IEHC 78 — IEHC 78 — High Court

Garryduff Properties v ACP [2026] IEHC 78

THE HIGH COURT PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT JUDICIAL REVIEW [2026] IEHC 78 Record No: 2024/22JR IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 50, 50A and 50B OF THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT ACT 2000, AS AMENDED Between: GARRYDUFF PROPERTIES LIMITED Applicant and AN COIMISIÚN PLEANÁLA Respondent and LAOIS COUNTY COUNCIL Notice Party

JUDGMENT OF MR JUSTICE DAVID HOLLAND, DELIVERED 16 FEBRUARY 2026

CONTENTS JUDGMENT OF MR JUSTICE DAVID HOLLAND, DELIVERED 16 FEBRUARY 2026 ................................................. 1 INTRODUCTION & CERTAIN DETERMINATIONS .................................................................................................. 2 New Development Plan Takes Effect During Planning Application & Observations ....................................... 3 General Observations ...................................................................................................................................... 3 Particular Observations ................................................................................................................................... 6 From Council’s Clarification Request of 27 January 2022 ............................................................................... 7 INSPECTOR’S REPORTS ........................................................................................................................................ 8 IMPUGNED DECISION .......................................................................................................................................... 9 PLEADINGS - AMENDED GROUNDS, GROUND 2 & SCOPE OF CASE AS ARGUED ................................................ 9 GROUND 1 – CONTRAVENTION OF S.137 PDA 2000 ......................................................................................... 11 S.137 PDA 2000 ............................................................................................................................................. 12 Garryduff’s Position ....................................................................................................................................... 12 Commission’s Position ................................................................................................................................... 13 G1 – Discussion & Decision ........................................................................................................................... 15 Interpretation & Application of s.137 ....................................................................................................... 15 Fair Procedures .......................................................................................................................................... 16 Discretionary Relief ................................................................................................................................... 17 LAW AS TO REASONS - S.34(10) PDA 2000 & CASELAW ................................................................................... 18 GOCE (2024) on Significance of Non-Compliance with Development Plan .................................................. 21 GROUND 3 - REASONS why PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT DID NOT SATISFY OBJECTIVE HPO1 .......................... 22 Garryduff’s Position ....................................................................................................................................... 22 Commission’s Position ................................................................................................................................... 22 G3 - Decision .................................................................................................................................................. 23 GROUND 2 - FAILURE TO GIVE REASONS FOR NOT ACCEPTING THE INSPECTOR’S RECOMMENDATION ........ 24 Given Reason & Initial Observations ............................................................................................................. 24

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What did the Inspector Recommend? .......................................................................................................... 24 G3 – Further Discussion & Decision .............................................................................................................. 27 REASONS FOR REFUSAL ILLUMINATORY OF PROSPECTS OF FUTURE PLANNING APPLICATION ...................... 28 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................................... 30

INTRODUCTION & CERTAIN DETERMINATIONS1

1. The Applicant (“Garryduff”) seeks certiorari quashing the decision of An Coimisiún Pleanála2 (“the Commission”) by order3 dated 6 November 2023 to refuse it planning permission for 85 residential units on a residentially-zoned site at Kilminchy, Portlaoise, Co. Laois (“the Impugned Decision”, “the Proposed Development” and “the Site”). The refusal was grounded only in the Commission’s view that the proposed mix of housing types was inconsistent with a development plan objective and hence with proper planning and sustainable development.

2. I am grateful to all counsel for their helpful submissions and their focussed and practical approach to the case.

3. Garryduff applied to the Notice Party (“the Council”) on 29 July 2021 for permission for 85 three- bedroom houses. The Laois County Development Plan 2017-2023 (“the 2017 CDP”) was operative at that time. I have not seen it, but that is because the parties agree that it did not address housing mix – or at least did not do so in quantified terms, as did its successor, which applied when the Impugned Decision was made. The Council sought further information by request dated 22 September 2021 (“RfI”) – including as follows:

“7. Housing Mix Following discussions with the Housing Department with regards to the mix of unit types, it is noted that the demand for 3 bedroom social housing units has been satisfied. There is currently a demand for one and two bedroom units. The applicant is requested to submit their comments and proposals in this regard.”

This request derived from social housing requirements for which Part V PDA 2000 provides and not from any other or general development plan content as to housing mix. However, I respectfully disagree with Garryduff’s submission that the formulation of this request in Part V terms has implications for the decision of these proceedings. The significance of the RfI is simply that it drew attention to housing mix as an issue and, more importantly, prompted a reply in particular terms as to housing mix.

1 Headings are not a curial part of this judgment and do not circumscribe the content thereunder. They are provided for navigational assistance only. 2 The Respondent herein - by s.495(3) of the Planning and Development Act 2024, as from 18 June 2025, references to An Bord Pleanála are construed

as references to An Coimisiún Pleanála. 3 ABP-313771-22.

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4. Garryduff’s reply, dated 21 December 2021, to the RfI (“RRfI”) stated as to housing mix:

“The revised layout includes proposals for a block of duplex units consisting of 5 no. 1-bed apartments and 5 no. 2-bed apartments …The proposals outlined above means that over 11% of the proposed development will be dedicated to one and two-bedroom units.”4

This increased the number of units proposed from 85 to 89. 10 of those 89 were 1- and 2-bedroom units.5 As will be seen, the RRfI’s primary significance now is Garryduff’s assertion that over 11% of the proposed units will be one- and two-bedroom units. I should say that by its use of the word “over” Garryduff does not assert an open-ended exceedance of 11%: it merely asserts a precise figure slightly exceeding 11%.

5. The Council’s planner6 considered the RRfI at “acceptable” as having “introduced a number of 1 and 2 bedroom apartments into the scheme.” On 27 January 2022, the Council sought further clarification from Garryduff – but not as to housing mix.

NEW DEVELOPMENT PLAN TAKES EFFECT DURING PLANNING APPLICATION & OBSERVATIONS

6. The next significant occurrence, during the process before the Council, was that the Laois County Development Plan 2021-2027 (“the 2021 CDP”) took effect on 8 March 2022. By CDP Housing Strategy Objective HPO17 it provides that applications for residential development of 10 units or more should:

“Ensure that 35% … provides for single and two person households.”

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

7. I should make some general observations at this point.

• First, HPO1 is in both strong (“ensure”) and quantified (“35%”) terms.

• Second, while Garryduff attempted in these proceedings to argue against a correlation between “1- and 2-bedroom units” and “single and two person households”, I respectfully reject that argument on an XJS8 interpretation of HPO1 as if by an intelligent layperson - as opposed to a legalistic interpretation. The correlation may not be inevitably and invariably precise (no doubt a single person can, and some do, occupy 3-bedroom houses) but it is at least close in general terms and a layperson would regard the concepts as generally and broadly interchangeable.

4 §7. 5 The Inspector’s second report, of 5 October 2023 §3.1.5 notes that “This was achieved by replacing two pairs of semi-detached houses by a terrace of 10 duplex units and a pair of semi-detached houses by a larger detached 5-bedroom house”. 6 Report 25 January 2022. 7 2021 Development Plan, at Chapter 4. HPO stands for “Housing Policy Objective”. 8 In re XJS Investments Limited [1986] IR 750 - recently confirmed in Sherwin v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 13.

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• Third, it is necessary to consider the position of a planning permission applicant whose application is pending on the coming into effect of a new development plan and also to consider the relationship of a development plan to the reasons which may be given for a planning decision.

8. In that third regard, it is important first to recollect the purpose and status of a development plan. A development plan is an environmental contract by a planning authority with the community in its functional area “embodying a promise by the council that it will regulate private development in a manner consistent with the objectives stated in the plan …” – McGarry.9 It and its effectuation are “answerable to public confidence”- as “a representation in solemn form, binding on all affected or touched by it, that the planning authority will discharge its statutory functions strictly in accordance with the published plan” and will do so “openly and transparently” – Byrne.10 Generally, Browne says that “The development plan lies at the heart of the planning legislation” and “occupies a pivotal role in the determination of any application for planning permission”.11 As was said in Ebonwood: “It is of the utmost importance that the public at large and in particular those persons seeking to develop their lands or property should have certainty and precision as to the relevant criteria by which any application for permission will be judged ... The first reference point in their consideration will be the provisions of the development plan.”12 In Element Power, Haughton J described as the “four corners” within which planning decisions must be made as “the 2000 Act, existing government policy and objectives, existing ministerial guidelines, and existing county development plans.”13 Though the Commission can, the planning authority cannot grant permission in material contravention of the plan. It is also important to recollect that while detailed rules – procedural and substantive – attend the adoption of a development plan, its general description, stated by s.10(1) PDA 2000, is that a development plan is “an overall strategy for the proper planning and sustainable development of the area of the development plan.” In other words, a development plan is necessarily the view of the Planning Authority as to of what, at least in general terms (and in some respects quite specific terms), the proper planning and sustainable development of the area consists. Charleton J in Wexele14 approved Browne15 to the effect that in deciding planning applications on their merits “The terms of the development plan are not conclusive: the overriding consideration must be the proper planning and sustainable development of the area.” – but also to the effect that “In practice consideration of the proper planning and sustainable development of an area, and of the development plan, are often inextricably linked; development objectives may be characterised as an attempt to articulate in general terms the proper planning and sustainable development of the area.”

