Legislator Rechtsprechung & Gesetzgebung
IEHC 386 ECLI:IE:HC:2006:386 KI-generiert

High Court allows appeal where Garda used 'exercising' instead of 'having' control, finding no material prejudice to the accused.

Geschäftsnummer IEHC 386
Gericht / Behörde
Rechtsordnung Irland (IE)
Entscheiddatum
Ausgang Gutgeheissen (Allowed)

Legislator-Zusammenfassung

KI-generiert

The High Court allowed an appeal by way of case stated regarding a drunk driving charge. The District Court judge dismissed the charge because the arresting Garda stated the accused was incapable of 'exercising' control rather than the statutory 'having' control. The court held that the semantic difference between these words was nonexistent in this context and did not materially alter the offence's meaning, thus the accused was not prejudiced.

Legislator-Regeste

KI-generiert

s. 49(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1961; where a Garda uses 'exercising' control instead of 'having' control, the accused is not prejudiced as the difference is nonexistent and does not materially alter the section's meaning.

Schlagwörter

KI-generiert
drunk driving charge case stated appeal statutory wording interpretation material prejudice test Road Traffic Act 1961

Zitierte Gesetzesbestimmungen

KI-generiert
s. 49(3) and (6)(a) of the Road Traffic Act, 1961
Contrary to s. 49(3) and (6)(a) of the Road Traffic Act, 1961 as
s. 10 of the Road Traffic Act, 1994
inserted by s. 10 of the Road Traffic Act, 1994 and as amended by s.
s. 23 of the Road Traffic Act, 2002
10 of the Road Traffic Act, 1994 and as amended by s. 23 of the Road Traffic Act, 2002.”
s. 49(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1961
exact wording used in s. 49(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1961.”
Road Traffic Act, 1961
49(3) and (6)(a) of the Road Traffic Act, 1961 as

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Volltext

Neutral Citation Number [2006] IEHC 386

THE HIGH COURT

[2006 1343 SS]

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 2 OF THE SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACT 1857 AS EXTENDED BY SECTION 51 OF THE COURTS

(SUPPLIMENTAL PROVISIONS) ACT 1961

BETWEEN

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (AT THE SUIT OF GARDA RICHARD T. O’CONNOR)

PROSECUTOR

AND

BRENDAN CRONIN

ACCUSED

APPEAL BY WAY OF CASE STATED

Judgment of Mr. Justice de Valera delivered the 13th day of November, 2006.

1. On the 5th April, 2006, Brendan Cronin appeared before Judge James O’Connor at the Tralee District Court charged with two

offences.

2. The offence, the subject matter of this appeal by way of case stated read:

“On the 28th May, 2005, at Dirtane, Ballyheigue, Kerry in the said District Court area of Tralee drove a mechanically

propelled vehicle registered number 94 D 16922 in a public place while there was present in your body a quantity of

alcohol such that, within three hours after so driving, the concentration of alcohol in your urine exceeded a concentration

of 107 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of urine. Contrary to s. 49(3) and (6)(a) of the Road Traffic Act, 1961 as

inserted by s. 10 of the Road Traffic Act, 1994 and as amended by s. 23 of the Road Traffic Act, 2002.”

3. In the appeal by way of case stated, the District Court judge has sought the opinion of the High Court on the following question:

“In the circumstances of this case, was I correct in dismissing the charge where the arresting Garda had said that he had

formed the opinion the accused was incapable of ‘exercising’ proper control of a mechanically propelled vehicle rather than

stating he had formed the opinion that the accused was incapable of ‘having’ proper control of the vehicle which is the

exact wording used in s. 49(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1961.”

4. I am satisfied that the District judge was not correct in dismissing the charge.

5. The difference in meaning between the use of the words “exercising” and “having” in the context of this section, and also in the

context of the circumstances of the offence and the subsequent arrest, is nonexistent.

6. It is impossible to put any construction on the use of these words other than that the driver was incapable by reason of the

intoxicant of having proper control of the vehicle.

7. In matters such as this, where the use of the slightly different wording from that of the section involved does not materially alter

the section’s meaning, the accused is not prejudiced by this alteration and it is not a sufficient ground to dismiss the charge.