IEHC 425 — IEHC 425 — High Court

APPROVED [2026] IEHC 425

THE HIGH COURT

SPECIAL SUMMONS

Record No. 2025/134 SP

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 327 OF THE SOCIAL WELFARE

CONSOLIDATION ACT 2005

BETWEEN

P

APPELLANT AND

THE MINISTER FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION, CHIEF APPEALS OFFICER, SOCIAL WELFARE APPEALS OFFICE

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Nolan delivered on the 30th day of June 2026

Introduction

1. This is an appeal under section 327 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 (“the

2005 Act”) against the decision of the Appeals Officer dated 18 June 2025, (“the Decision”),

whereby the Appeals Officer disallowed the Appellant’s (“Mr. P”) appeal for Disability

Allowance.

2. He seeks an order quashing that decision and remitting the matter to a different Appeals

Officer for a de novo determination. 3. Since Mr. P has reached his majority, I made an order amending the proceedings so that

he can proceed in his own name. The effect of that order was to discharge his mother from the

proceedings.

Background 4. The Appellant was born on 8 May 2008. It is pleaded that he has been diagnosed with

certain medical issues, including Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”) which

affect his comprehension of instructions, concentration, communication, personal hygiene, use

of public transport and ability to acquire life skills to such an extent that he cannot obtain or

retain any employment or participate in training for employment.

5. An application for Disability Allowance was made on 23 July 2024 and was supported

by three reports. The first was from the family GP, the second from the Child and Adolescent

Mental Health Services (“CAMHS”) and the third from Professor Michael Fitzgerald.

Professor Fitzgerald reported that Mr. P required a special needs assistant, five hours of

resource teaching per week and assistance with attention, organisation, living skills and

dressing. It should be noted that Professor Fitzgerald’s report and follow-up letter are over a

decade old. His school reports noted that he suffered from inattention, distractibility and

difficulty finishing tasks.

6. A report was prepared by Dr. Claire Joyce, the medical assessor for the Respondents,

for the guidance of the Deciding Officer. Having had access to Mr. P’s medical information,

she accepted that he suffered from ADHD, but expressed the opinion that he was not

substantially restricted in undertaking employment of a kind which, if the person was not

suffering from that condition, would be suited to that person's age, experience and

qualifications “within the next 12 months” (the requirement set out in the Regulations). 7. The reasons she gave were that Mr. P had not experienced temper outbursts,

unpredictable behaviours or mood changes. She noted that while there were some ongoing

issues with a degree of inattentiveness and poor organisational skills, his stimulant medication

was still being optimised to improve his condition with further medication being considered.

Furthermore, she noted that he was attending appropriate services and that, with ongoing

specialist management, an improvement in his condition could reasonably be anticipated.

8. On foot of that report, the application was refused on 23 August 2024, and a review

was refused on 8 October 2024. The review decision stated that although the medical evidence

showed a level of incapacity, it did not show substantial restriction precluding training and that

given his age, there remained scope for him to train for an occupation.

9. He appealed to the Social Welfare Appeals Office ("SWAO"), the Third Named

Respondent. Mr. P’s solicitor wrote on 29 October 2024, requesting an oral hearing, on the

basis that material received pursuant to a Freedom of Information request showed a conflict

between the evidence submitted by him and the Respondents, as to whether he met the medical

criteria for Disability Allowance. The SWAO replied that the case would be referred to an

Appeals Officer who would make a decision or, if necessary, hold an oral hearing. No oral

hearing was convened. On 18 June 2025, the Appeals Officer disallowed the appeal. It is that

decision which is impugned in these proceedings.

The Decision of the Appeals Officer

10. The decision of 18 June 2025 is in the form of a long four-page letter. In it, the Appeals

Officer sets out in detail the law and the test, namely that the Appellant “who is by reason of a

specified disability substantially restricted in undertaking employment (in this Chapter

referred to as “suitable employment”) of a kind which, if the person was not suffering from

that disability, would be suited to that person 's age, experience and qualifications, whether or not the person is availing of a service for the training of disabled persons under section 68 of

the Health Act 1970” and that, in her opinion Mr. P did not meet the criteria.

