IEHC 8 — IEHC 8 — High Court

THE HIGH COURT

[2026] IEHC 8

Record Number 2024/533MCA

META PLATFORMS IRELAND LIMITED

Appellant

-and-

THE DATA PROTECTION COMMISSION

Respondent

JUDGMENT of Ms Justice Nessa Cahill delivered on 12 January 2026

INTRODUCTION

1. This is a decision on the allocation of the costs of a motion in which the Appellant (Meta Platforms Ireland Limited (“Meta”)) sought certain reliefs related to the hearing of preliminary issues (“the Motion”). The reliefs sought were refused by ex tempore judgment delivered on 31 October 2025 (Meta Platforms Ireland Limited v. Data Protection Commissioner [2025] IEHC 631).

2. Meta contends that it is not yet the time to make an order as to costs or, alternatively, if an order is to be made, that it should be an order that costs be costs in the cause. The position of the respondent (the Data Protection Commissioner (“the DPC”)) is that, having been entirely successful, the DPC should be awarded the costs of the Motion.

1 3. It is also contended on behalf of the DPC that an order that costs be costs in the cause does not constitute an award of costs for the purposes of Order 99, Rule 2(3) of the Rules of the Superior Courts, and should only be ordered if it is “not possible justly to adjudicate upon liability for costs” within the meaning of that sub-rule. It is said that this test is not met here. The DPC however identified a certain lack of clarity as to whether an order that costs should be costs in the cause is an award of costs within the meaning of Order 99, Rule 2(3). It was primarily because of this uncertainty that judgment was reserved in relation to the question of costs.

4. Having considered the parties’ position and the authorities relied upon, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to now make an order determining liability for the costs of the Motion. I am also satisfied that it is appropriate and just to order that costs be costs in the cause, which does constitute the making of an award of costs within the meaning of Order 99, Rule 2(3).

BACKGROUND

5. By the Motion, Meta sought orders for the trial of preliminary issues and a direction that the trial of those issues take place at the same time as, or immediately after, the hearing of the same preliminary issues in separate proceedings between Linkedln Ireland Unlimited Company (“LinkedIn) and the DPC, bearing record number 2025/ 580 MCA (“the LinkedIn Proceedings”). The focus of the dispute between the parties was on the latter aspect of the motion, it being accepted by the DPC that the issues in question were suitable for trial as preliminary issues.

6. I heard the motion on 29 October 2025 and delivered judgment on 31 October 2025, refusing the relief sought by Meta.

7. There was then a contested costs hearing before me on 6 November 2025. At that hearing, no application for costs was made on behalf of the State - correctly so, as the State was not strictly a party to the Motion, but was rather in a position analogous to that of a notice party.

8. Meta contends that no costs order falls to be made at this time. This contention will first be addressed. I will then address the parties’ contentions as to how liability for costs should be allocated.

WHETHER COSTS OF THE MOTION NOW FALL TO BE DETERMINED

9. The first issue is whether it is appropriate to make an order as to the costs of this Motion at this stage. Meta’s position is that no order as to costs should be made, as the question as to whether there should be a trial of the preliminary issues in these proceedings has not been substantively determined. It is said that the application for the trial of preliminary issues – or certain issues

2 associated with it – will remain to be decided after the trial of the preliminary issues in the LinkedIn Proceedings. Meta’s counsel notes that the Judgement envisages the possibility that there may be further preliminary issues to be determined in these proceedings. The position of the DPC is that the Motion was heard and conclusively determined against Meta and that the costs incurred now fall to be determined.

10. I agree with the DPC in this respect.

11. There is no doubt but that the determination of the preliminary issues in the LinkedIn Proceedings will be important for these proceedings (as well as the other eight statutory appeals pending against DPC by Meta or entities related to Meta and associated judicial review proceedings). That determination will resolve significant legal questions about the correct interpretation of sections 142 and 150 of the Data Protection Act 2018, questions which are material to each of the pending proceedings.

12. This does not mean that the determination of these issues will itself determine the outcome of these or other proceedings, nor will it preclude applications for the trial of further preliminary issues.

13. Indeed, the Judgment does refer to the fact that Meta has not ruled out, but rather has reserved, the possibility of seeking the trial of “further preliminary issues” (at [42], [53], [82]). However, this is not the same as saying that the issues raised or relief sought by this specific Motion may be argued again or revisited or that the Motion has not been fully determined. As counsel for the DPC points out, this Motion has been determined. The application for the hearing of the specific preliminary issues identified in this Motion, and the application to have these issues heard in the manner and according to the timescale sought by Meta, have been refused.

