Legislator Rechtsprechung & Gesetzgebung
IEHC 272 ECLI:IE:HC:2006:272 KI-generiert

High Court grants leave for judicial review where waste licence breach of buffer zone requirement is substantial ground.

Geschäftsnummer IEHC 272
Gericht / Behörde
Rechtsordnung Irland (IE)
Entscheiddatum
Ausgang Teilweise gutgeheissen (Partially Allowed)

Legislator-Zusammenfassung

KI-generiert

The High Court granted leave to issue judicial review against the Environmental Protection Agency's decision to issue a waste licence. The applicant argued the licence was invalid because the agency failed to determine a specific buffer zone as required by the Waste Management Act, 1996. The court concluded that the applicant had made out substantial grounds that the agency's failure to address this statutory requirement rendered the licence potentially invalid.

Legislator-Regeste

KI-generiert

s. 40(4)(c) of the Waste Management Act, 1996; s. 42(2) and s. 42(3) of the Waste Management Act, 1996: Where a licensing authority fails to determine a specific buffer zone as a condition of Best Available Techniques, the applicant has substantial grounds to contend the licence is invalid.

Schlagwörter

KI-generiert
judicial review leave waste management licence buffer zone requirement BATNEEC compliance Environmental Protection Agency

Zitierte Gesetzesbestimmungen

KI-generiert
s. 43(5)(a) of the Waste Management Act, 1996
notice party as is required under s. 43(5)(a) of the Waste Management Act, 1996 (“the Act of 1996”).
s. 42(2) of the Waste Management Act, 1996
requirements of s. 42(2) of the Act of 1996.
s. 42(3) of the Waste Management Act, 1996
requirements of s. 42(2) of the Act of 1996.
s. 40(4)(c) of the Waste Management Act, 1996
The respondent acted ultra vires in granting the licence as it failed to comply with s. 40(4)(c) of the Act of 1996 in
O.84, r.20(7) of the Rules of the Superior Courts, 1986
Development Act, 1992
19(3) of the Planning and Development Act, 1992 was intended
s. 62(1) of the Environmental Protection Agency Act, 1992
to be land filled and any occupied dwelling and the respondent’s obligation under s. 62(1) of the Environmental Protection Agency Act,

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Volltext

Neutral Citation Number: [2006] IEHC 272

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

2004 No. 694 J.R. / 2004 32 COM

BETWEEN

USK AND DISTRICT RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION LIMITED

APPLICANT

AND

THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

RESPONDENT

AND

GREENSTAR RECYCLING HOLDINGS LIMITED

NOTICE PARTY

Judgment of Ms. Justice Finlay Geoghegan delivered the 28th day of July, 2006.

1. This is an application for leave to issue judicial review seeking an order of certiorari of a decision of the respondent made on 8th

June, 2004, to grant a waste licence to the notice party and related reliefs. The application is made on notice to the respondent and

notice party as is required under s. 43(5)(a) of the Waste Management Act, 1996 (“the Act of 1996”). The motion was issued on 4th

August, 2004. The unusual delay in the hearing of the application for leave was caused by applications and appeals in relation to

security for costs.

2. The applicant is a company limited by guarantee. Its members are residents in the district of Usk, County Kildare, some of whom

live close to the site of the proposed waste management facility. The applicant has participated in the relevant licensing procedure

under the Act of 1996 which culminated in the granting of the licence to the notice party by the respondent by decision of 8th June,

2004.

Factual background

3. On 10th December, 2001, the notice party made an application for a waste licence to the respondent for the operation of a waste

management facility at Usk, Dunlavin, County Kildare. With the application there was lodged an Environmental Impact Statement.

4. The site the subject matter of the application had been a quarry. Quarrying by a third party continued on the lands the subject

matter of the application until approximately March, 2003. Those activities are alleged by the applicants to have been unlawful but

nothing turns on this for the purposes of this application.

