Supreme Court dismisses appeal against trial prohibition due to Garda leaks, citing fade factor and state institution duty.

THE SUPREME COURT

Appeal No: 66/2014

Denham C.J.

Hardiman J.

Dunne J.

Between/

J.(S).T.

Applicant/Appellant

and

President of the Circuit Court and the Director of Public Prosecutions

Respondents

Judgment of the Court delivered on the 10th day of March, 2015, by Denham C.J.

1. This is an appeal by the applicant/appellant, J.(S).T., hereinafter referred to as “the appellant”, from the judgment and order of the

High Court (Kearns P.), made and perfected on the 17th January, 2014, refusing to prohibit the trial of the appellant in Limerick Circuit

Criminal Court on 251 counts of indecent assault on a number of pupils in a national school in Limerick between 1979 and 1981, when

the appellant was a teacher at the school.

2. The Director of Public Prosecutions is the respondent, and is referred to as “the D.P.P”.

3. This appeal is in essence a repeat of the appellant’s previous unsuccessful appeal, made in relation to other prosecutions, where

other complainants, other ex pupils of his, made similar complaints: J.T. v. D.P.P. [2007] IESC 270.

Judicial Review

4. The High Court (Peart J.) on the 30th January 2013, granted the appellant leave to apply for judicial review for the following

reliefs:-

(i) An order of prohibition, or in the alternative an injunction, by way of judicial review prohibiting the D.P.P., his

servants or agents, from prosecuting criminal proceedings entitled “The People (at the suit of the D.P.P) –v- J.

(S).T., Bill Number 93/2010” pending before Limerick Circuit Court and comprising of 113 charges.

(ii) An order of prohibition, or in the alternative an injunction, by way of judicial review prohibiting the D.P.P., his

servants or agents, from prosecuting criminal proceedings entitled “The People (at the suit of the D.P.P) –v- J.

(S).T., Bill Number LK 190/12” pending before Limerick Circuit Court and comprising of 139 charges.

(iii) An order of prohibition by way of judicial review staying the trial of the appellant as an abuse of process.

(iv) A declaration that the delay in instituting the criminal proceedings and the delay in bringing the proceedings to

hearing had prejudiced the appellant generally and specifically with regard to the possibility of a fair trial.

(v) A declaration that the wholly exceptional circumstances exist in the circumstances of this case that render it

unfair or unjust to put the appellant on trial.

(vi) A declaration that the delay in bringing the criminal proceedings the subject matter of the application to hearing

constitutes:

a) an unfair procedure within the meaning of article 40.3 of the Constitution;

b) a trial otherwise than in due course of law as required by Article 38 of the Constitution;

c) an infringement of the appellant’s liberty; and

d) A breach of Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms 1950.

(vii) An order staying the criminal proceedings the subject matter of the application for relief.

(viii) An order providing for an extension of time within which to bring these proceedings.

(ix) Damages

(x) Costs.

5. The grounds for such relief sought were:-

“i) The [appellant] is now seventy years of age and in bad health. He currently faces 251 charges of indecent assault

spanning the time period 1979 to 1981 in respect of 18 complainants. Complaints were made by all but one of these

complainants upon being approached by members of An Garda Siochana. The first complaint which was made by [R.K.C.]

was made in or around 2005 and thereafter members of An Garda Siochana approached the other 17 complainants on

dates between 2006 to 2011.

ii) These charges are currently pending before Limerick Circuit Court (Bill Number 93/2010) and Bill Number LK190/12.

iii) The [appellant] was questioned by the prosecution authorities in respect of the allegations the subject matter of Bill

Number 93/2010 in May 2006 and May 2008 and was first before the court on the 11th February 2010 in respect of these

allegations. The prosecution authorities made disclosure in November 2012 after a trial date of the 5th of February 2013

had been set. An earlier trial date had been vacated on the application of the prosecution.

iv) The [appellant] was first before the court in respect of the allegations the subject matter of Bill Number LK190/12 on

the 21st June 2012 having been questioned about these matters by members of An Garda Siochana in 2011. It would

seem that these complaints were received from members of An Garda Siochana after the gardai approached former pupils

of the Christian Brothers in Sexton Street, Limerick on dates between 2010 and 2011. A book of evidence was served on

the [appellant] in respect of these matters on the 28th of November 2012 and he was returned for trial to Limerick Circuit