9. It follows therefore, and is relevant in this case, that, when considering the reasons given for planning decisions, a decision affirming conformity, or non-conformity, of a proposed development to development plan content is, ipso facto, the expression of the decision-maker’s view as to what amounts to proper planning and sustainable development as it relates to the proposed development in question. Of course, in a given case, the position may be more complex – a more elaborate reason may be required as to

9 AG (McGarry) v Sligo County Council [1991] 1 IR 99 at p113. 10 Byrne v Fingal County Council [2001] 4 IR 565. 11 Simons on Planning Law, 3rd Ed’n (Browne) §§1-11 & 1-40. 12 Ebonwood Ltd v Meath County Council [2004] 1 I.L.R.M. 305. 13 Element Power Ireland Ltd v An Bord Pleanála [2017] IEHC 550. 14 Wexele v An Bord Pleanála (No. 1) [2010] IEHC 21. 15 Charleton J cited Simons - Planning and Development Law (2nd Ed., 2007) at para. 1.23. I update the reference to Simons on Planning Law, 3rd Ed’n

(Browne) §1-45 & 1-47.

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proper planning and sustainable development, than simply an assertion of conformity or non-conformity of a proposed development to development plan content - e.g. GOCE.16 The potential complexity is also demonstrated by the statutory possibility of a permission in material contravention of a development plan – which is nonetheless considered in accordance with proper planning and sustainable development. But it is at least often and ceteris paribus a ready inference that, where a decision-maker states that a proposed development conforms to or contravenes a development plan, that is, per se, an adequate statement whether the proposed development conforms to or contravenes proper planning and sustainable development.

10. In that third regard, it is important, next, to observe that in the world of planning, and as planning relates to the functional area of a planning authority, the coming into effect of a new development plan is a highly significant event. It invariably involves significant evolution of planning policy for the area in question – which changes may, often will, have significant implications for the prospects of planning applications. Every planning advisor must be aware of the significance of a new development plan. Further, it has long since been taken in practice17 and has been confirmed in Crofton,18 that a planning decision-maker must decide a planning permission application having regard to the development plan in force at the date of the decision – not that, if different, in force when the planning application was made and on the basis of which it was prepared. As Farrell J put it in a Protect East Meath case: “The hazards of making an application at the cusp of a change of development plan have been highlighted by the issues arising in this case. …….. Timing is everything, …… Many of the issues and arguments in these proceedings would have been avoided had the Notice Party made its application more quickly after the Board had issued its Opinion on the pre-application consultation, or waited until Meath County Development Plan 2021 - 2027 had come into effect.”19

11. In short, a planning permission applicant is on the hazard of the effecting of a new development plan while the planning application is pending and the applicant must manage that hazard in his/her own interest. As I said at trial, when the target shifts one must shift one’s aim. In that respect McMonagail,20 though a case about the particular position of quarry operators to whom a particular statutory regime applies, is illuminatory of what is generally expected of a planning permission applicant:

“The onus is on an applicant making an application under the relevant statutory processes to collate all relevant material and anticipate the issues which might reasonably arise from that material in light of the applicant's particular circumstances and the relevant criteria under the statutory scheme. A quarry owner or operator must be taken to be aware of the potentially very significant consequences for it of decisions under the statutory processes and it cannot present itself as some form of passive entity waiting to be informed as to what the decision-maker regards as weak points in its application so that it can then make submissions or further submissions on those points.

16 Infra. 17 Simons on Planning Law, 3rd Ed’n (Browne) §6-319. 18 Crofton Buildings Management CLG v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IEHC 704, [2024] IESC 12. 19 Protect East Meath v. An Bord Pleanála & Rockmill [2025] IEHC 276. While the point is generally a good one, it should be said that the difficulties in

that case were particular to the Strategic Housing Development regime prescribed by the Planning and Development (Housing) and Residential Tenancies Act 2016 which gave limited procedural scope for submissions by planning applicants during the process. 20 McMonagail Stone v Ireland & An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 223, [2023] 4 JIC 2809.

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In my view, this expectation of self-interested pro-activity by planning applicants applies in the case of a planning applicant, such as Garryduff, whose application is pending when a new development plan takes effect. It follows that it will almost inevitably be prudent on the part of the planning permission applicant and his/her planning advisors to consider any implications of the new plan for the prospects of the application and, if needs be, to seek to make submissions to the planning decision-maker accordingly. “In such matters, the law helps those who help themselves”.21

12. There is, of course, considerable continuity between successive development plans. Often, the novelties in a new development plan will represent subtle or minor changes only or changes of marginal relevance to a particular planning application. It may be that on considering a new plan a planning applicant will decide, if only on balance or tactically, to leave well enough alone. But generally the applicant takes any risks of such a choice.

PARTICULAR OBSERVATIONS

13. Here, however, it is not a matter merely of objectionable hindsight to say that the relevant novelty in the 2021 CDP was not subtle or minor or only marginally relevant to Garryduff’s planning application. It was the introduction, for the first time, in emphatic terms (“ensure”) of a precisely quantified (“35%”) and simply-expressed development plan objective as to provision for single- and two- person households in any residential development of 10 units or more. Garryduff’s application, as revised, was for 89 units. It had itself advised the Council that only 11% of those would be 1- and 2-bedroom units. Objectively, the application of HPO1 to the Proposed Development, the 69% shortfall22 and the resultant hazard to the planning application can only have been obvious – inter alia to Garryduff and its advisors. In fairness, counsel for Garryduff all but accepted that.23

14. I say “objectively” as, as will be seen, the application of HPO1 to the Proposed Development and the 69% shortfall was not, it seems, subjectively apparent to the Council or, at least at first, to the Board’s Inspector. However, I am satisfied that, whatever the explanation for their subjective views, the objective view is what matters here.

15. In this context and as illustrative of the practical significance of HPO1, I recall that counsel for Garryduff properly accepted24 (as I think he had to) that, if one posited Garryduff’s first making its planning application after the 2021 CDP had taken effect, it would inevitably – “absolutely” - have had to address in its planning application HPO1 and its 35% objective. It appears to me that, in the events which in fact occurred, once the 2021 CDP had taken effect it became inevitable and entirely foreseeable that HPO1 would bear on Garryduff’s pending application and, as to the need to address HPO1, Garryduff was in a

21 Pat O’Donnell & Co v Dublin City Council & Uniphar [2024] IEHC 671 citing Baile Bhruachlain Teoranta v Galway County Council [2024] IEHC 604 in which Humphreys J cited Benjamin Franklin and Euripides to the effect that the ancient Greek gods took a similar approach. 22 (35-11)/35 x100 = 69. 23 Transcript p17, 11:26. 24 Transcript p15 et seq. See also p36 11:52.

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position little different, if different at all, than it would have been in had it first made its planning application after the 2021 CDP had taken effect.

16. Objectively, therefore, the prudent course was for Garryduff to respond to the hazard presented by HPO1. As will be seen, it in fact had opportunity to respond. In fact it did nothing. While its precise response was for it to decide, it could, for example, have suggested: • a revised development proposal substituting additional 1- and 2-bedroom units for 3-bedroom units. • a planning condition to the same effect. • that the non-compliance was a non-material contravention of HPO1 such that permission should be granted as conforming to proper planning and sustainable development. • to the Commission that, despite material contravention of HPO1, permission should be granted as conforming to proper planning and sustainable development.

17. Also , and while it now complains of the delay inherent in making a new planning application (though I understand it has made one – I do not know when or in what terms), Garryduff could have made one once the 2021 CDP came into effect in March 2022 and could have had it in preparation from whatever earlier point in the CDP adoption process the prospect of HPO1 became apparent. However, that was a matter on which it was entitled to take its own view and it does not weigh against them in this judgment.

FROM COUNCIL’S CLARIFICATION REQUEST OF 27 JANUARY 2022

18. Garryduff responded on 19 April 2022 to the Council’s clarification request of 27 January 2022. In so doing it did not address the 2021 CDP or HPO1. Given the events and opportunities for submissions which followed, I need not decide whether, after the 2021 CDP took effect, Garryduff had opportunity to make submissions on HPO1 to the Council. The Council decided on 13 May 2022, in terms which did not address HPO1, to grant permission for the Proposed Development. A third-party appeal to the Commission ensued. (“the Appeal”). The Appeal raised no issues of housing mix - nor did it cite the 2021 CDP.

19. Garryduff made a submission on the Appeal. It did not address the 2021 CDP or, specifically, HPO1. That must be regarded as Garryduff’s voluntary choice. It accepts (as it must) that it could have done so.25 It had an opportunity to do so and didn’t take it.

20. As it happens, Garryduff’s submission on the Appeal was rejected by the Commission as made out of time. Garryduff accepts that such rejection was legally valid. It seems to me that, as to fair procedures, that rejection weighs little, if at all, against Garryduff. What does weigh against Garryduff is that it had, but failed to take, opportunity to make submissions to the Commission as to the bearing of the 2021 CDP, and specifically HPO1, on the determination of the Appeal.

25 Transcript p19 et seq. Also p28 11:41.

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INSPECTOR’S REPORTS

21. The Commission appointed an Inspector to report on the Appeal – which she did by first report dated 24 February 2023. It noted the RRfI and the RRfI revision of the Proposed Development to include duplexes,26 thus increasing the number of units from 85 to 89.27 It identified the 2021 CDP as applicable28 but did not address it in any detail. Specifically, it did not advert to HPO1. Nor did the Inspector consider housing mix to be an issue – as it is not mentioned in her first report. The Inspector recommended the grant of permission on conditions which did not address housing mix or HPO1.

