IEHC 97 — IEHC 97 — High Court

THE HIGH COURT COMMERICAL [2026] IEHC 97

[Record No. 2020/174 COS]

IN THE MATTER OF TUSKAR PROPERTY HOLDINGS LIMITED (IN

LIQUIDATION)

AND

IN THE MATTER OF HYNES JEWELLERS (WEXFORD) LIMITED (IN

LIQUIDATION)

AND

IN THE MATTER OF JW FASHIONS LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES ACT 2014

AND

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 599, 600, 608,

609, 610 AND 612 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 2014

BETWEEN

MYLES KIRBY APPLICANT AND

ALAN HYNES,

FRANK HYNES, 2

ADRIAN O'REILLY,

TUSKAR INVESTMENT GROUP LIMITED

AND

MARTINA HYNES

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Michael Quinn delivered on the 19th day of February

2026

The First Judgment and the Order

1. On 9 January 2026 I delivered judgment in these proceedings ([2026] IEHC 6) (the

“Judgment”).

2. The matter was listed on 23 January 2026 for any submissions as to costs and other

matters. That sitting was adjourned to 6 February 2026 and again to Friday, 13 February 2026.

None of the respondents appeared on any of those dates.

3. On 13 February 2026 I made the final order in the proceedings. I am delivering this

second judgment having regard to communications received by the court through the Registrar

from the first named respondent Alan Hynes following delivery of the Judgment and his failure,

notwithstanding those communications, to appear when the matter was listed post judgment.

4. By the Order the following declarations and orders were made as regards the first

named respondent:

(1) A declaration that the first named respondent acted as a de facto director of the

Companies named in the title of the proceedings (“the Companies”) within the

meaning of section 222 of the Companies Act 2014

(2) A declaration pursuant to section 610 of the Act that the first named respondent be

held personally liable, without limitation of liability, for the debts of the Companies

in the amounts measured below by reason of his knowingly being party to the 3

carrying on of the business of the Companies with intent to defraud creditors of the

Companies and/or other fraudulent purposes.

(3) An order pursuant to section 610 of the Act that the first named respondent be

personally liable for the debts of the Companies measured in the sum of

€794,263.51 for Hynes Jewellers (Wexford) Limited (in liquidation), in the sum of

€651,609.93 for JW Fashions Limited (in liquidation) and in the sum of

€3,260,971.03 for Tuskar Property Holdings Limited (in liquidation), being a total

sum of €4,706,844.47.

(4) A declaration pursuant to section 609 of the Act that the first named respondent be

held personally liable for the debts of the Companies by reason of the Companies

being in contravention of sections 281 to 285 of the Act by failing to keep adequate

accounting records in relation to the Companies, in circumstances where the first

respondent is in default in respect of the said contravention, in the sum of

€3,262,520.10.

(5) An order that the said declaration of liability pursuant to section 609 of the Act is

not cumulative with the separate declaration of personal liability made in pursuance

of section 610 of the Act, but is an additional ground, pursuant to section 609, for

declaring the first respondent to be personally liable in relation to the debts of the

Companies.

(6) An order pursuant to section 609 of the Act that the first named respondent is liable

to discharge the applicant's costs of reconstructing the records of the Companies in

the further total amount of €47,851.12, comprising of the following sums:

(i) For Hynes Jewellers Wexford Limited (in liquidation), the amount of

€20,122.19

(ii) For JW fashions Limited (in liquidation), the amount of €6,295 4

(iii) For Tuskar Property Holdings Limited (in liquidation), the amount of

€21,433.93.

(7) An order that the personal liability of the first respondent for the debts of Hynes

Jewellers Wexford Limited (in liquidation) and JW Fashions Limited (in

liquidation) be joint and several with that of the second named respondent in

circumstances where the second respondent has also been declared to be personally

liable for the debts of the said companies.

(8) An order that the personal liability of the first respondent for the debts of Tuskar

Property Holdings Limited (in liquidation) as aforesaid shall be joint and several

with that of the third respondent, in circumstances where the third respondent has

also been declared to be personally liable for the debts of the said company.

(9) An order that in the event of the first respondent discharging the sums which he is

directed to pay in accordance with the paragraphs which follow below, pursuant to

section 608 and 612 of the Act in full or in part, or the applicant otherwise

recovering the sums due and owing in this regard in full or in part, the level of the

first respondent’s personal liability for the debts of the Companies pursuant to

section 610 and 609 shall stand reduced by the amount of any such payment or

recovery.