5. On 3rd October, 2003, the respondent issued a proposed decision on the application for a waste licence in accordance with the

requirements of s. 42(2) of the Act of 1996. The applicant made a written objection to the proposed decision as permitted by s. 42(3)

of the Act of 1996 on 30th October, 2003. A Technical Committee of the respondent made a report on the objections of the applicant

and the notice party dated 24th May, 2004.

6. The waste licence was issued by the respondent on 8th June, 2004.

Statutory criteria for leave

7. Section 43(5) of the Act of 1996 provides that leave shall not be granted challenging the decision of the respondent to grant the

licence “unless the High Court is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for contending that the decision is invalid or ought to be

quashed”. There was substantial agreement between the parties as to the proper approach of the court in determining what are

“substantial grounds” within the meaning of s. 43 of the Act of 1996. It is in accordance with the approach of Carroll J. in McNamara

v. An Bord Pleanála [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. 125, where at p. 129 she stated:

“In order for a ground to be substantial it must be reasonable, it must be arguable, it must be weighty. It must not be

trivial or tenuous. However, I am not concerned in trying to ascertain what the eventual result would be. I believe I

should go no further than satisfying myself that the grounds are “substantial”. A ground that does not stand any chance

of being sustained (for example, where the point has been decided in another case) could not be said to be substantial. I

draw a distinction between the grounds and the arguments put forward in support of those grounds. I do not think I

should evaluate each argument and say whether I consider it sound or not. If I consider a ground, as such, to be

substantial, I do not also have to say that the applicant is confined in this argument at the next stage to those which I

believe may have some merit.”

8. The above approach was approved of by the Supreme Court in Re the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill, 1999 [2000] 2 I.R. 360.

9. I was referred also to the helpful consideration of the meaning of the phrase by McKechnie J. in Kenny v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 1)

[2001] 1 I.R. 565 and his reference at p. 572 of the judgment to the observation of Finlay C.J. in KSK Enterprises Limited v. An Bord

Pleanála [1994] 2 I.R. 128 that the similar threshold provided for in s. 19(3) of the Planning and Development Act, 1992 was intended

“to result in a different and higher threshold than that normally applicable to an application for judicial review under the Rules of the

Superior Courts, 1986”. However, I also agree with McKechnie J. as he stated following his consideration of the meaning of the phrase

that one cannot do better than return to the words used by Carroll J. in McNamara that the ground be reasonable, arguable and

weighty. It is the requirement that it be “weighty” which appears to put the threshold higher than that required for an ex parte

application under the Rules of the Superior Courts in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G. v. D.P.P. [1994] 1 I.R.

374. It is not clear to me that one can describe in a comprehensive but abstract manner this heightened threshold.

10. In relation to an application for leave on notice to the proposed respondents I agree with the observations of Clarke J. in Arklow

Holidays Limited v. An Bord Pleanála and Wicklow County Council (Unreported, High Court, 18th January, 2006), where in respect of

such an application he stated:

“…The process envisaged is that, with the assistance of argument from all sides, the court has to form a judgment as to

whether notwithstanding the points raised by those opposing leave there remains substantial or weighty arguments in

favour of the challenge…

11. Thus where, even after having had the benefit of argument on both sides, the court remains of the view that there are

substantial or weighty arguments either way, the court should not express any view on the relative strengths of those arguments.

Rather leave should be granted and it is for court dealing with the substantive application to weigh the strengths of the relevant

arguments.”

Alleged substantial grounds

12. Counsel for the applicant in submission did not pursue all the grounds as set out at paragraph E of the statement of grounds. He

confined the challenge to the validity of the decision to grant the licence to three grounds which may be summarised as follows:

1. Non compliance of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) with the relevant statutory requirements.

2. The invalidity of condition 3.12 of the waste licence.

3. The respondent acted ultra vires in granting the licence as it failed to comply with s. 40(4)(c) of the Act of 1996 in

relation to the best available technology not entailing excessive costs relative to the buffer zone between the proposed

waste disposal facility and sensitive receptors including private residences.

