Legislator Rechtsprechung & Gesetzgebung
IEHC 430 ECLI:IE:HC:2005:430 KI-generiert

High Court dismisses applicant's claim that a different District Judge sentencing him violates constitutional rights after guilty plea.

Geschäftsnummer IEHC 430
Gericht / Behörde
Rechtsordnung Irland (IE)
Entscheiddatum
Ausgang Abgewiesen (Dismissed)

Legislator-Zusammenfassung

KI-generiert

The applicant challenged his detention, arguing that sentencing by a District Judge other than the one who heard his initial plea violated his rights. He contended that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to proceed with a different judge after a guilty plea and request for a probation report. The court held that the District Court possessed jurisdiction under the 1951 Act and that fair procedures were observed, allowing the matter to be disposed of by the sitting judge.

Legislator-Regeste

KI-generiert

s. 2(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1951; s. 13(2) of the District Courts Act 1967: The District Court, not a specific judge, holds jurisdiction to try summary cases; a change of judge does not invalidate jurisdiction if fair procedures are followed.

Schlagwörter

KI-generiert
District Court jurisdiction summary trial procedure change of judge constitutional justice guilty plea validity Haftprüfung fehlerhafte Strafzumessung fehlende Legitimation der Staatsanwaltschaft

Zitierte Gesetzesbestimmungen

KI-generiert
s. 2(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1951
That is specifically provided for in s. 2 (2) of the Criminal Justice Act,
s. 13(2) of the District Courts Act 1967
O'Higgins has referred to the fact that since the Courts Act, 1971 (s. 13 thereof) the District Court is a court of record.
Order 24 (2) of the District Court Rules
s.2 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1951
summary disposal pursuant to s.2 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1951; that it was Judge Brophy who did that and to whom the pleas of
Criminal Procedure Act, 1967
Section 3 of the Act ( albeit repealed by the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967 "the 1967 Act") refers also to "the District Court" or
Courts Act, 1971
O'Higgins has referred to the fact that since the Courts Act, 1971 (s.
Criminal Justice Act, 1951
summary disposal pursuant to s.2 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1951; that it was Judge Brophy who did that and to whom the pleas of
Justice Act, 1924
77(B) of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924 ("the 1924 Act")
The Criminal Justice Act, 1951
summary disposal pursuant to s.2 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1951; that it was Judge Brophy who did that and to whom the pleas of
s. 10(3) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1999
substituted by s. 10(3) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1999 now provides as follows:
KI-generiert

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Volltext

Neutral Citation Number: [2005] IEHC 430

THE HIGH COURT

Record Number: 2005 No. 1799 SS

IN THE MATTER OF AN INQUIRY PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 40 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND 1937

BETWEEN

KEVIN O'KEEFFE

APPLICANT

AND

THE GOVERNOR OF SAINT PATRICK'S INSTITUTION

RESPONDENT

Judgment of Mr Justice Michael Peart delivered on the 13th day of December 2005

1. The applicant submits that his detention is unlawful. The circumstances alleged to constitute this illegality are that having been

charged with eight offences as set forth on certain Balbriggan Garda Charge Sheets as exhibited herein, he appeared before Judge

Brophy in District Court 44 on the 5th August 2005 when evidence of arrest, charge and caution were given, and he was remanded in

custody to appear again in Court 44 on the 12th August 2005. Legal aid was granted and the Director of Public Prosecution gave an

indication to the Court that he was directing summary disposal of the charges. On that date also, the applicant was admitted to bail

in his own bond of €100 and was remanded to Balbriggan District Court on the 29th September 2005.

2. He appeared on that date before Judge Brophy, with his solicitor and counsel, and elected to be tried summarily in the District

Court, and pleaded guilty to all charges.

3. It is averred in the affidavit of his solicitor, John Quinn, and this is uncontested before me, that on that date, the 29th September

2005, following the plea of guilty, Judge Brophy was given an outline of the facts of the case, and a plea in mitigation of sentence

was given on behalf of the applicant by his counsel. It is averred also that having heard these matters, the District Judge “having

duly considered matters felt it appropriate to direct that the Probation and Welfare Service prepare a report”, and that the Judge

remanded the applicant on continuing bail to appear again in Balbriggan District Court on the Thursday the 1st December 2005.