Court on the same day. A provisional trial date of the 5th of February 2013 has also been set for the trial of these

matters.

v) The [appellant] has previously faced trial on 6 occasions on diverse dates between May 2009 and May 2011 before

Dublin Circuit Criminal Court for similar allegations (and been in custody for a total of 4 ½ years on foot of those matters)

but has never been convicted of any offence.

vi) The delay on the part of the Director of Public Prosecutions in commencing these criminal proceedings (both in terms

of complainant delay and prosecutorial delay) constitutes a breach of the [appellant's] constitutional rights:

(a) to be tried on criminal charges in due course of law pursuant to Article 38.1 of the Constitution.

(b) to be tried with reasonable expedition.

(c) to fair procedures, and

(d) to fairness and justice

vii) The delay on the part of the Director of Public Prosecutions in commencing these proceedings (both in terms of

complainant delay and prosecutorial delay):

(a) constitutes an inordinate and inexcusable delay, and

(b) has prejudiced the [appellant]. In this regard the [appellant], at this time remove does not remember individual

complainants and one potential witness namely R.C.C. is now deceased. Furthermore, one of the complainants

namely R.C.C. refers to making a complaint about me to a Brother Sexton. However at this time remove it is

impossible for me to establish that no such complaint was actually made as the then principle of the school is

deceased.

The witnesses Sue Davis Dawn Bird and K.M. Noonan cannot be located by the prosecution authorities. All counselling notes made by

them have been destroyed. These witnesses are said to have counselled the complainant R.C.C. It is now impossible for the

[appellant] to establish what may have been said by the complainant R.C.C. to these witnesses about the subject matter of chafes 1

and 2 in the book of evidence relating to Bill Number 93/2005 and so cross examine as to any previous inconsistent statements.

viii) The delay on the part of the Director of Public Prosecutions in commencing these proceedings (both in terms of

complainant delay and prosecutorial delay) is contrary to Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of

Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950.

ix) The trial of the [appellant] on these offences at such a remote time from the date of the alleged offences amounts to

an abuse of process of the courts. The prosecuting authorities have manipulated the court process so as to cause the

[appellant] the maximum amount of stress and anxiety.

x) The prosecuting authorities, their servants or agents, by their acts or more particularly by their omissions are culpable

in relation to the passage of time between the alleged incidents and the initiation of proceedings.

xi) Exceptional circumstances exist that render it unfair or unjust to put the [appellant] on trial. Those circumstances are

as follows:

• the charges relate to events which are alleged to have occurred 32 to 34 years ago,

• save for one complainant the gardai seem to have first approached the complainants,

• the [appellant] is now 70 years of age and in bad health,

• the [appellant] has previously faced trial on 6 occasions in respect of similar allegations and has not been

convicted,

• the [appellant] has previously spent over 4 years in custody in while awaiting trial for those other matters;

xii) Such further or other grounds as this Honourable court may deem meet.”

The High Court judgment

6. The High Court (Kearns P.) by judgment and order on the 17th January, 2014, refused the appellant’s application.

7. The learned trial judge held that he was not satisfied that there had been any prosecutorial delay in bringing the prosecutions after

the complaints were initially made. He stated:-

“This was not a case which lent itself to a speedy process. The very number of complaints made that impossible.”

8. Kearns P. held that even if there had been undue prosecutorial delay, the appellant’s application would still have been refused

because exceptional circumstances did not exist which would have rendered it unfair or unjust to put the appellant on trial. The

appellant had sought to rely on his advanced age and poor health as constituting exceptional circumstances. However Kearns P.

rejected this and held that the medical evidence before the Court did not suggest that the appellant was incapable of participating in

the trial process.

9. It was also held by the learned trial judge that the fact the appellant had previously faced trial on six other occasions on other

complaints, and had not been convicted, could not be described as exceptional circumstances that would warrant a grant of the relief

sought. Kearns P. stated:-

“This Court is of the view that the ‘Dublin offences’ or his period of freely chosen time in custody are not matters relevant

to the present application. To hold otherwise would ineluctably lead to the position that the longer the list of offences

with which a person was charged the less likely it would become that he would ever have to stand trial for those later

uncovered and made the subject of further criminal charges.”

