IEHC 71 — IEHC 71 — High Court

THE HIGH COURT

2026 IEHC 71

RECORD NO: 2025/10/MCA

BETWEEN:

MARIA ULEMU CHIMWALA

APPELLANT

and

THE RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES BOARD

mjRESPONDENT

and

VADIMS ABROSIMOVS

NOTICE PARTY

JUDGMENT of Ms Justice Nessa Cahill delivered on 10 February 2026

OVERVIEW

1. The Appellant has brought this appeal on a point law pursuant to section 123(3) of the Residential Tenancies Act 2004 (“the 2004 Act”) against the determination order of the Residential Tenancies Board (“the RTB” or “the Tribunal”) dated the 18 December 2024 (“the Determination”), which followed the report of the Tenancy Tribunal dated the 12 December 2024.

1 2. The appeal centres on the obligation of a landlord to sign a termination notice and the scope of the so-called “slip rule” contained in section 64A of the 2004 Act. The question that must be determined, in summary, is whether it was ultra vires and erroneous as a matter of law for the Tribunal to determine that the apparent failure by the landlord of a rented residential property to sign a termination notice was a slip or omission which did not render the notice invalid within the meaning of section 64A.

3. The Appellant seeks various reliefs, including orders quashing the Determination and declaring that the decision of the Tribunal - that the apparent failure to sign the termination notice issued to her on 27 November 2023 (“the Notice of Termination”) was a “slip” or “omission” which did not invalidate the Notice of Termination - was invalid and erroneous as a matter of law. A declaration was also sought that the Tribunal failed to provide adequate reasons for that determination that the Notice Party's failure to sign the Notice of Termination was a mere "slip or omission".

4. The unusual feature of this case is that the Notice of Termination was in fact signed, but the second page of the Notice which contained the signature was not before the Tribunal. The Tribunal was under the misapprehension that it was unsigned. The appeal was nonetheless presented and has been determined on the basis of the incomplete documentation that was before the Tribunal. In this judgment, I reject the appeal as wholly lacking in merit and refuse the relief sought.

BACKGROUND

5. The Appellant has resided at Apartment 8, Mill House, 72/73 O’Connell Street, Waterford, in the county of Waterford (“the Property”) since 9 July 2019. Her son is now attending university and resides with her at the Property at the weekends and during holidays. The Landlord is the owner of the property. By lease dated 9 July 2019 (“the Lease”), the Appellant agreed to lease the Property at an agreed rent of €850.00 per month, which eventually increased to €900.00 per month.

6. The Appellant’s case is that she has at all times complied with her obligations under the Lease whereas the Landlord has failed to carry out necessary repairs or to allow her peaceful or exclusive use of the Property. She relied on a report of the Thornton Group following an inspection of the property on the 31 January 2024, which identifies various issues with the condition of the Property.

7. The Landlord delivered a termination notice dated 25 July 2023 to the Property on 3 September 2023, by handing it to the Appellant’s son. The Appellant was served with a warning notice

2 for rent arrears on 23 October 2023. The Landlord then delivered the Termination Notice on 27 November 2023.

8. On 29 November 2023, the Appellant applied to the RTB under section 76 of the 2004 Act alleging breaches of the Landlord’s obligations and challenging the validity of the termination notices. The Landlord also made an application to the RTB claiming rent arrears, breach of the obligations of the Appellant as tenant and alleging a failure to maintain the Property (among other claims).

9. An adjudication took place on 14 June 2024 and it was determined that:

- The termination notice dated 25 July 2023 was invalid;

- The Termination Notice was valid and the Property should be vacated;

- The Landlord must pay the Appellant €3000.00 in damages for breaches of landlord obligations for failing to carry out necessary repairs, and for failing to allow peaceful and exclusive occupation of the Property;

- The Appellant must pay rent arears of €8,761.75.

