Legislator Rechtsprechung & Gesetzgebung
IEHC 203 ECLI:IE:HC:2006:203 KI-generiert

High Court grants extension of time for asylum appeal but dismisses judicial review application due to lack of substantial grounds.

Geschäftsnummer IEHC 203
Gericht / Behörde
Rechtsordnung Irland (IE)
Entscheiddatum
Ausgang Teilweise gutgeheissen (Partially Allowed)

Legislator-Zusammenfassung

KI-generiert

The High Court granted an extension of time for the applicant to file a judicial review application, finding the delay minimal and justified by legal advisor difficulties. However, the court ultimately refused leave to proceed with the review, stating the Refugee Appeals Tribunal had properly assessed credibility without needing an oral hearing. The decision rests on the finding that the applicant failed to discharge the burden of proving substantial grounds to quash the original refusal.

Legislator-Regeste

KI-generiert

Section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000; Section 10 of the Refugee Act, 1996: The court may extend time for judicial review applications where delay is minimal and justified, but will not substitute its own view on credibility assessments made by the Refugee Appeals Tribunal unless substantial grounds exist to quash the decision.

Schlagwörter

KI-generiert
asylum judicial review extension of time substantial grounds test credibility assessment Refugee Appeals Tribunal audi alteram partem anxious scrutiny test Verzögerung des Asylverfahrens

Zitierte Gesetzesbestimmungen

KI-generiert
Section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000
Section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000, sets out
Section 10 of the Refugee Act, 1996
s. 13 of the Refugee Act, 1996
report of the Commissioner the Respondent was entitled to determine the appeal without an oral hearing. See s. 13 of the Refugee

Zitierte Rechtsprechung

KI-generiert
Imafu v. the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and Ors
V.I. v. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Refugee Appeals Tribunal
Gashi v. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform
O'Keeffe v. An Bord Pleanala
KI-generiert

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Volltext

Neutral Citation Number: [2006] IEHC 203

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

[2005 No. 520 JR]

BETWEEN

KAYODE OGUNYEMI

APPLICANT

AND

THE REFUGEE APPEALS TRIBUNAL AND

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM

RESPONDENTS

Judgment of Mr. Justice McGovern delivered on the 30th day of June, 2006

1. This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review for the reliefs set out in the notice of motion herein dated 19th May,

2005. The Applicants seeks inter alia an order quashing the decision of the first named Respondent dated the 27th April, 2005, that

the Applicants appeal against the recommendation of the Refugee Applications Commissioner be refused. The Applicant also seeks

further ancillary orders arising out of that decision.

2. The Applicant was born on 16th June, 1967 and formally lived in Nigeria. He came to Ireland and applied for asylum in the State in

January 2005. He was interviewed by an officer of the Refugee Applications Commissioner on the 21st February, 2005 and following

the interview the Refugee Applications Commissioner made a report and a recommendation that the Applicant be refused recognition

as a refugee. This recommendation was dated 16th March, 2005. The Applicant appealed the recommendation by notice of appeal

dated 7th April, 2005 and on the 27th April, 2005, the Applicants appeal was dismissed by the Refugee Applications Commissioner. He

received the decision by post on or about the 29th April, 2005. Section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000, sets out

the manner in which such a decision may be challenged. The challenge has to be by way of application for leave to apply for judicial

review and the application must be made within fourteen days commencing on the date on which the person was notified of the

decision. In this case the plaintiff was out of time but not by very many days. He says in his grounding affidavit that due to

difficulties that his legal advisors had in contacting him, he was unable to swear the affidavit grounding the application for a number

of days after it had been drafted. He seeks an extension of time for bringing the application. I am satisfied that in all the

circumstances the delay was minimal in this case and having regard to what is deposed in the Applicants affidavit of 19th May, 2005,

I consider there is good and sufficient reason for extended the period within which the application can be made and I make that

order.

3. Section 5(2)(b) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000 states that in applications for leave to apply for judicial review in

cases such as this leave shall not be granted unless the High Court is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for contending that

the decision, determination, recommendation, refusal or order is invalid or ought to be quashed.