22. The Commission, by direction dated 7 September 2023, requested an addendum Inspector’s report, by reference to the 2021 CDP, on issues including density, residential amenities and housing unit mix. The Inspector’s Addendum Report, dated 5 October 2023, whilst not altering the recommendation to grant permission, found, on the evidence presented, that the Proposed Development did not comply with HPO1 – stating, inter alia:

“3.3. Mix of Housing Types and Residential Amenities 3.3.1. Policy Objective 1 (PO129) states: ‘ensure that 35% of any residential developments (10 units or more) provides for single and two person households’. The proposed development provides 11% of units which are suitable for single and two person households. This does not comply with the development plan objective. It was however found acceptable by the planning authority. Replacement of further detached or semi-detached houses, by duplexes similar to those currently proposed, would not unduly impact on the overall layout and could be conditioned. … I am satisfied that the density, and residential amenities, are acceptable in light of the Laois County Development Plan 2021-2027. As noted above the mix of housing is deficient in its provision for smaller households.”30

23. The Addendum Report also notes that the issues raised in the Commission direction requesting an addendum report, including housing type mix, were not raised by the parties to the Appeal and that “should the Board be minded to take these matters into account in their decision”, s.137 PDA 2000 “may apply”.31

26 Report §3.6. 27 Report §3.7.4. 28 Report §5.2. 29 Sic. In fact HPO1. 30 §3.3.1. 31 § Other issues.

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IMPUGNED DECISION

24. The Commission did take the issue of housing mix/HPO1 into account in its decision. It refused permission for one reason only, as follows:

“Policy Objective 1 (HPO1) of the [2021 Development Plan] states: “ensure that 35% of any residential development (10 units or more) provides for single and two person households”.

It is considered that the proposed development which proposes 11% of the 85 units are suitable for single and two-person households does not comply with this Development Plan Objective. The proposed development would, therefore, be contrary to the proper planning and sustainable development of the area.

In deciding not to accept the Inspector’s recommendation to grant permission the … [Commission] considered the proposed housing mix of 11% of the 85 units for single and two person households was contrary to Development Plan policy and contrary to proper planning and sustainable development of the area.”

PLEADINGS - AMENDED GROUNDS, GROUND 2 & SCOPE OF CASE AS ARGUED

25. The Statement of Case32 identified Core Grounds 2 and 3 as impugning the Commission’s compliance with its duty to give reasons for its decision. In fact, in the Amended Statement of Grounds, Core Grounds 3 and 4 are the “reasons” grounds. Core Ground 2, which I set out below, was not a “reasons” ground.

26. Yet the pleaded Particulars of Core Ground 2 are headed “The impugned decision is invalid in that it has failed to give sufficient reasons for not accepting the recommendation of the Inspector in arriving at its decision” and the particulars which follow do not obviously make reasons complaints at all. Indeed, they do not even use the word “reasons”. That they would use that word is not a strict requirement but the absence illustrates the disconnect between the core ground as to reasons for not accepting the recommendation of the Inspector and the particulars proffered in its support. Unhelpfully, the particulars introduce what are in truth new core grounds - such as regard to irrelevant considerations, prejudgment, bias, irrationality, and breach of fair procedures. I observe as follows.

• First, while novelty is possible and they do overlap, there is an established taxonomy of core grounds in judicial review. I have just listed some of the major ones. Where possible – and it all but invariably is possible - core grounds should identify themselves by reference to that taxonomy and particulars should confine themselves to elaborating only the core grounds thus identified. Particulars are not an opportunity for introducing what are in truth new core grounds or for defensive “kitchen sink” or “scattergun” pleading. Pleadings in judicial review must be precise.

32 Filed pursuant to PD HC126.

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• Second, the disconnect between the core ground as to reasons for not accepting the recommendation of the Inspector and the particulars proffered in its support created confusion at trial as to what exactly was the scope of Garryduff’s case in this regard. As was said in a Ballyboden case33 where in a statement of grounds “there is genuine ‘doubt, ambiguity or confusion’ an Applicant in Judicial Review cannot have the benefit of it”.

27. Third, as O’Donnell J said in Shatter,34 even objective bias is an ugly allegation which should not be lightly made and care should be taken to establish that there is a sufficient factual and legal basis to make the claim before it is made. There was never here any basis for a plea of bias. In fairness, counsel at trial did not stand over, much less pursue, the plea. But it should never have been pleaded.

28. Fourth, counsel did seek to persist in an allegation of prejudgment on the basis that the Commission made its decision without first hearing Garryduff.35 While a fair procedures point might properly be made – breach of the principle audi alteram partem – that is not a prejudgment point. To be clear, whatever it may mean colloquially (In fairness to counsel, I think he deployed the word colloquially), as a plea in law prejudgment is a form of bias – see SWI.36 When pleaded or argued at trial, that is its clear connotation. Even in its objective form, it asserts a reasonable apprehension that the decision-maker deliberately both decided the matter prematurely and shut out a party entitled to be heard. It is as ugly as any other form of allegation of bias. There is no basis for such an allegation in this case. The allegation should have been withdrawn and ultimately it was.37

29. The Statement of Grounds provided particulars of only three of the four Core Grounds. It gave no particulars of what was in fact Core Ground 2. Counsel sought to explain this by saying that Core Ground 2 itself satisfied all pleading and particularity requirements. I respectfully disagree. For example, Core Ground 2 pleaded that the Commission had erred in interpreting HPO1. Clearly, to be pursued, that plea would have required particulars: first, stating the correct interpretation of HPO1; second stating that which the Applicant attributed to the Commission; and third contrasting them to demonstrate the asserted error. At trial, counsel for Garryduff did not pursue, but did not formally abandon, Core Ground 2. Rather, he accepted that High Court precedent binding me was against him and that he did not argue for a “Worldport”38 departure by me from that precedent. The implication, as I understood it, is that he sought to keep Ground 2 in the deep freeze to thaw out if he finds himself elsewhere in due course. I dismiss Core Ground 2 on that basis. However to avoid confusion, given the re-enumeration of the Core Grounds in the Statement of Case, I make clear that this dismissal is of Core Ground 2 as pleaded in the Statement of Grounds.

30. I mention that the Statement of Grounds provided particulars of only three of the four Core Grounds also as explaining why the particulars in the Statement of Grounds of Core Ground 4, as to the Commission’s

33 Ballyboden Tidy Towns Group v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2022] IEHC 7, [2022] 1 JIC 1001. 34 Shatter v Guerin [2021] 2 IR 415. 35 Transcript p99. 36 SWI, IFI, Sweetman & Ors v ALAB et al [2024] IEHC 421 §129 et seq. 37 Transcript p101. 38 Re Worldport Ireland, [2005] IEHC 189, [2005] 9 I.C.L.M.D. 13. In this regard see the transcript p94 & 95.

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reasons for concluding that the Proposed Development contravened HPO1, were provided sub nom Ground 3. Again, they introduced what were in effect, additional core grounds: irrationality, “a premature and irrelevant and/or improper consideration” and an alleged obligation to “if necessary, impose a condition which would in their view, satisfy HPO1”. At hearing, correctly and unsurprisingly, counsel for Garryduff disavowed alleging any such obligation.39

31. Incidentally, also pleaded in this context was a positive plea of “the clear understanding by the Notice Party that the proposed development in question did not offend the Housing Policy objective HPO1.” If, as a matter of fact, Garryduff positively had such a “clear understanding”, that plea could readily be interpreted as an admission by Garryduff, That is as the Commission’s case was that Garryduff should have appreciated the relevance of HPO1 to the determination of the Appeal and made submissions to the Commission accordingly and had opportunity to do so. However, as the plea did not feature in submissions or argument, I will ignore it.

32. Ultimately the case was argued on the fairly simple basis set out in the Statement of Case - as to contravention of s.137 PDA 2000 and on two fairly discrete reasons issues. As I indicated at trial, I will consider the case on that basis.40 In fairness to both parties, I think that basis sensibly reflects both the essence of what Garryduff intended to plead and that which the Commission considered acceptably clear in the pleadings. There is no pleading difficulty with Ground 1 – breach of s.137 PDA 2000. The Statement of Case renumbered the reasons grounds as Grounds 2 and 3 as to, respectively, reasons for not following the Inspector’s recommendation and for refusing permission for contravention of HPO1. I will do likewise.

33. As to what had been the pleaded Core Ground 2 (which I have dismissed), the Commission argued that its non-pursuit has consequences for the determination of the remaining grounds. So, I must set it out. It is that the Commission:41 • erred in its interpretation of HPO1. • failed, even if its interpretation of HPO1 is correct, to have regard to its jurisdiction under s.37(2)(a) PDA 2000,42 to grant permission despite contravention of HPO1. • failed to have regard to the views of the Planning Authority, Laois County Council and the Inspector.

GROUND 1 – CONTRAVENTION OF S.137 PDA 2000

34. Core Ground 1 asserts that:43 • The Impugned Decision contravenes s.137 PDA. • The purpose of s.137 is to protect parties to an appeal from determination of the appeal, based on

39 Transcript p53. 40 Transcript p101 & 102. 41 I have reformatted it and simplified the wording for clarity without changing meaning. 42 37 (2) (a) Subject to paragraph (b), the Board may in determining an appeal under this section decide to grant a permission even if the proposed

development contravenes materially the development plan relating to the area of the planning authority to whose decision the appeal relates. 43 Edited for brevity and clarity.