4. On that date, the 1st December 2005 he again appeared at Balbriggan District Court to find that a different judge was sitting,

namely Judge Fitzpatrick. The Probation report which Judge Brophy had directed was available. Counsel on behalf of the applicant

submitted to Judge Fitzpatrick that as pleas of guilty had been made to Judge Brophy and that he had heard the facts and called for

a Probation Report to be prepared, that it was appropriate that the matter be put back to a date on which Judge Brophy could finally

dispose of the matter. It is averred also that upon this application being made, Judge Fitzpatrick stated that Judge Brophy would not

be back to that Court in the foreseeable future and that he would deal with the matter himself. This course of action was not

something to which the applicant or his legal team consented. In fact they objected to that course of action. It is averred that the

prosecution made no submissions in that regard.

5. Mr Quinn then avers that that despite the objection raised to Judge Fitzpatrick disposing of the matter, the judge proceeded to

hear facts in relation to the offences, a plea in mitigation was made by the applicant’s counsel, including by reference to the

Probation report. It is averred that this report recommended that should the applicant remain at liberty that he should be returned to

court after a short period so that he might be in a position to demonstrate that he has cooperated with, and acted upon the advice

of the Probation and Welfare Service on a number of issues, and the officer indicated in that report that she would be happy to

provide any further report on any other date set by the court.

6. In the event the District Judge imposed consecutive sentences amounting to a total of twenty two months, in circumstances

where, it is averred, the District Judge could not have imposed sentences totalling more than twenty four months. The sentence can

therefore be viewed as being at the top end of the range of sentencing available to the Court. It is averred that Judge Fitzpatrick

himself did not at any stage consider jurisdiction, nor place the applicant on his election before sentencing, and that therefore he

acted without jurisdiction.

7. Feichín McDonagh SC on the applicant’s behalf has submitted that in circumstances where one judge has received the pleas of

guilty, decided upon jurisdiction, and entered upon the sentencing/punishment process by hearing the facts of the case and a plea in

mitigation, and has furthermore directed that a Probation report be obtained, it is a necessary fair procedure that the same judge

consider the report and decide on the appropriate sanction. This is the argument based purely on fair procedures.

8. Mr McDonagh submits that as a matter of fair procedures alone the applicant is entitled to expect that he will be punished by the

judge before whom he entered his pleas of guilty and who commenced the punishment process by hearing a plea in mitigation and

thereafter requesting a Probation report. He submits that in the present case justice cannot be seen to be done and that a patent

unfairness has occurred, the more so where objection was taken to the course taken. Mr McDonagh has referred the Court to a

judgment of Kinlen J. in Burns v. The Governor of St. Patrick’s Institution Dublin, unreported, 3rd February 1995. Appearing from that

judgment, the facts were that the applicant pleaded guilty to certain offences before Judge Hussey who remanded him to another

date on bail informing him that reports were to be obtained, and informed him also that if the reports were favourable she proposed to

impose some community service by way of punishment, and if not she would impose a sentence of two months imprisonment. On the

adjourned date the applicant appeared before Judge Windle who, not being impressed by the answers the applicant gave to certain

questions designed to elicit from the applicant the extent of his knowledge of what community service entailed, proceeded to remand

the applicant in custody so that he during that time learn what was the meaning of community service. In that regard, Kinlen J.

stated the following:

“…It seems to me that this order was fatally flawed for a number of reasons. Firstly I think it a reprehensible practice

for one judge to try the case and indicate the punishment and for another judge, who has not heard the case, to

proceed to deal with the case by remanding the accused in custody to learn the meaning of words………I am quite

satisfied that Judge Windle should have adjourned the matter to Judge Hussey.”

9. There are clearly some important factual distinctions between the facts of that case and the present one. Firstly, Judge Brophy

gave no indication of what he proposed to do in the light of any report which he might receive. Secondly Judge Fitzpatrick certainly

cannot be accused of acting towards the present applicant in the same unfair or “reprehensible” manner as was found to be the case

in respect of Judge Windle. As I read the judgment of Kinlen J. what was reprehensible was the remanding in custody to learn about

community service, as opposed to entering upon a case commenced before another judge. In any event, I would not go so far in the

present case as calling it “reprehensible” for Judge Fitzpatrick to have imposed sentence, since that term seems to imply some moral

judgment upon the behaviour of the judge, which would not be justified in any way in the present case. I do not as a result feel that

the Burns case is of assistance in the present case.