Notice of appeal

10. The appellant filed a notice of appeal setting out 16 grounds of appeal. The primary ground of appeal arises from an alleged failure

of the learned President of the High Court to conduct an overall assessment of all the circumstances in considering whether it would

be unfair or unjust to put the appellant on trial.

The specific grounds of appeal were stated to be:-

“1. The learned President of the High Court erred in law in failing to conduct an overall assessment of all the

circumstances of the Appellant and concerning the prosecutions pending against him for the purpose of determining

whether the relief sought by the Appellant should be granted, in particular on the ground that it would be unfair or unjust

to put the Appellant on trial.

2. The learned President of the High Court erred in law in concluding that it would not be unfair or unjust to put the

Appellant on trial in this case. In this regard, the teamed President of the High Court Judge failed to have regard to the

totality of the circumstances of the case in so concluding.

3. The learned President of the High Court erred in law in finding that the Appellant's previous multiple trials for similar

type charges, over many years, none of which resulted in a conviction, and time spent in custody by the Appellant while

awaiting those trials, were not relevant to the application to prohibit the Appellant's trial on the charges the subject

matter of these proceedings.

4. The learned President of the High Court erred in law and in fact in treating the case as one in which an application for

leave to bring proceedings by way of judicial review was brought at the last moment only days before the trial was due to

get underway, when the reasons for the timing of the application were explained on affidavit. In particular, the learned

President of the High Court erred in law in failing to consider or give any or any adequate weight to the circumstances

that, in one case (bill no. 190/2012), the application was in fact brought within less than three months of the return for

trial and, in the other case (bill no. 93/2010), the application was brought within less than three months of disclosure

having been made by the prosecution notwithstanding repeated requests by the defence over a period of two years for

disclosure, which requests were deliberately ignored by the prosecution, and in circumstances where the prosecution

proposed to have the two cases tried together.

5. The learned President of the High Court erred in law in treating the investigation as sufficiently complex and detailed to

require five years or more for the prosecution to investigate yet failing to consider or give any or any adequate weight to

the circumstances in which the Appellant was required to defend the allegations with less than three months notice of the

case against him on bill no. 190/2012 and with less than three months to consider the disclosure made by the prosecution

on both bills.

6. The learned President of the High Court erred in law in failing to consider or give any or any adequate weight to the

circumstances in which the complaints emerged, in particular that there had been extensive, adverse publicity concerning

the Appellant, which publicity had prompted civil actions by some of the complainants, and there was evidence of

communication between some of the complainants in that regard, without complaints having been made by-them to the

Gardai of any criminal wrongdoing.

7. The learned President of the High Court erred in law in failing to consider or give any or any adequate weight to the

fact that some of the complainants, having pursued civil actions in those circumstances, had not made any complaint of

criminal wrongdoing until approached by Gardaí.

8. The learned President of the High Court erred in law in applying the principle identified in S. H. v. Director of Public

Prosecutions [2006] 3 I.R. 574, that it is not a necessity to inquire into the reasons for complainant delay, in the

particular and very unusual circumstances of this case, in particular the fact that some of the complainants had spoken

to other complainants about the subject matter of the charges, having become aware of adverse publicity concerning the

Appellant, and had commenced or even concluded civil proceedings without making any complaint to the Gardaí.

9. The learned President of the High Court erred in law and in fact in concluding that no blameworthy prosecutorial delay

had occurred.

10. The learned President of the High Court erred in law in failing to consider or give any or any adequate weight to the

delay in the conduct of the Garda investigations and in the assessment of the outcome of those investigations by the

Second-Named Respondent.

11. The learned President of the High Court erred in law in failing to consider or give any or any adequate weight to the

deliberate policy of the prosecution to frustrate the conduct of the defence in relation to bill no. 93/2010 by refusing to

make disclosure in relation to that case until such time as they were in a position to proceed with bill no. 190/2012,

notwithstanding repeated requests for such disclosure to be made, and notwithstanding the very considerable passage of

time since the dates of the alleged offences.

12. The learned President of the High Court erred in law and in fact in concluding that the Appellant was not prejudiced

by reason of blameworthy prosecutorial delay.

13. The learned President of the High Court erred in law and in fact in his assessment of the evidential significance of the

prejudice to the Applicant as a result of the passage of time, in particular in relation to the loss of counseling notes in

relation to one complainant and the death of Brother S and of a teacher, FK.

