IEHC 426 — IEHC 426 — High Court

THE HIGH COURT

[2026] IEHC 426

[Record No. 2024 No. 1426 JR]

BETWEEN

G. T.

APPLICANT

AND

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL AND

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE

RESPONDENTS

JUDGEMENT delivered by Hon. Mr. Justice Patrick McGrath on the 12 June 2026

1. FACTS

1.1 The Applicant is a Georgian national who served as a soldier in the Georgian Armed

Forces from 2006 to 2011, during which time he was a combatant in the 2008 Russo – Georgian war. He states that in July 2019, he took part in protests relating to veteran rights and was arrested the following month, along with others who had participated in the said protests and detained thereafter for five days. He further says that, whilst in detention, he and other fellow detainees were pressurised to state that Georgia had in fact started the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, on the instigation of the former Georgian President, Mikhail Saskashvili. He claims that threats were made that, if they did not make such statements, they would be deemed as traitors to the state.

1 1.2 The Applicant subsequently left Georgia in October 2019 and, having initially travelled

to Turkey, then went on to Slovakia where he lived until 2022. Together with other Georgian veterans, he states that he volunteered to assist in the defence of Ukraine. He claims to have travelled to Ukraine in February/March 2022 and, having remained there for about a week, says he was forced to flee due to alleged threats from Georgian State security agents who were embedded in this volunteer movement and were surveilling its activities. He also says that he in fact subsequently discovered that two of his fellow volunteers had been arrested and detained following their return to Georgia.

2. APPLICATION FOR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION

2.1 The Applicant submitted an application for International Protection on the 19 April

2022 and was interviewed pursuant to s. 13(2) of the International Protection Act, 2015 [‘the 2015 Act’] on that date. The applicant also completed an International Protection Questionnaire and a copy of this document, translated into English, was filed in these proceedings. The applicant was further interviewed, pursuant to s. 35 of the 2015 Act, on the 21 April 2013.

2.2 By letter dated the 3 November 2023, the Applicant was advised that the International

Protection Office [‘the IPO’] had recommended that he should be given neither a refugee declaration nor a subsidiary protection declaration and furthermore that the Second Respondent had refused him permission to remain in the State.

2.3 A Notice of Appeal was filed with the International Protection Appeals Tribunal on the

7 December 2023. Following inter alia the filing of submissions and country of origin information by the Applicant, an oral audio-visual hearing of the said appeal took place on the 27 June 2024. On the 16 October 2024, the Tribunal issued its decision affirming the recommendation of the IPO that the applicant should be given neither a refugee declaration not a subsidiary protection declaration.

3. JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS

3.1 In these proceedings the Applicant seeks various orders from this Court, including an

order of Certiorari quashing the order of the Tribunal affirming the recommendation of 2 the IPO that he be refused a declaration of refugee status or a subsidiary protection declaration.

3.2 The grounds upon which relief is sought are set out at Paragraph (e) of the Statement

of Grounds as follows: -

‘1. The essential rationale of the decision is not patent from its terms in breach of the Applicant’s constitutional right of access to this Honourable Court. 2. The tribunal failed to take relevant considerations into account, and / or acted in breach of natural and constitutional justice and fair procedures, including the principle of audi alteram partem, in failing to have any or any adequate regard to the Legal Submissions and country of origin information [‘COI’] submitted to the Tribunal on behalf of the Applicant by emails dated 18 April 2024 and 27 June 2024 and relied upon by the Applicant. 3. The tribunal failed to address a central issue it was required to determine and reach a reasonable conclusion in respect thereof, namely if the applicant failed to provide documentation, whether he had provided a satisfactory explanation for such absence and give a reasoned decision on the issue. 4. The Tribunal erred in law in failing to discharge its statutory duty to determine the Applicant’s application for international protection in accordance with the International Protection Act, s28 as mandated by the Qualification Directive in particular by failing to apply the test mandated by that section. 5. The tribunal failed to consider the evidence in context although indicating in reliance on case law that it would so do. 6. The tribunal erred in law in holding that documentary evidence was required in every case’

3.3 Leave was granted by Phelan J to seek relief on the above grounds on the 13 January

2025. A statement of opposition was in due course filed on behalf of the Respondents. Submissions were thereafter filed on behalf of both parties in support of their respective cases.