10. From a fair procedures point of view, it has been argued by Micheál P. O’Higgins B.L. on behalf of the respondent, that no

constitutional unfairness has occurred, given first of all the context of a plea of guilty, and secondly, in as much as during the

sentence hearing before Judge Fitzpatrick he heard the facts outlined to him, a full opportunity was both given and taken for

submissions to be made in mitigation, the Probation report was read and considered by the judge, and he duly imposed a sentence

which he was entitled to impose. He asserts that in an application for an order of Habeas Corpus in the face of a plea of guilty and

sentence imposed there is a high hurdle to be overcome as far as the establishment of an unlawfulness of detention is concerned. He

has referred to the comments of O'Higgins C.J. in The State (McDonagh) v. Frawley [1978] I.R. 131 at p.136 as follows:

" The stipulation in Article 40, section 4, subsection 1 of the Constitution that a citizen may not be deprived of his liberty

save 'in accordance with law' does not mean that a convicted person must be released on habeas corpus merely

because some defect or illegality attaches to his detention. The phrase seems to mean that there must be such a

default of fundamental requirements that the detention may be said to be wanting in due process of law. For habeas

corpus, therefore, it is insufficient for the prisoner to show that there has been a legal error or impropriety, or even

that jurisdiction has been inadvertently exceeded.".

11. Mr O’Higgins submits that in the present case, even if it is true that Judge Fitzpatrick ought not to have imposed a punishment

where his colleague had embarked upon the sentencing process, it is a legal error or an exceeding of jurisdiction by inadvertence only,

and not such as to invade the constitutional rights of the applicant, and that in those circumstances an order for the release of a

convicted person should not be made.

12. Mr O’Higgins has also submitted that an estoppel operates so as to prevent the applicant making a case in respect of unfair

procedures. He suggests that the applicant, through his legal team, did not at the hearing before Judge Fitzpatrick, reserve their

position in relation to that judge proceeding with sentencing, and that they simply accepted the situation and made submissions in

relation to mitigation and acquiesced in the process accordingly. He submits that at the least there should have been an express

reservation as to the applicant’s rights to challenge what was being done. I am not content that it would be appropriate to deal with

this matter, affecting the liberty of the applicant by way of an estoppel argument. Either the applicant is in lawful custody or he is

not, and it is not appropriate in my view for this court to reach a conclusion that maybe his detention is unlawful, but he only has

himself to blame because he did not on the occasion when the matter of sentence was being dealt with utter the necessary

reservation of his position through his legal team, who I am sure dealt with the matter as best they could at the time, not having

expected that Judge Fitzpatrick would not remand the matter back to Judge Brophy.

13. Implicit in the applicant’s submissions is a feeling that Judge Fitzpatrick imposed a sentence of more severity than may have been

imposed had the matter come before Judge Brophy. But Judge Brophy gave no indication of what he proposed doing when he directed

a Probation report. It follows that even if the sentence imposed was at the higher end of the range of sentences which the judge

could by law impose, it was a permissible sentence, capable of being appealed against in the ordinary way on grounds of severity, and

unfairness perceived to have taken place in the Burns case is not in the present case..

14. However, the applicant relies on a more fundamental point, namely one that District Judge Fitzpatrick lacked jurisdiction to impose

sentence, or indeed presumably, any penalty, at all. The point made is that Judge Fitzpatrick himself gave no consideration to

summary disposal pursuant to s.2 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1951; that it was Judge Brophy who did that and to whom the pleas of

guilty were subsequently made; that accordingly the conviction occurred before Judge Brophy, and that the conviction and sentence

are not severable events, but a unified process.

15. Mr McDonagh submits that there is just the one order of the District Court – a conviction and sentence, and one cannot have one

Judge for the conviction and another judge for the sentence. In such circumstances, he submits that since the order is not severable,

a finding that Judge Fitzpatrick had no jurisdiction to impose sentence means that both the sentence and the conviction itself must

be bad.

16. Mr McDonagh has accepted, as he must, that there can be circumstances where one judge may have embarked upon a case and

received a plea of guilty and adjourned the question of punishment for a Probation or other report, and by the time the adjourned

date is reached that same judge may not be available either through serious illness or death. But even in such a situation of

necessity, he submits that it is simply not possible for another judge to take up that case where his predecessor left off. Rather the

trial process must be recommenced before the new judge, by that new judge in the first instance deciding on jurisdiction to deal with

the matter summarily if he or she is so minded, putting the accused person on his or her election, inviting a plea of guilty or not guilty

and so on, and proceeding either to a hearing of the case or imposing penalty depending on whether a plea of guilty or not guilty has

been given by the accused.