10. The Appellant appealed that determination and, following a hearing before a Tenancy Tribunal on 19 November 2024 (which was a full re-hearing), the Determination were issued. In the Determination, the Tribunal found that the Notice of Termination was valid and that the Appellant must vacate the Property within 42 days. The Tribunal specifically found that,

"The Notice of Termination served on the tenant on the 27th November 2023 complied with the following provisions of Section 62 of the Act: it is in writing, it specified the date of service of the notice, it sets out the reason for the proposed termination, it specifies the termination date, states that the tenant has the whole of 24 hours of the termination date to vacate the dwelling and states that the tenant has a right to refer any dispute she has in relation to the notice to the RTB. However, it was not signed by the landlord as required by Section 62(b) of the Act. The Tribunal is satisfied that the absence of the signature of the Landlord constitutes a slip within the meaning of Section 64A of the Act. The Tribunal is further satisfied that the omission of the Landlord's signature does not prejudice the Notice in a material respect in the circumstances. The Tenant did not raise any issue concerning the absence of the landlord's signature from the Notice of Termination at the hearing and the Tribunal is satisfied that she was not prejudiced by its omission. The Tribunal finds that the Notice was otherwise in compliance with the Act."

3 11. The Tribunal found that the Termination Notice was valid and the Property must be vacated within 42 days. The Tribunal also found that the Landlord was in breach of his obligations towards the Appellant and awarded her damages in the combined amount of €6,000. The Appellant was ordered to pay to the Landlord the sum of €6,947.49, which was the arrears of rent owing (€12,947.49) less the damages.

12. In the report the preceded the Determination, the Tribunal recorded certain matters which were agreed between the parties, including that the Appellant is still in occupation of the dwelling; the Appellant has not paid rent since the rental period 9 August 2023 to 8 September 2023; a signed warning notice for rent arrears was served on 23 October 2023 and the Notice of Termination was served on 27 November 2023.

13. This appeal on a point of law was issued by the Appellant on 8 January 2025. It may be noted that the Appellant is represented in this appeal but was not legally represented during the adjudication or before the Tenancy Tribunal.

GROUNDS OF APPEAL

14. In this appeal, the Appellant has identified a specific and clearly defined alleged error of law. This alleged error was the application of section 64A of the 2004 Act to the apparent failure by the Landlord to sign the Termination Notice.

15. Six specific arguments are advanced by Appellant on affidavit and in submissions (I would just observe here that an affidavit is not the proper place for legal arguments, but the same legal points are made by way of submissions and treated here on that basis):

16. First, it is contended that the Act requires the landlord’s signature on the face of the notice, as one of the requirements of a valid notice of termination. It is said that this is one of the core ingredients of a valid notice of termination and that it cannot be treated as a mere “slip or omission” which can be overlooked by a Tenancy Tribunal. It is contended that the RTB acted ultra vires, as a failure to comply with an express statutory requirement cannot be treated as a non-material error, given that section 64A only applies to a mistake which “does not prejudice, in a material respect, the notice of termination.” It is asserted that the Tribunal’s approach renders the express legislative requirements of section 62 moot and drastically broadened the scope of the “slip rule” in section 64A beyond that envisaged by the legislature and allows the RTB to disregard the requirements of section 62

17. Second, insofar as the Tribunal finds that the Appellant did not raise any issue concerning the absence of the landlord’s signature at the hearing, the Appellant did not have legal

4 representation or advice at that stage of the process and no legal understanding or training. She also points to medical ailments from which she suffers.

18. Third, in relation to the finding of the Tribunal that the Appellant was not prejudiced by the omission, it is submitted that this is an error of law, as the issue is that the signature was a statutory requirement, which must be there both to protect tenants and to provide a clear procedure for the termination of tenancies and which is devalued by the application of a “slip rule”. The Appellant also challenges the finding that there is no prejudice, pointing to the termination of a lease of a property which has been her home for over 5 years.