14. The possibility that the impact of the determination of the preliminary issues in the LinkedIn Proceedings may need to be further and separately addressed at a later stage does not alter the outcome of this Motion or its finality. Similarly, the fact that Meta reserves the right to seek to raise additional or other preliminary issues in these or other proceedings does not change the fact that this Motion has been finally determined. If Meta does make an application in the future for the trial of additional, different preliminary issues in these or any of the other proceedings against the DPC, that will be a separate and distinct application. The merits of any such application, or of any arguments that may be made in opposition to it, can only be assessed if and when such an application is made. That has no bearing on the costs of this Motion.

15. Insofar as Meta’s counsel suggested during the costs hearing that the Motion remains live and that, notwithstanding the determination of the preliminary issues in the LinkedIn Proceedings,

3 the same issues may yet be heard in these proceedings, this is an immediately problematic proposition. While the affidavit grounding the Motion did refer to this possibility (and Meta stated that it reserved its position in this respect), Meta also acknowledged the risk that a court would not permit the same issues to be heard twice. Indeed, the premise of the Motion as argued before me was that the determination of the preliminary issues in the LinkedIn Proceedings will be of huge significance for Meta in each of the nine pending statutory appeals and that it would be unjust for the issues to be determined in the LinkedIn Proceedings without Meta having the right to make submissions or be heard. Meta’s position was predicated on the relief sought in the Motion being necessary for Meta to be heard on the preliminary issues. The relief sought was refused.

16. Whatever about the arguments Meta may seek to advance in the future, the Motion as issued and heard has been determined, the trial of the specific preliminary issues identified in the manner proposed by Meta has been refused. I would also note that any suggestion that the same issues may yet be heard in these proceedings clashes with several findings in the Judgment, including the finding that:

“the fixing of these issues in the LinkedIn Appeal for determination as net legal issues, has the inevitable consequence that their determination in those proceedings will have precedential weight for other statutory appeals” (at [69]).

17. Another relevant finding in the Judgment is that there was no justification for having the same issues determined again in separate proceedings (at [71]).

18. The suggestion that the Motion is somehow still live such that an order may later be made for the trial of the same preliminary issues in these proceedings is not sustainable or reconcilable with the premise of the Motion or of the Judgment. The Motion as argued was finally determined on its merits and I reject Meta’s contention that the costs of the Motion should not be determined at this stage.

DECISION ON COSTS

19. Turning then to the decision on the question of costs, the following topics will be addressed:

- Positions of the Parties - Relevant legislation - Characterisation of “costs in the cause” - Costs of case management motions - Assessment

4 Positions of the Parties

20. The position advanced by Meta’s counsel is that the correct order (if one is to be made) is an order that costs be costs in the cause. This is said to be warranted because the application was in the nature of a case management application, in which the dispute and the decision of the Court focussed on whether the trial of these preliminary issues should take place together with, or directly after, the trial of the same issues in the LinkedIn Proceedings. It is said that the hearing only became onerous because of the nature and importance of the issues, but that this did not alter its character as a question of case management.

21. Counsel for the DPC, by contrast, contends that, as the interlocutory motion was determined entirely in its favour, the DPC has a presumptive entitlement to its costs. It is said that an order that costs be “costs in the cause” is not an award of costs for the purposes of Order 99, and, even if it was to be so regarded, costs should be awarded in favour of the DPC. Reliance is placed on Order 99 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 (“the 2015 Act”) as interpreted by Murray J. in Daly v. Ardstone Capital Limited [2020] IEHC 345 (“Daly”) and by the Court of Appeal in Pembroke Equity Partners Limited v. Corrigan [2022] IECA 142 (“Pembroke”).

Relevant legislation

22. The costs of the application are governed by section 169 of the 2015 Act and Order 99. Order 99, Rule 2(1) sets out the general, overarching principle that, except where otherwise provided, “The costs of and incidental to every proceeding in the Superior Courts shall be in the discretion of those Courts respectively.”

23. According to Order 99, Rule 3(1),

“The High Court, in considering the awarding of the costs of any action or step in any proceedings, and the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal in considering the awarding of the costs of any appeal or step in any appeal, in respect of a claim or counterclaim, shall have regard to the matters set out in section 169(1) of the 2015 Act, where applicable.”