4. In this case the Applicant claims that he applied for asylum on the grounds of religious persecution and membership of a social

group and also on the basis that he was employed in the oil industry in Nigeria and while working there was kidnapped and released

subsequently due to the intervention of his employers. He says in his affidavit that if he returns to Nigeria he will be subject to a

strong likelihood of kidnapping again and that he did not approach the Nigerian State Security Services due to the fact that they

would not be able to offer him any effective protection against persecution.

5. One of the complaints made by the Applicant is that because he was not granted an oral hearing on his appeal he was not able to

address all the issues affecting his application and thereby have his claim for asylum determined in accordance with the requirements

of constitutional and natural justice. It is clear in this case that the Refugee Applications Commissioner held that the application

showed either no basis or a minimal basis for the contention that the Applicant was a refugee. Once that finding was included in the

report of the Commissioner the Respondent was entitled to determine the appeal without an oral hearing. See s. 13 of the Refugee

Act, 1996 as amended.

6. A major issue in the determination of the Applicants claim before the Refugee Appeals Tribunal was the issue of his credibility. This

had also been an issue before the Refugee Applicants Commissioner. It is not for the High Court to substitute its own view on the

credibility issue for that of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal. But the court must be satisfied that the matter was properly considered by

the Tribunal. Mr. Christopher B.L. on behalf of the Applicants submits that there was an error of law on the face of the report of the

Refugee Appeals Tribunal. He refers to page 10 of the report (page 125 in the book of documents) where it is stated: “…the Applicant

made no mention whatsoever of any fears concerning his safety if he returned to work in the oil industry.” This is a matter that is also

referred to in the statement required to ground an application for judicial review. He argues that the first named Respondent failed to

consider the country of origin material submitted on behalf of the Applicant in his written notice of appeal. Although Mr. Christopher

indicated to the court that the Applicant was not relying on the document entitled “the lingering crisis in the Niger Delta field work

report by Akpobibibo Onduku he relies on other documentation referred to in the course of the hearing. On behalf of the Respondent

Ms. Harnett-O’Connor B.L. states that this is a mis-characterisation of the statement made in the Refugee Appeals Tribunal Report

and that the sentence concerned was taken totally out of context by the Applicant. I agree with the submission of the Respondent

on this issue because when you read the entire paragraph it was quite clear that the Tribunal placed significance on the fact that:

“…when asked what he feared if he returned to Nigeria, the Applicant made no mention whatsoever of any fears

concerning his safety if he resumed work in the oil industry. This is particularly noteworthy as he was asked the question

immediately after approximately 20 questions on the issue of the alleged kidnapping. Accordingly I do not find the

Applicants evidence consistent with a subjective fear of persecution.”

7. It is clear that when considered properly and in context the Refugee Applications Commissioner and the Refugee Appeals Tribunal

considered the Applicants claim concerning the issue of kidnapping but found it to be incredible for the reasons set out in the report.

These matters are dealt with in the analysis of the Applicants’ case at pages 9 and 10 of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal Report.

8. The report points out inconsistence between his answer to questions at interview and his response to a questionnaire and deals

with these issues in what appears to be a careful and reasoned manner. It was argued on behalf of the Respondent that even if the

country of origin documentation establishes that there was kidnapping of workers in the oil industry the Refugee Appeals Tribunal was

still entitled to disbelieve the Applicant. It was further pointed out by counsel for the Respondent that the evidence from the country

of origin established that it was foreign workers and not Nigerians who were being kidnapped from time to time. I accept that there

was country of origin evidence to that effect.

9. It is significant that when the Applicant had been asked at interview “what would be your fear if you were to return to Nigeria?” He

replied “I will be killed. Her parents are Muslim fanatics and they don’t forgive or forget.” This was a reference to the parents of his

Muslim wife who were unhappy that she was marrying the Applicant who was a Christian. It is clear that that issue had also been fully

considered. See pages 239 and 10 of the Tribunal Report.

10. A number of authorities have been open by the parties in this case. The Applicant argues that the court must consider not only

whether the State refuses adequate protection but whether it is able to offer adequate protection.