17. In the present case, Mr McDonagh submits that any possible delay or administrative inconvenience involved in Judge Brophy

returning to Balbriggan Court for this case was insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon or otherwise entitling Judge Fitzpatrick to

lawfully complete a sentencing process which had already been embarked upon by Judge Brophy. Mr McDonagh submits that in these

circumstances, Judge Fitzpatrick lacked fundamental jurisdiction and that his order for the applicant’s detention is therefore bad.

18. The Court has been referred by Mr McDonagh to the judgment of Henchy J. in The State (de Burca) v. O hUadhaigh [1976] I.R. 85

in support of his submission that the conviction and sentencing is a single unified process. In that case a question arose as to the

effect of a certain order of the then President of the High Court whereby he granted an order of certiorari in respect of an order made

in the District Court, and whether the effect was to quash only the erroneous entry made in the court record relating to the sentence

imposed by the District Justice, or whether in so quashing the entry relating to sentence, the conviction itself must also be regarded

as quashed. Henchy J. was of the opinion that it had the effect in law of quashing both the sentence and the conviction. At p. 92

the learned judge stated:

“…For my part, I am satisfied that that is the correct interpretation of the law. We have been referred to a long line of

judicial authorities, running back for over 200 years, which show that an invalid sentence cannot be severed from a

conviction so as to validate a conviction on its own……… Since a conviction and sentence must stand or fall together, I

conclude that the quashing of the sentences in this case also struck down the convictions.”

19. This is certainly conclusive of the view that if the sentence imposed by Judge Fitzpatrick is one made without jurisdiction, that

fact has the knock-on effect of undermining fatally also the conviction. The question remains whether Judge Fitzpatrick was or was

not acting within jurisdiction by acting as he did.

20. In that regard, Mr McDonagh has referred to the judgment of McCarthy J. in Feeney v. District Justice Clifford [1989] I.R. 668.

That was a case where the respondent having heard an outline of the offences from a Garda decided that they were minor offences

and fit to be tried summarily. The applicant elected for summary disposal and pleaded guilty. Only afterwards, but before sentencing,

did the District Judge learn of certain facts which precluded him from imposing the two year sentence which he felt the offences

merited. He therefore decided that the offences, though minor, were not fit to be dealt with summarily, and that the applicant should

be sent forward to the Circuit Court. He therefore declined jurisdiction and adjourned the matter for a book of evidence.

21. That applicant failed in High Court in his bid for an order of prohibition, but prevailed in the Supreme Court. In his judgment in the

Supreme Court, McCarthy J. (with which Finlay C.J. and Hederman J. agreed) contrasted two situations. The first being where a

District Judge having had the facts of a case outlined forms the opinion that the offence is a minor one and enters upon a hearing

during which he hears further evidence from which he is satisfied that in fact it is not a minor offence. In such a situation, McCarthy J

was of the view that “he must discontinue the summary trial and proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal

Procedure Act, 1967.” The second situation, contrasted with the latter, is where the District Judge decides that the case is a minor

one, accepts jurisdiction to deal with the matter summarily, and thereafter receives a plea of guilty from the accused. In respect of

such a situation, McCarthy J. states as follows at p. 678:

“If on the facts alleged, a district judge concludes that an offence is a minor offence fit to be tried summarily and the

person accused pleads guilty………once he embarks upon an enquiry as to the penalty appropriate to the offence, in my

judgment he is precluded from changing his mind. There is, in law, no such thing as a provisional conviction. Driven to its

logical conclusion if it were otherwise, then without any plea of guilty a district justice might embark upon a summary

trial, find the accused guilty, record a conviction and, then, on hearing a criminal record purport to ‘vacate’ the

conviction, adjourn the hearing, extend the time for service of a book of evidence and make a return for trial of an

accused to the Circuit Court to be tried before a judge and jury for an offence in respect of which he has already been

tried and convicted in the District Court. Such cannot be the law.” (my emphasis)