3 3.4 In the submissions filed by the Applicant the legal issues in the case were set out as

being the following:-

‘(i) Whether the first named respondent ( the ‘Tribunal’), in failing to have any or any adequate regard to the Legal Submissions and country of origin information (‘COI’) submitted to the Tribunal on behalf of the applicant by emails dated 18 April 2024 and 27 June 2024, erred in fact and/or acted irrationally and/ or unreasonably and/or disproportionately, and/ or failed to take relevant considerations into account. (ii) Whether the Tribunal, in failing to have any or any adequate regard to the said Legal Submission and COI, erred in law, and/ or acted in breach of natural and constitutional justice and fair procedures. (iii) Whether the Tribunal, in failing to provide information sufficient to identify the essential rationale of the decision and/or provide adequate reasons for the refusal, erred in fact and/or in law, and/or acted irrationally and/or unreasonably and/ or disproportionately, and/or failed to take relevant considerations into account, and/or took irrelevant considerations into account’

4. SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPLICANT

4.1 The Applicant first submits that the Tribunal acted unlawfully in failing to take relevant

considerations into account. In this regard, the applicant submits that, contrary to the requirements of s. 28 of the 2015 Act, the Tribunal failed to have any or any adequate regard to the legal submissions and Country of Origin information filed by the Applicant in support of his appeal.

4.2 The applicant further submits that, in breach of the requirements of law, the Tribunal

wrongly used the lack of supporting documents to find against the applicant’s credibility. Rather than assessing general credibility and the reasons why no documentary evidence was adduced in support thereof to support his claim, the Tribunal ‘put the cart before the horse’ by relying on the lack of supporting documents to find against credibility.

4 4.3 The undue and overbearing weight given by the Tribunal to the absence of supporting

documentation resulted in the Tribunal failing to have any regard or to disregard Country of Origin information that could have supported the Applicant’s claims.

4.4 In support of his submission that there was a failure to properly consider credibility in the

context of COI, the Applicant refers to the following case law:

- ESO v IPAT [2023] IEHC 197, where Phelan J at paragraph 42 stated that the failure to consider credibility in the context of relevant COI can render a decision invalid; - RA v RAT [2017] IECA 297, where Hogan J. stated at paragraph 41 that a failure to consider credibility ‘in the context of relevant COI in itself rendered the decision invalid’ - IR v Minister for Justice [2009] IEHC 353 where Cooke J commented that ‘the assessment of credibility must be made by reference to the full picture that emerges from the available evidence and information as a whole’.

4.5 The Applicant further submits that, by failing to have any or any adequate regard to the

legal submissions and COI, the Tribunal acted in breach of fair procedures. In this regard the applicant submits that, by approaching the appeal on the basis that the said COI and Legal Submissions were not relevant as the applicant had not submitted supporting documentary evidence, the applicant was deprived of fair procedures as the Tribunal had failed or refused to hear part of his case. This was a breach of the fundamental ‘right to be heard’ and constituted a breach of the applicant’s constitutional right to fair procedures.

4.6 The Applicant also claims that even if, contrary to his submissions, the Tribunal did

consider the submissions and COI, it did so unlawfully as it failed to provide sufficient reasons for its decision refusing the appeal.

4.7 The Applicant refers to a number of well-known decisions, including Meadows v Minister

for Justice [2010] 2 IR 701 and Rawson v Minister for Defence [2012] IESC 26, explaining the duty of administrative bodies such as the Tribunal to give reasons. Reference is also made paragraph 156 of the Judgment of MacMenamin J. in NECI v Labour Court & Ors [2021] IESC 36, where the underlying rationale for the duty to give reasons was described in the following terms:- 5 ‘(a) Could the parties know, in general terms, why the recommendation was made? (b) Did the parties have enough information to consider whether they could, or should, seek to avail of judicial review? (c) Were the reasons provided in the recommendation and report such as to allow a court hearing a decision to actually engage properly in such an appeal, or review? (d) Could other persons or bodies concerned, or potentially affected by the matters in issue, know the reasons why the Labour Court reached its conclusions on the contents of a projected SEO, bearing in mind that it would foreseeably have the force of law, and be applicable across the electrical contracting sector?’