EIS

13. It is common case between the parties that on the facts of this application article 13(1) of the Waste Management (Licensing)

Regulations 2000 required the notice party to submit with the application an EIS which complied with the Environmental Impact

Assessment Regulations 1989 - 1999 and in particular article 25 thereof.

14. An EIS was submitted with the application in December, 2001. The applicant makes no complaint about the compliance of the EIS

with the relevant statutory provisions in December, 2001. The alleged ground of invalidity is that as quarrying continued on the site

until at least March, 2003 (and certain processing activities continued after that date) that the information about the site contained

in the EIS was by the end of 2003 out of date and accordingly the respondent was not in a position to carry out the environmental

impact assessment in connection with the application as it is required to do so under the relevant statutory provisions.

15. It was not submitted on behalf of the applicant that there was any statutory obligation on the notice party to submit an updated

Environmental Impact Statement in circumstances such as occurred here where the conditions of the site may have altered between

the date of application and the date upon which the respondent came to consider and make a decision on the waste licence

application.

16. The statutory obligation on the respondent is contained in s. 40(2)(b)(ii)(I) of the Act of 1996 as amended. In considering the

application for the waste licence it is to have regard to “any environmental impact statement in respect of the proposed development

comprising or for the purposes of the waste activity concerned, which is submitted to the Agency under and in accordance with a

requirement of, or made pursuant to, regulations under section 45.” It is not contended on behalf of the applicant that the

respondent failed to have regard to the EIS submitted therein.

17. It is also common case on the facts that the respondent was aware of the continued quarrying. Also, that there are a number of

High Court decisions which make clear that the adequacy of an EIS which in its terms appears to provide the information required

under article 25 of the Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations 1989 - 1999 is a matter for the respondent. See for example

Kenny v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 1) [2001] 1 I.R. 565. The respondent has a power to request further information of the applicant. It

did not exercise that power in this application in relation to the information contained in the EIS. That was a decision which was

within its discretion.

18. The applicant has not made out a substantial ground for contending that the decision to grant the waste licence was invalid by

reason of any failure on the part of the respondent or the notice party to comply with their respective statutory obligations in relation

to the EIS.

19. Having regard to my conclusion on this ground it is unnecessary for me to consider the respondent’s submission that the applicant

had no locus standi to make an objection to the validity of the licence on this ground.

Condition 3.12 of the Licence

20. The licence at paragraph 3.12 states:

3.12 Buffer Zone

3.12.1 The licensee shall maintain a minimum distance of 100 metres between the non-hazardous landfill footprint and any

dwelling house (occupied or unoccupied) present at date of issue of licence. Waste deposition within the 100m zone,

between the quarry face and the non-hazardous landfill liner, will be restricted to inert waste.

3.12.2 A zone in which no waste shall be landfilled, shall be provided and maintained within the facility as shown on Figure

5.2 Contours of Completed Site of the Environmental Impact Statement subject to the landscaping requirements of

Condition 5.

21. The objection made to the validity of this condition is that a number of the terms therein are not defined; that it is contradictory

in its terms and is uncertain and consequently void for uncertainty.

22. In response the respondents and notice party submit that whilst they acknowledge that certain of the terms are not defined and

even arguably are not used in their normal meaning that the actual meaning of this condition in the context of the application and EIS

is capable of clear understanding.

23. The principles according to which the condition should be construed are not in dispute. They are those set out by the Supreme

Court in the judgment of McCarthy J. in XJS Investments Limited [1986] I.R. 750, where at p. 756 he stated:

24. Certain principles may be stated in respect of the true construction of planning documents:-

(a) To state the obvious, they are not Acts of the Oireachtas or subordinate legislation emanating from skilled draftsmen

and inviting the accepted canons of construction applicable to such material.

(b) They are to be construed in their ordinary meaning as it would be understood by members of the public, without legal

training as well as by developers and their agents, unless such documents, read as a whole, necessarily indicates some

other meaning.

