IEHC 411 — IEHC 411 — High Court

1

[APPROVED]

THE HIGH COURT

[2026] IEHC 411

Record No. 2026 39 SA

IN THE MATTER OF EUGENE KEARNS, A LEGAL PRACTITIONER PREVIOUSLY PRACTISING AS EUGENE P KEARNS SOLICITORS, 10 LOWER ABBEY STREET, DUBLIN 1

AND IN THE MATTER OF THE SOLICITORS ACTS 1954-2015

BETWEEN

THE LAW SOCIETY OF IRELAND APPLICANT

AND

EUGENE KEARNS RESPONDENT

Ex tempore JUDGMENT of Mr Justice David Barniville, President of the High Court, delivered on the 11th day of June 2026 2

1. Introduction

1. This is my judgment on an application brought by the Law Society (the “Applicant” or the

“Society”) for various orders against the Respondent solicitor, Eugene Kearns (the

“Respondent”) pursuant to s. 82(2), s. 85(3) and s. 85(7) of the Legal Services Regulation Act

2015 (the “2015 Act”) and Order 53D of the Rules of the Superior Courts (as amended) (the

“RSC” or the “Rules”). The matter comes before the Court following a Determination and

Recommendation made by the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal (the “LPDT” or the

“Tribunal”) on 27 March 2026, which made a number of findings of misconduct against the

Respondent. The Tribunal recommended various sanctions in its Recommendation, which it

determined ought to be imposed on the Respondent.

2. The Society, on this application, asks the Court to make certain orders as recommended by

the Tribunal, as well as an additional order not recommended by the Tribunal, namely, an

order for its costs of this application. The orders sought by the Society as recommended by

the Tribunal are that the Respondent’s name be struck off the Roll of Solicitors, an order that

the Respondent pay the Society’s costs of the Tribunal proceedings in the measured sum of

€3,762, and that the Respondent pay the whole of the Society’s costs of this application and

that those costs should be measured in the sum of €3,254 on foot of a bill of costs sent by the

Society to the Respondent on 2 June 2026 or, in the alternative, such costs as are assessed by

a Legal Costs Adjudicator in default of agreement.

2. Principles applicable to such applications

3. Certain of the statutory provisions applicable to this application were set out by me in

judgments I gave in Legal Services Regulatory Authority v Edward O’Brien [2026] IEHC

348, and earlier today in Law Society v Ronan O’Brien [2026] IEHC 380 and Law Society v 3

McSweeney [2026] IEHC 400. Those judgments and the statutory provisions discussed in

them are relevant to this application, save for in some respects.

4. The misconduct referred to in s. 50(1)(a) of the 2015 Act, which is an act or omission which

“involves fraud or dishonesty”, does not arise in this case. This is not a case in which

dishonesty by the Respondent was alleged or found by the Tribunal. The relevant provisions

of s. 50(1) of the 2015 Act and the relevant “misconduct” in this case is that referred to in s.

50(1)(e), (h) and (m) of the 2015 Act. Those subsections state as follows:

“(1) For the purposes of this Act, an act or omission of a legal practitioner may be

considered as constituting misconduct where the act or omission—

(e) in the case of a solicitor, consists of a breach of the Solicitors Acts 1954 to

2015 or any regulations made under those Acts…

(h) in the case of a solicitor, is likely to bring the solicitors’ profession into

disrepute…

(m) consists of a breach of this Act or regulations made under it…”

5. The other provisions of the 2015 Act relevant to inquiries before the Tribunal and the role of

the Court on applications such as this under the 2015 Act were set out in my earlier judgments,

as mentioned above. So too is a description of the approach which the Court is required to

take on an application such as this and the legal principles applicable to sanctioning in this

area. I do not propose to reproduce those principles here as I have done so in some detail in

those earlier judgments. I would note, in particular, that while the Tribunal can make

recommendations to the Court in respect of the sanctions which it believes should be imposed,

it is ultimately a matter for the Court to decide on what the appropriate sanctions should be. 4

In doing so, the Court will consider whether the sanctions recommended by the Tribunal

comply with the relevant legal principles governing the imposition of such sanctions.