22. Clearly in the present case there is no question of either District Judge having changed his mind as to the matter being one which

is triable summarily. But, Mr McDonagh relies on this passage in order to highlight the sentence emphasised by me therein, namely

that once the District Judge embarks upon an enquiry as to penalty he is precluded from adopting any different course. He submits

that it follows that in the present case once District Judge Brophy had “embarked” upon the sentencing process he was engaged

upon that process and that a point had been reached where he and he alone had seisin of the matter of sentencing, and that no

other judge could finish that process without such other judge re-commencing the entire process. That would in his view entail any

such other judge, and in the present case, Judge Fitzpatrick, himself forming the view that the offence was a minor one fit to be tried

summarily, putting the accused again on his election, and in the event of the accused opting for summary disposal, inviting a plea of

guilty or not guilty, and then upon the plea of guilty being offered, proceeding to embark upon the sentencing process. Mr McDonagh

calls this judgment in aid of his submission that the conviction and sentencing is a unified process, incapable of severance either by

the judge being able to change his/her mind after conviction/plea of guilty, or, as in this case, by one judge taking the plea of guilty

(i.e. the conviction) and another judge completing the sentencing process, the same having been embarked upon by the first judge.

23. In response to the jurisdiction point. Mr O’Higgins has stated that he does not take issue with the applicant’s submission that if

the sentence imposed by Judge Fitzpatrick was to be quashed, this would have a knock-on effect for the conviction also – that both

would fall. But he submits that this is not the point at issue in the present application for Habeas Corpus. It would be appropriate to

judicial review proceedings for an order of certiorari on the basis that the judge had no jurisdiction to make the order which he made

due to the involvement already by Judge Brophy in the matter of sentencing. In his submission, the applicant must show that the

sentence order is bad. He also submits that the Feeney case is a case so distinguishable on its facts that it is not of assistance to

the present applicant, since it was a case in which the District Judge in question had changed his mind about the matter and in effect

reversed himself. Mr McDonagh had relied on that case for the purpose of showing that an embarking on the process of sentencing

that course could not be halted prior to completion when the judge changed his mind as to the minor nature of the offence.

24. Mr McDonagh has referred also to the judgment of Henchy J. in The State (Royle) v. Kelly [1974] 259 by way of response to Mr

O’Higgins reliance on the well-known passage from State (McDonagh) v. Frawley. In Royle, the learned Henchy J. states at p. 269:

“…The expression ‘in accordance with law’ in this context has an ancestry in the common law going back through the

Petition of Right to Magna Carta. The purpose of the test is to ensure that the detainee must be released if – but only if

– the detention is wanting in the fundamental legal attributes which under the Constitution should attach to the

detention.

The expression is a compendious one and is designed to cover these basic legal principles and procedures which are so

essential for the preservation of personal liberty under our Constitution that departure from them renders a detention

unjustifiable in the eyes of the law………It is the circumstances of the particular case that will usually determine whether

or not a detention is in accordance with the law.

Where as in the present case the prisoner has been convicted and sentenced by a court established by law under the

Constitution, and the jurisdiction of that court to try the offence and impose the sentence has not been challenged, it

would be necessary to show that the procedure has been so flawed by basic defect as to make the conviction a nullity

before it could be held that the detention was not in accordance with the law.” (my emphasis)

25. Mr McDonagh points to the fact that in the present case the jurisdiction of Judge Fitzpatrick to sentence the applicant has been

challenged, and that this goes to the fundamentals rights of the applicant such as to bring him within the principles of both State

(McDonagh) v. Frawley, as well as The State (Royle) v. Kelly. He submits that what has occurred is not simply a procedural

irregularity or deficiency which fell short of invalidating an essential step in the proceedings leading to the sentencing of the

applicant. It is a matter rather that goes to the fundamental jurisdiction to make any order in the matter. Mr McDonagh submits that

the onus of establishing that the applicant’s detention is in accordance with law is on the State and that it has failed to discharge

that onus.

26. An order for the release of the applicant must be made unless this Court is satisfied that the detention of the applicant is in

accordance with law. The fact that the respondent may not have satisfied this Court in a positive way that the order for his

detention is one made within jurisdiction does not end the matter and absolve the Court on an application for inquiry pursuant to

Article 40 from pursuing the matter further by its own inquiry. The matter is not dealt with solely on the basis of an adversarial

contest between the applicant and the respondent. A passage from the judgment of O’Dalaigh C.J. in Re: Application of Michael

Woods [1970] IR.154 at 162 is instructive in this regard:

“The principles which apply in litigation inter partes are not applicable in habeas corpus. The duty which the Court has

under the Constitution of ordering the release of a person, unless satisfied that he is lawfully detained, requires that the

Court should entertain a complaint which bears on the question of the legality of the detention - even though in earlier

proceedings the applicant might have raised the matter but did not do so. The duty of the courts, to see that nobody is

deprived of his liberty save in accordance with law, overrides considerations which are valid in litigation inter partes."