24. The “matters set out in” section 169(1) of the 2015 Act are the following:

“A party who is entirely successful in civil proceedings is entitled to an award of costs against a party who is not successful in those proceedings, unless the court orders otherwise, having regard to the particular nature and circumstances of the case, and the conduct of the proceedings by the parties, including—

5 (a) conduct before and during the proceedings,

(b) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest one or more issues in the proceedings,

(c) the manner in which the parties conducted all or any part of their cases,

(d) whether a successful party exaggerated his or her claim,

(e) whether a party made a payment into court and the date of that payment,

(f) whether a party made an offer to settle the matter the subject of the proceedings, and if so, the date, terms and circumstances of that offer, and

(g) where the parties were invited by the court to settle the claim (whether by mediation or otherwise) and the court considers that one or more than one of the parties was or were unreasonable in refusing to engage in the settlement discussions or in mediation.”

25. It is also relevant to this application to note Order 99, Rule 2(3) which provides,

“The High Court, the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court, upon determining any interlocutory application, shall make an award of costs save where it is not possible justly to adjudicate upon liability for costs on the basis of the interlocutory application.”

26. The correct interpretation of Order 99 and section 169 as they apply to interlocutory applications was summarised by Murray J. in Daly as follows:

“(a) The general discretion of the Court in connection with the ordering of costs is preserved (s.168(1)(a) and 0. 99 R.2(1)).

(b) The Court should, unless it cannot justly do so, make an order for costs upon the disposition of an interlocutory application (0.99 Rule 2(3)).

(c) In so doing, it should ‘have regard to’ the provisions of s.169(1) (0.99 Rule 3(1)).

(d) Therefore - at least in a case where the party seeking costs has been ‘entirely successful’- it should lean towards ordering costs to follow the event (s.169(1)).

(e) In determining whether to order that costs follow the event the Court should have regard to the non-exhaustive list of matters specified in s.169(1)(a)-(g) (0. 99 R.3(1)).

6 (f) Those matters include the conduct of the parties before and during the proceedings, and whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest one or more issues (s. 169(1)(a) and (b))” (at [15]).

27. In Pembroke, Collins J. (Donnelly and Faherty JJ. concurring) noted that, in dealing with the costs of an interlocutory application, section 169(1) embodies the general principle that costs follow the event and that “there is nothing surprising about a broad presumption – and that is all it is – that a party who is “entirely successful” in an interlocutory application should get their costs” (Pembroke, at [27]).

Characterisation of “costs in the cause”

28. The effect of an order that costs be costs in the cause is that whichever party ultimately succeeds in the substantive proceedings will be entitled to recover the costs of the motion. The DPC disagrees that such an order is appropriate. DPC’s counsel submits that Order 99, Rule 2(3) is applicable here and that, given the issues in the Motion are separate to the issues in the proceedings and will not be re-visited, there is no reason not to make an award of costs.

29. This raises the question of whether a decision that costs be costs in the cause is equivalent to a decision to reserve costs, such that it can only be made if the test in Order 99, Rule 2(3) is met.

30. The judgment of Laffoy J. in Haughey v. Synnott [2012] IEHC 403 (“Haughey”) is relevant here. In that case, Laffoy J considered an application for the appointment of a receiver over the assets of a solicitors’ practice. The application was rejected as being misconceived and it was characterised as a “clear discrete event on which the outcome of the substantive action can have no bearing”. The costs of the application were awarded against the moving party.

31. In making that decision, Laffoy J. explained the rationale underlying Order 99, Rule 1(4A) (now Order 99, Rule 2(3)):

“4. The rationale underlying that rule and the manner in which it has been applied during the past three years is outlined in Delany & McGrath on Civil Procedure in the Superior Courts (3 rd Ed.) at paras. 23 - 42 to 23 - 52. The following general commentary on rule 1 (4A) is set out at para. 23 - 43:

‘It is clear from the use of the word 'shall' in rule 1(4A) that the effect of the rule is that a court is required to adjudicate upon and make a costs order in respect of an interlocutory application rather than to reserve the costs of the application. However, the Court retains a wide discretion in deciding what costs order to make in respect of the application and the options available include making an order awarding all or part

7 of the costs to one party, making no order as to costs or making the costs of the application costs in the cause. It is only permissible to reserve costs, thereby deferring an adjudication upon the entitlement to costs, where it is not possible, at that juncture, justly to adjudicate upon the costs of the application.’”