(10) A declaration pursuant to section 608 of the Act that property of the Companies

was disposed of to the first named respondent and that the effect of such disposal

was to perpetrate a fraud on the Companies their creditors or members.

(11) An order pursuant to section 608 (2) that the first named respondent, being a

person having the use, control or possession of property of the Companies pay the

sum of €300,000 to the applicant as liquidator of Tuskar Property Holdings Limited

(in liquidation). 5

(12) A declaration pursuant to section 612 of the Act that the first respondent has

misapplied and retained and become liable and accountable for money and property

of the Companies and has been guilty of misfeasance and other breaches of duty

and trust in relation to the Companies.

(13) An order pursuant to section 612 (2) of the Act that the first named respondent

pay the sum of €569,372.60 to the applicant as liquidator of Hynes Jewellers

(Wexford) Limited (in liquidation) and the sum of €1,316,960.69 to the applicant

as liquidator of Tuskar Property Holdings Limited (in liquidation).

(14) A declaration pursuant to section 842 (b) (c) (d) and (h) of the Act that the first

named respondent for a period of eighteen years shall be disqualified from being

appointed or acting as a director or other officer, statutory auditor, receiver,

liquidator, or examiner or being in any way whether directly or indirectly,

concerned or taking part in the promotion, formation or management of each of the

following

(a) a company with the meaning of section 819 (6),

(b) any friendly society within the meaning of the Friendly Societies Acts 1896

to 2014 and

(c) any society registered under the Industrial and Provident Societies Acts 1893

to 2014.

(15) An order pursuant to section 846 (b) of the Act that the applicant recover against

the first named respondent the costs of the applicant's investigations into the matters

the subject of the applications made in these proceedings pursuant to section 842 of

the Act and in collecting evidence in respect of those matters in the sum of

€156,505.62 plus VAT.

(16) An order that the liability of the first respondent to discharge the said sum of

€156,505.62 as aforesaid pursuant to section 846 shall be joint and several with that 6

of the second and third respondents in respect of the sums which those parties have

been ordered to pay pursuant to section 846 of the Act.

(17) An order that the first and third named respondent pay the applicant the costs of

these proceedings, to include any reserved costs, such costs to be adjudicated in

default of agreement.

(18) An order pursuant to Order 99 rule 2(5) of the Rules of the Superior Courts, as

amended by SI 584/2019, and High Court Practice Direction HC125 that the first

and third named respondents do forthwith pay on a joint and several basis to the

applicant €100,000 plus VAT being the sum of €123,000, in respect of the costs of

these proceedings pending the adjudication of such costs.

(19) An order that each and all of the injunctions made against the first and third

named respondent, contained in the order of the High Court dated 22 July 2020 and

continued by the order of the High Court dated the 9 December 2021 are continued

until further order of the court.

(20) A direction that the applicant refer the findings of his investigation into the

affairs of the Companies to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

5. Corresponding, but not identical, declarations and orders were also made as against the

second and third named respondents. The second named respondent was declared personally

liable for debts of two of the Companies on the ground of fraudulent trading. The third named

respondent was declared personally liable for debts of one of the Companies, Tuskar Property

Holdings Limited on the ground of reckless trading. Declarations of personal liability were

made against those two also pursuant to section 609 of the Act for failure to maintain adequate

accounting records and specific further orders pursuant to sections 608 and 846. Orders of

disqualification pursuant to section 842 were made as against the second named respondent for

a period of seven years and against the third named respondent for a period of twelve years. 7

6. At the conclusion of the Judgment, I directed that the matter be listed before the court

two weeks after delivery of the Judgment, being 23 January 2026. I also stated the following

in para. 984:

“Throughout this judgment I have stated the amounts in respect of which I intend to

declare the respondents to be liable under different sections of the Act. Before the

order is perfected, I shall hear the parties as to any necessary corrections or updates

to those numbers which may be required. This is not an invitation to reopen the

substantive decision in relation to the amounts being imposed or any other parts of this

judgment, but an opportunity for the parties to identify any potential errors in

calculation before the final order is perfected”.

7. At the trial of the action none of the respondents were legally represented. The third

and fourth respondents did not attend or participate at all. The first, second and fifth

respondents joined parts of the hearing remotely.