4.8 The Applicant submits that the decision under review was not rendered clearly, cogently or

understandably. He submits that a consideration of the legal submissions and COI was not patent or capable of being inferred. Furthermore, it is claimed that the Tribunal failed to offer information necessary to enable the applicant to consider whether he has a reasonable chance in judicial review or understand whether the decision maker had directed his mind adequately to the submissions and COI which he was obliged to consider.

5. SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT

5.1 The Respondent takes issue with the complaints of the Applicant and says that the Tribunal

properly considered all relevant evidence, including the submissions and COI submitted and gave clear and sufficient reasons for its decision. The Respondent submits that the Applicant’s challenge amounts to a disagreement with the Tribunal’s assessment of the evidence and credibility of the applicant and this is not a proper basis for Judicial Review.

5.2 The Minister cites the decision of Supreme Court in Rana v Minister for Justice [2024]

IESC 46, which makes it clear that the Tribunal is not required to address every submission or piece of evidence in its written decision, provided it can be shown that all relevant matters were considered and that the essential rationale for the decision is patent from its terms.

5.3 The Respondent submits that the Tribunal acted within jurisdiction in rejecting the

credibility of the Applicant. In this regard the Minister refers to the following:

6 a. At paragraph 26 of the decision the Tribunal noted that, whilst he claimed to have been in the Georgian military from 2006 to 2011 and reached the rank of sergeant major, this was not corroborated by a single document; b. The applicant claimed to have been involved in protests in Georgia in 2019 which led to his arrest and his being pressurised into supporting a claim that Georgia started the Russo – Georgian war. Once again, no document was produced to corroborate this claim; c. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that that he had not provided any explanation why the authorities might have pressurised him to attest to this despite repeated requests; d. The Tribunal said that he gave different dates for his alleged arrest in Georgia – at the s. 35 interview it was said this occurred at the end of August 2019 whereas at the hearing he stated July 2019; e. At paragraph 30 of its decision the Tribunal noted that he had not provided any document to corroborate his claim to have been in Ukraine in February or March 2022 and / or that he had enlisted with the Georgian Legion to fight against the Russians. He also said that any document to support this claim was with the Georgian Special Forces and this was said to undermine his credibility; f. The applicant was also vague and inconsistent about the dates he was in Ukraine. At the oral hearing he had said he was in Ukraine ‘in February, about February’, whereas in the s. 35 interview he had said March and when this inconsistency was put to him, he had said it was March or February.

5.4 Finally, at paragraph 31 of the decision the Tribunal held that overall, the applicant’s claim

that he was involved with the military in Georgia was vague, lacking in detail, inconsistent and entirely uncorroborated. Accordingly, his claim that he was persecuted in Georgia, by virtue of having been a soldier involved in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and his involvement in Ukraine, was rejected.

5.5 The Respondent rejects the contention that the Tribunal failed to consider legal submissions

and COI. In this regard the Minister submits:-

a. At Paragraph 11 of the decision, the Tribunal expressly acknowledges receipt of the written submissions and COI relied upon by the Applicant; 7 b. The Tribunal clearly read the submissions and documentation as it specifically referred to the cited case law in its decision; c. At paragraph 13 of the decision, it is recorded that the Tribunal had specifically informed both parties that it intended to rely upon the 2023 US State Department Country Report on Human Rights in relation to Georgia; d. The Tribunal at Paragraph 17 of its decision properly directed itself to the relevant legal principles and thereafter went on to rely upon a number of clear reasons for rejecting the credibility of the Applicant; e. The fact that a Tribunal does not refer to every item of COI or every legal argument in its written decision does not mean that these matters were not considered. A decision maker is not required to address every single aspect of a claim in the reasoning process and the fact that a particular matter is not specifically referred to does not mean that it was not considered.

5.6 The Respondent further says that credibility findings can only be made on the basis of a

complete understanding of the entire picture and the probative value of the evidence must be evaluated inter alia in light of what is known about conditions in the country of origin. The Minister submitted that it is clear from a number of specific parts of the decision that the Tribunal considered the applicants submissions and relevant COI during its credibility evaluation. The Minister says that the Tribunal is not however obliged to accept the Applicants interpretation of COI or refer to each element of COI in its decision.