3. Relevant Facts and Background to this Application

6. The particular facts of this case are set out in the grounding affidavit of Mary Fenelon,

solicitor in the Regulatory Legal Services Section of the Society.

7. As appears from that affidavit, there was no appearance by or on behalf of the Respondent on

this application or in the substantive inquiry hearing before the Tribunal in relation to the

complaint made against him.

8. The Respondent was admitted and enrolled on the Roll of Solicitors on 13 October 1992, and

carried on practice as the principal of the firm of Eugene P. Kearns Solicitors at 10 Lower

Abbey Street, Dublin 1. The Respondent is no longer the holder of a practising certificate.

9. Following an investigation by Noreen MacCarthy, an authorised officer, appointed by the

Registrar of Solicitors and Director of Regulation of the Society, Niall Connors, an

investigating accountant’s report was prepared by Ms MacCarthy in relation to the

Respondent. That report highlighted a number of instances of alleged misconduct on the part

of the Respondent, and various concerning issues in relation to the Respondent’s practice.

Those issues were considered on numerous occasions by the Regulation of Practice

Committee of the Society. Ultimately, the Committee decided to refer the matter to the

Tribunal for an inquiry into alleged misconduct on the part of the Respondent.

10. Ms MacCarthy swore an affidavit on 21 March 2025 in support of the Society’s application

to the Tribunal for an inquiry under s. 81 of the 2015 Act. A number of allegations of

misconduct were made by the Society. It alleged that the Respondent was guilty of

misconduct in that he: 5

“(a) Deducted €46,853.47 VAT inclusive in advance in the estate of Margaret Kiernan

deceased on 22 occasions from 2013 to 2022 in circumstances where there were no

formal invoices on file and there was no indication that fees were agreed or authorised

by the client in breach of Regulation 7 of the Solicitors Accounts Regulation[s] 2014;

(b) Failed to comply with the direction of the Regulation of Practice Committee made

on 1 May 2024 that he file an Ancillary Motion in the probate matter to have the

question of his entitlement to deeds decided;

(c) Failed to comply with Sections 68, Section 150 and Section 152 in the four files

reviewed as there were no formal invoices available on the files and there was no

evidence to show that clients were provided with the Solicitor’s Dispute Resolution

Procedure;

(d) Contravened Section 30(A)(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2010 as inserted by

Section 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 2018 by failing to carry out a business risk

assessment to identify and assess the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing

involved in carrying on his business activities and breached Regulation 6 (Business

Risk Assessment) of the Solicitors Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

Regulations in failing to carry out a Business Risk Assessment to identify and assess

the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing involved in carrying on the

practice; 6

(e) Contravened Section 30(A)(6) of the Criminal Justice Act 2010 as inserted by

Section 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 2018 by failing to make a written Business Risk

Assessment available during the inspection;

(f) Contravened Section 30(B)(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2010 as inserted by

Section 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 2018 by failing to document the client risk

assessment in four regulated files inspected;

(g) Contravened Section 54 of the Criminal Justice Act 2010 as inserted by Section 26

of the Criminal Justice Act 2018 by failing to have policies controls and procedures in

place that specified his obligations regarding the assessment of and management of

risks of money laundering or terrorist financing to prevent and detect the commission

of money laundering and terrorist financing and breached Regulation 5 (Risk

Assessments, Policies, Controls and Procedures) of the Solicitors Money Laundering

and Terrorist Financing Regulations 2020 in failing to adopt internal policies, controls

and procedures to prevent and detect the commission of money laundering and terrorist

financing;

(h) Breached Regulation 8 (Records) of the Solicitors Money Laundering and Terrorist

Financing Regulations 2020 by failing to keep records evidencing the internal policies

controls and procedures applied and information obtained by the Solicitor in respect

of each of his clients; 7

(i) Failed to attend before the Regulation of Practice Committee on 6 September 2023,

on 18 October 2023, on 4 September 2024, on 23 October 2024 and on 4 December

2024 despite being asked and required to so attend”.

4. The Inquiry

11. The hearing of the inquiry before the Tribunal took place on 20 January 2026. The

Respondent did not attend that hearing. However, the Tribunal was satisfied that service on

the Respondent was in order, and that the Respondent was aware that the inquiry would

commence on 20 January 2026.