19. Fourth, the Appellant makes certain points about agency, asserting that there was no “agent” acting for the Landlord within the meaning of section 12(1)(e) of the 2004 Act which requires,

“In addition to the obligations arising by or under any other enactment, a landlord of a dwelling shall…(e) notify the tenant of the name of the person, if any, (the "authorised agent") who is authorised by the landlord to act on his or her behalf in relation to the tenancy for the time being..”

20. The Appellant also swears that the Landlord gave evidence that he thought that his “agent” served the Notice of Termination, but, according to the Appellant, no evidence was given that the Landlord had engaged an agent in relation to the tenancy. The position stated by the Appellant in her affidavit is that no agent was authorised to sign the Termination Notice.

21. Fifth, it was contended at the hearing of the appeal that the fact that the Termination Notice was in fact signed is irrelevant, as the second, execution page of the notice was not before the Tribunal and was not therefore part of the Tribunal’s decision. The Appellant’s position is that this appeal must proceed on the basis of the one-page Termination Notice without a signature sheet.

22. Sixth, in her grounding affidavit, the Appellant swears that the Landlord admitted during cross- examination at the hearing before the Tenancy Tribunal that he did not sign the Notice of Termination. The Appellant also contends that the signature on the Termination Notice was not the real signature of the Landlord as contained on the invalid notice of termination dated 25 July 2023.

POSITION OF THE TRIBUNAL

23. By the Statement of Opposition filed on 28 May 2025, the Tribunal relies heavily on the undisputed fact that the Termination Notice as received by the Appellant in November 2023 was in fact signed by the Landlord. It is pleaded that the Appellant is estopped from asserting

5 prejudice on this ground. The RTB also pleads that the issue of the signature on the Notice was not raised by the Appellant at the hearing before the Tribunal and cannot be raised now.

24. It is denied that there was an error of law and it is denied that the Tribunal erred in applying section 64A. It is pleaded that the Tribunal exercised its discretion correctly in finding the Termination Notice to be valid in all of the circumstances. It is pleaded that, even if the court was satisfied that there was an error of law, the appropriate reliefs are set out in section 123(5) of the Act.

25. Affidavits were sworn by John Keane (the Chairperson of the Tribunal which conducted the hearing on 19 November 2024 and produced the Report) and by Mr Padraig McGoldrick (Acting Deputy Director of the RTB) on behalf of the RTB verifying the facts and the position of the RTB as just summarised. The most important factual matter addressed is that the Appellant was served with the Termination Notice duly signed (as exhibited to her affidavit of 8 January 2025), but the Tribunal only received the first page of that document and did not receive the signature page.

26. As regards the hearing before the Tribunal, Mr Keane sets out on affidavit that the Appellant acknowledged receipt of the Termination Notice and raised no issue regarding its form or signature. He points out that the bulk of the documentation and the hearing was taken up with the dispute regarding the condition of the Property, an aspect of the matter which has no relevance to this appeal. Mr Keane points out that there was no suggestion or finding that the Termination Notice was signed by another person as an agent of the Landlord and asserts that the Appellant is incorrect insofar as she contends that the document was forged or that it was treated by the Tribunal as having been signed by another person on behalf of the Landlord. The full transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal is exhibited to the affidavit of Mr Keane.

27. Mr McGoldrick in his affidavit confirms that the RTB does not accept that there is any frailty in the Determination and that the view of the RTB is that the Tribunal correctly interpreted and applied section 64A of the 2004 Act.

APPLICABLE LEGISLATION

28. A landlord is permitted to terminate a Part 4 tenancy on six specific grounds identified in the Table to section 34(a) of the 2004 Act. The ground the Tribunal was concerned with in this case was ground 1A in the table as follows:

“The tenant has failed to comply with paragraph (a) of section 16 in relation to the tenancy concerned and the condition specified in subsection (3) (inserted by paragraph

6 (b) of section 12 of the Residential Tenancies and Valuation Act 2020) of section 67 has been satisfied”.