5.7 The Minister submits that the decision of the Tribunal sets out clear reasons for its finding

on credibility, including the applicant’s failure to provide documentation to support key aspects of his account, inconsistencies in his narrative and the Tribunal’s assessment of his credibility in light of the COI. The Tribunal was, in the circumstances of this case, entitled to have regard to the absence of documentary evidence, particularly where his accounts were inconsistent.

5.8 The Respondent says that ‘it is telling’ that no particular COI is quoted by the Applicant as

being relevant but missed or overlooked by the Tribunal. Though replete with reference to case law and legal principles concerning the assessment of credibility, the Respondent submits that the Applicant does not provide any analysis to explain how the credibility assessment was made unlawful by a failure to refer in more detail to the COI presented. 8 5.9 The Minister submits that the decision of the Tribunal, considered fairly and as a whole,

demonstrates that all relevant matters were considered.

5.10 The Respondent denies that there was any breach of fair procedures or natural justice. The

Applicant was given a full opportunity to present his case, both in writing and at an oral hearing. Contrary to what is asserted by the Applicant, the Tribunal did not decide that the submissions and COI were not relevant and the real complaint here is that the Tribunal did not give them the weight he would have wished.

5.11 Finally, the Minister says that contrary to the submission of the Respondent, the Tribunal

here adequately set out the rationale for its decision, namely that for a number of clear reasons, the applicant was not credible. The reasons given are adequate, factually sustainable and allow the court to properly exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.

5.12 In this regard the Respondent says that the claim of the Respondent is misconceived as;

(a) The Tribunal is not required to address every submission or item of COI in a ritualistic or mechanistic fashion as suggested by the Applicant; (b) The Tribunal’s obligation is to consider the evidence and submission before it, weigh them in the round and provide a reasoned decision; and (c) The Tribunal’s decision in this case referred to relevant COI and legal submission and provided clear reasons for its findings on credibility.

6. ANALYSIS

6.1 There is no substantive dispute between the parties as to the legal principles that apply to

the issues raised in this Judicial Review. The dispute rather concerns the application of those principles to the issues raised in this case and whether or not the Tribunal carried out its functions in accordance with the same.

Credibility Assessment - the first two legal issues identified

6.2 The assessment of credibility is a matter for the Tribunal and not for this Court. The

assessment of the credibility of an applicant is a central and primary function of the decision 9 maker, here the Tribunal, and this court must exercise restraint in interfering with credibility findings. In his judgment for the Court of Appeal in R.A v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2017] IECA 297 Hogan J restated with approval the ten non-exhaustive principles formulated by Cooke J in IR v Minister for Justice [2009] IEHC 353, which he said had emerged from previous cases dealing with the judicial review of credibility assessments. Included amongst those principles were the following:-

1) The determination as to whether a claim to a well-founded fear of persecution is credible falls to be made under the Refugee Act 1996 by the administrative decision maker and not by the Court. The High Court on judicial review must not succumb or fall into the trap of substituting its own view for that of the primary decision makers 2) On judicial review the function and jurisdiction of the High Court is confined to ensuring that the process by which the determination is made is legally sound and is not vitiated by any material error of law, infringement of any applicable statutory provision or of any principle of natural or constitutional justice ……. 8) When subjected to judicial review, a decision on credibility must be read as a whole and the court should be wary of attempts to deconstruct an overall conclusion by subjecting its individual parts to isolated examination in disregard of the cumulative impression made upon the decision – maker especially where the conclusion takes particular account of the demeanour and reaction of an applicant when testifying in person’

6.3 At paragraph 43 of his judgment in R.A Hogan J explained the general position as follows:-

‘The general approach of the courts to judicial review applications of this kind where a request for asylum has been rejected on credibility grounds is well established and was summed up by Cooke J in IR in the following terms [2015] 4 I.R. 144 @ 149)

‘It is because in such cases the judgment of the primary decision-maker must frequently depend on the personal appraisal of an applicant, that it is not the function of the High Court in judicial review to reassess credibility and to substitute its own view for that of the decision-maker. Its role is confined when a finding of

10 lack of credibility is attacked, to ensuring that the process by which the conclusion has been reached is legally sound and not vitiated by any material error of law’

6.4 In considering an application, including the assessment of the credibility of an applicant, it

is a requirement that all legal submissions and country of origin information be considered by a decision-making body such as the Tribunal. A failure to consider credibility in the context of relevant country of origin information and / or a failure to assess credibility by reference to the full picture that emerges from all the available evidence including the country-of-origin information, taken as a whole, could render a decision invalid.