11. She set out the role of the Appeals Officer, restated the key question and repeated the

applicable test, noting that it required a judgment as to the effect of his medical condition on

him. She further noted that the medical evidence provided was a fundamental factor in reaching

a reasonable conclusion.

12. She noted that consideration of eligibility did not depend solely on the diagnosis of a

medical condition or disability but rather on whether the medical evidence demonstrated that

Mr. P was substantially restricted in undertaking suitable employment for a period of one year,

as required by the Regulations.

13. She defined the term “suitable employment” as applying to a wide variety of

employment types and not merely to his usual or preferred type of work. She noted that, he

was 16 years of age at the date of application and was in education and therefore there were no

details regarding his work history. She carefully set out his medical evidence, his engagement

with CAMHS and his ability and disability.

14. In a paragraph which forms the basis of the appeal she said: -

“I certainly acknowledge your condition, and the challenges it presents, however

having considered all the available evidence, I am not satisfied that the medical and

other evidence on file could be said to be strongly supportive of the contention that you

are restricted from all types of employment suitable for your age. Whilst your condition

may affect your ability to undertake certain types of work, the evidence as it stands at

the present time indicates that the restriction is not currently substantial enough to

prevent you from engaging in all types of suitable work for a continuous period of at

least 12 months.”

15. It should be noted that the word “all” was in bold print. Statutory Framework

16. Section 210(1)(b) of the 2005 Act, requires that the claimant for Disability Allowance

be, by reason of a specified disability, substantially restricted in undertaking employment

suited to that person's age, experience and qualifications:

“210. (1) Subject to this Act, an allowance ("disability allowance") shall be payable to

a person-

(a) who has attained the age of 16 years but has not attained pensionable age,

(b) who is by reason of a specified disability substantially restricted in

undertaking employment (in this Chapter referred to as "suitable employment")

of a kind which, if the person was not suffering from that disability, would be

suited to that person's age, experience and qualifications, whether or not the

person is availing of a service for the training of disabled persons under section

68 of the Health Act 1970.”

17. Article 137 of the Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims, Payments and Control)

Regulations 2007 S.I. No. 142/2007, (“the 2007 Regs), provides the one-year duration

requirement for specified disability: -

“Specified disability

137. (1) Subject to sub-article (2), for the purposes of section 210, a person shall be

regarded as being substantially restricted in undertaking suitable employment by

reason of a specified disability where he or she suffers from an injury, disease,

congenital deformity or physical or mental illness which has continued or, in the

opinion of a deciding officer or an appeals officer, may reasonably expect to continue

for a period of at least 1 year.

(2) A person shall not be regarded as being substantially restricted in undertaking

suitable employment where it is subsequently shown to the satisfaction of a deciding officer or an appeals officer that he or she is no longer likely to continue to be

substantially restricted in the undertaking of employment for a period of at least 1

year.”

18. A claimant who is dissatisfied with the decision of a deciding officer may seek a review

of the decision pursuant to section 301 of the 2005 Act and may also seek to appeal to an

appeals officer pursuant to section 311 of the 2005 Act.

19. The role of an appeals officer is to determine whether the available evidence establishes

that a person meets the legislative conditions for the social welfare scheme under appeal. At

this stage, the burden of proof rests on the person submitting the claim to establish, through

information and evidence provided that she or he meets the legislative conditions for

entitlement to the payment (see NL v. Minister for Social Protection [2025] IECA 275).

20. Section 311(3) of the 2005 Act provides that the social welfare appeal function is de

novo in character, in that appeals officers may decide the question as if it were being decided

for the first time. It states: -

“An appeals officer, when deciding a question referred under subsection (1), shall not

be confined to the grounds on which the decision of the deciding officer or the

determination of the designated person, as the case requires, was based, but may decide

the question ‘as if it were being decided for the first time’”. (See C. O'B. v Chief Appeals

Officer [2014] IEHC 485 (para. 15))

Appeal on a Point of Law

21. It is helpful that the parties are agreed on the applicable legal principles that govern the

jurisdiction of the High Court in an appeal on a point of law. In MD v Minister for Social

Protection and Ors [2023] IEHC 88, Phelan J. traced its history, particularly the decision of the Supreme Court in Attorney General v. Davis [2018] IESC 27, where McKechnie J. at para.