29. The condition identified in section 67 is that a landlord must serve a warning notice of rent arrears on the tenant indicating that if the outstanding rent is not paid within 28 days, the landlord will be entitled to serve a notice of termination giving 28 days to terminate the tenancy. Section 62(1) then provides,

“A notice of termination to be valid shall— i. be in writing, ii. be signed by the landlord or his or her authorised agent or, as appropriate, the tenant, iii. specify the date of service of it, iv. be in such form (if any) as may be prescribed, v. if the duration of the tenancy is a period of more than 6 months, or the tenancy is a further Part 4 tenancy, state (where the termination is by the landlord) the reason for the termination, vi. specify the termination date, that is to say, the day (stating the month and year in which it falls)—on which the tenancy will terminate, and (ii) on or before which (in the case of a termination by the landlord) the tenant must vacate possession of the dwelling concerned, (and indicating that the tenant has the whole of the 24 hours of the termination date to vacate possession), and vii. state that any issue as to the validity of the notice or the right of the landlord or tenant, as appropriate, to serve it must be referred to the Board under Part 6 within 28 days from the date of receipt of it.

30. According to section 64A,

"On the hearing of a complaint under Part 6 in respect of a notice of termination, an adjudicator or the Tribunal, as the case may be, may make a determination that a slip or omission which is contained in, or occurred during the service of, the notice of termination shall not of itself render the notice of termination invalid, if he or she or it, as the case may be, is satisfied that- i. the slip or omission concerned does not prejudice, in a material respect, the notice of termination, and ii. the notice of termination is otherwise in compliance with the provisions of this Act."

7 PRINCIPLES GOVERNING APPEALS OF THIS NATURE

31. This is an appeal on a point of law only. The principles that govern such an appeal are well- established. The RTB cited the following passage from the leading authority of Deely v. The Information Commissioner [2001] 3 IR 439 (“Deely”):

“There is no doubt but that when a court is considering only a point of law, whether by way of a restricted appeal or via a case stated, the distinction in my view being irrelevant, it is, in accordance with established principles, confined as to its remit, in the manner following:-

a. it cannot set aside findings of primary fact unless there is no evidence to support such findings; b. it ought not to set aside inferences drawn from such facts unless such inferences were ones which no reasonable decision making body could draw; c. it can however, reverse such inferences, if the same were based on the interpretation of documents and should do so if incorrect; and finally; d. if the conclusion reached by such bodies shows that they have taken an erroneous view of the law, then that also is a ground for setting aside the resulting decision…” (at [18]).

32. The principles addressed in Deely have been applied in the specific context of an appeal under section 123 in a number of cases such as Doyle v PRTB [2015] IEHC 724 and Marwaha v. RTB [2016] IEHC 308. In Web Summit v. RTB [2023] IEHC 634 (“Web Summit”) (an authority also cited by the RTB), Ferriter J. noted:

“As can be seen, an appeal may not succeed unless, inter alia, there was no evidence to support a material finding of primary fact, or an inference or conclusion on the facts was one which no Tribunal could reasonably have reached. As we shall come to, in so far as these principles are engaged in this case, apart from the question of the proper interpretation of s.16(f), the focus is on the question of whether inferences drawn from the ‘primary findings’ of fact were ones which a reasonable decision making body could draw” (at [27]).

33. A point emphasised by the RTB is that an appellant is not permitted to make a case that was not advanced before the Tribunal. This was set out by Fennelly J. in Rotunda Hospital v. Information Commissioner [2013] 1 IR 1:

8 “I think it is an integral part of any appeal process, other than possibly an appeal by complete re-hearing, that any point of law advanced on appeal shall have been advanced, argued and determined at first instance” (at [88]).