6.5 Insofar as country-of-origin information is concerned, any relevant COI or submissions

thereon must be considered in the course of the assessment of credibility. In K (Zimbabwe) v International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2023] IEHC 6, Simons J criticised the approach adopted by the Tribunal in relation to how it considered COI in that case and observed as follows:-

’18. The Appeals Tribunal chose to defer consideration of any country of origin information until after it had purported to reach its findings of fact. The Appeals Tribunal purported to assess the credibility of the applicant’s narrative of events without reference to relevant information …. …23. The Appeals Tribunal concluded that the only personal circumstances of the applicant which were relevant to her claim for refugee status and/or subsidiary protection were that the applicant was a single mother from Zimbabwe. It was only after having whittled down the personal circumstances of the applicant to these characteristics that the Appeals Tribunal then considered country of origin information from the US State Department on Zimbabwe..’

6.6 It would be improper for the Tribunal, as the Applicant alleged was done here by the

Tribunal, to fail to consider submitted country of origin information solely on the basis that the Applicant did not or could not provide documentary evidence to support a claim. Whilst the general legal principle is that the duty to substantiate a claim lies with the applicant, in the context of determining international protection needs, an adaptation of this general principle may well be required. It is well recognised that frequently an applicant for refugee status will be unable to provide documentary support for his or her claims as those fleeing 11 persecution will often arrive with the barest of necessities and without even personal documents. As stated in the UNHCR Handbook:-

‘Thus, while the burden of proof in principle rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the examiner. Indeed, in some cases it may be for the examiner to use all the means at his disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support of the application’

6.7 The obligation of the Tribunal was to consider all relevant matters relevant to the issue to

be determined. As stated, it is not the law that the Tribunal, in assessing credibility, is required to refer in its decision to every item of COI or every legal submission made by the Applicant. Furthermore, the Tribunal, like every decision maker, is entitled to decide upon what weight to attach to particular items of evidence and submissions.

6.8 Having considered the decision of the Tribunal, I do not consider that a full and fair reading

of the same supports the complaints made by the Applicant in relation to the assessment of credibility. Firstly, the Tribunal specifically stated that it had considered all country-of- origin information and legal submissions. In this regard it should be noted that the applicant did not in his submissions refer to any particular relevant COI as having been overlooked or missed by the Tribunal. Nor does the applicant explain how he submits that the credibility analysis of the Tribunal was unlawful as a result of a failure to refer in detail to some particular COI.

6.9 Secondly, in the course of the decision the Tribunal referred to specific case law – e.g. RMK

v RAT [2020] IEHC 367 in the context of how to consider an applicant’s evidence in the round and ON v RAT [2017] IEHC 13 where O’Regan J had referred to the standard of proof being on the balance of probabilities. The Tribunal also specifically informed the parties that it was going to rely upon the 2023 State Department Report of Georgia and this is confirmed at paragraph 13 of the decision.

6.10 Thirdly, at several points in the course of its decision the Tribunal referred to country of

origin information. At paragraph 19 of the decision the Tribunal specifically referred to COI reporting alleged comments of the former President of Georgia, Salome Zurabishvili, that it was Georgia who had commenced the 2008 Russia Georgia war and the Tribunal 12 specifically found this corroborated the Applicants claim that that former president had made such comments. Again, at paragraph 30 of the decision, the Tribunal specifically referred to the COI and submissions which provided evidence from the Georgian Dream Party which ‘have at least strongly suggested that enlisting for the army of another country (Ukraine) may lead to Georgian citizens losing their Georgian citizenship’.