53, stated that: -

“…a statutory right of appeal on a point of law will, if its wording does not otherwise

prescribe, include the following:

. Errors of law as generally understood, to include those mentioned in Fitzgibbon;

. Errors such as would give rise to judicial review including illegality;

irrationality, defective or no reasoning, and procedural errors of some

significance, etc.;

. Errors in the exercise of discretion which are plainly wrong, notwithstanding

the latitude inherent in such exercise; and

. Errors of fact next referred to.”

22. At para. 58 of MD, Phelan J. said that there is a significant overlap between the High

Court's jurisdiction in judicial review proceedings and its jurisdiction by way of statutory

appeal on a point of law. She approached the appeal on the basis that the court’s jurisdiction to

intervene to set aside a decision in respect of an error of law, is wider than in judicial review

proceedings, in that the jurisdiction on a statutory appeal is not constrained to errors of law

which go to the jurisdiction of the decision-maker and the decision-maker is not entitled to

deference on questions of law.

23. Phelan J. said: -

“Although not every error of law is sufficient to vitiate the decision on a statutory

appeal, nonetheless, where the ground of challenge constitutes a pure error of law (for

example, a failure to apply the correct statutory test or a breach of the duty to give

reasons) and I am persuaded that an error of law which has occurred is significant

enough in terms of the actual decision made to vitiate that decision, then I should set

the decision aside without regard to the special position of the Appeals Officer as a specialist decision maker. This is because the Appeals Officer does not have expertise

or specialised knowledge relative to the High Court in deciding questions of law.”

24. Having noted that the Supreme Court in Davis had identified at para.54, a non-

exhaustive list of the issues of fact which may be regarded as issues of law, she said as follows:

-

“(i) Findings of primary fact where there is no evidence to support them;

(ii) Findings of primary fact which no reasonable decision-making body could make;

(iii) Inferences or conclusions:

• Which are unsustainable by reason of any one or more of the matters

listed above;

• Which could not follow or be deducible from the primary findings as

made; or

• Which are based on an incorrect interpretation of documents.”

25. She said that a decision could be set aside where there was a “pure error of law” which

was “significant enough in terms of the actual decision made to vitiate that decision”, and that:

- “…the Appeals Officer is entitled to deference in deciding mixed questions of law and fact

such as arise ·when a challenge is brought on the basis that the decision is unreasonable having

regard to the evidence adduced. Clearly, however, if there is no evidence to support a finding

of primary fact, the findings made are not ones which a reasonable decision-making body could

make and/or or inferences or conclusions are drawn which are unsustainable because they

could not follow or are based on an incorrect interpretation of documents, then I should set

aside that decision notwithstanding the special expertise of the Appeals Officer because these

constitute errors of law and fall to be treated as such.” (para. 59).

26. That the role of the appeals officer is to weigh the evidence and reach findings on foot

of that evidence was recently emphasised by the Court of Appeal in NL, at para.36, in which Collins J. held that an appellant must “show that the appeals officer’s treatment of the evidence

led to findings that were unsupported by that evidence or were ones no reasonable appeals

officer could make”.

The Pleadings and Issues 27. By way of Special Summons dated 8 July 2025 the Appellant sought to appeal on eight

questions of law pursuant to section 327 of the 2005 Act, and sought, inter alia, an order

quashing the decision and remitting the matter for further consideration. While the written

submissions raised an argument that her decision was devoid of reasons, that submission was

again correctly in my view not argued in court.

28. In oral submissions, the parties narrowed the case down to three main grounds. Those

grounds are: -

i. The Appeals Officer applied a more onerous standard than required in law;

ii. The Appeals Officer failed to obtain the opinion of another Medical Assessor pursuant

to Reg. 14 of the Social Welfare (Appeals) Regulations 2024 (“the 2024 Regulations”);

iii. Having requested an oral hearing, the Appeals Officer had failed, not only to provide

such a hearing, but had failed to provide reasons for not doing so, in breach of Reg. 14

of the 2024 Regulations.