14. The learned President of the High Court erred in law in deciding that, because it had not been shown that the

Appellant was incapable of participating in a trial process, it would therefore not be unfair or unjust to put him on trial.

15. The learned President of the High Court erred in-law and in fact in exercising his discretion to refuse the relief sought

on the grounds that the application was brought days before the trial was due to get underway.

16. Such further and other grounds as to this Honourable Court may seem fit.”

Submissions on behalf of the appellant

11. Written and oral submissions were made on behalf of the appellant. It was submitted that there had been blameworthy

prosecutorial delay in this case.

12. It was submitted that the appellant would suffer specific prejudice if the matter went to trial as his position is fatally hampered by

the passage of time and the absence of witnesses. It was submitted that the absence of four witnesses means that they cannot be

cross examined as to any previous inconsistent statements made by one of the complainants.

13. In oral submissions, counsel for the appellant said that the adverse publicity generated in relation to the alleged Dublin offences,

including the appellant’s identification in media publications, affected the emergence of further allegations in this case. It was

submitted that the existence of these newspaper articles and the emergence of civil claims against the appellant undermines the

credibility of the complainants and the fairness of the trial.

14. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the following cumulative factors give rise to wholly exceptional circumstances so as to

render it unfair or unjust to put the appellant on trial in this case:-

(i) The age (71) and ill-health of the appellant. During the course of these proceedings the appellant’s health has

fallen into significant decline.

(ii) The charges relate to events which are alleged to have occurred 32 to 34 years ago.

(iii) Save for one complainant the gardaí seem to have first approached all the other complainants

(iv) There is evidence that there was discussion amongst some of complainants prior to official complaints being

made to the gardaí. Some of those discussions took place in contemplation of civil proceedings.

(v) The prosecution are unable to locate witnesses, and counselling records have been destroyed.

(vi) The appellant has previously faced trial on 6 occasions in respect of similar allegations from other complainants,

“the Dublin offences”, and has not been convicted.

(vii) The appellant has previously spent over 4 years in custody while awaiting trial for those other matters.

Submissions on behalf of the D.P.P.

15. Counsel for the D.P.P. made oral and written submissions to the Court. It was submitted on behalf of the D.P.P. that a complex

and detailed investigation had taken place and there had been no blameworthy prosecutorial delay in the complex circumstances of

this case. Further, there was no evidence before the High Court that valuable evidence was lost or that there was any specific

prejudice arising from delay in this case.

16. In the event that the Court should find that there has been blameworthy prosecutorial delay, it was submitted that this Court, in

adopting the balancing exercise, should find that the public interest in having these multiple allegations prosecuted outweighs the

effect of any delay in the case.

17. The sheer number of allegations and the serious nature of those allegations made against the appellant, from various pupils from

various classes at the school, is an important factor that should weigh against prohibition in the event that the Court adopts any

such balancing test.

18. Counsel for the D.P.P. submitted that the High Court (Kearns P.) addressed each of the issues stated by the appellant to

constitute cumulative factors that justified prohibition. He considered the issue of prosecutorial delay, the allegations that this was a

garda driven investigation, the issue of unavailable witnesses and whether the Dublin charges should be weighed in the balance. The

trial judge then specifically addressed the health of the appellant and concluded that none of the medical evidence suggested that

the appellant was unable to stand trial or incapable of participating in the trial process or that his ability to contest the charges would

be in any way impaired.

Decision

19. This appeal is very similar to an earlier appeal taken by the appellant, J.(S).T before this Court in relation to the alleged Dublin

offences, J.T. v. D.P.P. [2007] IESC 270.

20. In J.T. v. D.P.P. the Court refused the appellant’s application to injunct his trial and held that he had failed to establish matters so

as to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court upon which to prohibit his trial. The appellant did not meet the required test for prohibition of

a trial, and in the circumstances as a whole there was no real risk of an unfair trial. It was pointed out that the trial would proceed

under the control of a judge who had a duty to ensure that the trial was fair. It was stated:-

“On behalf of the applicant it was submitted that the alleged offences occurred many years ago, that the Director of

Public Prosecutions decided to prosecute, but that he was guilty of delay in his office, that there was leaking of

information by the Garda Síochána, that there was a campaign of vilification, that he says he can remember only four of

the complainants, that relevant witnesses have died, that some of the school rolls are missing, and that in all of the

circumstances of the case there is a real risk of an unfair trial arising from the cumulative effect.