(c) …

(d) …

25. The respondents and notice party make the commonsense submission that the applicant did not appear to have any difficulty in

understanding the meaning of the equivalent condition 3.12 in the proposed decision dated 3rd October, 2003. This was in similar

terms save that it did not include the words after “dwelling house” in the first sentence. No objection is based upon these words.

26. In response to the proposed decision, the applicant, as it was entitled to do, lodged an objection. This was lodged on its behalf

by Mr. Jack O’Sullivan who is also a deponent for the applicant in these proceedings. The objection made to condition 3.12 was in the

following terms:

27. Condition 3.12.1 requires the licensee to maintain a minimum distance of 100 metres between the landfill footprint and any

dwelling house, and to deposit only inert waste within the 100 metre buffer zone between the quarry face and the landfill liner. We

would submit that no waste should be deposited within the buffer zone, otherwise it ceases to be a buffer zone as understood by the

normal meaning of the term. Condition 5.7.1 also refers to the deposit of inert waste within the buffer zone, and we would submit that

the deposit of any kind of waste, if permitted, would be inconsistent with the function of a buffer zone.

28. The applicant maintains its objection to the use of the heading “buffer zone”. It is not disputed on behalf of the respondent that

a buffer zone as normally understood may mean a zone in which no waste shall be deposited. As normally understood, this is only the

zone referred to at para. 3.12.2, not the distance of 100 metres referred to in 3.12.1. Notwithstanding, it does not appear to me that

the use of the term buffer zone as a heading of itself creates any uncertainty as to the meaning of condition 3.12.1.

29. The primary objection now made is the absence of any special definition for the term “non-hazardous landfill footprint” and the

submission that, having regard to the type of waste to which the licence applies and the definition of landfill, that this term in its

ordinary meaning refers to the area of the site where all non-hazardous waste is disposed of by placement on the ground or on other

waste. It is common case that the licence only relates to non-hazardous waste. Further, landfill is defined in the licence as:

“Refers to the area of the facility where the waste is disposed of by placement on the ground or on other waste.”

30. The licence defines inert waste. It is accepted on behalf of the respondent and notice party that inert waste is a subset of the

non-hazardous waste to which the licence relates.

31. Construing the first sentence of condition 3.12.1 alone and in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the term “non-hazardous

landfill footprint” in the context of this licence the condition appears to provide that there is to be a minimum distance of 100 metres

between the landfill footprint of the facility and any dwelling house (occupied or unoccupied) present at the date of issue of the

licence. However, the next sentence in condition 3.12.1 then permits “waste deposition within the 100 metre zone, between the

quarry face and the non-hazardous landfill liner” but provides that such waste deposition is to be “restricted to inert waste”.

32. However, construing the two sentences of condition 3.12.1 together as should be done and in the context of the waste disposal

activities licensed as set out in Part I of the licence, it becomes clear that the term “non-hazardous landfill footprint” in the first

sentence of condition 3.12.1 is not being used in accordance with its ordinary meaning but rather means the area of the facility in

which non-inert or active waste is to be deposited.

33. Whilst I accept the submission of the applicant that condition 3.12 does not mean that there is a minimum distance of 100 metres

between any dwelling house (occupied or unoccupied) present at the date of issue of the licence and the non-hazardous landfill

footprint in the ordinary meaning of that term, it does not appear to me that a reading of 3.12.1 as a whole gives rise to any

uncertainty as to the nature of the landfill footprint which must be 100 metres from any such dwelling house. It is clearly intended to

be the landfill footprint in relation to the deposit of non-inert, non-hazardous waste which elsewhere in the licence is required to be in

specially engineered lined cells. Only inert waste may be deposited outside of this footprint and within the quarry face. It is also clear

from the objection made on behalf of the applicant to the proposed licence that the condition was so understood by Mr. O’Sullivan.