12. The Tribunal heard the evidence of Ms MacCarthy and submissions on behalf of the Society

by Ms Fenelon. Those submissions were initially in respect of the allegations of misconduct

against the Respondent. Submissions were also made by the Society in respect of sanction.

13. The Tribunal gave its decision as to whether the allegations amounted to misconduct at the

hearing on 20 January 2026, but decided to defer its decision as to sanction until it delivered

its Determination and Recommendation on 27 March 2026. The Tribunal found that the

solicitor was guilty of misconduct under s. 50(1)(e), (h) and (m) of the 2015 Act in respect of

all of the allegations at (a) to (i) above, and that all of those allegations were proven as to fact.

The Tribunal relied on the evidence of Ms MacCarthy in this respect, and on the findings

made in the investigation report exhibited to her affidavit of 21 March 2025. The Tribunal

gave reasons for its findings orally on 20 January 2026, and I set them out below.

(a) Findings of the Tribunal as to fact and misconduct

14. In respect of allegation (a), the Tribunal found that that allegation was proven as to fact and

that it constituted misconduct under s. 50(1)(e) and (h) of the 2015 Act. The Tribunal was

satisfied that the taking of fees without legal authority from the client account on multiple 8

occasions over a number of years amounted to serious misconduct. It noted that the

representations made by the Respondent before the Regulation of Practice Committee were

to the effect that he was entitled to charge for the work that he undertook on the file, and that

the Respondent, by making that representation, had fundamentally misunderstood the duties

of a solicitor under the Solicitors Accounts Regulations 2014 and as a matter of professional

duty and obligation. The Tribunal noted that the Respondent still had not made a “promised”

court application which might allow him to deduct these fees, despite him being given a

considerable period of time to do so.

15. In respect of allegation (b), which concerned the alleged failure by the Respondent to comply

with the direction of the Regulation of Practice Committee made on 1 May 2024 that an

ancillary motion be filed by him in relation to the probate matter to have the question of his

entitlement to fees decided, the Tribunal found that that allegation was proven as to fact and

that it constituted misconduct within the meaning of s. 50(1)(h) of the 2015 Act. The Tribunal

noted that the Respondent was given multiple opportunities by the Regulation of Practice

Committee to file this motion, but that there was no evidence that he had done so. The

Tribunal was of the view that this failure on behalf of the Respondent to follow a direction of

his professional body was a serious matter, which the Tribunal was satisfied would likely

bring the solicitors profession into disrepute.

16. In respect of allegation (c), which concerned the alleged failure by the Respondent to comply

with s. 68 of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994 and s. 150 and s. 152 of the 2015 Act due

to no formal invoices being available on certain files and no evidence being shown in relation

to clients being provided with the required Solicitors Dispute Resolution Procedure, the

Tribunal found that that allegation was proven as to fact and that it constituted misconduct

within the meaning of s. 50(1)(e) and (m) of the 2015 Act. The Tribunal noted that this

instance of misconduct could not be considered a “once-off” as the allegation related to 9

numerous files in the Respondent’s practice. The Tribunal highlighted the fact that, when

engaging a solicitor, clients are entitled to know the basis upon which legal fees are

chargeable. The Tribunal noted that the conduct of the Respondent in this instance was likely

to bring the solicitors profession into disrepute under s. 50(1)(h) of the 2015 Act.

17. The Tribunal dealt with allegations (d) and (e) together. Allegation (d) related to an alleged

contravention by the Respondent by failing to carry out a business risk assessment, contrary

to s. 30(A)(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2010 (the “2010 Act”) as inserted by s. 10 of the

Criminal Justice Act 2018 (the “2018 Act”), and in breach of Regulation 6 (Business Risk

Assessment) of the Solicitors Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Regulations 2020

(the “2020 Regulations”). Allegation (e) related to an alleged contravention by the

Respondent by failing to make a written business risk assessment available during inspection,

contrary to s. 30(A)(6) of the 2010 Act as inserted by s. 10 of the 2018 Act. The Tribunal

found both allegations (d) and (e) were proven as to fact and constituted misconduct within

the meaning of s. 50(1)(h) of the 2015 Act. The Tribunal noted that, when looked at in

combination, allegations (d) and (e) amounted to misconduct which was likely to bring the

solicitors profession into disrepute. The Tribunal was of the view that the Respondent exposed

his practice to the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, and noted that the business

risk assessment document which the Respondent was obliged to have on file is “a

straightforward and simple document, but an important one in the context of protecting

practices from money laundering and terrorist financing”.