27. Although stated in the context of an assertion that the applicant in that case ought to have raised the point at issue at an earlier

application for habeas corpus, nonetheless the principle seems to be clear – namely that it is for the Court itself, if necessary by

carrying out its own inquiry into the lawfulness of detention, to reach a conclusion in that regard irrespective of submissions made or

not made by the parties. It is also a feature of applications of this kind that they are brought at very short notice to the other side

and to the Court itself. In the present case the application for an order first came before me during the morning of Friday last the 2nd

December 2005, the detention of the applicant having occurred on the previous day. I made the order sought, namely that the

applicant be produced to the Court and his detention certified, returnable before me at 3.30pm on the same day, last Friday. It

inevitably means that whatever Counsel is instructed to deal with the application on behalf of the respondent has very little time

indeed, and appreciably less that Counsel for the applicant, to prepare himself/herself for the application. Indeed, that feature of

these applications gave rise to a submission by Mr O’Higgins that it would be more appropriate for the applicant to seek a remedy, if

his complaint was a valid one, by way of judicial review for an order of certiorari, so that the case could be dealt with in a less hasty

manner given the importance of the issues raised. Given the very short time at his disposal last Friday given the shortness of the

return, Mr O’Higgins is to be commended for the submissions which he was able to make. Nevertheless this Court was not by the time

all submissions were completed in a position to have formed a decided view on the matter, and reserved its decision until the 5th

December 2005 at 10am. I was not in a position to deliver judgment on that date, and was engaged on an official commitment outside

the jurisdiction for the remainder of that week, and hence permitted the applicant to be released on agreed bail terms pending my

decision.

28. O’Connor’s Irish Justice of the Peace states at page 206 :

…Nothing shall be intended to be within the jurisdiction of an inferior court but that which is so expressly alleged…

Therefore, apart from statute, a conviction made by justices should contain an express adjudication by the justices of

every fact material to give them jurisdiction.”

29. In that regard I refer to the Warrant of Execution – Committal Warrant dated 1st December 2005 upon which the applicant is held

in the respondent’s institution. It recites inter alia:

“Whereas [the applicant] was this day before the Court charged [with the offences]

* The accused having pleaded guilty

* And whereas the Court was of the opinion that the facts alleged constituted a minor offence fit to be tried summarily

and the accused on being informed by the court of his/her right to be tried by a jury, did not object to being tried

summarily and the DPP having consented to the offence being dealt with summarily

AND WHEREAS the accused has been convicted of the said offence and ordered to be detained for a period of [totalling

22 months]

THIS IS TO COMMAND YOU TO WHOM THIS WARRANT IS ADDRESSED…..”ETC.

30. The wording of this warrant would certainly give the impression on its face that everything has taken place on the one day before

the judge who has signed the order, namely Judge Fitzpatrick. It refers to the applicant being before the Court “this day” and “having

pleaded guilty” and that “the Court” (presumably being “the Court on the 1st December 2005) “was of opinion that the facts alleged

constituted a minor offence fit to be tried summarily”, and it goes on to suggest that on that date also the applicant was told of his

right to be tried before a judge and jury and so on. There is no reference to the fact that much of this happened on a different date

and before a different District Judge. As is known, the formation of the opinion as to a minor offence, and the plea of guilty were

referable to Judge Brophy.

31. The question which must arise is whether the reference to “the Court” can be interpreted as being “the District Court” as an

institution, or whether it is confined to meaning “the Court presided over on the 1st December 2005 by Judge Fitzpatrick. If a wide

interpretation is possible, then it may be possible to fit the present case’s facts into a literal interpretation of the words used in the

warrant even though it disguises the fact that much of what happened occurred before a different judge on a different date.

32. The question arising here really is whether the decision that an offence is a minor one, and one therefore fit to be disposed of

summarily is one made by "the District Court" as opposed by the individual District judge, thereby enabling Judge Fitzpatrick to

operate on the basis that he does not have to recommence ab initio and form that opinion himself before proceeding to deal with

sentence, but rather can operate on the basis that this view has already been formed by the District Court. In this regard, Mr

O'Higgins has referred to the fact that since the Courts Act, 1971 (s. 13 thereof) the District Court is a court of record.

