part 6 of the 2015 Act.

291. I am also satisfied that there is no other reason why I should not grant the orders

sought by the Authority. Indeed everything points in favour of granting the orders which

the Authority seeks. It is essential for the protection of the public and for clients of Mr

Sallabi to whom he provides legal services as a barrister in Ireland that he has

professional indemnity insurance cover in place which complies with the requirements

of the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations. As matters stand, for the detailed reasons set

out in this judgment, Mr Sallabi does not have such compliant cover. However, on the

evidence, it is clear that the deficiency in Mr Sallabi’s insurance cover can readily be

remedied. Mr Sallabi previously had insurance cover under the Zurich policy from

October 2023 to the end of April 2025 for an annual premium of €90. He received a

quotation in March 2026 from AON for cover under the Zurich policy which would

have provided him with a compliant policy for an annual premium of €235. I have

considered the explanation which he offered on affidavit for not taking out that policy

and found that explanation to be baffling, contradictory and to make absolutely no

sense. Instead of acting as a reasonable and responsible practitioner and complying with

the reasonable request of his statutory regulator, the Authority, by subscribing to cover

under the Zurich policy for minimal cost, Mr Sallabi has himself spent many multiples

of that amount responding to the Authority’s application and has caused the Authority

to incur what are no doubt very substantial costs in engaging external solicitors and

counsel to act for it in this application, not to mention incurring substantial court time

in the hearing of the application, in deciding the application by issuing its decision on

21 May 2026 and by requiring a detailed judgment following the giving of that decision. 136

This whole exercise is, as I stated earlier, a scandalous waste of time and money by Mr

Sallabi.

292. The allegations which Mr Sallabi has chosen to make against the Authority and

its lawyers, lawyers acting for his opponents and other parties in the Al Maktoum

proceedings in the High Court and against a High Court judge are really quite

extraordinary. They would be extraordinary if made by an unqualified legal

professional. The fact that they have been made by a qualified barrister who obtained

his Barrister-at-Law degree from the King’s Inns and who was called to the Irish Bar is

almost inconceivable.

293. Mr Sallabi’s irresponsible and baseless allegations against a female solicitor in

the firm representing the Authority in this application who happened to finish up her

employment with the firm during the currency of the application was the nadir of Mr

Sallabi’s conduct in relation to this application. All of those allegations were made

without any proper basis or evidence and without any proper appreciation as to how

litigation should be conducted before the Irish courts. It was entirely improper,

inappropriate and irresponsible for Mr Sallabi to make those allegations. They ought

not to have been made on affidavit by Mr Sallabi or in his written submissions and were

never withdrawn by Mr Sallabi in the course of the application. They ought to have

been.

294. The irresponsible manner in which Mr Sallabi conducted this application was

further compounded by his request in open court on 26 June 2026 that I recuse myself

from the case and that I consider pausing work on this judgment. This application was

apparently made on the basis of information which Mr Sallabi allegedly obtained on 1

May 2026 (a few days after the hearing of the Authority’s application had finished) and

three weeks before I provided the parties with a note of my decision on 21 May 2026. 137

When I handed out the note of my decision in open court that day and when I enquired

whether the parties required a more detailed judgment setting out more extensive

reasoning for my conclusions (as I had offered to do in the note of the decision), counsel

for the Authority indicated that the Authority was happy with the note of the decision

and did not require a more full judgment. However, notwithstanding that he had

apparently obtained material on 1 May 2026 (three weeks previously) to support his

belief that I should recuse myself from the case, Mr Sallabi requested that I proceed to

complete my detailed written judgment and I have spent considerable time in doing so

at his request. I have no idea whatsoever of the material that Mr Sallabi claims to have

received on 1 May 2026 to support his belief that I should recuse myself from the case

and that I should pause writing this judgment but the fact that he allegedly had that

material for at least three weeks and then requested me to complete my judgment is

surprising to say the least. Also surprising is the fact that the first occasion on which

Mr Sallabi made any mention to an application that I should recuse myself was in court

on 26 June 2026, nine weeks after he allegedly obtained information which led him to

seek my recusal from the case and notwithstanding that the case was listed before me

on 21 May 2026 and 11 June 2026 and that Mr Sallabi was during this period in

correspondence with the Registrar. I refused to entertain an application that I recuse

myself and to pause work on this judgment.

15. Concluding comments and orders

295. For the reasons set out in detail in my judgment, I have concluded that Mr Sallabi,

a practising barrister, has contravened and is likely to contravene the provisions of s.

46 of the 2015 Act and Regulation 4 of the 2024 Regulations by failing to have in place

professional indemnity insurance cover in respect of the legal services which he

provides as a barrister in Ireland. I am satisfied that in those circumstances I should 138

make the orders sought by the Authority under s. 35 of the 2015 Act. I have previously

made orders on an interlocutory basis against Mr Sallabi, including on 21 May 2026,

11 June 2026 and 26 June 2026. I now propose to make those orders on a permanent

basis unless and until Mr Sallabi puts in place a professional indemnity insurance policy

which complies with the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations, as I indicated that I would

in the note of my decision announced on 21 May 2026.

296. I will, therefore, make the following orders against Mr Sallabi under s. 35 of the

2015 Act:

(1) An order that Mr Sallabi be prohibited from providing legal services in the

State unless and until he puts in place an approved policy of insurance in

compliance with the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 (Professional

Indemnity Insurance for Barristers) Regulations 2024 (the “2024

Regulations”);

(2) An order that Mr Sallabi be prohibited from holding himself out as being a

practising barrister available to provide legal services in the State unless

and until he puts in place an approved policy of professional indemnity

insurance in compliance with the 2024 Regulations; and

(3) An order that Mr Sallabi be required to produce to the Authority proof that

he has in place an approved policy of professional indemnity insurance in

compliance with the 2024 Regulations before he provides any legal services

in the State or holds himself out as being available to provide legal services

in the State.

297. It is my provisional view that, as the Authority has been entirely successful in its

application, for the purposes of s. 169(1) of the 2015 Act, the Authority should be 139

entitled to an order for the costs of the application against Mr Sallabi to include all

reserved costs and the costs of submissions. If Mr Sallabi wishes to contend otherwise,

I will hear submissions on the issue following the delivery of my judgment.