34. Reference is also made to the judgment of Simons J. in Fitzpatrick v. Residential Tenancies Board [2023] IEHC 229 (“Fitzpatrick”) at [20]:

“… it should be emphasised that the point of law must arise from the determination under appeal. The High Court is not hearing the matter de novo but rather is considering the legality of the decision of the Tenancy Tribunal. The High Court should normally decline to decide a point of law which had neither been argued before, nor decided by, the Tenancy Tribunal. See, by analogy, Governors & Guardians of the Hospital for the Relief of Poor Lying-in Women, Dublin v. Information Commissioner [2011] IESC 26, [2013] 1 I.R. 1 (at paragraph 90 of the reported judgment). See also the judgment of the High Court (Noonan J.) in Hyland v. Residential Tenancies Board [2017] IEHC 557 (at paragraphs 25 to 27).”

35. The language of that passage is notable, as Simons J. draws the line of admissibility based on whether a given point was argued before – or decided by – the Tribunal. The position in that case was clear-cut, as the appeal was based on alleged discrimination contrary to the Equal Status Act 2000, a point which was not raised before the Tribunal.

ASSESSMENT

36. The crux of the appeal is whether the Tribunal erred in law or acted ultra vires in deciding that the apparent absence of a signature on the Termination Notice was a “slip” or “omission” which did not invalidate the Termination Notice. This point was not argued before the Tribunal, but the Tribunal did make a determination on this issue. It was therefore properly the subject of this appeal (applying Fitzpatrick ). It seems to me that there are five issues that need to be addressed.

37. The first is the relevance (if any) of the fact that the Termination Notice was in fact signed by the Landlord (I return later to the allegation by the Appellant that the signature was not in fact the Landlord’s signature). The second is whether a failure to include a signature on a notice of termination can be treated as an omission within the meaning of section 64A. The third is whether it was unlawful, ultra vires or erroneous for the Tribunal to treat the Termination Notice here as valid within the meaning of section 64A. Fourth, the Appellant places reliance on the fact she was not legally represented at the hearing. Finally, there is a complaint of want of reasons.

9 Relevance of the missing signature page

38. The nature of this appeal has already been addressed: it is an appeal on a point of law only and is limited to the facts and evidence that were before the Tribunal. The appeal in this case is unusual in that the Tribunal made a decision based on the documentation before it, but that documentation was incomplete in (what has transpired to be) a material respect. On the basis of Deely, as applied in the RTB context since then, the test to be applied by me is whether there was evidence to support the findings made by the Tribunal and whether the inferences or conclusions that the omission was a “slip” or “omission” were ones which no Tribunal could reasonably have reached. Applying this test, the Tribunal has defended the appeal on the basis of the documentation that was actually before it at the time of its decision which did not include the complete Termination Notice. It is defending the decision to apply Article 64A on its merits at the time of that decision based on the then-available information. There was no attempt to defend the Determination on the basis of the complete Termination Notice.

39. This gives rise to a situation of significant artificiality: the Appellant’s point of law is that the Tribunal erred in forgiving an omission, but it is now apparent on appeal that the omission did not actually occur. I have a fundamental doubt as to the meritoriousness of any appeal grounded on such a technical point, which is based on a perpetuation of the myth that the notice was not signed. I do not see that it is a good use of the resources of the parties or the court to assess whether a false hypothesis justified the invocation of section 64A. If the decision is quashed and the matter remitted to the RTB, the RTB could then repeat the same determination, with the single change that it would omit any reference to the want of a signature. I do not see how anyone’s interests are served by that exercise.

40. Nonetheless, this was the basis on which the appeal is made and defended and I will proceed to determine the appeal on the basis that the relevant document is the one-page, unsigned Notice that was before the Tribunal. This is subject to the qualification (to which I will return below), that the RTB does rely on the fact the Notice was actually signed to dispute any assertion of prejudice by the Appellant.

Scope of section 64A

41. The second question is whether it was ultra vires or erroneous as a matter of law for the Tribunal to apply section 64A and find the Termination Notice to be valid. Section 64A, is extracted here again for convenience. It provides that the Tribunal may determine,

10 “…that a slip or omission which is contained in, or occurred during the service of, the notice of termination shall not of itself render the notice of termination invalid, if he or she or it, as the case may be, is satisfied that- (a) the slip or omission concerned does not prejudice, in a material respect, the notice of termination, and (b) the notice of termination is otherwise in compliance with the provisions of this Act."