The Submissions

Issue 1. Whether the Appeals Officer Applied a More Onerous Standard than Required in Law

29. Adopting this agreed format, Mr. Shortall SC for Mr. P submits that the Appeals Officer

failed to apply the correct legal test under section 210(1)(b) of the 2005 Act and Article 137

of the 2007 Regulations. The correct question is whether Mr. P was “substantially restricted”

in undertaking suitable employment, having regard to his age, experience and qualifications. 30. He submits that she required evidence that was “strongly supportive” and proof that

Mr. P was restricted from “all types of suitable employment”, which imposes a higher threshold

than the law requires.

31. He submits that the decision wrongly converts a test of substantial restriction into a test

requiring complete incapacity to undertake any suitable employment. In particular, he submits

that the Appeals Officer applied a much higher and undefined standard by stating that the

evidence was not “strongly supportive”. The legislation does not require exclusion from all

work, only substantial restriction. The correct standard is the civil standard, namely balance of

probabilities.

32. While he accepts that she initially framed the issue correctly, she then applied a

different, stricter test in the conclusion. This inconsistency, he submits, undermines the validity

of the decision.

33. In reply, he draws the Court’s attention to the use of bold print where the Appeals

Officer emphasised the word “all” in the line “I am not satisfied that the medical and other

evidence on file could be said to be strongly supportive of the contention that you are restricted

from all types of employment suitable for your age”, as noted above.

34. On that basis, he submits that the Appeals Officer clearly misapplied the legal test. The

test is not whether the Appellant was restricted from all types of employment. He points out

that the Oireachtas permits applicants to work up to a prescribed earnings limit and submits

that the statutory test remains whether the person is substantially restricted in undertaking

suitable employment for the relevant period. He relies in particular on Article 137(2) of the

2007 Regulations and submits that the Appeals Officer’s approach amounted to an error of law.

35. The written submissions also alleged that the Appeals Officer did not meaningfully

assess Mr. P’s suitability by reference to his experience and/or qualifications, but only by reference to his age. That argument was, correctly in my view, not pursued in court, since the

decision clearly considered his experience and lack of qualifications, as set out above.

36. Ms. Carroll SC for the Respondents submits that the Appeals Officer set out the issues,

the relevant background, the evidence and legal framework in detail and gave reasons for her

conclusions and she correctly identifies the key legislative question and statutory test, applied

that test, and found that his restriction was not substantial enough to meet the legal threshold.

That conclusion was correct in law and in fact.

37. She submits that the Appeal Officer considered all evidence before her, addressed each

item specifically and concluded that Mr. P’s medical condition did not prevent him from

engaging in suitable work for a continuous period of at least 12 months and therefore, he had

not satisfied the statutory requirement.

38. In substance, Ms. Carroll SC argues that his case depends on an isolated reading of a

single paragraph, which used phrases such as “strongly supportive” evidence and refers to an

inability to perform “all types of suitable work.”, while ignoring the full decision. In her

submission, that approach takes the paragraph out of the context and that the decision, taken as

a whole, does not show that the proper legal test was misapplied.

39. The caselaw supports the proposition that a decision must be read as a whole, rather

than by isolating particular phrases. The courts should prefer an interpretation that upholds the

validity of a decision rather than one that invalidate it and should avoid overly technical or

“over-refined” scrutiny: (see NL and YY v Minister for Justice [2017] IESC 61).

40. She submits that the reference to ‘all types of employment suitable for your age’ reflects

the breadth of the statutory concept of ‘suitable employment’ and does not impose a

requirement of total incapacity. Decision on Issue 1

41. The parties agree that the onus in this appeal rests with the Appellant. His case focuses

on one paragraph of the Appeals Officer’s four-page decision. If that one paragraph were read

in isolation, it might indeed suggest that the Appeals Officer was in error in her application of

the statutory test, by using the phrases “strongly supportive” and “restricted from all types of

employment suitable for your age”. However, she also stated that “the key question from the

legislative perspective is whether your medical condition or disability reaches the threshold of

posing a substantial restriction on you for the purposes of undertaking suitable employment

for a period of at least one year. "

42. Such an approach would fail to view the decision in the round. Similar submissions

formed the core of the argument in NL, but did not find favour with the Court of Appeal. It is

clear looking at the decision as a whole, that the Appeals Officer considered all relevant

matters, including the law, the correct test to be applied, the medical evidence submitted by

both parties and the personal circumstance of Mr. P. She reached a clear and reasoned

conclusion having identified and applied the correct statutory test.

