Court of Appeal dismisses appeal where trial judge failed to exclude a voluntary statement from a man with limited intellectual capacity.
Legislator-Zusammenfassung
KI-generiertThe Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal against his conviction for indecent assault, rejecting the claim that the trial judge erred in admitting a police statement. The appellant argued he had limited intellectual capacity and did not understand the caution given while not under arrest, yet the court reviewed video evidence showing he was attentive and confirmed the statement's accuracy. The court held that since the appellant voluntarily attended the station without arrest, no legal requirement existed to record the statement, and the evidence demonstrated he understood the proceedings.
Legislator-Regeste
KI-generiertCriminal Justice Act 1984, s. 4; Criminal Procedure Act 1967, s. 139: A statement made by a person who voluntarily attends a police station without arrest is admissible even if they have limited intellectual capacity, provided there is no evidence of vulnerability requiring special measures and the person understood the caution.
Schlagwörter
KI-generiertZitierte Gesetzesbestimmungen
KI-generiertZitierte Rechtsprechung
KI-generiertVolltext
THE COURT OF APPEAL
Appeal No. 168/14
Birmingham J.
Sheehan J.
Mahon J.
The Director of Public Prosecutions
Respondent
- and -
Thomas Mooney
Appellant
Judgment of the Court delivered by Mr. Justice Alan Mahon on the 16th day of July 2015
Introduction
1. The appellant was convicted in the Dublin Circuit Criminal Court on 2nd July 2014 of eight counts of indecent assault contrary to
Common Law following a five day trial. The appellant was sentenced on 25th July 2014 to concurrent four year sentences in respect
of three of the indecent assault counts (counts 1, 4 and 8) with the final two years thereof suspended on conditions. The convictions
on the remaining counts (counts 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7) were taken into consideration. The appellant was also placed on the Sex Offenders
Register in relation to counts 1, 4 and 8.
2. The victim of all the offences was, at the time they were committed, a child under fifteen years of age. His date of birth is 15th
November 1971. The offences took place on dates between 1st July 1983 and 30th June 1985 at 33, Gardiner Street, Dublin, which
was the appellant’s home. At the time the appellant occupied a basement flat at that address. The appellant is now seventy three
years of age; he was in his forties at the time the offences were committed. The indecent assault took place in circumstances where
the victim was persuaded to go to the appellant’s flat and there perform sexual acts in return for payment. The activity ceased when
the young victim was brought before the district court and sent to an industrial school in November 1985 because of truancy from
school.
3. There is one ground of appeal in this case:-
“The learned trial judge erred in principle in failing to exclude the contents of a statement made by the accused to
members of An Garda Síochána in Mountjoy garda station at a time where he was not under arrest nor detained under s.
4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 and also in circumstances where there was uncontroverted expert evidence before
the court that the accused had extremely limited intellectual capacity and did not understand the caution.”
4. The statement in question was dictated by the appellant and taking down in writing by one of his garda interviewers on 6th July
2010. In the statement, the appellant acknowledged that he had been cautioned, that he was not under arrest and was free to leave
the garda station at any time. The appellant went on to make admissions that he had engaged in sexual activity with the victim (and,
indeed, others) whom he stated was then fourteen or fifteen years old. The appellant named other individuals who engaged in similar
activity and he disclosed that he himself had been sexually abused and had sold sexual favours to men when in his youth. He
expressed remorse for having sexually abused young boys.
5. The factual background relating to the circumstances in which the statement was taken are as follows. In the course of
investigations arising from a complaint made by the victim in this case, a number of gardaí attended a particular address, being that
of a friend of the appellant. While the gardaí had the appellant on a list of suspects in relation to complaints in relation to complaints
made by the victim, they were not on this date actively looking for him. To this extent the appellant meeting the gardaí on the
occasion was unexpected on both sides. The appellant had arrived at the premises to visit his friend, accompanied by his dog. He was
cautioned by Det. Sgt. Cox and asked to accompany the gardaí to Mountjoy garda station which he agreed to do. He was not
arrested at any stage on that date, but was informed that he was a suspect in the investigation then underway.