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matters not raised in the appeal, without the parties having had opportunity to make submissions on such matters. • Here, none of the matters that determined the appeal were raised in the appeal and Garryduff had no opportunity to address them. • Thereby Garryduff was deprived of fair procedures.

35. Garryduff pleads that the Commission’s qualitative assessment of the proper planning and sustainable development of the area having regard to HPO1 without first giving s.137 notice to the relevant parties, including Garryduff, was impermissible under the statutory scheme.

S.137 PDA 2000

36. S.137 PDA 2000 provides as follows:

‘‘137.— (1) The Board in determining an appeal or referral may take into account matters other than those raised by the parties or by any person who has made submissions or observations to the Board in relation to the appeal or referral if the matters are matters to which, by virtue of this Act, the Board may have regard.

(2) The Board shall give notice in writing to each of the parties and to each of the persons who have made submissions or observations in relation to the appeal or referral of the matters that it proposes to take into account under subsection (1) and shall indicate in that notice —

(a) in a case where the Board proposes to hold an oral hearing of the appeal or referral, or where an oral hearing of the appeal or referral has been concluded and the Board considers it expedient to re-open the hearing, that submissions in relation to the matters may be made to the person conducting the hearing,

or

(b) in a case where the Board does not propose to hold an oral hearing of the appeal or referral, or where an oral hearing of the appeal or referral has been concluded and the Board does not consider it expedient to re-open the hearing, that submissions or observations in relation to the matters may be made to the Board in writing within a period specified in the notice (being a period of not less than 2 weeks or more than 4 weeks beginning on the date of service of the notice).’’

GARRYDUFF’S POSITION

37. The Commission, in requiring an additional inspector’s report, clearly acknowledged the significance of the new 2021 CDP as to mix of housing types. In that regard, the Addendum Report considered a change

12 Garryduff Properties v ACP [2026] IEHC 78

effected by the 2021 CDP44 - i.e. HPO1 - which had not been raised by anyone in the appeal. The Inspector suggested that the replacement of additional houses, by additional duplexes similar to those proposed,45 would not unduly impact on the overall layout and could be conditioned. The Commission elected neither to impose the condition which the Inspector had proposed nor to notify the parties to the Appeal pursuant to s.137 PDA 2000 of its contemplated reliance on HPO1. This deprived Garryduff of an opportunity to address the Commission’s concerns as to HPO1.

38. Garryduff submits that

• Where the Commission, of its own motion, decided to rely, in making its decision and as the sole reason for refusing permission, entirely on a matter not raised by anyone in the Appeal, it was statutorily obliged, but failed, to give Garryduff an opportunity to comment thereon.

• The Commission’s assertion that Garryduff had opportunity to address this matter in its response to the Appeal, if made in the timeframe provided, is unreasonable where such a response would have been confined to the issues raised in the Appeal and where the Council did not take issue with HPO1 at first instance or in its response to the Appeal. The purpose of the statutory requirement is to afford parties opportunity to address matters likely to inform decisions on appeal.

COMMISSION’S POSITION

39. The Commission submits that, as to the interpretation and application to the facts of s.137 PDA, the 2021 CDP was not, for the purpose of s.137(1) PDA 2000, a new matter to which the Commission “may” have regard. Rather, the 2021 CDP was a matter to which the Commission must, by statute, have regard and so was a matter which did not fall within s.137 because, in making its submission in the ordinary way, an interested person is taken to be aware of those matters to which the Commission, as a matter of law, must have regard. So such person has fair opportunity, of which (s)he is expected to avail, to address those matters. The Commission considers that such caselaw as there is on s.137 was of little assistance on the particular interpretive issues arising here.46

40. Even if there was a breach of s.137, the Commission submits, given the purposes of fair procedures which underlie S.137 (which purposes Ground 1 invokes), Garryduff should be refused discretionary relief in judicial review as, on the facts of this case, it has suffered no substantive unfairness of procedures.

41. As to fair procedures, the Commission says Garryduff ignores the facts that the 2021 CDP and HPO1

44 An unpleaded additional allegation in the Statement of Case of unheralded reliance on guidelines was abandoned at trial on the basis, correctly in my view. See transcript p103. 45 i.e. in the revised plan on which the Council had decided to grant permission. 46 Frank Harrington v An Bord Pleanála [2010] IEHC 428; Keshmore Homes v An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 369, [2023] 6 JIC 2702; Annagh Windfarm

Limited v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 2.

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took effect prior to: (i) Garryduff’s last submission to the Council; (ii) the Council’s Decision; (iii) the making of the Appeal to the Commission and (iv) Garryduff’s opportunity to make a submission to the Commission in the Appeal.

42. The Commission invokes the de novo nature of an appeal, its obligation to decide an appeal by reference to the development plan operative at the date of its decision and Garryduff’s entitlement to make in the Appeal any submissions it might have wished to make – including as to the 2021 CDP and HPO1. It invokes also s.129 PDA 2000 and the cases of McMonagail, Wexele, Keshmore Homes and Morehart.47 It submits that

• it should have been obvious to Garryduff that the Commission would consider HPO1 in determining the Appeal.

• Garryduff ignores that, and fails to explain why, it did not address the relevant aspects of the 2021 CDP or HPO1 before the Council or, thereafter, before the Commission – despite having had opportunity to do so. Garryduff omits to address that it failed, without explanation, to make any valid submission in the Appeal.

• Specifically as to making a submission regarding HPO1, it appears (albeit only disclosed in submissions – not in evidence), that Garryduff’s failure to do so was due to an erroneous belief that the scope of any submission it might make in the Appeal was confined to the grounds of appeal. It was not so confined.

• Accordingly, there was nothing unfair to Garryduff in the process before the Commission.

• Contrary to Wexele,48Garryduff fails also to articulate what it would have said about HPO1 had it had opportunity to do so.

• Garryduff attempts to now blame the Commission for determining the Appeal by reference to the operative development plan and seeks reward for its own failure to participate proactively in the planning process.

43. S.137 PDA was not breached, nor were the Commission’s procedures unfair – this ground of challenge should be dismissed, if needs be on a discretionary basis given the lack of substantive unfairness.

47 As to which, see below. 48 §20.

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G1 – DISCUSSION & DECISION

Interpretation & Application of s.137

44. I agree that the caselaw on s.137 does not much assist – though that is no criticism of the cases given the context in which they considered s.137. It is, however, common case that the animating principle of s.137 is that of fair procedures. Also, and whatever its substance, it is clear that when the conditions for its invocation are satisfied, the power s.137 confers on the Commission is not discretionary. The Commission must exercise it. The s.137 power is in imperative and beguilingly simple terms.

45. It is common case that the 2021 CDP and its HPO1 were, in s.137 terms, matters,

• “other than those raised by the parties or by any person who has made submissions or observations to the Board in relation to the appeal”. • Which the Board in determining the appeal or referral took into account”.

The Commission’s resistance to the allegation of breach of s.137, therefore, rests at least in part on the assertion that the 2021 CDP and its HPO1 were not, in the terms of s.137, matters to which it “may” have regard but were matters which it “must” have regard.

46. It is well established that, depending on context, the word “may” can be, though it is not usually, imperative – it can mean “must” or “shall”. The cases were canvassed in Heneghan.49 Here the question is a bit different – whether “may” includes or excludes “must”. The question arises in a highly complex planning code in which the Commission must have regard to very many matters – such as s.28 guidelines. But there is in reality a multiplicity of such documents, on myriad subjects, many of which will be, in truth, more or less irrelevant to a given planning appeal. In reality, the Commission has appreciable discretion as to whether, other than a notional way, it has regard to them. Similarly, while the Commission must have regard to a development plan, much of such a plan will be more or less irrelevant to the appeal in hand. While I do not so hold, it seems to me that s.137 is at least a context in which a may/must distinction may blur in practice. I would be cautious of unintended consequences for more complex cases in taking a view on the relatively simple facts of this case as to the interpretation of s.137 as it relates to that may/must distinction. If necessary to decide this case I would, of course, be obliged to take a view. But, fortunately I think, it is not so necessary.

47. On that basis, I assume for present purposes (but do not find) a breach of s.137 as Garryduff alleges. The question remains whether that assumption justifies certiorari on the facts of this case.

49 Heneghan v Minister for Housing, [2023] IESC 7 [2023] 2 I.L.R.M. 1.

15 Garryduff Properties v ACP [2026] IEHC 78

Fair Procedures

48. It is, as stated above, common case that the animating principle of s.137 is that of fair procedures. In that light, the following considerations appear to me to be relevant.

49. By s.37(1)(b) PDA 2000 it determines appeals as if the application had been made to it in the first instance - South-West Regional Shopping Centre.50 It is fundamental to the PDA 2000 that the Commission considers and decides appeals by way of “full de novo assessment of the application” – Alen-Buckley.51 It does so on the criterion of “proper planning and sustainable development of the area”52 – and to that end must “have regard” to the development plan.53 It can grant permission for a modified development on foot of revised plans.54 So, the Commission, in deciding an appeal, is not confined to consideration of only the issues raised in the appeal – as, indeed, is demonstrated by s.137 PDA 2000, which provides for submissions by the parties on issues not raised in the appeal.