32. This indicates that there is a distinction between reserving costs (which can only be done if the test in Order 99, Rule 2(3) is met) and an order making costs costs in the cause (which is not so limited). When a court orders that costs be costs in the cause, this is an exercise of the court’s discretion as to the correct order to make. It may be noted that the 5th edition of Delany & McGrath on Civil Procedure includes the same language that was relied upon in Haughey (now at [24-101]).

33. Counsel for the DPC relied on Irish Coursing Club v. The Minister for Health [2021] IEHC 157 (“Irish Coursing”) as authority that the two forms of orders are captured by Order 99, Rule 2(3). In the course of that judgment, the court referred to Order 99, Rule 2(3) and observed “I should only treat the costs as costs in the cause if I consider it is not possible justly to adjudicate upon liability for costs.” It is not apparent that there was any argument or submissions on the question of the distinction between costs being reserved or made in the cause. Moreover, it appears from the judgment that the unsuccessful applicant for the interlocutory injunction sought an order that costs be costs in the cause relying on the type of grounds that typically justify the reservation of costs (primarily the overlap between the grounds for refusing the motion and substantive issues and evidence in the proceedings). The grounds were directed to showing that it was not possible justly to decide costs and that the trial judge would be better placed to do so. This question was the focus of the judgment. In addition to this apparent confusion in the terminology adopted by the parties, the court ultimately decided to award 75% of the costs of the motion to the defendant. The question of any distinction between costs in the cause and reserved costs was not debated or determined.

34. One of the cases cited in Irish Coursing – ACC Bank plc v. Hanrahan [2014] 1 IR 1 - was also opened to me by counsel for the DPC. In his judgment in that case, Clarke J. analysed the background to the introduction of Order 99, Rule 1(4A) (the precursor to Order 99, Rule 2(3)), including the rationale of disincentivising unreasonable interlocutory motions (or unreasonable opposition to them). He then observed that, in determining the costs of an interlocutory application, specifically an application for summary judgment,

“Costs in the cause may be the appropriate measure unless it may be the case that the judge adjudicating on the summary judgment motion feels that it is possible that the detail in which the trial judge determines the ultimate issues in the case could have a

8 bearing on the justice of where the costs should lie. In those circumstances a reservation of the costs may be more appropriate.”

35. This distinguishes between an order that costs be costs in the cause (which is an adjudication on costs) and an order reserving costs (which is not).

36. Having considered the authorities on this point, and the language of, and rationale underlying, Order 99, Rule 2(3), I am satisfied that an order that costs be costs in the cause is to be regarded as an award of costs within the meaning of Order 99, Rule 2(3). This is for two primary reasons:

37. First, the test in Order 99, Rule 2(3) hinges on whether it is possible to justly decide the allocation of liability for the costs of a motion. It is either possible to justly decide costs or it is not. If it is not, the question of costs may be left over for the trial judge to deal with. Another way of looking at the same question is that, if there is a basis to believe the trial judge will be in a better – or unique - position to decide the just allocation of liability for the costs of the motion, that may justify their reservation. If, on the other hand, it is possible to justly decide the allocation of the costs of an interlocutory step, this should be done. A decision that costs should be costs in the cause is an example of a costs decision that leaves no residual role for the trial judge. Such a decision may be made in various circumstances, including if the debate on the motion was considered to have been worth having or if some useful clarification or case management structure emerged from the motion (as will be seen). A judge hearing the interlocutory motion may be uniquely well-placed to assess such questions. This highlights the distinctions between a decision that costs of a motion should be costs in the cause and a decision to reserve costs under Order 99, Rule 2(3).

38. Second, while there is some lack of clarity in the decided cases on this point, Laffoy J. in Haughey quoted with approval the writing of Delany & McGrath which describes the costs orders which a court has a discretion to make – when it is making an adjudication as to costs - as including an order that costs be costs in the cause. The judgment of Clarke J. in ACC v. Hanrahan is consistent with the view that an order that costs should be costs in the cause is a decision on the award of costs and may be contrasted with an order reserving costs. I regard this as the correct interpretation of that form of order.

39. The consequence of this analysis is that an order that costs be costs in the cause does not hinge on a determination that it is not possible justly to adjudicate on liability for costs. Consequently, the type of factors that are typically weighed under Order 99, Rule 2(3) - such as possible injustice arising from an overlap between the issues in the motion and in the substantive

9 proceedings - do not need to be weighed when deciding whether to direct that costs be costs in the cause (unless one party is contending that costs should be reserved).