34. The next objection made is that neither the location of the quarry face nor of the non-hazardous landfill liner is specified and

accordingly there is and remains uncertainty as to the area in which inert waste may be deposited. Counsel for the respondent

submits that the quarry face is ascertainable on the ground and its precise location will be identified in the course of preparation

works. Also, that the non-hazardous landfill liner as used in condition 3.12.1 has the same meaning as the non-hazardous landfill

footprint in the first sentence and therefore its location will be identified by compliance with the minimum distance of 100 metres from

any dwelling house. It is submitted that the precise agreement on these locations, subject to compliance with the condition, is

properly a matter to be agreed between the notice party and the respondent when the proposals for the Specified Engineering Works

are submitted in accordance with condition 3.2.1 for prior agreement with the respondent prior to the commencement of works.

35. Again, whilst I accept that condition 3.12.1 does not specify the precise location of either the quarry face or the non-hazardous

landfill liner, it appears to me that these are matters of detail which may properly be a matter for agreement between the notice

party and the respondent in the course of approval of the relevant drawings and other specifications for the Specified Engineering

Works pursuant to condition 3.2.1 of the licence.

36. Finally, it is suggested that the terms of condition 3.12.2 are uncertain as fig. 5.2 contours of completed site of the Environmental

Impact Statement does not show the zone in which no waste shall be land filled. This appears to refer to the area between the

landfill footprint as shown in fig. 5.2 and the site boundary. As this condition must be read in conjunction with the preceding

paragraph the meaning appears clear. Waste may only be land filled inside the quarry face and the zone outside of that to the site

boundary must be provided and maintained. There is no dispute that the site boundary is as shown in fig. 5.2. The final position of the

total landfill footprint, including the area in which inert waste may be deposited, may be different as it is now fixed in relation to the

quarry face. As already decided this is a matter of detail which it is permissible to leave for agreement on accordance with condition

3.2.

37. Accordingly, I would refuse leave on the ground that condition 3.12 is so uncertain as to be void. There are matters of detail in

relation to the exact contour of the quarry face and the non-hazardous landfill liner as that term is used in relation to the area in

which active waste may be deposited to be agreed in accordance with the procedure envisaged in condition 3.2 but that appears to

be a matter which it is

38. permissible to leave for agreement between the notice party and respondent.

Breach of section 40(4)(c) of the Act of 1996

39. The third ground advanced is that the licence was granted in breach of s. 40(4)(c) of Act of 1996. This provides:

“40(4) The Agency shall not grant a waste licence unless it is satisfied that –

…

(c) the best available technology not entailing excessive costs will be used to prevent or eliminate or, where that is not

practicable, to limit, abate or reduce an emission from the activity concerned.”

40. Section 5(2)(a) and (b) of the Act of 1996 further defines what is required by sub-s.(40)(4)(c). It provides:-

“5(2)(a) A reference in this Act to the use of the best available technology not entailing excessive costs to prevent or

eliminate, or where that is not practicable, to limit, abate or reduce an emission from an activity, shall be construed as a

reference to the provision and proper maintenance, use, operation and supervision of facilities which, having regard to all

the circumstances, are most suitable for the purposes.

(b) For the purposes of this subsection, regard shall be had to—

(i) in the case of an activity other than an established activity—

(I) the current state of technical knowledge,

(II) the requirements of environmental protection, and

(III) the application of measures for these purposes, which do not entail excessive costs, having regard

to the risk of environmental pollution that, in the opinion of the Agency, or the local authority

concerned, exists;

(ii) in any other case, in addition to the matters aforesaid—

(A) the nature, extent and effect of the emission concerned,

(B) the nature and age of the existing facilities connected with the activity and the period during which

the facilities are likely to be used or to continue in operation, and

(C) the costs which would be incurred in improving or replacing the facilities referred to in clause (B) of

this subparagraph in relation to the economic situation of activities of the class concerned.”