6.11 Fourthly it is not the case, as submitted by the Applicant that the Tribunal ‘put the cart

before the horse’ and only went on to consider COI having first of all made adverse credibility findings. It is clear that the Tribunal decision on credibility was reached having considered the evidence and submissions in the round. Having considered the evidence adduced by the Applicant, identified inconsistencies in the case of the applicant, the absence of documents supporting various aspects of his claim, the legal submissions and the COI submitted the Tribunal stated at paragraph 31 of its decision:-

‘Overall, the applicant’s claim that he was involved with the military in Georgia is vague, lacking in detail, inconsistent and entirely uncorroborated. Accordingly, the Appellants claim that he was persecuted in Georgia by virtue of his having been a soldier involved in the 2008 Russo Georgian War is rejected by the Tribunal as not credible’

6.12 I agree with the submission made by the Minister that this is not a case where the Tribunal

failed to consider the submissions and the COI and his real complaint is that the Tribunal did not accept his submissions or did not give them the weight he claimed attached thereto in his case.

6.13 I do not accept that the Tribunal failed to have adequate regard to the legal submissions and

COI submitted and reject the contention that the Tribunal, in carrying out its duties in this case, erred in fact and / or acted unlawfully as alleged. I further reject the submission that the Tribunal failed to have sufficient regard to the COI and legal submissions and thereby acted in breach of constitutional and natural justice.

13 Alleged Failure to Give Reasons

6.14 It is not a legal requirement that a decision-making body, such as the Tribunal in this case,

must in the course of its decision expressly refer to all the COI submitted and considered and that it must expressly address every submission or piece of evidence in the course of its ruling. Furthermore, there is no requirement that the reasons given for a decision are in any particular form or given with any particular detail. What is central in this regard is that the essential rationale for the decision be clear or capable of being clearly inferred from the ruling, per Murray CJ in Meadows v Minister for Justice [2010] 2 IR 701, at p 732.

6.15 A high degree of latitude is given to decision makers in this regard and, as made clear by

Clarke CJ in Connelly v An Bord Pleanala [2021] 2 I.R 752, at paragraphs 54 and 73 thereof, what is required is that the reasons for the same are ascertainable and capable of being determined from the ruling and the documents considered. I agree with the submission of the Minister in this regard that a Tribunal decision, in a case such as the present one, does not slavishly have to go through every submission made and every piece of COI proffered, provided it rejects the credibility of the applicant for clear reasons.

6.16 Returning to the comments of Mac Menamin J. in NECI v Labour Court & Ors [2021]

IESC 36, as set out above, and applying them to the decision under review here, the essential questions to be considered here are:

a. Do the parties know in general terms why the decision of the Tribunal was made? b. Did the parties have sufficient information to consider whether to Judicially Review the decision? c. Are the reasons set out in the decision of the Tribunal sufficient to allow this Court to engage properly in this Judicial Review application? d. Do the parties here know the reasons why the Tribunal reached its conclusion on the appeal of the applicant?

6.17 I agree with the submissions made by the Respondent in this regard. The Tribunal clearly

set out its rationale for its decision, namely that for a number of clearly identifiable reasons, the applicant’s claim lacked credibility. The Tribunal further set out in sufficient detail why 14 it reached this conclusion in relation to his credibility and the effect that this had on his overall claim. As already note above and contrary to the submissions made by the Applicant, I am of the view that these findings of credibility were made following careful consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances, including the country-of-origin information and the submissions of the applicant.

6.18 Having read the decision of the Tribunal, the applicant could have been in no doubt as to

why his appeal was rejected. There was sufficient detail and information contained in the body of the decision of the Tribunal so as to enable him to make a considered decision as to whether to bring these proceedings. And, having considered the decision and the submissions made thereon by each party to these proceedings, it is finally my opinion that there was sufficient detail in that document to allow this court to properly carry out its task and review the lawfulness of the decision.

6.19 This ground of complaint, the third legal issue identified above, is not therefore made out.

7. CONCLUSION

7.1 Having considered and rejected each of the complaints made by the Applicant and

identified in the three legal issues set out in paragraph 3.4 above, I refuse the reliefs sought by the Applicant and dismiss this application for Judicial Review for the reasons set out above.

7.2 Given this conclusion my preliminary view is that there would appear to be no reason that

the normal rule in relation to costs should not apply and that costs should be awarded to the successful party in these proceedings, namely the Respondent. I will however afford the parties the opportunity to make submissions on this issue and direct that any written submissions on the issue of costs be filed by the Applicant within two weeks of the date of this Judgment with the Respondent then allowed a further two weeks to file any replying submissions.

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