40. Accordingly, the fact that the substantive merits of the proceedings had no relevance to the Motion and there is no question of the Motion or the grounds on which it was refused being revisited at trial, are not relevant here, as there is – quite appropriately - no suggestion that the costs of this Motion should be reserved.

Costs of case management motions

41. Meta asserts that this was a case management application and the appropriate and usual order is that costs should be costs in the cause. The authority opened by the DPC in responding to this point was Cork Plastics (Manufacturing) v. Ineos Compounds U.K. Ltd. [2011] 1 IR 492 (“Cork Plastics”). Clarke J. addressed his approach to the costs of case management motions in that case as follows:

“In passing I should note that I have adopted a practice in this case of directing that any costs associated with the orderly conduct of the case management, should be costs in the cause, in circumstances where I am satisfied that both sides have been constructively engaged in attempting to resolve any outstanding issues. It is only where a significant and separate issue requires independent argument and a formal judgment that I have considered making individual cost orders in respect of discrete elements of the process. It seems to me that the constructive engagement of parties with a case management process in complex litigation such as this is advanced by such a practice.” (at [4]).

42. Applying that judgment, the DPC contends that, while this was a case management application, it raised independent and discrete issues that will not be revisited, requiring a hearing and judgment, and that there is no reason not to make an award of costs in favour of the DPC.

43. Having heard the submissions of the parties and considered the judgment in Cork Plastics, I think it can safely be said that there is no hard rule governing the award of the costs of case management applications, but that, as a matter of practice, the costs of such applications are commonly made costs in the cause.

44. The comments by Clarke J in Cork Plastics highlight that it may be appropriate to make orders of costs in favour of one side or another if the matter required a separate hearing and formal judgment, having regard to the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct and the constructiveness of their engagement.

10 45. This does not alter the general practice regarding the costs of case management motions, but merely indicates an entirely sensible approach that, when there is a fully contested motion, there is no presumption (much less a rule) that costs should be made costs in the cause. It is instead necessary to weigh the factors listed in sections 169(1(a) to (g).

Assessment

46. The starting point is that this was an interlocutory case management motion, in which the DPC was entirely successful. This gives rise to a broad presumption – and no more - that the DPC should be awarded the costs of defending the Motion.

47. This presumption must then be weighed against the individual factors listed in section 169(1) of the 2015 Act. When these factors are adjusted for an interlocutory application, they may be summarised as:

- the conduct of the parties before and during the motion;

- whether it was reasonable for the moving party to pursue the motion and whether the respondent to the motion was reasonable in the position taken;

- the manner in which the motion was conducted;

- whether the parties engaged constructively in relation to the matter (adopting Cork Plastics).

48. Meta’s position is that the Motion was a reasonable and worthwhile one and that an analogy may be drawn with Avoncore Limited v. Leeson Motors Limited [2021] IEHC 163 (“Avoncore”). That is cited as an example of a case in which the order sought (a stay on one set of proceedings pending the determination of another related action) was refused but the provisional view of McDonald J. was that costs should nonetheless be costs in the cause. The reason for this view was that a useful purpose was served by the motion in that “it has allowed the issues to be debated and provided an opportunity for the court to give directions for the case management of the proceedings” (Avoncore at [49]).

49. It is said by Meta that, like in Avoncore, the motion served a useful purpose, as the debate that took place as to the relevance of the preliminary issues was a debate worth having and that costs being in the cause is the appropriate outcome. The DPC seeks to distinguish Avoncore on the basis that, here, there was no benefit or insights derived from the Motion and no case management advantages have accrued.

11 50. The DPC is of course correct that, by contrast with Avoncore, the hearing and determination of the Motion has not resulted in any formal case management orders. However, that was a specific feature of the Avoncore case which is not an essential component of a decision to direct that costs be costs in the cause. Further, case management does not immediately arise in these proceedings now largely because the proceedings stand parked pending the determination of the preliminary issues in the LinkedIn Proceedings. This does not detract from the value derived from this Motion or the undoubted interest Meta had in issuing it.

51. It is also notable that the provisional view expressed by McDonald J. in Avoncore that the correct order was for costs to be costs in the cause was based on the value of the issues having been debated in the motion, as well as the opportunity for case management it presented.

