Legal aid refused for theft charge; court denies appeal citing gravity of offence and prosecution risk assessment.
Legislator-Zusammenfassung
KI-generiertThe applicant appealed the District Court Judge's refusal to grant legal aid for a theft charge valued at €70.00. While the applicant highlighted her recent custodial sentences and alleged confusion regarding her risk status, the court accepted the prosecution's view that the offence was minor. Consequently, the court ruled that the Judge was entitled to refuse aid based on the low gravity of the charge and the lack of likely custodial risk.
Legislator-Regeste
KI-generiertLegal Aid Act 1996, s. 10; Legal Aid Act 1996, s. 11: A District Court Judge may refuse legal aid if, in their opinion, the offence charged is not likely to result in a custodial sentence, provided they consider the gravity of the offence and the prosecution's risk assessment.
Schlagwörter
KI-generiertZitierte Gesetzesbestimmungen
KI-generiertVolltext
Neutral Citation Number: [2008] IEHC 180
THE HIGH COURT
2007 No. 1369 J.R.
BETWEEN
PAMELA BIRD
APPLICANT
AND
JUDGE BRADY, JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT COURT AND THE DIRECTOR
OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
RESPONDENTS
Judgment of Mr. Justice John Hedigan delivered on the 11th day of June, 2008.
1. This case was heard together with the above case of Gerard Neeson because essentially the same issues arise. Herein, the charge
involved the theft of food and clothing to the value of €70.00. The facts are different in the following ways. Three days after the
decision of the District Court Judge in this matter, the applicant in the District Court received from another District Court Judge a
custodial sentence of nine months in relation to a separate conviction for theft. She further received a six months suspended
sentence in the Dublin Circuit Criminal Court four weeks later in another matter. On both occasions she had the benefit of legal aid.
This was not known nor brought to the attention of the Judge herein when he dealt with the application for legal aid. Secondly, there
was some confusion as to whether the presenting Garda thought she was “at risk”. The evidence as presented by the applicant
herein is accepted by the respondent and consequently I proceed on the basis that the Garda in question had always expressed the
view that the applicant was “at risk”. I reiterate what I have decided in the Neeson case. Applying the same principles here, it
appears to me that it might well be a case in which a renewal of the application might be considered. Were the District Court Judge to
be appraised of information concerning the applicant’s numerous other convictions and two subsequent sentences, then he would,
absent a plea of guilty, be obliged to recuse himself. That should not, however, present any insuperable difficulty as the case could
be readily transferred to another District Court Judge in those circumstances. In the event that such a renewed application failed and
the applicant did receive a custodial sentence, then it might well precipitate a more appropriate resort to the High Court than the two
applications dealt with today.
2. Legal aid is not available in respect of all offences charged; inter alia, the District Court Judge must look to the gravity of the
same. If, in his or her opinion, the offences charged are ones not likely to result in a custodial sentence, then he or she is entitled to
refuse legal aid. The role of the prosecution, if asked, is to express an opinion as to the risk of imprisonment in any given case. The
role of the Judge is to decide whether to accept or reject the view of the prosecution. In deciding on this issue, the District Court
Judge will draw upon his or her knowledge and experience as to how such charges transpire within their jurisdiction, and if the Judge
takes the view they are not likely to result in a custodial sentence, then he or she is entitled to refuse an application for a legal aid
certificate. For these reasons I refuse the reliefs sought in this case as well.