Legislator Rechtsprechung & Gesetzgebung
IECCA 143 ECLI:IE:CCA:2009:143 KI-generiert

Certificate refused as trial not nullity; defence strategy caused unsworn evidence admission.

Geschäftsnummer IECCA 143
Gericht / Behörde
Rechtsordnung Irland (IE)
Entscheiddatum
Ausgang Abgewiesen (Dismissed)

Legislator-Zusammenfassung

KI-generiert

The Court of Criminal Appeal refused the applicant's certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court regarding procedural irregularities in the trial. The applicant argued that the admission of unsworn witness statements rendered the trial a nullity, relying on precedent that requires evidence to be given on oath. The court held that the irregularities were caused by the defence's own strategy to facilitate their case, creating an estoppel preventing the applicant from challenging the trial's validity. Consequently, the application was dismissed because the issues did not constitute points of law of exceptional public importance.

Legislator-Regeste

KI-generiert

Section 29 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924; Section 22 of the Criminal Justice Act, 2006: Where an appellant relies on the admission of unsworn evidence as a mistrial, they may be prevented by estoppel from an implied waiver or by a finding of fraud on the court, and certificates are refused where issues are specific to the case rather than of exceptional public importance.

Schlagwörter

KI-generiert
certificate of appeal unsworn evidence trial nullity estoppel exceptional public importance defence strategy Criminal Justice Act 2006

Zitierte Gesetzesbestimmungen

KI-generiert
Section 29 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924
Before a certificate under s.29 can be granted it is not sufficient that the matters sought to be raised are of importance to
Section 22 of the Criminal Justice Act, 2006
as to whether the relevant section of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984 was s.22 or s.21.
Section 21 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984
as to whether the relevant section of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984 was s.22 or s.21.
Criminal Justice Act, 1984
as to whether the relevant section of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984 was s.22 or s.21.

Zitierte Rechtsprechung

KI-generiert
Mapp (A minor) v. Gilhooley, [1991] 2 I.R. 253

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Volltext

THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

Macken J.

Birmingham J.

Edwards J.

[190/06]

RULING ON APPLICATION FOR A CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO SECTION 29 OF THE COURTS OF

JUSTICE ACT, 1924 AS SUBSTITUTED BY SECTION 22 OFTHE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, 2006

BETWEEN

DANIEL DOHERTY

APPLICANT

AND

THE PEOPLE AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR

OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT of Mrs. Justice Macken delivered the 14th day of December, 2009

1. Arising from the judgment of the Court delivered on 26th February, 2009, the applicant has sought a certificate from the

Court to permit an appeal to the Supreme Court. In its notice of motion five questions are suggested but as was pointed out

by Mr. Alex Owen, senior counsel on behalf of the applicant, as is not unusual in these cases, there was an element of

overlap and reformulation of the same issue.

2. In essence the application now made relates to the view of the court that while the procedure followed in relation to the

statements of evidence of two witnesses who were outside the jurisdiction was inappropriate, this did not have the effect of

rendering the trial a nullity. In moving the application, particular reliance has been placed on the case of Mapp (A minor) v.

Gilhooley, [1991] 2 I.R. 253. There is no doubt that the requirement that evidence be given on oath or affirmation or as

provided for by statute is a matter of real significance. However, Mapp (A minor) v. Gilhooley, makes clear that it is not

every departure from the appropriate procedure that will constitute a mistrial. In that regard the provisions of para. 4 of the

head note are of significance. It provides:-

“That where an appellant sought to rely on the admission of unsworn viva voce evidence as constituting

a mistrial, he might be prevented from doing so by reason of:

an estoppel arising from an express or unambiguously implied representation that he was waiving

his right to challenge; or

by a finding that to allow such a challenge would constitute a virtual fraud or abuse of the process

of the court.”

3. As emerges from this court’s judgment and as was reiterated by Mr. Denis Vaughan Buckley, senior counsel on behalf of

the respondent in the course of this application, the procedure followed at trial was designed to facilitate the defence which

saw the statements of evidence as assisting the strategy that it had decided upon. What happened occurred at the behest of

the defence. It is clear from the sequence of events during trial, that what occurred clearly falls within the first of the above

two categories. The court has already held that the pursuit of the defence strategy which led to the admission of the contents

of the statements not sworn in compliance with the provisions of the relevant statute, has not been shown to be so clearly

erroneous and misguided that it could be said that what happened was not a trial in due course of law.

4. The circumstances in which the jury came to hear the contents of the statement (save for a small portion of one of them

which it was agreed would not be read out), will be recalled. At trial there appears to have been some element of confusion

as to whether the relevant section of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984 was s.22 or s.21. Section 21 was the applicable

provision. Given that the two statements were coming from persons outside the State, it was required by s.21 of the above

statute that the statements contain a declaration to the effect that it was true to the best of the knowledge and belief of the

person making this statement. Neither statement contained any such declaration. It is the absence of these declarations that

forms the basis of the present application.

5. Before a certificate under s.29 can be granted it is not sufficient that the matters sought to be raised are of importance to

the applicant. Rather, it is necessary that the matters identified transcend the specifics of the case before the court and

constitute points of law of exceptional public importance on which it is desirable that the views of the Supreme Court be

obtained. Given the history of the present proceedings the court is not satisfied that the enumerated points amount to points

of law of exceptional public importance but rather are matters which, while of substance, are very much specific to this

case. In these circumstances the application for a certificate is refused.