33. As I have said I am satisfied that from a purely fair procedures point of view no infirmity exists since the applicant has not shown

in what manner his right to fair procedures has been infringed since his counsel was able to make appropriate submissions in

mitigation, the judge heard the facts of the case, read and considered the Probation report and arrived at his decision. It is also

notable that Judge Brophy had not indicated an intention to impose any particular penalty. If he had done so, then the matter might

well give rise to different considerations, but as things transpired I am satisfied that no unfairness leading to unlawfulness of

detention has arisen on that ground. This latter point can be seen in play in R v. Kiely [1989] 11 Cr.App. R.(S) 273.

34. Neither can the fact that Judge Brophy called for a Probation and Welfare report be taken by the applicant as any indication that

a particular penalty would be imposed by him in die course. Neither in my view had the applicant any legitimate expectation that the

matter would be concluded by Judge Brophy. He will naturally have expected that it would be, but that is a different matter and not

something to which he was entitled as of right.

35. Neither can it be said that simply because the applicant received what he considers to be a heavy sentence that it is an

erroneous one. He had always of course the right to lodge an appeal against that sentence, and in that regard I notice that

recognizances were fixed for that purpose.

36. There is no doubt that a view must be formed that the offence is a minor one and one fit to be tried summarily and that the

accused person must be informed of his right to a trial by jury. That is specifically provided for in s. 2 (2) of the Criminal Justice Act,

1951 ("the 1951 Act") which provides:

"2. (2)(a) The District Court may try summarily a person charged with a scheduled offence if --

(i) the Court is of opinion that the facts proved or alleged to constitute a minor offence fit to be so tried, and

(ii) the accused, on being informed by the Court of his right to be tried with a jury, does not object to being tried

summarily." (my emphasis)

37. I note in passing that s.1 provides:

"1.-- In this Act "Court" refers to any court exercising criminal jurisdiction, save where the context otherwise requires,

but does not include courtmartial."

38. Section 3 of the Act ( albeit repealed by the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967 "the 1967 Act") refers also to "the District Court" or

"the Court" in relation to the procedure where an accused person pleads guilty in the District Court to an indictable offence.

39. The 1951 Act itself had repealed the equivalent provision contained in s. 77(B) of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924 ("the 1924 Act")

which provided:

"77.-- The District Court shall have and exercise all powers, jurisdictions and authorities which immediately before the

6th day if December 1922 were vested by statute or otherwise in Justices or a Justice of the peace sitting at petty

Sessions and also (by way of addition and not of exception) the following jurisdictions:--

A.-- In Civil Cases-- ………

B.-- In Criminal Cases-- in any of the following cases, if the Justice shall be of opinion that the facts proved against

the accused constitute a minor offence fit to be tried summarily and the accused (inquiry having been made of

him by the justice) does not object to being so tried…" (my emphasis)

40. In the State (Hastings) v. Reddin [1953] I.R. 134, Davitt P. considered s. 2 of the 1951 Act and stated at p.136:

"The Criminal Justice Act, 1951, s.2, sub-s. 2(a), provides that the District Court may try summarily a person charged

with an indictable offence mentioned in the First Schedule to the Act if 1, the Court is of opinion that the facts proved

that the facts proved or alleged constitute a minor offence fit to be tried summarily, and 2, the accused on being

informed by the Court of his right to be tried with a jury, does not object to being tried summarily."

41. It is noticeable from the terms of that Act that it was the District Court which gains jurisdiction in these circumstances rather

than the particular District Justice. The District Court Rules, 1948 at Order 59 thereof on the other hand referred to the "District

Justice" having jurisdiction to deal with the matter summarily, and it spoke of "the District Justice" proceeding to hear and determine

the case. So there was the use in that Act of the term "District Court" and in the Rules applicable, to "the District Justice.