43. While the Appellant argues the phrase “strongly supportive” introduced an unlawful

evidential standard, I do not see it that way. It seems to me that in fact that, when the decision

is read as a whole, she applied the correct standard. I agree with Ms. Carroll SC that the

criticism isolates wording and ignores the substantive analysis and conclusion.

44. This leads me to the word “all”, on which Mr. Shortall SC places great emphasis. I do

not accept that applying a bold font to the word “all” is sufficient to justify ignoring the rest of

the decision or treating the paragraph on which the Appellant relies as containing the entirety

of the Appeals Officer’s reasoning.

45. Looking at the decision as a whole it is clear that she set out the test, considered the

evidence and applied the evidence to the test. In so doing, she gave clear reasons why she decided as she did, stating: - “Whilst your condition may affect your ability to undertake certain

types of work, the evidence as it stands at the present time indicates that the restriction is not

currently substantial enough to prevent you from engaging in all types of suitable work for a

continuous period of at least 12 months.”

46. As Phelan J. noted in MD: - “the Appeals Officer is entitled to deference in deciding

mixed questions of law and fact such as arise ·when a challenge is brought on the basis that

the decision is unreasonable having regard to the evidence adduced. Clearly, however, if there

is no evidence to support a finding of primary fact, the findings made are not ones which a

reasonable decision-making body could make and/or or inferences or conclusions are drawn

which are unsustainable because they could not follow or are based on an incorrect

interpretation of documents…”

47. In this case there was clear evidence to support her findings, based on the medical

evidence and the full set of papers before her. She was entitled to conclude that the evidence

did not go far enough to justify allowing the appeal. In my view, she was fully entitled to come

to that view and there is no error in law in doing so.

48. It would be incorrect or unfair to simply look at the rather loose language in one

paragraph and say otherwise.

49. I am satisfied that she considered all the evidence before her, came to a lawful

conclusion and explicitly addressed the factors that Appellant was 16 years old and in education

and that no work history or qualifications were provided.

50. In all the circumstances, I am of the opinion that the Appeals Officer did not make any

''pure error of law", as Phelan J. described the matter in MD. Nor has the Appellant been able

to show that her treatment of the evidence led to findings that were unsupported by that

evidence or were ones no reasonable appeals officer could make. Far from it, the evidence before her clearly supported her decision, she applied the correct legal test, considered all

relevant evidence and properly assessed his eligibility.

51. Therefore, I reject this ground of appeal.

Issue 2: The Appeals Officer Failed to Obtain the Opinion of Another Medical Assessor

52. Mr. Shortall SC submits that, when read together, Regs. 11 and 12 of the 2024

Regulations mandates that the Appeals Officer must have regard to the opinion of a medical

assessor to assist her in determining the appeal once it relates to the Appellant’s medical

condition. He says that to do otherwise would be an error of law and a breach of fair procedure.

He accepts that not every appeal requires an oral hearing.

53. In this regard it is worth setting out the relevant provisions of the Regulations: -

“Determination of appeals

11. An appeal, in accordance with section 311(3), shall be determined de

novo by an Appeals Officer as if the decision being appealed was being decided

for the first time. The appeal shall be decided on the basis of the information

submitted by or on behalf of the appellant, any other party appearing to the

Appeals Officer to be directly affected by the decision that they shall make, and

the Minister (which shall include reports of inspectors and assessors working on

behalf of the Minister) and taking due account of any opinion provided by any

assessor who may be assigned, in accordance with section 309.

Decision involving an assessment of capacity to work or requirements for

care

12. (1) In any appeal where the question to be decided relates to a person's

capacity to work under sections 40, 46A, 74 and 118, or to whether or not they

are substantially restricted in undertaking employment under section 210, or to a relevant person's requirement for full-time care and attention under sections

100, 179 and 186C, the Appeals Officer shall, if they are not themselves a

registered medical practitioner, have regard to the opinion of a medical assessor

to assist them in determining any question that may arise from consideration of

any new medical information or opinion provided as part of the appeal.