Communications post delivery of Judgment

8. Between the electronic delivery of the Judgment on 9 January 2026 and the listing on

23 January 2026 the first named respondent sent a series of emails to the Registrar of this

Court. Some of these communications were addressed directly to the Registrar and copied to

certain other respondents but not all of them. Others were addressed to some other respondents

and copied to the court. Before I quote from these communications, two general observations

arise.

9. Firstly, much of the contents of these communications relate to matters which were not

the subject of these proceedings and in respect of which this court heard no evidence and has

no information or detail. They appear to relate to different aspects of the first respondent’s

affairs, including other litigation and threatened litigation to which he is or was a party.

10. Secondly, these communications reveal that it may have been lost on the first

respondent that the Judgment delivered on 9 January 2026 was not a draft. It is the final 8

judgment recording the court’s decisions on the applicant’s claims having considered the

evidence and submissions of all those parties, including the first respondent, who participated

in the trial of the action.

11. On the same day on which the Judgment was delivered to the parties the first named

respondent sent an email to the Registrar stating that he wished to request clarifications

regarding the Judgment and stating that he intended to consult Messrs Fieldfisher Solicitors

“to determine if the findings made by Mr. Justice Quinn are covered by my existing bankruptcy

protection”. He referred to what he described as the “overlapping nature of the claims made

in the Commercial Court by Hayes Solicitors [the applicant’s solicitors] and the relevant

findings of the Legal Services Regulatory Authority (LSRA)”.

12. Nowhere in these proceedings either at the trial or subsequently or in the course of the

Judgment was the case concerned with “bankruptcy protection” of the first respondent or with

any findings of the Legal Services Regulatory Authority.

13. At my direction the Registrar replied stating that a draft Order containing all relevant

numbers would be circulated by the applicant and submitted to the court and that he would

have an opportunity to address it in court before it is perfected.

14. There then followed, almost daily, further emails from the first respondent in which he

made a number of requests and observations some of which can be summarised as follows:

• The first respondent requested a “formal process for reviewing the calculation of

the directors current accounts”.

• That “any revised calculation of these accounts may significantly impact on the

€10.9 million compensation claim formally notified to the applicant solicitors, who

previously represented me”.

• The respondent requested “access to the court’s calculation of the directors current

accounts and the specific variants from the original amounts claimed. This review

is particularly relevant for those whom the court intends to restrict or disqualify”. 9

• The respondent requested “a spreadsheet of these calculations so that I may engage

accountants in the United Kingdom to audit the figures”.

• The first respondent requested “clarification on whether Mr. Justice Quinn has

agreed to lift the freezing order currently in place against me. I intend to engage

senior counsel to assist with my legal submissions prior to the next hearing, and I

have copied Mark Woodcock on this email as he manages the administrative

aspects of my estate”. The first respondent repeated in numerous emails his request

for a “variation or removal of the current injunction to permit the funding of senior

counsel”.

• The first respondent stated that he wished “to finalise a fee agreement with senior

counsel this weekend, I am seeking the court's permission to utilise the costs

previously awarded in my favour by Mr. Justice Meenan. I propose that these funds

be released to me separately from the fees requested for my ongoing work”.

• The respondent stated that “the anticipated cost for legal representation is

approximately €125,000. I propose to fund this through the €195,000 in costs

awarded in my favour from the successful judicial review proceedings dealt with by

Mar (sic) J. Meenan”.

• The respondent said that he was “seeking remuneration for work performed on this

case since 2020 at a rate of €5,000 per month, to be paid separately from the legal

costs mentioned above”.

• The respondent continued “Calculations for final order: I intend for counsel to

incorporate the following proposed reductions to the applicant's trial figure of €7.8

million into our legal submissions

- Court’s subsequent investigation €3 million

- LSRA investigation €3.1 million

- Official Assignee investigation: €2.45 million 10

International accounting standards set a 0.5% margin for error. The 38.95%

discrepancy between the trial figures and the court's calculations warrants the

activation of professional insurance against Mr. O'Malley's legal practice. I request

that Mr. O'Malley provide the necessary ‘client instruction’ information in softcopy”.

15. In response to these emails, at my direction, the Registrar replied to the first named

respondent to the effect that any application or submission could be made at the sitting of the

court and that he could appear in court in person or by a solicitor or counsel instructed by a

solicitor.

16. The respondent stated that he did not have capacity to make court applications or

present legal submissions without the assistance of a barrister.