41. In summary, the argument of the applicant is firstly that an appropriate buffer zone between the landfill footprint and the nearest

dwelling houses forms an important part of the best available technology not entailing excessive costs (BATNEEC) for the waste

disposal activities sought to be licensed. On the facts of this application it is submitted that the respondent did not determine what

buffer zone is BATNEEC for the activities and site sought to be licensed; hence it could not have been satisfied that BATNEEC would

be used as required by s. 40(4)(c) of the Act of 1996 and accordingly the respondent was prohibited by the terms of the section from

granting a waste licence. This submission was made in furtherance of grounds (9) and (12) of the statement of grounds.

42. The applicant also advanced a related submission in furtherance of grounds (10) and (11) in reliance upon the respondent’s draft

“manual on landfill site selection” of September, 1996 and the reference therein to a minimum distance of 250 metres between areas

to be land filled and any occupied dwelling and the respondent’s obligation under s. 62(1) of the Environmental Protection Agency Act,

1992 to specify and publish criteria and procedures for the selection, management, operation, and termination of use of landfill sites

for the disposal of domestic and other waste.

43. In response to this latter submission, the respondent and notice party submit that this distance is a general indication and that

the appropriate buffer zone must be considered and determined on a site-specific basis having regard to available guidance on

relevant site issues and risk. I have concluded that the applicants have not discharged the onus of establishing that there exist

weighty arguments that a site-specific approach in impermissible and accordingly would not allow leave on the grounds at paragraphs

(10) and (11) of the statement of grounds.

44. I have concluded that notwithstanding, the evidence and submissions of the respondent and notice party the applicant has made

out substantial grounds for contending that the licence is invalid as it was granted in breach of the prohibition in s. 40(4)(c) of the

Act of 1996 by reason of the failure of the respondent to determine what buffer zone between the landfill footprint (in the sense of

total footprint of all waste disposal activity) and the nearest dwelling house (occupied or unoccupied) is BATNEEC for the activities

and site sought to be licensed.

45. Having reached the conclusion that the applicant has made out substantial grounds it is not appropriate that I set out my view as

to the relative merits of the submissions made by the applicant and respondent and notice party on the issues concerned. I only

propose setting out shortly my reason for concluding that the grounds at paragraphs (9) and (12) constitute substantial grounds.

46. It is common case between the parties that a buffer zone forms part of the necessary BATNEEC for the activities sought to be

licensed. It is also undisputed that the nearest dwelling house at the north eastern boundary is approximately 20 meters from the site

perimeter. Further that whilst the precise location of the quarry face referred to in condition 3.12 has not been determined the

distance between the probable line of the quarry face and the site perimeter at such boundary is approximately 11.5 meters.

Accordingly, at the north eastern side of the boundary the buffer zone, used in the sense contended for by the applicant will be in

the order of 31.5 meters.

47. Whilst there is a dispute between the parties as to the purpose and nature of a buffer zone the applicants have established

weighty arguments that both in its normal meaning and to be BATNEEC for the activities and site concerned it should be an area in

which no waste deposit activity is carried on.

48. The applicant has satisfied me that there exist weighty arguments that before the respondent could be satisfied that BATNEEC

will be used it must consider and determine what buffer zone (in the sense contended for by the applicant) is BATNEEC for the

activities and site sought to be licensed.

49. If the applicant is correct in its submission that the respondent must consider and determine what buffer zone is BATNEEC for the

activities and site sought to be licensed before it can be satisfied that BATNEEC will be used then there is a weighty argument that

the recital by the respondent in the licence that it “is satisfied that the requirements of s. 40(4) of the Act of 1996 has been

complied with” is not alone sufficient to demonstrate compliance with s.40(4)(c) of the Act of 1996.

50. I will grant leave to seek the reliefs sought at paras. D (i), (vi) and (vii) upon the grounds set out at paras. E (9) (as amended)

and (12) of the statement of grounds. I will hear the parties in relation to the stay sought pursuant to O.84, r.20(7) of the Rules of

the Superior Courts, 1986 and the relevant times for the issue and service of a notice of motion and delivery of a statement of

opposition.