Court of Appeal dismisses appeal against sentence for assault and threat to kill, upholding proportionality despite family impact.
Legislator-Zusammenfassung
KI-generiertThe Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal against his custodial sentence for assault and threatening to kill his wife. The appellant argued that the length of imprisonment would disproportionately harm his family and children, but the court rejected this, noting that significant custodial sentences remain appropriate for serious offences. The court affirmed that while family circumstances are a factor, they do not justify reducing sentences unless exceptional, and found no error in the sentencing judge's application of the principle of totality.
Legislator-Regeste
KI-generierts. 5 Non Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997; s. 3 Non Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997; s. 41(1) and (5) Criminal Justice Act 1999; s. 17(1) Domestic Violence Act 1996: Family circumstances, including the impact on children, are a relevant factor in sentencing but do not justify a non-custodial or reduced custodial sentence where the offence is serious and a significant custodial term is otherwise appropriate.
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KI-generiertVolltext
THE COURT OF APPEAL
Sheehan J.
Mahon J.
Edwards J.
Appeal No.: 186/14
Between
The People at the Suit of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Respondent
- and -
Eamon Maughan
Appellant
Judgment (ex tempore) delivered on 21st day of April 2016 by Mr. Justice Mahon
1. This is an appeal against a sentence imposed on 4th April 2014 at Castlebar Circuit Criminal Court following conviction on 2nd
February 2014 at the conclusion of a three day jury trial.
2. The appellant was found guilty of four counts, being:-
(i) Count No. 1:
Threat to kill or cause serious harm contrary to s. 5 of the Non Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997. (In respect
of this offence the appellant received a prison sentence of three years, to date from 6th November 2013).
(ii) Count No. 2:
Assault causing harm contrary to s. 3 of the Non Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997. (In respect of this offence
the appellant was sentenced to two years, sentence to run consecutively with the sentence imposed on count no. 1 and
concurrently with the sentence imposed in count no. 2).
(iii) Count No. 3:
Intimidation of a witness contrary to s. 41(1) and (5) of the Criminal Justice Act 1999. (In respect of this offence the
appellant was sentenced to three years imprisonment, sentence to run concurrently with the sentence imposed on count
no. 1).
(iv) Count No. 4:
Contravention of Safety Order contrary to s. 17(1) of the Domestic Violence Act 1996. (This offence was taken into
consideration with counts 1, 2 and 3).
3. On 8th June 2013 the appellant contravened a Safety Order contrary to 2. 17(1) of the Domestic Violence Act 1996 and assaulted
his wife, Ann Maughan. The appellant and his wife lived together with their seven children. On that date the appellant arrived home
and demanded money from his wife with which to gamble. Mrs. Maughan did not give him money and he proceeded to beat her with a
handle of a brush about her head, hitting her four or five times. She was bleeding from a cut to her head. He then left the house. Mrs.
Maughan called the gardaí and made a statement in relation to the assault.
4. Approximately ten days later, on 17th June 2013 the appellant threatened to kill his wife with a carpet knife stating “Do you see it?
I will slice you with it. I will do away with you”. Mrs. Maughan made a statement to the gardaí in which she provided details of the
threat. At the time Mrs. Maughan was in bed with two of her young children. She described to the gardaí how the appellant shouted
at her and warned her to drop the charges and tell the guards I was telling lies and that if I get him jail that he would kill me. Mrs.
Maughan alleged that her husband told her that if he was to go to jail he would serve ten years and that he would do something right
to you. She told the gardaí that she was in serious fear for her life and that she believed her husband would kill her.
5. When called to give evidence at an early stage in the trial, Mrs. Maughan maintained that her statements to the gardaí about the
appellant assaulting and threatening her were lies. She maintained that stance and the case proceeded with the admission of Mrs.
Maughan’s statements into evidence, the learned trial judge having satisfied himself that the statements were made voluntarily and
were reliable.
6. Mrs. Maughan declined to make a victim impact statement.
Grounds of appeal
7. The appellant’s grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows:-
(i) The effective overall sentence of five years was excessive and disproportionate, and amounts to an error in principle.
(ii) Insufficient weight was attached to the mitigating factors. It is contended that the learned sentencing judge was
wrong in his failure (as stated by him) to identify any serious mitigating factor in the case.
(iii) It was wrong to treat as an aggravating factor the appellant’s lack of remorse in relation to the commission of these
offences.