18. In relation to allegation (f), which concerned an alleged contravention by the Respondent of

s. 30(B)(2) of the 2010 Act as inserted by s. 10 of the 2018 Act by failing to document the

client risk assessment in four regulated files, the Tribunal found that that allegation was

proven as to fact and constituted misconduct within the meaning of that term in s. 50(1)(h) of

the 2015 Act. The Tribunal made similar findings to those in relation to allegations (d) and 10

(e), and noted that the client risk assessment document was also a very important document

for a solicitor to complete and have available in relation to their files.

19. The Tribunal dealt with allegations (g) and (h) together. Allegation (g) related to an alleged

contravention by the Respondent of s. 54 of the 2010 Act as inserted by s. 26 of the 2018 Act

by failing to have policies controls and procedures in place in respect of risks of money

laundering and terrorist financing in breach of Regulation 5 of the 2020 Regulations.

Allegation (h) related to an alleged breach by the Respondent of Regulation 8 of the 2020

Regulations by failing to keep records evidencing internal policies controls and procedures

applied and information obtained by the Respondent in respect of each of his clients. The

Tribunal found that both allegations (g) and (h) were proven as to fact and that they amounted

to misconduct within the meaning of that term in s. 50(1)(h) of the 2015 Act. The Tribunal

noted that both allegations as proven, when looked at in combination, amounted to conduct

which was likely to bring the profession into disrepute, and that failure by the Respondent to

adopt these internal policies controls and procedures, and failure by him to produce

documentation in relation to them, is a serious matter.

20. In respect of allegation (i), which concerned the alleged failure by the Respondent to attend

before the Regulation of Practice Committee on 6 September 2023, 18 October 2023, 4

September 2024, 23 October 2024 and on 4 December 2024 despite being asked and required

to attend, the Tribunal found that that allegation was proven as to fact and constituted

misconduct under s. 50(1)(h) of the 2015 Act. The Tribunal noted that the Regulation of

Practice Committee had expressed serious concerns about the number of matters pertaining

to the Respondent in their inquiries and that it had given the Respondent multiple

opportunities and advice to assist him in resolving matters. The Tribunal noted that, while the

Respondent indicated that he had certain health issues, little or no evidence was provided to 11

substantiate those and that the non-attendance by the Respondent before the Committee was

part of a pattern of non-engagement.

(b) Submissions by the Society as to sanction

21. The Tribunal heard submissions by Ms Fenelon on behalf of the Society as to sanction at the

inquiry hearing on 20 January 2026. However, it deferred its decision on that issue until it

produced its Determination and Recommendation on 27 March 2026. In her submissions, Ms

Fenelon noted the very serious findings of misconduct made against the Respondent, and

noted, in particular, the findings in relation to allegation (a) concerning to the Respondent’s

deduction of €46,853.47 in advance from the estate of Margaret Kiernan (deceased) on 22

occasions from 2013 to 2022 in circumstances where there were no invoices on file and there

was no indication that fees were agreed or authorised by the client. Ms Fenelon noted that the

Society regarded this as the most serious allegation made against the Respondent. Ms

Fenelon’s submitted that the Society’s view was that this was a case which would justify

strike off from the Roll of Solicitors.