6. The appellant had not sought a solicitor, nor was he advised by the gardaí to speak to a solicitor. The appellant maintained that he
had gone to the garda station in the belief that he had no choice but to so do.
7. The appellant was interviewed in an interview room in the garda station for about one hour. He signed the statement which garda
witnesses stated that he had dictated to them, and had been written down by one of them and then signed by the appellant. The
interview, including the dictation of the statement, was not recorded, even though a recording system was available in the interview
room. However, the reading back to the appellant of his signed statement was recorded and the court has had the opportunity to
view that recording in full.
8. The admissibility of the statement was the subject of a voir dire in the course of the trial. The learned trial judge ruled as follows:-
“I am satisfied that the statement made by Mr. Mooney on 6th July 2010 was a voluntary statement made after proper
caution, that the process in taking the statement was fair and that the statement should be admitted into evidence.”
9. Central to the contention by the appellant that the statement ought not to have been admitted into evidence is that the appellant
was a person of limited cognitive ability and that in those circumstances the taking of the statement should have been recorded. It
was conceded by the appellant that in circumstances where an individual has not been arrested there is no strict legal requirement to
record the interviewing of that individual in a garda station. In effect, it is submitted, that having regard to the vulnerable character
of the appellant (he being a person of limited cognitive ability) and the fact that the recording system was readily available, his
interview ought to have been recorded by the gardaí.
10. Specifically, it is submitted that the taking of a statement from a vulnerable man in a garda station while the video system was
turned off should have triggered scepticism on the part of a court been subsequently asked to consider it. For their part, the gardaí,
while they accepted that the appellant was not intellectually very bright, believed that he had understood the caution giving to him
and was capable of providing a voluntary statement. It was also suggested that the appellant’s general health had deteriorated in the
period between the making of his statement, and his appearance in court nearly three years later.
11. The court has had the opportunity to view the approximately ten minute long video recording of the statement being read over to
the appellant. It is noteworthy that in that recording the appellant appears to be particularly attentive to everything been read to
him, and he confirms the accuracy of what is stated frequently throughout the process. He acknowledges the statement as his own
and the information stated therein as information provided by him. He is seen to sign the acknowledgement that the statement has
been read over to him. His general demeanour is that of a man who is fully engaged in the process at hand, and does not appear
particularly vulnerable or to be a man acting under extreme or undue pressure or duress or any lack of capacity to understand. There
is nothing to suggest that he did not understand the caution.
12. It is now well established that an individual under arrest is entitled to fair procedures including the right to speak to a solicitor. For
example, in DPP v. Gormley [2014] IESC 17, the Supreme Court acknowledged the right of access to legal advice during detention in a
garda station. It is also the case that the recording of interviews of persons in custody in gardaí station is now a widespread
practice.
13. In this case however, the appellant had not been arrested. He had gone voluntarily to the garda station and had engaged in the
process of making a statement following caution. There is no evidence to indicate that a formal arrest of the appellant had been
avoided or delayed inappropriately or for any particular reason.
14. In those circumstances, there was no requirement to record the making of the statement. There was no evidence to suggest that
the appellant was in such a vulnerable state of either mental or physical health that any special or precautionary measures needed to
be put in place. Indeed, the recording of the reading of the statement to the appellant which the court has viewed suggests that the
appellant was then in a position to deal adequately with the situation he found himself in, albeit undoubtedly a situation which would
have been very stressful for him, as it would for anyone in similar circumstances.
15. While there was not in the particular circumstances of this case a legal requirement to record the making of the statement, such
a recording could have taken place. It is certainly preferable that in similar situations, available recording facilities should be utilised,
particularly where serious criminal activity is the subject of investigation.
16. The appeal is therefore dismissed.