50. It follows that, in making replying submissions to an appeal, a person such as Garryduff in the subject Appeal, is not confined to the issues raised in the appeal but may address any issues relevant to the Board’s consideration of the appeal. Indeed, though a contrary position had been intimated, counsel for Garryduff, correctly and properly, accepted at trial that this is so.55 S.129 PDA 2000,56 which governs the right to make submissions and observations in an appeal provides no support for a contrary view. And in Morehart57 Farrell J found that an observer’s entitlement to make observations in an appeal is “not restricted” in “nature or scope” – are “not limited in terms of scope or subject matter”. A fortiori, that must be true of the applicant for permission in responding to a third-party appeal. Undoubtedly, this unrestricted entitlement to make submissions includes submissions as to the bearing on the determination of the appeal of the relevant development plan – including a development plan which took effect after the planning application was made.

51. Considering fair procedures in Wexele58 Charleton J, observed that, as to fair procedures, “The first

50 South-West Regional Shopping Centre Promotion Association v An Bord Pleanála, & Limerick City and County Council, [2016] IEHC 84, [2016] 2 IR 481. Also, Simons on Planning Law, 3rd Ed’n (Browne) §6-255, O'Keeffe v An Bord Pleanála [1993] 1 IR 39 (HC) & Spencer Place Development Company v Dublin City Council [2019] IEHC 384. 51 Alen-Buckley v An Bord Pleanála (No.2) [2017] IEHC 541 §43. See also Fitzgibbon v Law Society of Ireland [2015] 1 I.R. 516; [2014] IESC 68. 52 Navan Co-Ownership v An Bord Pleanála [2016] IEHC 181 §18. 53 Spencer Place Development Company Limited v Dublin City Council [2020] IECA 268 §11. 54 Simons on Planning Law, 3rd Ed’n (Browne) §6-258. 55 E.g. Transcript p80. 56 129.—(1) The Board shall, as soon as may be after receipt of an appeal or referral, give a copy thereof to each other party.

(2) (a) Each other party may make submissions or observations in writing to the Board in relation to the appeal or referral within a period of 4 weeks beginning on the day on which a copy of the appeal or referral is sent to that party by the Board. (b) Any submissions or observations received by the Board after the expiration of the period referred to in paragraph (a) shall not be considered by the Board. (3) Where no submissions or observations have been received from a party within the period referred to in subsection (2), the Board may without further notice to that party determine the appeal or referral. (4) Without prejudice to section 131 or 134, a party shall not be entitled to elaborate in writing upon any submissions or observations made in accordance with subsection (2) or make any further submissions or observations in writing in relation to the appeal or referral and any such elaboration, submissions or observations that is or are received by the Board shall not be considered by it. 57 Morehart v. An Coimisiún Pleanála & Abbott Ireland [2025] IEHC 418 §92, [2025] IEHC 701 §22. 58 Wexele v An Bord Pleanála (No. 1) [2010] IEHC 21.

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principal applicable is that of utility”. He cited Haverty59 to the effect that:

“The essence of natural justice60 is that it requires the application of broad principles of commonsense and fair play to a given set of circumstances in which a person is acting judicially. What will be required must vary with the circumstances of the case.”

52. In Keshmore Homes,61 in distinguishing Wexele and McMonagail on their facts, Phelan J characterised those cases as ones in which the applicants had not fallen victim to unfair procedures as they had been afforded, as Charleton J said in Wexele, “full opportunity to make any reasonable or relevant point that they chose to pursue”.

53. As a matter of common sense and fair procedures it seems to me obvious that where an interested person is given the opportunity to make submissions but fails to take it he cannot complain of not having had the opportunity to make submissions and thus to be heard in the process. The point need only be stated to reveal such a complaint as unstateable.

54. In short and insofar as the substance of fair procedures are concerned, the height of Garryduff’s complaint is that they were denied a chance to address HPO1. Equally in short, they were not. I am in no doubt but that Garryduff had sufficient opportunity in the planning process, if only in the process before the Commission, to make any submissions it might have wished to make as to the bearing of the 2021 CDP, and specifically HPO1, on the determination of the Appeal. As to the requirement of audi alteram partem, the process was not unfair to Garryduff.

Discretionary Relief

55. Inaction by the claimant (in McMonagail terms, passivity), lack of prejudice and proportionality of relief are factors relevant to the consideration of the exercise of the discretion to refuse relief – see Reilly.62 In the circumstances of this case, the underlying purpose of s.137 – audi alteram partem - was not frustrated on the facts of this case. Indeed, it was amply met and Garryduff suffered no relevant prejudice. The failure was Garryduff’s in failing to avail of its opportunity to be heard. In those circumstances, certiorari would be disproportionate to the breach of s.137 which I have assumed for the sake of argument.

56. Accordingly, and of my discretion, I refuse to grant relief on Ground 1.

59 State (Haverty) v. An Bord Pleanála, [1987] I.R. 485. 60 For which phrase we can read “fair procedures”.

61 Keshmore Homes Ltd v An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 369 (inter alia, §92). 62 Reilly v An Coimisiún Pleanála & Lark Finance [2025] IEHC 659.

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LAW AS TO REASONS - S.34(10) PDA 2000 & CASELAW

57. S.34(10) PDA 2000 provides, as relevant, that a decision in a planning appeal “shall state the main reasons and considerations on which the decision is based”. Where the decision “to grant or to refuse permission is different, in relation to the granting or refusal of permission, from the recommendation in” the inspector’s report, the decision “shall indicate the main reasons for not accepting the recommendation in the report or reports to grant or refuse permission.”

58. The law as to the adequacy of reasons given by administrative decision-makers for impugned decisions reasons is recently summarised, though explicitly inexhaustively, in RWWA63 and Foran.64 Much of that summary is irrelevant here. It suffices to note that:

• Adequacy of reasons is fundamental to trust in public administration – Balz65and NECI.66 In similar vein, Farrell J recently said in GOCE67 that “The obligation to provide reasons is a fundamental requirement of a valid administrative decision.” The obligation is the administrative law analogue in of the common law’s requirement that justice should not only be done, but be seen to be done - Number 1 Poultry.68

• The requirement is to provide “the main reasons on the main issues”.69 That requirement is understood in terms of the “broad issues” in, and “broad gist” of, the impugned decision.70 There is no obligation to provide a discursive, narrative consideration. Reasons must state the “essential rationale” of the impugned decision and must “allow the applicant to understand in general terms why the decision was made” - “why the decision went the way it did”.71 Reasons must disclose that the decision-maker has “directed its mind adequately to the issue before it”.72 A “reasoned” decision “demonstrating” the decisionmaker’s reasoning process is required73 - as opposed to merely a statement of the conclusion reached. The Supreme Court has said that, while the refined logical reasoning and expression of a court judgment is not required, it is necessary is that, on a broad and common-sense approach, “a party, and in due course a reviewing court, can genuinely understand the reasoning process.”74 Reasons must, in context, be “adequate to the situation” considered as a question of substance not form and applying common-sense

63 Rural Residents Wind Aware and Environmental Group v An Coimisiún Pleanála & White Hill Wind [2025] IEHC 600, [2025] 11 JIC 0603 (1/11/25). 64 Foran v An Coimisiún Pleanála & Glenveagh [2026] IEHC 23. 65 Balz v An Bord Pleanála [2019] IESC 90; [2020] 1 I.L.R.M. 637. 66 NECI v Labour Court [2021] IESC 36,[2021] 2 I.L.R.M. 1. 67 GOCE v An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 554. 68 Save Britain’s Heritage v Number 1 Poultry Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 153, 170, Lord Bridge. 69 Connelly v An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31, [2018] 2 I.L.R.M. 45; Balscadden Road SAA Residents Association Ltd. v An Bord Pleanála (No. 1) [2020]

IEHC 586, [2020] 11 JIC 2501; Atlantic Diamond v An Bord Pleanála [2021] IEHC 322; Grassridge v Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2024] IEHC 669 §59; Pat O'Donnell v Dublin City Council [2024] IEHC 671 §129; Graymount House Action Group v An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 327, [2025] IESCDET 22; Morris v An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 25. 70 O'Keefe v An Bord Pleanála [1993] 1 I.R. 39, [1992] I.L.R.M. 237 at p. 76; Faulkner v Minister for Industry and Commerce 1997 WJSC-SC 962, ( [1996]

12 JIC 1007 Unreported, Supreme Court, 10 December 1996. 71 Kuwait v Kanj [2021] IEHC 395; Stapleton v ABP & Savona [2024] IEHC 3, FN v Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 116; Connelly v An Bord Pleanála, Clare

County Council & McMahon Finn Wind [2018] IESC 31, [2021] 2 IR 752 §30. 72 Ballyboden Tidy Towns Group v An Bord Pleanála & Shannon Homes [2022] IEHC 7; Oates v Browne [2016] IESC 7. 73 Rawson v Minister for Defence [2012] IESC 26 SC §6.9; Damer v An Bord Pleanála [2019] IEHC 505, Connelly v An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31, [2021]

2 I.R. 752, [2018] 2 I.L.R.M. 453, §5. 74 YY v Minister for Justice and Equality, [2018] 1 ILRM 109, §80.

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and practicality.75 Reasons must be “clear” and “cogent” (which is to say, “persuasive” in the sense of capable of persuading76) and “intelligible”/“comprehensible”.77

• Reasons may be implicit from the context and need not be explicitly stated for the obvious/self- evident.78 A decision should not be quashed for lack of reasons if nobody could be in any “real doubt” as to what the reasons were - Killegland79 and Leefield (“can have no real doubt as to why it lost and why An Bord Pleanála reached the decision it did”).80 These principles derive, at least in part, from the principles that administrative decisions should be interpreted holistically and in context and that one must “stand back and ask what the decision is fundamentally saying”.81

59. While I think Irish law as to reasons differs in at least some respects from English law, Garryduff cites, for another purpose, a UKHL decision which, as it happens, illuminates this latter point. In South Bucks DC82 the UKHL, in terms repeated in CPRE Kent,83 asked whether “on a straightforward down-to-earth reading” the decision-maker’s reasons leave “room for genuine as opposed to forensic doubt as to what he has decided and why”.