(c) Respondent’s disciplinary history

22. Ms Fenelon outlined the Respondent’s previous disciplinary history to the Tribunal at the

inquiry. There were three previous findings of misconduct and orders made by the Tribunal

against and in respect of the Respondent. The first order followed a hearing on 28 September

2023. In that matter, the Respondent was found guilty of misconduct in relation to his failure

to ensure that his accountant’s report was furnished to the Society for the year ended 31

October 2021. The Tribunal made an order that the Respondent be censured, pay the sum of

€1,000 to the Compensation Fund and the sum of €1,512 to the Society in respect of agreed

costs. The fine and costs were never discharged by the Respondent. 12

23. The second order followed another hearing by the Tribunal on 28 September 2023 in which

the Tribunal found the Respondent guilty of misconduct in failing to ensure that his

accountant’s report for the year ending 31 October 2020 was furnished to the Society on time.

The Tribunal ordered that the Respondent be censured, pay the sum of €2,000 to the

Compensation Fund, and the sum of €1,512 to the Society in respect of its agreed costs in the

Tribunal proceedings. None of those amounts were paid.

24. The third order was made following a hearing by the Tribunal on 20 March 2025 in which

the Tribunal found that the Respondent was guilty of misconduct by failing to ensure that his

accountant’s report for the year ending 31 October 2023 was furnished to the Society on time.

The Tribunal ordered that the Respondent be censured, pay a fine of €5,000 to the

Compensation Fund and the sum of €1,834.50 to the Society in respect of its agreed costs in

the Tribunal proceedings. Once again, none of those amounts were paid.

25. In light of the allegations against the Respondent in this case, and in the context of his

previous disciplinary history, the Society urged the Tribunal to impose the sanctions which I

mentioned earlier.

5. Tribunal’s Determination and Recommendation as to sanction

26. The Tribunal delivered its decision as to sanction when it produced its Determination and

Recommendation on 27 March 2026. It decided that it was more appropriate to deal with the

matter under s. 82(2) of the 2015 Act, and it subsequently made its recommendations as to

sanction to the High Court. The Tribunal recommended that the Respondent be struck off the

Roll of Solicitors pursuant to s. 85(7)(f) of the 2015 Act. It did not include in its

Recommendation that the Respondent pay the costs incurred by the Society in the Tribunal

proceedings. It noted in its Recommendation that the High Court has jurisdiction to determine

the issue of costs and to make orders in relation to costs under s. 85(8)(a) of the 2015 Act. It 13

also did not include a recommendation that the Respondent pay any fine or contribution to

the Compensation Fund, noting that the evidence before the Tribunal suggested that the

Respondent is a person of very limited means.

27. In the reasons which it set out for its Recommendation as to sanction, the Tribunal noted that

it had taken a stepwise approach and had regard to the totality of the evidence before it and

the gravity and seriousness of the misconduct involved.

28. The Tribunal noted that findings of misconduct had been made against the Respondent

beyond reasonable doubt in respect of multiple allegations over a number of years. It stated

that those findings included fees deducted from a client account without legal authority or

client agreement on 22 occasions over a period of 9 years. The Tribunal highlighted that it

was cognisant of its duty to maintain the reputation of the profession and to uphold

professional standards. In that context, it noted that this allegation contained the most serious

finding of misconduct in the case. It also referred to the failure by the Respondent to comply

with directions of the Regulation of Practice Committee of the Society and failure to

implement fundamental anti-money laundering controls and records.

29. The Tribunal noted that while there was no allegation of dishonesty in this case in relation to

the deduction of fees by the Respondent, on any analysis, the taking of fees without legal

authority over a number of years is an extremely serious matter.

30. The Tribunal was of the view that the fact that the Respondent had not filed an ancillary

motion to determine his entitlement to these fees, despite being given multiple opportunities

by the Regulation of Practice Committee to do so, aggravated the situation further. The

Tribunal noted that the Regulation of Practice Committee had treated the Respondent with

considerable leniency in this respect, and that it made its application to the Tribunal very

much as a last resort. It observed that there has been no repayment by the Respondent of the

unauthorised deductions, and that it now appears that the Respondent does not have the means 14

to restore the funds. The Tribunal highlighted that this exacerbated the seriousness of the

misconduct.

31. The Tribunal also noted as a matter of concern the Respondent’s continued practice a solicitor

despite the grave deficiencies identified in anti-money laundering compliance, which exposed

the practice to money laundering and terrorist-financing risks. The Tribunal was of the view

that this failure reflected broad competence and systems issues in the practice.