42. There was no suggestion that the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation should not apply to the construction of this provision. The judgment of the Supreme Court (Murray J., with O’Donnell C.J., O'Malley J., Woulfe J. and Hogan J. agreeing) in Heather Hill Management Company CLG & McGoldrick v an Bord Pleanala [2024] 2 IR 222 is the guiding authority and confirms the correct approach to the interpretation of a statutory provision:

“The words of the section are the first port of call in its interpretation, and while the court must construe those words having regard to the context of the section, of the Act in which the section appears, the pre-existing relevant legal framework and the object of the legislation insofar as discernible, the onus is on those contending that a statutory provision does not have the effect suggested by the plain meaning of the words chosen by the legislature to establish this” (at [214]).

43. According to the plain words of section 64A, a slip or omission in a notice of termination shall not of itself invalidate the notice, provided the tribunal is satisfied that the two conditions stated in that provision are met.

44. Section 64A is not limited or qualified other than by reference to these two conditions. The second of these – in section 64A(b) – is particularly important to interpreting section 64A as a whole, a point emphasised by counsel for the Tribunal. Section 64A(b) specifically requires a notice of termination to be “otherwise” in compliance with the requirements of the 2004 Act.

45. The requirements of the Act governing notices of termination are contained in section 62, with sections 63 and 64 containing clarification as regards certain dates (the termination date and service date respectively). Section 64A(b) can only sensibly be read as incorporating a failure by a termination notice to comply with a requirement of the Act, provided the other requirements are satisfied. The plain and ordinary language of section 64A makes it clear that it does permit a notice of termination to be treated as valid, notwithstanding an omission to comply with one of the requirements of section 62, provided the two criteria specified in section 64A are satisfied. Accordingly, section 64A, properly interpreted, permits the Tribunal to allow

11 a slip or omission to comply with section 62 to be excused and not of itself invalidate the notice of termination, provided it otherwise complies with the requirements of the 2004 Act.

46. There is no basis from the text of section 64A to read in any more prescriptive language or more extensive conditions. Despite this, the Appellant contends that the section cannot be used to excuse the omission of a signature or other “core” requirement of section 62. It is said that, if the absence of a signature could be excused, this would render the legislative requirements of section 62 moot, broaden the slip rule and allow the requirements of the Act to be disregarded in their entirety. It is contended that this is ultra vires the Act.

47. I see no justification for that interpretation in the words of either section 62 or section 64A. There is nothing in those sections to indicate the criteria of section 62 cannot be derogated from. On the contrary, if section 62 requirements cannot be treated as forgivable omissions under section 64A, it is not apparent to me what omissions are addressed by that provision. In short, no basis has been shown from the surrounding provisions or indeed the broader or pre-existing legislative framework to read the limitation for which the Appellant contends into the plain words of those provisions.

48. It must also be observed that section 64A does not necessarily lead to the validation of a notice of termination but rather confirms that the slip or omission in question will not “of itself” be treated as invalidating the notice, provided the criteria of that provision are satisfied.

49. Based on this analysis, I see no basis in the language of the provisions, in the surrounding legislative context or otherwise to support the interpretation of sections 62(1)(a) and 64A that is urged by the Appellant in this appeal.

Whether the Tribunal properly applied section 64A

50. The question here is whether the Tribunal acted ultra vires or erred in treating the Notice of Termination as valid, notwithstanding the (mistaken) understanding that it was not signed. What the Tribunal said in the Determination, it may be recalled, was:

“The Tribunal is satisfied that the absence of the signature of the Landlord constitutes a slip within the meaning of Section 64A of the Act. The Tribunal is further satisfied that the omission of the Landlord's signature does not prejudice the Notice in a material respect in the circumstances. The Tenant did not raise any issue concerning the absence of the landlord's signature from the Notice of Termination at the hearing and the Tribunal is satisfied that she was not prejudiced by its omission. The Tribunal finds that the Notice was otherwise in compliance with the Act.”