I have addressed the factors individually previously in this judgment. Considering them cumulatively I am not satisfied that

they meet the required test for intervention and prohibition of a trial by the Court either on the basis of prosecutorial

delay, or an abuse of trial process. In the circumstances as a whole there is no real risk of an unfair trial. As in all such

cases the trial will proceed under the control of a judge who has the duty to ensure that the trial is fair. The test to be

applied is that stated by Finlay C.J. in Z. v. Director of Public Prosecutions[1994] 2 I.R. 476, at p.507:

‘… to establish a real risk of an unfair trial … necessarily and inevitably means an unfair trial which cannot be

avoided by appropriate rulings and directions on the part of the trial judge. The risk is a real one but the unfairness

of trial must be an unavoidable unfairness of trial.’

Conclusion

The applicant has sought to raise the exceptional jurisdiction of the Court to prohibit his trial. However, he has

failed to establish matters so as to invoke this jurisdiction. In all the circumstances of the case, which include the

fact that there are multiple offences, multiple complaints, and witnesses available to the alleged events, I would

dismiss the appeal of the applicant and affirm the order of the High Court refusing the application to injunct the

trial.”

21. While this case relates to complaints against the appellant arising from different pupils in another school, the issues are similar. On

analysis of this application, the conclusion is the same.

Prosecutorial delay

22. The appellant raised the issue of prosecutorial delay. In the case of S. H. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2006] 3 I.R. 574, this

Court set out the approach to be applied in applications to prohibit criminal trials on grounds of complainant delay. It was held to be

no longer necessary for the Court to inquire into the reasons for the delay or whether the accused had exercised dominion over the

complainant or make assumptions as to the truth of the complaints.

23. The Court would adopt the reasoning of Kearns J., as he then was, in P.M v. Malone [2002] 2 I.R 560, who set out the required

balancing process when considering blameworthy prosecutorial delay. He stated as follows at p. 185 :-

“I believe that the balancing exercise referred to by Keane C.J. in P.M. v. Malone [2002] 2 I.R. 560 is the appropriate

mechanism to be adopted by a court in determining whether blameworthy prosecutorial delay should result in an order of

prohibition. It means that an applicant for such relief must put something more into the balance where prosecutorial delay

arises to outweigh the public interest in having serious charges proceed to trial. In most cases, pre-trial incarceration will

not be an element as an applicant will probably have obtained bail pending his trial. Secondly, while he may assert

increased levels of stress and anxiety arising from prosecutorial delay, any balancing exercise will have to take into

account the length of such blameworthy delay, because if it is a short delay rather than one of years, the mere fact that

some blameworthy delay took place should not of itself justify the prohibition of a trial.”

Prior prosecutions

24. The Court agrees with and affirms the approach of the learned President that, the charges relating to “Dublin offences” have no

relevance to the allegations that are the subject matter of this complaint. The appellant did spend time in custody but this was

because he voluntarily decided not to take up bail. Again, it is not relevant to these proceedings.

Specific prejudice

25. On behalf of the appellant it was submitted that important witnesses died or cannot be traced. In particular, the principle of the

school at the time, Brother D, to whom complainants said they made complaints, is now deceased. However, this is not a factor of

itself sufficient to prohibit the trial.

26. Three individuals who were counsellors and from whom statements were taken are unavailable. Counselling records in relation to

one of the complainants, R.K have been destroyed.

27. In all the circumstances, the missing records are not a basis upon which to prohibit the trial. In a recent case of Ó’C. v. D.P.P

[2014], O’Malley J. rejected the argument that missing records from a health centre and the death of a doctor, to whom the

complainant had spoken to about alleged sexual abuse, were matters which should persuade the Court to grant prohibition. Each case

has to be considered on its own facts. The alleged absence of documents in this case does not appear to be such upon which to

prohibit a trial. That said, it is an issue which may be opened to the trial judge, who will be best placed to determine the matter.

Cumulative circumstances

28. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that his age, ill health and inability to withstand stress, inter alia, are factors which

render this case such that it warrants an order of prohibition.