17. The respondent referred also to the potential effect of the final order on “re/entering

pleas in inter-connecting cases”. He did not state or explain what these interrelated cases were.

18. The respondent submitted the draft of an affidavit which he stated was submitted in

support of a motion to vary the Mareva injunction in these proceedings. He stated that the

application respectfully requests a variation of the asset restriction to facilitate the engagement

of legal counsel, “specifically the utilisation of monies referenced within my affidavit”. He

continued by stating “this application respectfully requests a variation of the asset restriction

to facilitate the engagement of legal counsel, specifically the utilisation of monies referenced

within my affidavit. As previously stated this is essential to ensure the professional

representation is secured to prepare and present the required legal submissions by the 6th

February 2026 deadline”.

19. Attached to that email was the draft of an affidavit bearing the title of proceedings

before the Circuit Criminal Court, South Eastern Circuit, County of Wexford, between the

Director of Public Prosecutions and the first respondent. 11

20. Yet again the Registrar replied, stating that any applications or other requests in these

proceedings must be made to the judge in court at the sitting scheduled for the finalisation of

the order.

21. When the matter was listed before the court on 6 February 2026, early that morning the

respondent emailed the Registrar stating that he was unable to travel to the Four Courts “due

to severe weather conditions and impassable public transport routes from Wexford to

Dublin”. He repeated his request that the court “unfreeze” his assets. On that day extreme

weather conditions prevailed nationally, causing widespread flooding and travel disruption.

The County of Wexford, where the respondent resides was one of the most seriously affected

regions. The Registrar informed the first respondent that having regard to those conditions he

would be permitted to join the hearing remotely and a link was provided. The respondent did

not join the hearing either in person or remotely. The court decided that in the particular

circumstances the matter be adjourned on one final occasion to Friday, 13 February 2026 and

the respondent was so informed.

22. On 12 February 2026 the respondent emailed the Registrar repeating many of the

requests and applications previously made. He stated that he did not anticipate having access

to free legal aid and therefore repeated his request “for the release of costs awarded to me by

Mr. Justice Meenan”. He stated “these costs which arise from the judicial review of the

Chartered Accountants Ireland decision-making process are costed at €195,000. I am

prepared to accept a reduced sum of €190,000 to facilitate the immediate engagement of a

barrister for these legal submissions. I would ask again for the freezing order to be lifted to

expedite this payment. Please bring this matter to the attention of Mr. Justice

Quinn. Additionally I request that I be excused from any further attendances regarding the

Commercial Court until these arrangements are allowed by Mr. J. Quinn and are in place”.

23. The registrar replied again that any application must be made to the judge at the sitting

of the court. 12

24. On the morning of 13 February 2026 the respondent emailed the Registrar renewing a

number of his requests and stating, with regard to that morning's hearing, that due to a medical

condition he wished to “extend this request for an exceptional arrangement for me to be able

submit my requests electronically”. He continued “it’s a physical impossibility for me to

represent myself in court due to the severity of the weather so I am proposing to engage a

Dublin based barrister for this process be to whatever the court decides”.

25. The Registrar informed the respondent that he could participate in the hearing that

morning remotely if desired and a link was provided. The first respondent did not avail of this

facility or appear in person.

26. The draft of the final order had been circulated by the applicant to all the respondents

in advance of the listing on 13 February 2026.

27. When the matter was called on 13 February 2026 no respondents appeared either in

person or remotely. I heard submissions from counsel for the applicant. Having heard counsel

for the applicant, and there being no appearance, representation or submissions by any of the

respondents, I made the final order in the terms outlined in paragraph 4 above.

The first respondent

28. In Parts 2 and 10 of the Judgment I described in detail the manner in which the first

respondent conducted his defence of these proceedings. It is not necessary to repeat the

description here.