12 51. I have already determined that it was open to the Tribunal as a matter of law to make such a determination if the criteria of section 64A were satisfied. The first criterion is that the Tribunal must be satisfied that “the slip or omission concerned does not prejudice, in a material respect, the notice of termination”. This issue does not appear to have been addressed or discussed during the hearing before the Tribunal. The Tribunal nonetheless made findings that the notice was not prejudiced in a material respect and, further, that the Appellant was not prejudiced by the omission of the signature. In the context of this appeal, the Appellant sought to point to the termination of her tenancy as a form of prejudice. The Tribunal’s position is that, given that the signed notice as in fact served on her, the Appellant is estopped from alleging prejudice.

52. The formulation of section 64A is slightly curious as it asks whether a notice of termination was prejudiced. It is not the most common use of the term “prejudice”, which would more typically refer to prejudice to a person or persons. Nonetheless, when this provision is read in the context of section 64A as a whole, which is concerned with forgiving non-compliance with requirements of the Act (as already found), it is clear that it is intended to ensure that the omission or slip in question does not have the effect of materially undermining the notice, such as by preventing it from fulfilling its intended purpose in a material respect. The Tribunal reached a conclusion on this point having identified that the notice complied with every other requirement of the Act. I see no error or basis to interfere with the Tribunal’s finding in this respect. Indeed, the Appellant did not seek to identify how the notice was materially prejudiced by the apparent omission of a signature.

53. Insofar as the Appellant asserts that she was prejudiced by the Notice of Termination, I do not see any basis in the words used in section 64A(a) to conclude that it intends to refer to prejudice to the tenant. The legislature must be taken to have selected the words used and the Appellant has identified no basis in the provision or the surrounding or broader legislative context to read the plain words used in section 64A as referring to prejudice to the tenant, rather than prejudice to the termination notice. Even if prejudice to the tenant was the intended test in section 64A(a) (which I do not believe to be the case), I can see no basis for interfering with the decision of the Tribunal that no prejudice was caused to the Appellant by the want of a signature. The high threshold that must be met for such interference was neatly summarised by Ferriter J. in Web Summit:

“… an appeal may not succeed unless, inter alia, there was no evidence to support a material finding of primary fact, or an inference or conclusion on the facts was one which no Tribunal could reasonably have reached ” (at [27]).

13 54. The primary fact asserted by the Appellant as relevant prejudice is the loss of the tenancy. However, this was not argued before the Tribunal and, in any event, the loss of the tenancy arises from the fact of the termination notice, not the apparent omission of the signature. I note, as counsel for the Tribunal emphasises, that there was no infirmity in the warning notice which was signed and served on the Appellant. The high threshold that would need to be met in this appeal to interfere with factual findings by the Tribunal is not met. Insofar as the Tribunal advanced an argument of estoppel, I do not agree that this is the correct approach: the question is whether it was irrational for the Tribunal in making the decision on the grounds on which it did. I have already rejected that contention. More fundamentally, I must observe that any argument of prejudice is – and would at the time of the hearing have been - utterly unstateable, given the Appellant was in fact in possession of a signed Termination Notice at all material times.

55. Turning then to the second criterion of section 64A, there is no evidence or suggestion that the notice was not “otherwise” in compliance with the requirements of the Act and this criterion was therefore met. For these reasons, I am satisfied that there was no error of law or other flaw in the Determination of the Tribunal with regard to the application of section 64A.