32. The Tribunal then referred to what it considered a fundamental lack of insight on the part of

the Respondent. The Tribunal noted that this was demonstrated not only through the

Respondent’s pattern of non-engagement, but also through his repeated representations to the

Regulation of Practice Committee of his belief that he was entitled to unilaterally charge for

work done without appropriate authorisation. The Tribunal noted that the misconduct in this

case, looked at in this context, is “on the very serious end of the spectrum”.

33. The Tribunal looked at the disciplinary history of the Respondent when making its decision

as to sanction, and noted that it indicated a worsening situation in his practice.

34. The Tribunal then considered the principle of proportionality, and noted that the Respondent

had been treated with as much leniency as possible in the circumstances. However, that

exercise was rendered more difficult, the Tribunal noted, in light of the Respondent’s

unexplained absence from the inquiry hearing. The Tribunal considered the matters advanced

in mitigation in the documents before it, including correspondence to the Tribunal Registrar

on 10 October 2025, which referred to personal health difficulties, financial strain, the

challenges of sole practice, efforts to progress a complex probate application, and the impact

on the Respondent’s mental health. However, the Tribunal found that the mitigation was of

limited weight in the overall assessment of the appropriate sanction to be recommended to

the High Court. 15

35. The Tribunal considered lesser sanctions than strike off, but decided that they would not

suffice in this case. The Tribunal considered whether restrictions on practice, conditions (such

as working under supervision), mandatory education, or suspension, either alone or in

combination, would be appropriate in the circumstances. The Tribunal concluded that they

would not.

36. Further, the Tribunal explained that suspension or restriction would not address the lack of

insight, the failure to make restitution, the sustained disregard for regulatory requirements,

and the systemic failures in the Respondent’s practice which indicate ongoing risk.

37. The Tribunal concluded that the only appropriate sanction in this case that would adequately

protect the public and ensure public confidence in the profession, in the case of the established

and proven misconduct on the part of the Respondent, was to strike the Respondent’s name

from the Roll of Solicitors under s. 85(7)(f) of the 2015 Act and was the recommendation

made by the Tribunal to the Court.

6. Decision on the Society’s Application

38. The Society’s application now comes before me to give effect to the Tribunal’s

Recommendation as to sanction. The Society have also applied for an order under s. 85(8)(a)

of the 2015 Act that the Respondent pay the costs it incurred in the Tribunal proceedings in

the measured sum of €3,762, and an order that he pay the costs of this application to the Court

in the measured sum of €3,254.

39. As I indicated earlier, while the Court is required to give weight to and have respect for the

views of the Tribunal, and while it must consider the recommendations of the Tribunal in

carrying out its function under s. 85(3) of the 2015 Act, the Court’s role on an application

such as this is not to perform a rubber-stamping exercise. The Court must ultimately decide

on what the appropriate sanctions are in the case. The Court must also be satisfied that, in 16

arriving at its decision as to sanction, that the Tribunal had regard to all of the relevant legal

principles on sanctioning to be applied in a case such as this. I have considered those

principles, and I am satisfied that they were fully considered and correctly applied by the

Tribunal to the facts of this case.

40. I am satisfied that the recommendation by the Tribunal that the Respondent’s name be struck

from the Roll of Solicitors does comply with the legal principles, and is the appropriate

sanction to be imposed in this case. I am satisfied also that any sanction falling short of a

strike off would not be appropriate, and would not adequately protect the public in this case.

Nor would it enhance the reputation of the solicitors profession or provide the necessary

deterrent to the Respondent or to others in the profession who might seek to emulate his

conduct.

41. In terms of the costs orders sought by the Society, I am satisfied also that it is appropriate to

make those orders in relation to the costs incurred by the Society in the Tribunal proceedings,

and on this application. The measured amounts claimed by the Society are very reasonable.

42. I will, therefore, make the orders sought by the Society in the Originating Notice of Motion.

First, I will make an order that the Respondent’s name be struck off the Roll of Solicitors; an

order that the Respondent pay the sum of €3,762 for the costs it incurred in the Tribunal

proceedings, and an order that the Respondent pay the costs of the Society of this application

in the measured sum of €3,254.