52. Turning to this Motion, I do consider that it allowed for an important debate to take place on certain issues. For example, it was accepted and confirmed during the Motion by all parties that the preliminary issues – and their determination in the LinkedIn Proceedings – are important for, and will directly impact, these proceedings and the other pending statutory appeals and judicial review proceedings. I do not understand that Meta is seeking to – or could - deviate from the position so adopted, despite the contention (which I have rejected) that costs should not now be adjudicated.

53. It was also confirmed in court that, while there is no formal stay of these proceedings, the parties agree that no further steps should be taken until after the determination of the preliminary issues in the LinkedIn Proceedings. The DPC did also helpfully raise the possibility of active case management and directions being made in these – and possibly the other statutory appeals – either before or after that determination occurs. There is therefore an important acknowledgement of the willingness of both sides to engage constructively to advance these proceedings.

54. Another potentially useful development during the Motion was the discussion – and the DPC’s acceptance – of the possibility that different topics may be tried as preliminary issues in these proceedings after the determination of the issues fixed for hearing in the LinkedIn Proceedings, if this would assist in clarifying and narrowing the scope of the statutory appeal.

55. The Motion therefore served a useful purpose in allowing these issues to be raised, ventilated and formally confirmed. While the focus of the Motion was on whether Meta would have the opportunity to be heard before the determination of the issues in the LinkedIn Proceedings (a topic which will not arise again), these broader questions of the importance of the issues for these proceedings were worth debating. I also believe it was valuable and worthwhile that Meta

12 had the opportunity to advance its position as to the importance of the preliminary issues before they were determined. The Motion served these useful purposes.

56. Applying the specific criteria of section 169(1), it is relevant to observe, as I did in the Judgment, that the issues are ones of real magnitude for Meta and that it can be understood – and I do understand – why this Motion was brought. It was a novel application and an unsuccessful one, but I do not believe it was an unreasonably brought, in all of the circumstances of the case.

57. In terms of the conduct of the parties during the Motion, I do not believe that either party can or should be faulted for the approach taken to the Motion or the time and effort expended in dealing with it, particularly in light of the overall significance of the questions raised for both parties in these and several other pending proceedings. In fact, while the documentation was quite voluminous, there was just over half a day of oral submissions, and the parties did engage constructively in the preparation and presentation of the Motion and in synthesising the issues that required determination. It is also a relevant factor – although not a decisive one - that, while heavily contested, the Motion did fundamentally concern issues of case management.

58. In light of all of the relevant circumstances of the matter, and having weighed the factors identified in section 169(1), I am of the view that the appropriate order to make is an order that the costs of the motion be costs in the cause.

59. A final point that arose during the costs hearing is that a motion seeking the same relief was also issued in one of the other statutory appeals that are pending against the DPC, bearing record no. 2025/6 MCA which arises from a decision of the DPC made on 02 December 2024 (referred to as the “Token Breach Appeal”). It was only confirmed on the date of the hearing on 29 October 2025 that the Motion was being pursued only in these proceedings (in which a separate decision of the DPC of 26 September 2024 is challenged, referred to as the “Passwords Appeal”). The DPC asserts that costs were incurred preparing for both motions and, while there was a significant degree of duplication, this was a relevant factor in relation to the allocation of costs. Meta’s answer is that the only reason the two motions were issued was explained during an attendance in court prior to the hearing of the Motion. This reason was that the pleadings were not closed in these proceedings and the second motion was issued in anticipation of an argument by the DPC that there could be no trial of preliminary issues in these proceedings for that reason. As Meta points out, this argument was made but not strongly urged by DPC during the hearing of the Motion. I do not believe that the fact the motions were issued in two proceedings, albeit advanced only in one, was unreasonable in all of the circumstances, or that it warrants a different decision as to the allocation of costs.

13 CONCLUSION

60. For the reasons set out above, and in all of the relevant circumstances, I exercise my discretion as to the award of the costs of the Motion by making an order that the recoverable costs incurred by Meta and by the DPC should be costs in the cause. I make no order with regard to the costs incurred by the State.

61. Insofar as the parties incurred further costs in dealing with this application with regard to the costs of the Motion, my provisional view is that there should be no order as to those costs. I will however list the matter before me at 10.30am on 27 January 2026 should either party wish to contend for a different costs order. If that is not necessary, the parties may communicate this to the Registrar and the listing will be vacated.

14