Legal representation

56. The next issue I must address is the Appellant’s reliance on the fact that she was not legally represented. She relies on this by way of response to the failure to make any complaint about the Termination Notice at the hearing before the Tribunal. In reply, the RTB notes that the Landlord was also unrepresented and relies on the judgment of O’Raifeartaigh J. in Foley v. Johnson [2017] IEHC 424, “[t]he P.R.T.B. proceedings are relatively informal and it is not necessary to have a lawyer” (at [20]). The judgment of Barr J. in Stulpinaite v. Residential Tenancies Board [2021] IEHC 178 approving that statement was also cited.

57. I do not believe that the fact the Appellant was unrepresented or other factors cited by her (such as medical issues) alter or warrant any overlooking of the fact that, during the hearing before the Tribunal, she accepted that she was served with the Termination Notice and did not identify any shortcomings or issues with the document. She proved herself able to raise issues with the earlier termination notice (including complaints related to certain formalities and requirements) and I do not regard the lack of representation to be relevant.

Adequacy of reasons

58. The final point asserted by the Appellant is that there was a want of reasons in the Determination for the decision to apply section 64A. There is a pronounced artificiality to the contention that

14 the Tribunal did not sufficiently reason a decision which it did not need to make, and which the Appellant at all material times knew was not required. In any event, I do not regard this is a valid ground of appeal. While no decision to apply that section was necessary, the Tribunal did give reasons for the decision by reference to the specific criteria of the section.

Additional arguments

59. Two additional points were raised by the Appellant during this appeal.

60. First, a factual question was raised in the appeal concerning the authenticity of the signature on the Termination Notice and the evidence given at the hearing regarding it. The Appellant contends on affidavit that the signature on the Termination Notice was not in fact the signature of the Landlord and that the Landlord admitted during the hearing that he did not sign the Termination Notice. Having reviewed the transcript, I can see no evidence from the Landlord that the signature on the Termination Notice was not his signature.

61. He said in answer to a question from the Chair about a signature on the warning notice for rent arrears that “if it says Vadims Abrosimovs, then it is my signature” (transcript, page 51). He then answered “yes, yes” to the following question about paperwork regarding the tenancy: “And you signed it and she looked after the -- which she would have looked after the serving of it, would she?”

62. There was no evidence that anyone other than the Landlord signed the Termination Notice and no point was made before the Tribunal about the signature on the Termination Notice. On the contrary, when the Appellant was asked if she had “anything to say” about that Notice, her answer was “no” (transcript, page 31). This can be contrasted with her evidence about flaws and formatting issues she identified with the earlier termination notice of 21 July 2023.

63. These points about the signature were not before the Tribunal, nor could they be, given the Tribunal did not have a copy of the page containing the signature. They are not referenced in the Notice of Motion and are not and could not properly be part of this appeal. There is also no evidence on the transcript or otherwise that supports the Appellant’s contention.

64. Second, the Appellant has sought to make arguments based on agency. This appears to be a complaint that the Landlord asserted that he used an agent and that this was not disclosed within the meaning of section 12(1)(e) of the 2004 Act. The Landlord’s evidence, as recorded on the transcript, was that another individual, referred to as “Tatyana”, typed everything for him and he then signed the notices. His evidence was that “there were times when I would delegate everything to Tatyana and she looking like after all the procedures because she knew what's

15 the -- what are the procedures to follow..” (transcript, page 51). This evidence was given and no argument or objection was made by the Appellant about any reliance on an agent. This point was not part of the Determination. The finding material to this appeal – that the apparent failure to sign the Termination Notice did not invalidate it – does not have anything to do with the question of agency. This point is not properly part of this appeal. In any event, I fail to see how this point could advance the Appellant’s case.

CONCLUSIONS

65. This appeal is entirely artificial in its premise and lacking in merit. The reliefs sought are refused.

66. Given the findings made in this judgment, I am of the provisional view that the correct costs order is an order that the Appellant should be liable for the costs incurred by the Tribunal. I will list the matter before me at 10.45am on 17 February 2026 for the purpose of hearing any submissions the parties may wish to make regarding the allocation of costs and to make final orders.

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