42. Davitt P. at p.138 of the same judgment states:

"Both the conveying of the information to the accused by the Court of his right to a jury and the absence of objection

on his part to being tried summarily appear to me to be statutory conditions precedent to the exercise by the District

Court of the jurisdiction conferred by the section." (my emphasis)

43. Throughout that judgment the learned then President refers almost entirely to the "District Court" or "the Court".

44. As already adverted to, s. 3 of the 1951 Act was repealed by the 1967 Act, replaced by s. 13(2) of the 1967 Act which, as

substituted by s. 10(3) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1999 now provides as follows:

"13. -- (1) …

(2) If at any time the District Court ascertains that a person charged with an offence to which this section applies

wishes to plead guilty, and the Court is satisfied that he understands the nature of the offence and the facts alleged,

the Court --

(a) may with the consent of the prosecutor, deal with the offence summarily, in which case the accused shall be

liable to the penalties provided for in subsection (3), or

(b) if the accused signs a plea of guilty, may, subject to subsection (2A), send him forward for sentence with that

plea to that court to which, but for that plea, he would have been sent forward for trial."

45. Again one notices the reference to "the District Court". I also refer to the District Court (Criminal Justice) Rules, 2001 where in

Order 24 (2) thereof it provides as follows under the heading "Summary disposal on a plea of guilty - DPP consenting":

"(2) Where an accused person is before the Court charged with an indictable offence with which the Court has

jurisdiction to deal summarily if the accused pleads guilty the Director of Public Prosecutions consents, the Judge, on

being satisfied that the accused understands the nature of the offence and the facts alleged, may deal with the case

summarily if the accused pleads guilty and the Director consents."

46. This Rule relates to s. 13(2) of the 1967 Act.

47. It seems to me that this rule and the section to which it relates permits of a situation where on one occasion the District Court

has decided that the case is one which involves a minor offence fit to be tried summarily, and that at a later stage the judge (and

not necessarily the judge presiding on the occasion when the opinion was formed that the offence was a minor one fit to be tried

summarily) may deal with the matter on a plea of guilty and dispose of the matter by way of sentence or otherwise. In this regard s.

13 (2) of the 1967 Act refers to "the District Court" and "the Court". I appreciate that Order 24 (2) referred to refers to "the judge",

but that expression is not necessarily related back to the judge who dealt with the matter initially for the purposes of s. 2(2)(a) of

the 1951 Act.

48. I am satisfied that compliance with s. 2(2) of the 1951 Act confers jurisdiction upon the District Court and not any particular

individual District Judge thereof in spite of the reference in the District Court Rules to "the judge".

49. In the present case there is no dispute about the fact that Judge Brophy complied with the requirements upon him under s.2 of

the 1951 Act and that he formed the opinion that the matter was a minor offence and one fit to be tried summarily, and it is further

not in dispute that the applicant herein when made aware of his rights and put on his election, and being fully legally represented and

advised he must be taken as being aware of the facts alleged against him, pleaded guilty, and that thereafter certain submissions

were made to Judge Brophy as to penalty and that the judge decided that a Probation and Welfare report should be obtained before

any decision as to penalty. No indication was given as to what penalty was in the mind of Judge Brophy. He adjourned the matter and

remanded the applicant to another date to await the said report.

50. On the 1st December 2005, it seems clear that the District Court had already lawfully obtained jurisdiction to deal with the matter

summarily. In fact no submission to the contrary appears to have been made by the applicant's legal team if the contents of the

grounding affidavit is a full account of what occurred. There was certainly, according to that affidavit, an objection voiced to Judge

Fitzpatrick dealing with the matter of sentence/penalty on the basis that "as the pleas of guilty were entered before District Judge

Brophy, and it was he who heard the facts and considered it appropriate that a Probation and Welfare report be obtained, it would be

the proper course of action to remand matters back to him for ultimate disposal." But that is not a submission on the basis that the

District Court no longer had jurisdiction to deal with the matter summarily.

51 I am satisfied that, on the 1st December 2005, by virtue of the provisions of s. 13(2) of the 1967 Act, and any rules made

thereunder, the District Court had jurisdiction to dispose of the matter once the report was available. Once fair procedures were

observed by way of the facts being outlined to the sitting judge and the appropriate and necessary opportunity to be heard in

mitigation being afforded to the applicant and his legal team, there was no obstacle in my view to the matter being disposed of by

Judge Fitzpatrick. It is of course the case that if there was a want of fair procedures in the constitutional justice sense then this

Court should not hesitate to intervene to prevent a detention of the applicant which is not in due course of law, but in my view fair

procedures were observed in this case and the detention of the applicant was made within jurisdiction and is in accordance with law.

52. I therefore refuse the relief sought.