(iv) Insufficient weight was attached to the appellant’s family and personal circumstances.
The sentencing judgment
8. The learned sentencing judge identified and considered a number of factors in the case, particularly relating to the appellant’s
background and personal circumstances. He stated that the appellant had a complicated background and has a number of difficulties
that remained unresolved. He attempted anger management courses. He took that view that a significant feature in the case was
the appellant’s long history of addiction to alcohol, drugs and gambling. He did not accept the appellant’s claim (as made to the
Probation Service) that he had ceased drinking some months previously. He noted that the appellant had shown no remorse for his
offending behaviour, that he had believed he had done nothing wrong, and that he continued to blame his wife for causing him
trouble. He also notes that the appellant carried a high risk of re-offending within twelve months.
9. The learned sentencing judge stated that he could not identify any mitigating factor in regard to this man. He noted his history of
previous offending but that a previous conviction for assault occurred some thirteen years previously. He indicated that he would
sentence the appellant on the basis that there was no recent evidence of any crime of violence.
10. The learned sentencing judge expressed his view, (and correctly so), that the sentence for the second offence, (the threat to
kill), had to be consecutive to the sentence for the first offence, (the assault), as the second offence had been committed by the
appellant while he was on bail in respect of the first offence. He expressed his view that the appropriate sentence for this offence
was a term of imprisonment of five years, before later imposing the sentence of two years imprisonment.
Decision
11. These offenses were extremely serious. They involved a vicious and unprovoked assault on a defenceless woman; a example of
domestic violence of the most serious kind. They also involved threats of extreme violence - in fact a threat to kill his wife – unless
she took steps to frustrate or stop his prosecution. Any attempt to interfere by intimidation with the legitimate investigation and
prosecution of a crime is an offence of the utmost gravity.
12. One of the submissions made by counsel for the appellant was that the learned sentencing judge did not sufficiently take account
of the adverse affect that the prolonged long absence of the appellant while in prison would have on his young children. Undoubtedly,
the absence of a parent for prolonged period can, and does, adversely affect children, especially young children. It also imposes on
the other parent a host of additional practical problems in dealing with young children. However, while it is properly a factor to be
taken into account when considering a custodial sentence, and the length of such a sentence, in relation to the parent of a young
child, it should not, save in exceptional circumstances, result in the imposition of a non custodial sentence, or indeed a reduced
custodial sentence, in circumstances where a significant custodial sentence is otherwise appropriate with due regard to the
seriousness of the offence concerned, and, of course, the personal circumstances of the personal being sentenced.
13. In a recent decision of this court, in the case of DPP v. Counihan [2015] IECA 76, the following was stated:
“The Court holds that the suspended sentence cannot be justified in this case by reason only of the impact that
imprisonment would have on the respondent's family, although the Court does not in any way wish to underestimate
those effects. The fact is, however difficult it may be to cope without the respondent, many other families of
imprisoned people have to face major disruption and problems in coping with children and dependent adults.”
14. It is also suggested that these offences are less serious than they might otherwise have been if committed in the house of a
stranger. This is not necessarily so. The house in this case was Mrs. Maughan’s home and a place where she was entitled to feel safe
and secure. That right was very significantly breached by the appellant.
15. The court is satisfied that in respect of counts 1 and 3 no error of principle is evident in the sentences imposed, being three year
concurrent sentences.
16. In relation to count no. 2, being the threat to kill offence, and probably the most serious of the offences, the sentence imposed
was one of two years imprisonment. It was necessarily made consecutive to the three year sentence imposed in respect of count no.
1 as it was an offence committed while the appellant was on bail for that first offence. In the course of his sentencing judgment, the
learned sentencing judge identified the appropriate sentence for this offence to be one of five years imprisonment. The court finds no
fault with this view. In deciding, however, to impose just two years imprisonment for this offence; it is quite apparent that the
learned sentencing judge very fully respected and acknowledged the principle of proportionality and totality, almost to the point of
leniency.
17. There is no error of principle evident in the imposition of this sentence.
18. The appeal is therefore dismissed.
19. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the court believes it appropriate to acknowledge the appellant’s considerable and impressive
rehabilitation achieved since his incarceration approximately two and a half years ago, and as is apparent from the many certificates
of achievements in courses accessed by him while in prison, including in the areas of alcohol addiction and awareness, self esteem
and self development, parenting skills and anger management. Undoubtedly all of these will benefit him on release from prison in the
not too distant future.