(2) If an Appeals Officer, required in accordance with sub-article (1), to seek

the advice of a medical assessor, makes a decision contrary to the opinion of the

medical assessor, they shall advise and set out in writing to the appellant, and

any other parties concerned, the rationale for their making a determination

contrary to the advice of the medical assessor.”

54. Mr. Shortall SC submits that the materials before the Appeals Officer were the same

material that was before the Deciding Officer. This includes the medical information furnished

by Mr. P and the medical opinion of the medical assessor of the Respondents.

55. He says that on that having regard to the final part of Reg. 12 (1), the Appeals Officer

must procure a medical report or the opinion of an independent medical assessor. He submits

that the phrase “new medical information or opinion” should be read disjunctively, so that the

medical opinion of Dr. Joyce, which was before the Appeals Officer, constituted an “opinion”

for the purpose of the regulation.

56. Ms. Carroll SC for the Respondents says that there was no new medical information or

opinion before the Appeals Officer, only a letter from his solicitor saying there was a conflict.

In those circumstances there was no obligation to seek the views of another doctor.

Decision on Issue 2

57. Although I have set out Reg. 12(1) above, it is worth returning to its wording. The

pertinent part reads “the Appeals Officer shall, if they are not themselves a registered medical

practitioner, have regard to the opinion of a medical assessor to assist them in determining any question that may arise from consideration of any new medical information or opinion

provided as part of the appeal.” (emphasis added).

58. As I read it, this means that, where an Appeals Officer is not a Doctor of Medicine, she

should have regard, or to put it another way, obtain a medical opinion or report from, another

medical assessor, to assist or help her consider any new information or opinion provided as

part of the appeal.

59. It is clear that the phrase “any new medical information or opinion” must be read

together, and not disjunctively as suggested, since that would not make any sense. The

information or opinion referred to is that which was provided “as part of the appeal” and not

before the appeal or in any other context.

60. Therefore, the phrase “new medical information or opinion” could not relate to the

medical opinion of Dr. Clare Joyce, which was provided to the Deciding Officer before the

original decision and well before the appeal. It is clear from the notice of appeal to the Appeals

Officer that the Appellant offered no further new medical evidence.

61. On that basis there was no requirement for the Appeals Officer to obtain the views of

another medical assessor to assist her, because there was no new question which arose, since

no new medical information or opinion was provided as part of the appeal.

62. In my view, no question of law arises nor was there any error of pure law or mistake

made by the Appeals Officer.

63. Therefore, I reject this ground of appeal.

Issue 3: The Request for an Oral Hearing and Reg 14 - (Part One)

64. Mr. Shortall SC submits that this issue is of some importance outside the parameters of

this case and arises in two parts. As regards to the first part, he says that a legitimate request

for an oral hearing was made by Mr. P’s solicitor on 29 October 2024 and that such a hearing should have been granted, given what he submits was a conflict of medical evidence considered

by the Appeals Officer.

65. He submits that, as a matter of fair procedures, where there is a conflict of evidence, an

oral hearing is mandatory since the caselaw establishes that where material conflicts in

evidence exist, then an oral hearing may be required. He relies on C.O’B. for the proposition

that, where adverse medical evidence is relied upon, an applicant may be entitled to test that

evidence by cross-examination, and that an oral hearing may be necessary to vindicate that

right.

66. Ms. Carroll SC submits that in fact there was no real evidential conflict, nor has the

Appellant identified any such a conflict to justify the need for an oral hearing. The Appeals

Officer properly exercised her discretion and was entitled to proceed without a hearing.

Decision on Issue 3 - (Part One)

67. On this first point, I cannot agree with the Appellant’s submission. As I noted above,

there was no new medical evidence submitted with the appeal. The issue, therefore, is whether

there was a conflict on the medical evidence, such as to warrant an oral hearing. As Mr. Shortall

SC correctly identified there is no right to an oral hearing in every circumstance per se.