60. Some additional observations assist here. Sexton84 is authority that, on differing from its inspector, the Commission has what has been termed an “enhanced” duty to give reasons. It must set out simply and in a clear and meaningful way, its main reasons for not accepting the inspector’s recommendation and do so in sufficient detail to enable an interested person to know why the Commission differed from the inspector. There are two main reasons for this enhanced duty: first, as the Commission rejects the inspector’s reasons, it must state reasons of its own; second, the Commission is expected to engage with the inspector’s rationale. However, even in the case of such disagreement, the terse reasons may prove acceptable depending on circumstance. As held on the facts in Leefield:

“…….. the reason given could, I think, be fairly described as terse. However the question posed for consideration was a straightforward one. ……………. Once the Board had decided to differ with its Inspector there was really little more to be said.”85

75 Grassridge v Dún Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2024] IEHC 669 §§55, 60, 61, Murphy v The Standards in Public Office Commission [2024] IEHC

374, FC v Mental Health Tribunal [2022] IECA 290. McEvoy v Preliminary Proceedings Committee [2022] IECA 174, Marques v Minister for Justice and Equality [2019] IESC 16, Flynn v Medical Council [2012] 3 IR 236. 76 As opposed to persuasive in the sense of actually persuading.

77 Ballyboden Tidy Towns Group v An Bord Pleanála & Shannon Homes [2022] IEHC 7 §272, citing Mulholland and Kinsella v An Bord Pleanála and

others. [2005] IEHC 306, Grealish v An Bord Pleanála [2007] 2 IR 536; Harten v An Bord Pleanála [2018] IEHC 40; Westminster City Council v Great Portland Estates [1985] AC 661; Eco Advocacy CLG v An Bord Pleanála (C-721/21), [2024] Env L.R. 8 (2023) EU:C:2023:477 (Kokott AG); SWI, IFI, Sweetman & Ors v ALAB [2024] IEHC 421 §978. 78 Morehart v An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 418; Rana v Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46; Industrial Development Agency v Information

Commissioner [2024] IEHC 649 §132; Killegland Estates v Meath County Council [2022] IEHC 393, [2022] 7 JIC 0106, [2023] IESC 39 §83; Connelly v An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31, [2021] 2 I.R. 752, [2018] 2 I.L.R.M. 453 §37; Mallak v Minister for Justice [2012] IESC 59, [2012] 3 IR 297 §68. 79 Killegland Estates v Meath County Council [2023] IESC 39 (§69). 80 Leefield Limited v An Bord Pleanála & O'Flynn Construction [2012] IEHC 539 §20. 81 Mc Gowan v An Comisiúin Pleanála [2025] IEHC 405; O’Donnell v An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 381 §54; St. Margaret’s Recycling v An Bord Pleanála

[2024] IEHC 94 §57. 82 South Bucks District Council v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions [2004] UKHL 33, [2004] 4 All ER 775, [2004] 1 WLR

1953, [2004] 4 PLR 50. Also reported sub nom South Buckinghamshire DC v. Porter. 83 R(CPRE Kent) v Dover District Council [2018] 1 WLR 108, [2018] 1 WLR 108. 84 Sexton v ABP & Fingal CC [2025] IEHC 449. Also Ventaway v An Comisiúin Pleanála [2025] IEHC 406 & McGowan v An Comisiúin Pleanála [2025] IEHC

405. 85 Leefield Limited v An Bord Pleanála & O'Flynn Construction [2012] IEHC 539 §19.

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On reflection, I confess to wondering, but need not here decide, whether the word “enhanced” might, in the context of the duty to give reasons for rejecting an inspector’s recommendation, be usefully retired in favour of the word “particular” or “specific”.

61. Grassridge86 cites GOCE as an example of the observation that merely conclusionary reasoning may well be inadequate. But Grassridge also makes clear that this principle requires careful application - I would add, application by reference to the requirements, identified above, of a common-sense and practical approach to the question whether the decision discloses its essential rationale. Grassridge, citing, inter alia, Duffy87continues: “However”, • reasons must be read objectively. • adequacy of reasons is case- and context-specific. They must be “adequate to the situation” as a matter of fairness and as “a question of substance and not form”. So, “there is a balance to be struck”. I add that what may look at first blush like an objectionably conclusionary statement may be viewed differently in its contextual light and when read by the informed reader. • as reasons need not be given where they are obvious, it follows that in such cases the decision may be expressed in conclusionary terms.

62. The law does not require “reasons for reasons” or “micro sub-reasons”.88 These are just ways of saying that what is required are “main” reasons disclosing the “essential rationale” – “what the decision is fundamentally saying” and “why the decision went the way it did”89 – rather than highly detailed and refined logical reasoning.

63. Usually, the argument in a reasons case is not as to the substance of the law on reasons but as to its application to the facts of the particular case. Whether a proffered reason adequately discloses the decision- maker’s reasoning (as it must) or is merely conclusionary may be a fine, contextual and fact-sensitive exercise (e.g. O’Neill90) on which differing, indeed plausible and properly semantic, views may be possible. As to whether a proffered reason is flawed as merely conclusionary, and while in this respect they articulate approaches, not tests, the cases seem to me to assist as they approve a common-sense and practical approach, standing back to see what the decision is fundamentally saying and asking whether there is “real doubt” as to “why the decision went the way it did”.

86 Grassridge v Dún Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2024] IEHC 669. 87 Duffy v An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 558. citing MRRA v An Bord Pleanála & Lulani [2022] IEHC 318 §64, FC v Mental Health Tribunal [2022] IECA

290, Marques v Minister for Justice and Equality [2019] IESC 16, Carrownagowan Concern Group v An Bord Pleanála & Futureenergy [2024] IEHC 300 at §167, Mallak v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IESC 59, [2021] 3 IR 297. 88 Killegland Estates Ltd v Meath County Council [2022] IEHC 393. 89 Kuwait v Kanj [2021] IEHC 395; Stapleton v ABP & Savona [2024] IEHC 3, FN v Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 116; Connelly v An Bord Pleanála, Clare

County Council & McMahon Finn Wind [2018] IESC 31, [2021] 2 IR 752 §30. 90 O'Neill v. An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 356 §180.

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GOCE (2024) ON SIGNIFICANCE OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH DEVELOPMENT PLAN

64. Garryduff cites GOCE91 as authority that • mere demonstration of non-compliance with a development plan is, per se, an insufficient reason for refusal of a planning permission. • further reasons are required to explain why that non-compliance with the development plan implies that the development proposal falls short of proper planning and sustainable development – which is, all agree, the overarching consideration in a planning decision.

65. True in GOCE, Farrell J., in the context and on the facts of that case, considered that a finding of contravention of the development plan did not suffice to explain why the development proposal fell short of proper planning and sustainable development. But, in my view, Garryduff pitched the significance of GOCE too high. It errs in reasoning from the particular of GOCE to the general. I read GOCE as requiring that reasons for refusal of permission disclose why the development proposal falls short of proper planning and sustainable development. And in the context and on the facts in GOCE, that required going beyond merely finding contravention of the development plan. An important context in GOCE, absent here, was the finding that the Commission had misinterpreted the relevant development plan.92 I do not read GOCE as holding, as a matter of law, that demonstration of non-compliance with a development plan necessarily cannot, or even generally does not, suffice as demonstration of inconsistency with proper planning and sustainable development. It did not suffice in GOCE but may well do so in other instances. Context matters and common-sense applies. An important context in general is that, as I hope to have demonstrated above, a development plan’s terms are fundamentally informed by, and are an authoritative (even if not always decisive93) application and expression by the planning authority of, the concept of proper planning and sustainable development of the area to which it applies. While, in that regard, the Commission may or may not agree with the planning authority, it is hardly surprising or mysterious if it does. Even if a reason is not obvious absent recourse to the development plan’s terms, such recourse may make it so. Or it may not – depending on context. In short and in my view, properly understood, GOCE

• properly recognised the possibility that, in a given case, a finding of contravention of the development plan may not suffice to explain why the development proposal fell short of proper planning and sustainable development.

• did not hold that in all cases a finding of contravention of the development plan will not suffice as explaining why the development proposal fell short of proper planning and sustainable development.

66. As I observed at trial,94 to correctly say, as GOCE in effect does, that as to a proposed development a development plan is not always the last word on the issue of proper planning and sustainable development and further exposition of that issue may be required is not, logically, to say it can never be the last word on particular facts. Nor for that matter, is it even to say that it is not often or even usually the last word.

91 GOCE v An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 554. 92 GOCE §31. 93 Given the Commission’s power to grant permission in material contravention of a development plan. 94 Transcript p59.

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GROUND 395 - REASONS WHY PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT DID NOT SATISFY OBJECTIVE HPO1

67. The Statement of Case addressed together what it enumerated as Grounds 2 and 3. However it seems to me clearer to address them separately. I will consider Ground 3 first.