29. The appellant relied on the case of PT v D.P.P. [2007] IESC 39. However, each case has to be considered on its own facts. In PT

v D.P.P. the appellant had a serious medical condition and was much older, 87 years of age. The Court would distinguish that case.

30. Further, in relation to the age and ill health of the appellant, the Court adopts the reasoning in DT v. D.P.P.. [2007] IESC 2, where

it was held:-

“The issue raised on behalf of the applicant is his alleged disability, his capacity. Such is not part of the jurisprudence on

delay and the right to a fair trial, it is not an issue of prejudice caused by delay. Incapacity or disability may arise in

situations where there is no delay. If there are issues as to the applicant's capacity there are separate specific

procedures to be applied. It is a matter for the trial court to determine a person's fitness to stand trial.

[…]

Applying the law to the facts of this case I am satisfied that the issue of the applicant's fitness to plead is a matter for

the appropriate law and the trial court and that the applicant's submissions on this ground fail.”

31. The Court is satisfied that the medical evidence proffered, in addition to other factors raised, falls short of that required to

prohibit a trial. While there are a number of factors raised by the appellant, they do not, combined together, establish a situation

where his trial should be prohibited. The Court would dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the High Court.

Information in the public domain

32. There is a matter of concern in this appeal. It appears that there may have been a leaking of information by a member or

members of An Garda Siochána.

33. This issue was considered by High Court (Hanna J.) in the earlier case concerning “the Dublin offences” J.T. v D.P.P [2007] IEHC

309. Hanna J. found that the leakage did not require prohibition, but stated:-

"Having heard his evidence and observed him I am not disposed to conclude that Detective Garda Maloney was personally

responsible for passing information of the calibre complained of to the print media.

Nonetheless, I am satisfied that some part of it at least was sourced from a member or members of An Garda Síochána. It

is unfortunate that I must come to this conclusion given the limited nature of the enquiry in which I have engaged. It is

to my mind most regrettable that, after all of these articles had appeared, including material about which Detective Garda

Maloney expressed grave reservations, only the most lacklustre and informal enquiry resulted. Given the possibility of the

derailment of a trial I cannot accept that this was an appropriate response to what was, potentially, a significant

disciplinary matter.

[…]

In the circumstances of this case I am not persuaded that the leaking of information to the press by a member or

members of An Garda Síochána constitutes sufficient reason for stopping the trial. What occurred was reprehensible. But,

although undoubtedly sustained by the feeding of information to the newspapers, it is possible that the graphic and, at

times, tasteless and abusive references to the applicant may have occurred in any event.

Further, the evidence before me indicates that any vilification referable to the leaks ceased over three years ago. Any

residual trial prejudice could be assessed and dealt with if appropriate by the trial judge.”

34. The Court agrees with Hanna J.. While this is a matter for concern, it is not a ground upon which to prohibit the trial of the

appellant in the circumstances of this case at this time.

35. On the issue of prejudicial publicity, in this case, because of the lapse of time, the fade factor applies, and it is not a basis upon

which to prohibit the trial.

36. The Court, however, is concerned at the apparent premeditated leaking of information by a member or members of An Garda

Síochána. The Court condemns any such action by a member of An Garda Síochána. It should be observed also, that any such action

in another case could have the most serious consequences. The Court welcomes the opportunity to address this issue in a case

where, for quite different reasons, it is not appropriate to prohibit the trial. It must be clearly understood that information about a

criminal investigation in the possession of a member of An Garda Síochána, is not his or her personal property to be shared, or

otherwise disposed of, at his or her personal discretion. It is Official information, in the possession of An Garda Síochána as a State

Institution. If the gardai as an Institution decide to publicise such information to the Media, on the authority of a senior officer, that

is quite a different matter. But unauthorised leaks by individual members do no credit to the force and may, in an appropriate case,

lead to the prohibition of a trial. It is for those in charge of An Garda Síochána to bring this practice to an end, whether it is

attributable to ‘Garda sources’ or to an individual member.

37. The Court contrasts what happened in this case with a situation where it may be appropriate for An Garda Síochána as an

institution, with proper authority from a senior officer, perhaps through the Garda Press Office, to seek publicity in a case to, for

example, bring forward witnesses, or for another good reason.

Conclusion

38. For the reasons given, the Court would affirm the order of the learned High Court President and dismiss the appeal.