29. In the Judgment I quoted from the Judgment of Clarke J. as he then was, in ACC Bank

plc v. Kelly [2011] IEHC 7. In that case Clarke J. described the challenges for the court and

for all parties where a litigant is self-represented. He recognised that the court must make

allowances and accommodate self-represented litigants. He observed that self-represented

litigants are entitled to allowances and leeway in the manner in which a trial is conducted. He

said also that there are limits to the amount of this indulgence. 13

30. Clarke J. quoted with approval an article by Evan Bell (a Master of the Queen's Bench

and Matrimonial Divisions of the Court of Judicature for Northern Ireland) in 2010 Judicial

Studies Institute Journal No. 1 and I quoted from the article in full. Some passages from this

aspect of the Judgment of Clarke J. bear repeating where he stated the following, quoting

Master Bell as follows:

“While a trial judge’s over arching responsibility is to ensure that the hearing is fair,

it is not unfair to hold a self-represented litigant to his choice to represent himself. A

litigant who undertakes to do so in matters of complexity must assume the responsibility

of being ready to proceed when his case is listed. If he embarks upon the hearing of

his case, he is representing to the court that he understands the subject matter

sufficiently to be able to proceed. Although it may later become patently obvious that

he is not, litigants who choose to represent themselves must accept the consequences

of their choice. While the court will take into account the litigant's lack of experience

and training, implicit in the decision to represent himself is the willingness to accept

the consequences that may flow from that lack. Indeed to hold to the contrary would

mean that any party could derail proceedings by dismissing his representatives”.

31. Clarke J. continued by stating the following:

“It may well be that in many cases the party concerned has no real choice in the matter

for they may not be able to afford legal representation. That may well be a factor to

take into account in deciding precisely how to deal with difficult situations which may

arise in the course of a trial. However, whether a person represents themselves of

choice or of necessity does not alter the overriding requirement that the conduct of the

trial must be fair to both sides, and that the fact that a person is, for whatever reason,

unrepresented cannot be allowed to operate as an unfairness to the represented party”.

32. As appears from the description of the conduct of the trial in Parts 2 and 10 of the

Judgment, in this case the court indulged the first respondent arguably to an excessive degree 14

and to the disadvantage of the applicant. For the trial, the court had agreed to permit remote

participation for the specific purpose of accommodating the third respondent, who is a medical

doctor practicing and living in England. In the event, the third respondent never joined, even

remotely, any part of the trial. But having chosen to be unrepresented at the hearing, as was his

right, the first respondent then sought to disrupt the hearing by joining remotely only on an

intermittent basis.

33. The purpose of the listing of these proceedings on 23 January 2026, which was

adjourned to 6 February and ultimately to 13 February 2026 was, as is the practice of the court,

to ensure that the perfected order properly records and reflects the Judgment already delivered

and to hear any submissions as to costs or other matters arising from the Judgment. The

substantive case was heard over seven days and this Court has made the decisions which it was

required to make. All evidence and submissions of the applicant and of those respondents,

including the first respondent, who participated in the trial were considered in detail in the

Judgment. The time for substantive submissions on the case ended when the hearing

concluded.

34. Paragraph 984 of the Judgment, quoted at paragraph 6 above, was an invitation to

address any calculation errors which may be found on the face of the Judgment before finalising

the Order. I made it clear in paragraph 984 that this was not an invitation to reopen the

substantive decision either in relation to the amounts being imposed or any other parts of the

Judgment.

35. In response to this invitation, the applicant properly identified a required adjustment in

the calculation of the amounts for which the first respondent would be held personally liable,

resulting in a reduction of the total amount by €2,164 from a sum of €4,709,008.44 to

€4,706,844.47. He presented this adjustment in the draft order circulated to all respondents in

advance of the final sitting and in court and the perfected order reflects that adjustment. No

other party availed of this invitation. 15

36. At each listing post judgment the first respondent either did not appear without

explanation or excuse, or put differing reasons for his absence. This was a repeat of the pattern

of conduct which he exhibited throughout the seven days of the trial of the action.

37. After the making of the final order the first respondent sent more emails to the Registrar,

repeating many of the requests already made. I have directed the Registrar to send to the

respondents electronically a copy of this judgment and of the perfected order of 13 February

2026.

Conclusion

38. The first respondent elected not to be represented in these proceedings.

39. The first respondent never applied to court to vary the mareva injunction made at the

outset of these proceedings, a fact recorded in the Judgment. Such an application is not made

by email correspondence to court registrars. It can only be made by a Notice of Motion in the

proceedings grounded on an affidavit adducing any evidence to be relied on and served on the

other parties to the proceedings.

40. A draft of the final order in these proceedings was first circulated to all of the

respondents in advance of the matter being listed on 23 January 2026. An updated version was

circulated before the listing on 13 February 2026. The respondents were afforded three

opportunities to address the contents of the final order before it was made and perfected. None

of them availed of those opportunities and the order has been made and perfected.