IEHC 92 — IEHC 92 — High Court

[2026] IEHC 92 RECORD NUMBER 2025/19/HLC

THE HIGH COURT

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILD ABDUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF CUSTODY ORDERS ACT 1991

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION AND

IN THE MATTER OF G, A MINOR BETWEEN G APPLICANT AND

G (No. 2)

RESPONDENT

EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Michael Twomey delivered on the 11th day of February, 2026

1. This is a follow up decision to the judgment which was delivered in G v G (Child abduction:

consent; grave risk) [2026] IEHC 45 (the “Principal Judgment”) and this judgment should

be read in conjunction with that judgment.

1 2. This judgment relates to the form of undertakings to be given, once a decision has been

made that a child should be returned from Ireland to another country, being the child’s

habitual residence pursuant to the Hague Convention.

3. In this regard, the Court has been provided with undertakings which are being suggested

by the mother (who unlawfully removed the child from the US to Ireland). The mother

claims that these undertakings should be given by the father (who remains in the US). These

undertakings are contained in a letter sent by the mother’s solicitors to the father’s solicitors

after the Principal Judgment was delivered. In that letter, the mother states that nine

separate undertakings ‘were required’ in order to give effect to the order of the Court to

return the child to Kansas.

4. These nine undertakings ranged from the father providing an undertaking to discharge the

costs of the mother obtaining a further Green Card (after she let her previous Green Card

lapse) to an undertaking that the father pay $35,000 for ‘up to six months maintenance

and/or financial support’. Indeed, one of undertakings, which was stated to be ‘required’

for the child to be returned to the country from where she was abducted, was an undertaking

from the father that:

‘any property will have to be appropriately furnished and have the proper furnishings

for a two year old child such as a small bed, toys, a buggy or pushchair, highchair and

all other essential items required for a two year old.’

5. To support her claim for such extensive undertakings, counsel for the mother relied on the

Supreme Court decision in P v B [1994] 3 IR 507 and the undertakings which were offered

in that case, which primarily consisted of the father paying weekly maintenance for the

mother and the child, paying 5 months’ maintenance into the wife’s account and paying

rent in respect of an apartment.

2 6. It was submitted by the mother’s counsel that this case is authority for this Court making

an order in the form of the nine undertakings sought by the mother in this case.

7. This Court does not agree with this interpretation of P v B. It seems to this Court that the P

v B case is simply authority for the fact that the undertakings which were offered on the

particular facts of that case were acceptable. It is not authority for the fact that such

undertakings are the norm in Hague Convention cases.

8. In fact, the principle from the P v B case, which is of general application and so applicable

to this case, is that the purpose of the undertakings is not ‘to usurp the jurisdiction’ of the

local courts to deal with child welfare and maintenance issues.

9. The mother also relied on the Court of Appeal case of CMW v SJF [2019] IECA 227.

However, it seems to this Court that the general principle to be taken from that case is that

undertakings are simply mechanisms to secure the return of the child until the courts in the

country of habitual residence take over all issues concerning the welfare of the child and

maintenance of the mother, and they are not intended to provide ‘long term solutions’.

10. As it was submitted that the mother’s proposed undertakings were required in light of the

risk to the child, it is important to remember that, as is clear from the Principal Judgment,

this Court has no evidence of risk to the child. All it has are allegations by the mother and

denials by the father and hearsay evidence. This is not a basis upon which this Court can

require any particular form of undertaking.

11. In addition, there is no evidence before this Court that local courts in Kansas would not be

able to deal with matters regarding the childcare costs and maintenance of the mother (or

indeed child protection issues, if there were any) within a short time after the arrival of the

child back in Kansas.

12. For all these reasons, and bearing in mind that the mother previously had a Green Card and

employment in the US, immediately before she removed the child from the US, it seems to

3 this Court that a period of 3 months is more than a reasonable period for her to get back

into the position she was in, before she left the US, i.e. with her visa status established, an

apartment of her choosing, and employment.

13. On this basis, this Court has considered the proposed undertakings sought by the mother

and the ones offered by the father and regards the undertakings offered by the father to be

acceptable, subject to the following minor revisions (primarily extending the duration of

the undertakings from one month to three months):

• An undertaking that he provides and pays for the rental of a lease of a property for a

period of 3 months in Wichita, Kansas, unless otherwise varied by the Kansas courts;

• An undertaking to pay $1,500 per month, for a period of 3 months, in respect of

maintenance of the mother and childcare expenses, commencing on the date of the

child’s arrival in Kansas, unless otherwise varied by the Kansas courts;

• An undertaking not to make any referral to childcare services and/or the police and/or

immigration/ICE in respect of the child’s unlawful removal to Ireland (which

undertaking was agreed between the parties); and

• An undertaking to discharge all reasonable costs, of circa €1,500, of flying the mother

and child from Dublin to Kansas.

14. This Court has no evidence upon which to conclude that these undertakings by the father

will not be honoured. For this reason, it does not require that a stay be put on the return of

the child (as sought by the mother) until evidence is provided of money being paid into an

account or compliance with the undertakings.

15. More generally, it is important to remember that while this Court accepts that the mother

was acting in what she believed was the best interests of the child in removing the child to

live in, no doubt, a loving home with the mother and the child’s grandparents in Ireland,

4 this Court has decided that in removing the child, without the knowledge of the father, the

child was wrongfully removed by the mother.

16. For this reason, the focus now is on the return of the child as soon as possible. Any other

issues, whether regarding the mother’s costs of obtaining a visa, or who pays for a buggy

and highchair, are not matters to be dealt with by this Court, which is dealing with the return

of the child. Rather, these are matters to be dealt with by the courts in Kansas, if the parties

cannot reach agreement on those issues (which agreement should be possible).

17. As the father is not seeking his costs, there will be no order as to costs and, since it was

sought by the mother, a stay of 2 weeks will be put on the order, to enable the bringing of

an appeal, should the mother choose to do so.

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