GARRYDUFF’S POSITION

68. The Commission concluded that only 11% of the units in the Proposed Development would be suited to single- and two-person households, against a HPO1 objective to “ensure” 35%. Garryduff asserts that

• the Inspector based her conclusion that the Proposed Development of 11% of units for single- and two-person households does not comply with HPO1 and that the housing mix “is deficient in its provision for smaller households” not on the suitability of the units for single- or two- person households, but on an unreasoned quantitative exercise where only the outcome was detailed. She did not record on what evidence she relied and/or how the HPO1 criteria were not met.

• the Commission provided “no reasoning” and “no mathematical methodology” by reference to evaluative criteria in the 2021 CDP, and breached its duty under s.34(10) PDA 2000 to provide its own reasons for concluding that only 11% of the units met the criteria for single- and two- person households;

• due to the deficiency in the reasons provided it is unable to challenge the methodology of application of HPO1. It professes to be “at a loss” as to the basis for the 11% figure and to be “in the dark” as to how the decision was made.

COMMISSION’S POSITION

69. The Commission says the reasons for refusal in this case are obvious. HPO1 straightforwardly requires 35% of the units to cater for single and two-person households and only 11% do so. Garryduff itself provided the 11% figure to the Council. Like the numerically quantified objective at issue in Clane Community Council,96 HPO1 is “… simple, straightforward and mathematical, and doesn’t confer any planning judgement…”. Garryduff “can have no real doubt as to why it lost” - as to what the Commission’s reason were. In this regard it cites Leefield97 and Killegland.98

95 Enumerated as per Statement of Case. Is Ground 4 in the Statement of Grounds. 96 Clane Community Council v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 467 §94. The objective related to the quantum of provision of car parking spaces. 97 Leefield Limited v An Bord Pleanála & O'Flynn Construction [2012] IEHC 539. 98 Killegland Estates v Meath County Council [2023] IESC 39 §69.

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G3 - DECISION

70. The Commission’s submissions convince. As has been seen, the given reason for the Impugned Decision asserted that the Proposed Development did not comply with CDP Housing Policy Objective HPO1 to “ensure that 35% of any residential development (10 units or more) provides for single and two person households” as 11% of the proposed development units are suitable for single- and two-person households.

71. Given argument at trial, it is necessary to observe that the plea here is not • of reasons inadequate to explain a finding that the Proposed Development is inconsistent with proper planning and sustainable development. • that the finding that the Proposed Development did not comply with CDP Housing Policy Objective HPO1 does not supply a reason adequate to explain a finding that the Proposed Development is inconsistent with proper planning and sustainable development. Those observations distinguish the case from GOCE. Here we have, in the end, a simpler and narrower plea which does not raise wider issues of proper planning and sustainable development. The plea is simply of inadequate reasons why the Proposed Development did not comply with HPO1. The strict rules of pleading in judicial review confine Garryduff to that plea.

72. To the extent that its particulars elaborate the Core Ground, Garryduff pleads that the Commission “never recorded or undertook any or any adequate analysis of the units that were to be built”. As best I can discern, this assertion appears to be based in a view that, whereas Garryduff’s own RRfI asserts that over 11% of the proposed units will be one- and two-bedroom units, that assertion did not of itself permit of a conclusion that 11% of the Proposed Development units are suitable for single- and two-person households. Garryduff’s proposition appears to be that the phrases “one- and two-bedroom units” and “single- and two- person households” do not coincide. I have above rejected that view, considered in context, as linguistic cavilling of a kind in which the XJS interpreter would not indulge. In my view, such a reader, on a common- sense, practical and objective view, is left in no real doubt as to why, in this respect, the Impugned Decision went the way it did.

73. Accordingly, I respectfully reject Ground 3 as to reasons for concluding that the Proposed Development did not satisfy HPO1.

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GROUND 299 - FAILURE TO GIVE REASONS FOR NOT ACCEPTING THE INSPECTOR’S RECOMMENDATION

GIVEN REASON & INITIAL OBSERVATIONS

74. As has been seen, the Impugned Decision states, that

“In deciding not to accept the Inspector’s recommendation to grant permission the … [Commission] considered the proposed housing mix of 11% of the 85 units for single and two person households was contrary to Development Plan policy and contrary to proper planning and sustainable development of the area.”

75. I agree with Garryduff that this reason does not appreciably elaborate on – it essentially repeats – the Commission’s general reason for refusing permission. However, it would be a logical fallacy to suggest, on this account alone, that the Impugned Decision fails the duty to explain non-acceptance of the Inspector’s recommendation. The point is not to compare the general reason with the reason for non-acceptance of the Inspector’s recommendation: the point is to test the reason for non-acceptance of the Inspector’s recommendation against the duty to give reasons for such non-acceptance. Depending on circumstance, a given reason may satisfy both duties. And, as recorded above, Leefield is authority that in some circumstances, on a straightforward question the reason may be terse where there is “really little more to be said.”

WHAT DID THE INSPECTOR RECOMMEND?

76. The law does not prescribe the form of an inspector’s report. Yet anyone who has read more than a few knows that, though departures are permissible, in practice and more or less consistently (at least in relatively simple files, not involving complex EU Law issues, such as this was), they adhere to a template. The contents list (a very helpful element of any such report) of the Inspector’s first report reveals it to have been in conventional form. It reads, in part,100 as follows:

• 1.0 Site Location and Description • 2.0 Proposed Development • 3.0 Planning Authority Decision • 4.0 Planning History • 5.0 Policy Context o 5.6. EIA Screening • 6.0 The Appeal • 7.0 Assessment o 7.2. Appropriate Assessment o 7.3. Principle of Development

99 Enumerated as per Statement of Case. Is Ground 3 in the Statement of Grounds. 100 For brevity I have omitted most sub-headings.

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• 8.0 Recommendation o 9.0 Reasons and Considerations101 o 10.0 Conditions

77. It is important to say both that headings in Inspector’s reports are not determinative as to subject- matter or status of content and that such reports must be read as a whole – not as isolated chapters. Nonetheless, headings are informative and it is readily to be assumed that the form of such reports is informed, as relevant here, by the duty imposed on Inspectors by s.146(2) PDA 2000 to make recommendations in their reports.

78. Here, the Inspector’s first report, as has been noted, mentioned the 2021 CDP as applicable but said no more of it and, in particular, did not address HPO1. It contained the following:

“8.0 Recommendation 8.1.1. In accordance with the foregoing I recommend that the proposed development be permitted, for the following reasons and considerations, in accordance with the following conditions.”

79. There follow two sections which are clearly to be read as recommended content of the Commission’s decision.

“8.0 Reasons and Considerations The proposed development, in an area zoned for residential development, is part of the Kilminchy development impacted by servicing capacity constraints, which are being or are to be addressed by the local authority. The proposed development would benefit from these works and should contribute to the exceptional costs. With the benefit of the remedial works the proposed development would be in accordance with the proper planning and sustainable development of the area.”

80. §10.0 lists recommended conditions. Condition 1 is the usual condition requiring development in accordance with the plans and particulars supplied by Garryduff. They include the RRfI dated 21 December 2021, which included a revised proposal of 89 units, of which over 11% would be one and two-bedroom units in a block of duplexes. Otherwise, no recommended condition addresses housing mix or the provision of units for single- and two-person households.

81. In response to the Board’s direction of 7 September 2023 to, inter alia, further consider the mix of housing types in light of the 2021 CDP, the Inspector’s second report, in terms set out above,102 observed that

101 I have relegated §§9 & 10 to sub-heading status as they are part of the Inspector’s recommendation. 102 Inspector’s 2nd Report §3.3. Mix of Housing Types and Residential Amenities.

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• the Proposed Development of 11% of units for single- and two-person households does not comply with HPO1. The housing mix “is deficient in its provision for smaller households”. • The Council had found this acceptable. • Replacement of further houses by duplexes103 “would not unduly impact on the overall layout and could be conditioned”.

82. Given the first report had noted that the 2021 CDP applied and could have addressed the terms of the 2021 CDP but did not do so, and the obvious disparity between the 35% requirement of HPO1 and the 11% provision in the Proposed Development as revised by the RRfI, I think the Commission’s direction of 7 September 2023 must be read as an assertion of the inadequacy of the first report – including by reason of its failure to address HPO1.104 I must assume that the Inspector, in writing her second report, appreciated that as the position and yet remained conscious of her statutory duty to include a recommendation in her report. Given s.146 and s.37(10)105 PDA 2000, certainty and clarity of an inspector’s recommendation is important. Also, it is not difficult to infer that while a recommendation must be read as part of an Inspector’s report as a whole, it is at very least desirable from the point of view of legal certainty and likely is required by s.146 PDA 2000, to explicitly identify and express the recommendation of an inspector’s report. Indeed that is in fact the all-but-invariable practice of the Commission’s inspectors, I am conscious of the need in the present case to interpret both Inspector’s reports together as a whole, while also reading the second report as a specific response to the Commission’s direction of 7 September 2023. While, taking her reports as a whole, it must be considered that she let her recommendation in her first report stand, it would have been helpful had she, in her second report, explicitly addressed the issue of recommendation.

83. As has been seen, in her second report, the Inspector’s positing the application of s.137 was framed in terms of having drawn the Commission’s attention to the possibility of addressing replacement of further houses by duplexes. It uses the following phrase of this and of her consideration of the other issues raised in the Commission’s direction of 7 September 2023: “should the Board be minded to take these matters into account in their decision”. However, the Inspector does not explicitly recommend replacement of further houses by duplexes. Nor does she explicitly alter – or, for that matter, even mention - the recommendation of her first report. Her second report contains no explicit recommendation. Nor does her second report propose or recommend the terms of a condition providing for the replacement of further houses by duplexes.