68. When one looks at the evidence, it is not controversial or in material dispute. The

reports of Professor Fitzgerald, which were a decade old, say Mr. P suffers from ADHD. This

was acknowledged by Dr Joyce. The report of CAMHS confirmed that he attended every six

months and was prescribed medication. She observed that the school report noted none of the

classic signs of major difficulties such as temper outbursts, unpredictable behaviour or mood

changes. She came to the view that with his attending appropriate services and with ongoing

specialist management, an improvement in his condition would reasonably be anticipated. That

view is not contradicted anywhere in the information provided by the Appellant. Therefore, notwithstanding the assertion in the solicitor’s letter, that there was a clear conflict on the

medical evidence, in fact there was no such conflict. Therefore, there was no requirement for

an oral hearing.

69. In my view it would lead to an absurdity if whenever an administrative decision was

required to be made, an affected party could demand an oral hearing. It would place an

impossible burden on decision-makers such that the system would break down. It can only be

the law that where there is a clear conflict of evidence that goes to the heart of the matter, that

an oral hearing is justified. In this case there was no conflict of evidence at all, leaving aside a

clear material conflict.

Issue 3 The Request for an Oral Hearing and Reg 14 - (Part Two)

70. As regards the second part of his submission on the issue of an oral hearing, Mr. Shortall

submits that the wording of Reg.14 is mandatory because it uses the words “shall”. It is worth

setting out the Regulation, which I do below.

71. He says that once the solicitor requested an oral hearing, the Appeal Officer was

mandated to consider the request and, if she decided not to proceed with a hearing, she must

inform the Appellant, setting out the reasons why she considered a hearing of the appeal was

unnecessary.

72. Ms. Carroll SC says in reply that reasons were given in the replying affidavit and that

in reality since there was no new evidence to be considered it was obvious that there was no

need for an oral hearing.

Decision on Issue 3 - (Part Two)

73. The words of the Regulation are important and reads as follows: -

“Hearings 14. Where an appellant, or any other party who stands to be directly affected by the

appeal decision requests a hearing of the appeal (such request to be provided in

writing), the Appeals Officer shall consider this request and, if they decide not to

proceed with a hearing, the Appeals Officer shall advise the appellant, and other

parties concerned setting out the reasons why they consider a hearing of the appeal to

be unnecessary”. (emphasis added)

74. I agree with Mr. Shortall that the provision is mandatory. Once a request is made, the

Appeals Officer “shall” consider it and if she decides against it, as occurred here, she “shall”

give reasons. I do not accept that those reasons can be furnished in a replying affidavit. There

is no point in giving reasons once litigation has commenced.

75. The giving of reasons would allow an appellant to decide whether to utilise the various

review, revision or appeal mechanisms which the social welfare code provides. Such a party

may decide, for example, to seek a revision before the Chief Appeals Officer, thereby obviating

a statutory appeal to the High Court, with all the associated costs and pressures such a step

entails. The 2024 Regulations were, as was stated in Court, a remedial statutory provision,

which has dramatically altered judicial reviews in the area of social welfare law. It must be

applied strictly, particularly where the word “shall” appears.

76. As to when the reasons should be given, the Regulation is silent, but it seems to me

that, at the very least, it should be at the time of giving the decision, if not before, but certainly

not after.

77. The next question which arises is the effect of the failure of the Appeal Officer to give

reasons. I agree with Ms. Carroll SC that there is no causative link between that failure to give

reasons and her decision, since, in reality there was no need for an oral hearing, for the reasons

I have set out above. The error therefore does not in my view invalidate the decision. 78. While it is open to the court to grant declaratory relief directing the giving of reasons,

in fact the reasons have already been set out in the affidavit of Alison McCallum at paras. 38

and 39., where she said that an oral hearing was not necessary because no questions or conflict

arose regarding the medical report provided by the appellant or any other matter, nor did he

provide any new medical evidence in support of the appeal.

79. In those circumstances there is nothing to be gained by such declaratory relief. It seems

to me that the matter can be dealt with in another way, perhaps by way of an appropriate order

for costs.

Conclusion

80. For the reasons set out above, I do not believe that the Appeal Officer made any material

error in law in making her decision of 18 of June 2025, such that would warrant granting the

reliefs sought. However, the Appeals Officer did make an error in law in failing to give reasons

for not grating an oral hearing, but that error does not invalidate the decision made, since it was

no causative link between the error and the decision.

81. I shall list the matter before me on the 14 of July, 2026 for final orders.