11. In the case of Idiakheua v. Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform and Anor. (Unreported High Court 5th May, 2005). Clarke

J. said:

“It would appear that the true test is as to whether the country concerned provides reasonable protection in practical

terms. Noone v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Unreported, CA 6th December, 2000). While the

existence of a law outlawing the activity which amounts to persecution is a factor the true question is as to whether that

law coupled with enforcement affords “reasonable protection” and practical terms”.

12. In the case of V.N.I. and Ors. v. The R.A.T. and Anor. (Unreported High Court 24th June, 2005) Clarke J. stated:

“Obviously different considerations apply to cases where the fear of prosecution stems either directly from the State or

from persons whose activity is condoned or tolerated by the State concerned. On the basis on the country of origin

information before the R.A.T. in this case, it could not, in my view, be suggested that the R.A.T. was required to hold

that Nigeria condoned or tolerated F.G.M. However that is not the end of the matter. It is clear that fear of prosecution

for a convention reason by non state agents will nonetheless qualify a claimant for refugee status where the State

concerned either refuses or is unable to offer adequate protection. It was in that context that the comments quoted from

above from Idiakheua were made.”

13. In the case of Muia v. O’Gorman and Ors. judgment of Clarke J. 11th November, 2005, he stated (page 7 of judgment)

“It is, of course, the case that in reaching a decision on the adequacy of State protection it is unnecessary to be

satisfied that the State in question is in a position (which no State is) to provide absolute protection to its citizens. It is

equally the case that it is necessary, in each case, to form a judgment on the basis of relevant country of origin

information as to whether the degree of protection provided by the State is, in all the circumstances, sufficient to

warrant a finding that the Applicant concerned does not qualify for refugee status.”

14. In this case it is clear that the R.A.T. report considered these issues at page 11 of the report.

15. Counsel for the Respondent has referred me to the decision in the case of Imafu v. the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law

Reform and Ors. judgment Peart J. 9th December, 2005. In that case the judge determined inter alia that there could be cases where

the tribunal member can quite adequately and completely assess and reach a conclusion on the personal credibility of the Applicant in

circumstances where there would be no possible benefit to be derived from seeing whether the Applicants story fits into a factual

context in his/her country of origin. I accept that as an approach that can be taken in applications of this nature.

16. Counsel for the Applicant referred the court to the case of V.I. v. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the

Refugee Appeals Tribunal, judgment Clarke J. 10th May, 2005, in which he refers to his judgment in the Gashi case when he indicated

that for the purpose of a leave application it was arguable that a higher degree of scrutiny was required than that set out in O’Keeffe

v. An Bord Pleanala [1993] I.R. 39. In other words he was suggesting that the “anxious scrutiny test” applied. While there seems to

be some divergence of judicial opinion on this subject I am inclined to agree with the view expressed by Clarke J. on this issue since

applications for leave to apply for judicial review in asylum matters have been put on a statutory basis which is separate and distinct

from other applications for judicial review where fundamental human rights issues may not be considered.

17. Even applying the “anxious scrutiny” test it seems to me that the Applicant has not, in this case, discharged the burden of

proving that there are substantial grounds for contending that the decision by the first named Respondent is invalid or ought to be

quashed. All of the issues which the Applicant has canvassed in the application before the court were canvassed before the Refugee

Applications Commissioner and subsequently, on the documents, before the first named Respondent. The report of the first named

Respondent weighs up all the issues and arguments and reaches conclusions which are, to a significant extent, determined by what is

perceived to be a lack of credibility on the part of the Applicant on certain crucial issues. The court cannot substitute its own view

on those issues for that of the Tribunal.

18. Since I have already held that the first named Respondent was entitled to proceed with the appeal without an oral hearing it

follows that I do not accept the Applicants argument based on the principal of audi alteram partem. For the reasons I have already

outlined I am not satisfied that the Applicant has established substantial grounds for contending that the position of the first named

Respondent is invalid or ought to be quashed and I refuse leave to apply for judicial review and for the other reliefs sought in the

notice of motion.