84. Accordingly and not without hesitation, I have concluded as a matter of interpretation of her reports that the Inspector did not, explicitly or implicitly, recommend replacement of further houses by duplexes in order to approach or meet the 35% requirement of HPO1. I draw that conclusion in circumstances in which she had not, in her first report, recommended such a condition and on the basis that, had the Inspector in her second report intended to alter the explicit recommendation of her first report by recommending a

103 Similar to those proposed in the RRfI. 104 An analogous issue was discussed between counsel for the Commission and me – see transcript p140 et seq. It culminated in the Commission’s acceptance in effect that, as to HPO1, what it asserted should have been obvious to Garryduff when making its submissions to the Commission ought to have been equally obvious, but apparently was not, to the Inspector in writing her first report. As I have found earlier, the importance of HPO1 ought to have been apparent to both. 105 Which requires reasons for not accepting an inspector’s recommendation.

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condition requiring replacement of further houses by duplexes in order to meet the requirement of HPO1, she would have done so explicitly as a recommendation and, most likely, would have provided the terms of such a condition, including a quantification of the number of duplexes which would have rendered the Proposed Development acceptable in her view (which might or might not have fully reached 35%). Instead, she identified the possibility as available “should the Board be minded” to pursue the issue.

85. The Commission was not substantively obliged to avoid refusing permission by imposing a condition requiring replacement of further houses by duplexes in order to comply with HPO1. While Garryduff did ventilate that proposition, it was ultimately not pursued at trial. Nor, ordinarily, was the Commission obliged to provide a reason for not imposing such a condition. For present purposes, what matters is that it follows from the interpretation which I have ascribed to the Inspector’s reports that the Commission was not required by s.146 PDA 2000 to provide specific reasons for not imposing a condition requiring replacement of further houses by duplexes in order to comply with HPO1 - as no such condition had been recommended by the Inspector.

86. However as it did reject the Inspector’s recommendation, in the terms stated in her first report, to grant permission, the Commission bore in that regard to the duty as to reasons imposed by s.34(10)(b).

G3 – FURTHER DISCUSSION & DECISION

87. Perhaps due to the amalgamation of their submissions on the two reasons grounds and perhaps due to an erroneous view that, in her second report, the inspector had recommended a condition aimed at satisfying HPO1, once I find that she did not do so, the parties’ remaining written submissions on the issue of reasons for not accepting her recommendation become a little sparse. Garryduff says the Commission failed to engage with the Inspector’s rationale for her conclusions in her first report that the Proposed Development was consistent with the proper planning and sustainable development of the area. The Commission says that its citation, as its reason for disagreeing with the Inspector’s recommendation that permission be granted, of non-compliance with HPO1 as to housing mix sufficed to express and explain that disagreement as to planning and sustainable development. It says that it believed by reason of non- compliance with HPO1 that a grant of permission was not justified and that is clear and lawful reason for rejecting the Inspector’s recommendation.

88. Garryduff’s submissions on this issue understandably stress GOCE and Sexton as to the enhanced duty to give a reason for disagreeing with the inspector’s recommendation. On other facts such arguments might prevail. However, on present facts, they are overwrought. This is, in the end and on its particular facts, a simple case. A common-sense understanding of the Commission’s reasons, on a straightforward down-to- earth reading, leaves no room for real or genuine, as opposed to forensic, doubt as to what the Commission decided vis-à-vis the Inspector’s recommendation and why. This case is in the Leefield category of cases in which the reason given for rejecting the Inspector’s recommendation was terse on a straightforward (for that matter, simply quantifiable) issue and there was really little more to be said.

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89. That said, I will yield to the temptation of saying a little more: not to suggest that it should have been said, but simply to illustrate the obvious:

• First as I have said, the Development Plan, specifically here the 2021 CDP and HPO1, is an authoritative expression of the Council’s view of the proper planning and sustainable development of its area. There can be no doubt but that the Commission was entitled to accept that view and that its acceptance could likewise, without more and at least in this instance, be understood as an authoritative expression of its view of the proper planning and sustainable development of the Site.

• Second, HPO1 is expressed in emphatic (“ensure”) and simply quantified (“35%”) terms. So there is a strong impetus to apply it and it is relatively straightforward to apply. It is equally straightforward to discern on-compliance. Or, at least, it was so in this case.

• Third, the Proposed Development fell very considerably short of compliance with HPO1: by 69% of the required units for single and two person households - that is, by 24%106 of the total number of units.

• Fourth, on the issue of compliance with HPO1, there was in truth nothing in the Inspector’s recommendation with which the Commission, in its reason for rejecting her recommendation, could have “engaged”. The Inspector simply had not addressed HPO1 in her recommendation and, inasmuch as she addressed HPO1 in her second report she did not make a recommendation in that regard.

• Fifth, and perhaps unnecessarily, I point to the bald statement of the Inspector in her second report: “the mix of housing is deficient in its provision for smaller households”.

90. In my view, the Commission’s given reason for rejecting its Inspector’s recommendation sufficed in law and I reject Garryduff’s assertion to the contrary.

REASONS FOR REFUSAL ILLUMINATORY OF PROSPECTS OF FUTURE PLANNING APPLICATION

91. Garryduff’s written submissions asserted that it was entitled by the Commission’s reasons “to know how the decision-making process was conducted in respect of its proposal such that it would assist a future planning application in the event it was non-compliant.” This was not a pleaded complaint and is dismissed on that account.

92. However, lest I am wrong to dismiss it as not pleaded I will decide the issue. It is an issue on which there is conflicting authority.107 Weston108 states that the requirement for reasons arises in order, inter alia, “to indicate on what ground an application is refused in order that it can become known as to whether it is appropriate to make a further application or not”. However no authority is cited in Weston and it is not

106 35 – 11 = 24. 107 See generally, Simons on Planning Law, 3rd Ed’n (Browne) §§3.128 & 13.373-5. 108 Weston v An Bord Pleanála [2010] IEHC 255.

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apparent that this assertion was part of the ratio of that decision. Garryduff cites South Bucks DC109 for the same proposition. But, unlike here, that was a case of a statutory provision which required that the court must be satisfied also that “the interests of the applicant have been substantially prejudiced” by the failure to give adequate reasons110 and in that context considered that the interest of an objector could be prejudiced by a decision to grant permission for reasons which failed “to indicate what, if any, impact they may have in relation to the decision of future applications.” I confess that I would have thought that prejudice to the objector as to hypothetical future applications may often be of little weight compared to the prejudice of not being told why one has lost the present battle. There may not be other battles. In any event, South Bucks DC does not bind here. Conversely, in West Wood Club111 the court was clearly expressing ratio in professing itself

“….. satisfied, having regard to the above and to the jurisprudence on the duty to give reasons as set out in paragraphs 55-59 that the law in this jurisdiction does not go so far as to impose a duty on the respondent to cite what may be acceptable to it in a future application in order to comply with its duty to give reasons. ….. Sufficient reasons must be given so as to equip the applicant to appeal the decision or to judicially review it. …… For the reasons above, I must refuse the relief sought on this ground.”

93. Were it necessary, I would prefer West Wood Club to the contrary authorities. No doubt, reasons will often in practice be used to inform the terms of, and will tend to illuminate the prospects of, future planning applications. Indeed, that may have been all that Weston was intended to convey. However, that prospect of their utility, which is generally beneficial, does not of itself imply a legal obligation on the Commission to actively provide reasons which will serve that function. The Commission’s proper concern is to tell those interested the reasons for its present decision - not to provide hostages to fortune potentially affecting future decisionmakers as to development proposals not yet formulated. I see little attraction in the prospect of judicial review of reasons on the specific basis of alleged failure to provide such illumination – not least as difficult questions would arise, in my view to no good purpose, as to the degree and accuracy of the illumination required and how that degree and accuracy might be assessed in advance of the determination of a later planning application. Further, a judgment upholding reasons as providing the necessary illumination might ultimately be proved illusory by a later planning decision. And, clearly, no future decision-maker could be bound by such indications as might have been given in an earlier refusal of planning permission.

94. All that said, Garryduff did not develop its submission in this this regard and I will leave a conclusive view to a case in which the issue is pursued. In the present case, it suffices to say that the submission fails on the facts. The Commission’s reasons clearly conveyed that, ceteris paribus, the prospects of residential permission on the site would likely incrementally improve as the percentage of single- and two-person households proposed in any future development proposal neared and reached the HPO1 objective to “ensure” 35%. In truth, that is a proposition so obvious that Garryduff did not need it illuminated.

109 South Bucks District Council v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions [2004] UKHL 33, [2004] 4 All ER 775, [2004] 1 WLR 1953, [2004] 4 PLR 50, [2004] 31 LS Gaz R 25, (2004) Times, 2 July, 148 Sol Jo LB 825, [2004] All ER (D) 09 (Jul). Also reported sub nom South Buckinghamshire DC v. Porter. 110 Section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. 111 West Wood Club Ltd v An Bord Pleanála [2010] IEHC 16. §59.

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95. So, whether or not it was pleaded, this complaint that the Commission’s reasons failed to illuminate the prospects of a future planning application is dismissed.

CONCLUSION

96. Having rejected all grounds for the reasons set out above, I dismiss the proceedings. The case will be listed for final orders on 23 February 2026.

David Holland 16/2/26

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